

ATTACHMENT 1

Nevada’s Comments Submitted by SNWA and CRCNV on the Post-2026 Colorado River Reservoir Operations Draft Environmental Impact Statement (March 2, 2026)

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INTRODUCTION

On January 16, 2026, the Bureau of Reclamation (“Reclamation”) issued its “Post-2026 Operational Guidelines and Strategies for Lake Powell and Lake Mead” Draft Environmental Impact Statement (“Draft EIS”).¹ As detailed below, the Draft EIS fails to satisfy the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). Reclamation’s approach to managing the Colorado River reservoirs also fails to adequately account for and is inconsistent with the Law of the River. Accordingly, Southern Nevada Water Authority (“SNWA”) and the Colorado River Commission of Nevada (“CRCNV”), on behalf of the State of Nevada, request that the Secretary of the Interior² direct Reclamation to collaborate more expansively with the Basin States to prepare an environmental analysis that fully complies with NEPA and the Law of the River.³

Nevada specifically requests that all of its comments and the Attachments (as listed in the transmittal letter) be included as part of the administrative record in this matter. Nevada also requests that all documents, articles, reports, and other material cited in these Comments or the Attachments be included as part of the administrative record. If Reclamation is unable to locate any of the documents referenced by Nevada’s Comments that are not otherwise included in the Attachments here, copies may be obtained by contacting Steven Anderson, Deputy Counsel, SNWA.

¹ See 92 Fed. Reg. 2,131 (Jan. 16, 2026).

² The Secretary of the Interior must operate the Colorado River water delivery systems in compliance with the Law of the River. *E.g.*, Colorado River Basin Project Act (“CRBPA”) § 602(a)-(b), 43 U.S.C. § 1552(a)-(b) (directing the Secretary to consultatively develop operational criteria—known as Long-Range Operating Criteria (“LROC”)—for federally authorized Colorado River reservoirs); see also *Arizona v. California*, 376 U.S. 340 (1964).

³ For the purposes of these comments, the Law of the River consists of the Colorado River Compact of 1922, 43 U.S.C. § 617, the Consolidated Decree entered by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of *Arizona v. California*, 547 U.S. 150 (2006) (Consolidated Decree), the 1944 Treaty with Mexico, LROC, the CRBPA § 602, 43 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq., and other legal requirements. See Draft EIS, Sec. 1.8.2.1, at 1-13 to 1-14. Draft EIS Table 1-1 also sets forth numerous other instruments and documents that comprise the Law of the River. See Draft EIS, Sec. 1.8.2.1, at 1-14.

BACKGROUND

Lower Basin States Conservation Efforts

Nevada, as part of the Lower Basin States, has demonstrated a long and well-documented history of taking actions to conserve water and reduce existing uses to protect the Colorado River:

- In a consensus-based proposal, the Lower Basin States voluntarily agreed to conserve 3 million acre-feet (“maf”) leading up to 2026.⁴
- SNWA reduced water consumption from 325,000 acre-feet of water (105.9 billion gallons) in 2002, to 212,418 acre-feet (69 billion gallons) in 2024 despite an increase of 829,000 new residents.⁵
- SNWA established a new conservation goal of 86 gallons per capita per day by 2035.⁶

⁴ See Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, *Seven Basin states agree on analyzing consensus-based approach proposed by the Lower Basin* (May 22, 2023), available at <https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/biden-harris-administration-announces-historic-consensus-system-conservation-proposal>.

⁵ Reclamation, *Colorado River Accounting and Water Use Report: Arizona, California, and Nevada* (for calendar year 2024), at 5 (May 2025), available at www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/4200Rpts/DecreeRpt/2024/2024.pdf; see SNWA, *2026 Water Resource Plan*, at 23 (2025) (referenced throughout as “SNWA 2026 Water Resource Plan”) available at <https://www.snwa.com/assets/pdf/water-resource-plan-2026.pdf?lang=en>.

SNWA’s current water conservation measures include the Water Smart Landscape Rebate Program (250 million square feet of grass has been removed, saving 203 billion gallons of water since 1999); Water Efficient Technologies Program (participating businesses have saved more than 24 billion gallons of water through the program since 2001); Water Smart Homes (nearly 17,000 homes were built using water conservation features via the program from 2005-2020, saving 14 billion gallons of water); and Pool Cover Instant Rebate Coupon Program (more than 45,000 coupons were distributed before the program was retired in June 2020, saving an estimated 5.6 billion gallons of water). See also SNWA, *What We’re Doing to Conserve*, <https://www.snwa.com/water-resources/conservation-initiatives/index.html> (last visited Feb. 27, 2026).

⁶ SNWA 2026 Water Resource Plan, at 39. The updated edition of the landmark history, *Cadillac Desert*, praised SNWA’s water conservation efforts: “Every drop issuing from the city’s dishwashers, sinks, showers, carwashes, and even toilets is funneled through the sewer system into wastewater treatment facilities, and returned to the Colorado River and Lake Mead via the

- As described in SNWA's 2026 Water Resource Plan, "SNWA has stored more than 2.2 million acre-feet of water, eleven times Nevada's 2024 consumptive Colorado River water use."⁷

The Lower Basin States are committed to continuing and expanding those efforts. But the Lower Basin States cannot shoulder the burden of protecting the Colorado River on their own. To date, the Upper Basin States have been unwilling to contribute water to the Colorado River system in a volume that would avoid the Lower Basin States taking the full burden of dry hydrologic future conditions. Upper Basin States have received sharp criticism for failing to support and implement more water conservation programs.⁸

NEPA Alternatives Development Process and Lower Basin Alternative Submission

Reclamation began developing NEPA alternatives in late 2023. In March 2024, the Lower Basin States submitted their recommended alternative ("Lower Basin Alternative") to Reclamation for consideration in the ongoing NEPA process.⁹ Subsequent to the initial

Las Vegas Wash . . . Southern Nevada can and actually does pump much more water than its 300,000 acre-feet per year . . . Since 2000 [SNWA] has spent \$200 million in rebates for replacing grass with desert landscapes." MARC REISNER, *CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER*, at 527 (1986, 2017 proscript to the revised edition, by Lawrie Mott).

⁷ SNWA 2026 Water Resource Plan, at 3.

⁸ See Sammy Roth, *These Four States Are in Denial Over a Looming Water Crisis*, NY Times (Feb. 2, 2026) ("[T]he Upper Basin states of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming have emerged as the main obstacles to a fair deal. They've gummed up negotiations by refusing to accept mandatory cuts of any amount — unlike the Lower Basin states, which have spent years slashing water use."), available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/02/opinion/water-shortage-colorado-river.html>; Jack Schmidt, Anne Castle, John Fleck, Eric Kuhn, Kathryn Sorensen, and Katherine Tara, *Analysis of Colorado River Basin Storage Suggests Need For Immediate Action*, at 8 n. 35 (Getches-Wilkinson Center, University of Colorado-Boulder, Sep. 11, 2025) ("Cumulative conservation in the Lower Basin for 2023 - 2025 is estimated at 2.93 million acre feet . . . Upper Basin conservation during the same time period was approximately 0.1 [maf], but it is unclear how much of that water ultimately made its way to Lake Powell.").

⁹ The Lower Basin States informed Reclamation why the Lower Basin Alternative is viable and environmentally beneficial. The Lower Basin Alternative "builds on the foundation of the Law of the River and proposes a more holistic and sustainable approach to managing the Colorado River system reservoirs. The Lower Basin Alternative shares proposed water use reductions fairly among the Lower Basin States and Mexico to satisfy the 1.5 maf of proposed reductions under most system conditions. Further, under the most critical system conditions, the Alternative shares water use reductions fairly between the Upper Basin and Lower Basin including Mexico. The Lower Basin Alternative contemplates a broad, fair, and equitable

submission of the Lower Basin Alternative in March 2024, in June and December 2024, the Lower Basin States requested that Reclamation evaluate compliance with the 1922 Colorado River Compact under each NEPA alternative. Also, in the December 2024 request, the Lower Basin States provided the Compact compliance assumptions to be incorporated into the Draft EIS alternatives, including:

- Required deliveries pursuant to Article III of the Compact.
- Compact Call by the Lower Basin States.
- Upper Basin curtailment or other reductions as necessary to comply with the Compact requirements.
- Actions by the United States in management of federal reservoirs.¹⁰

In November 2024, Reclamation issued a summary of the anticipated alternatives that Reclamation would carry forward for detailed analysis in the Draft EIS, which included:

- No action alternative
- Federal authorities alternative
- Federal authorities hybrid alternative
- Cooperative conservation alternative
- Basin hybrid alternative

These alternatives did not include the Lower Basin Alternative or the Upper Basin Alternative. Reclamation claimed in its Alternatives Report issued on January 17, 2025, that they did not satisfy the purpose and need for its proposed action.¹¹ Reclamation maintained

sharing of reductions such that no one state, sector or water user bears the entire burden of protecting the system.” Letter from Water Districts to Reclamation, at 3 (Mar. 6, 2024).

¹⁰ These assumptions were described more fully in correspondence. See Correspondence from J.B. Hamby, Chairman, Colorado River Board of California to Reclamation (Dec. 24, 2024 at 8:49:40 AM).

¹¹ See Reclamation, *Alternatives Report: Post-2026 Operational Guidelines and Strategies for Lake Powell and Lake Mead*, at 9 (Jan. 17, 2025) (“Alternatives Report”) (“Based on preliminary modeling results, Reclamation concluded that, as submitted in the spring of 2024, the Upper Division and Lower Division proposals do not provide an appropriate basis for comprehensive and coordinated operations of Lake Powell and Lake Mead, a necessary component of the purpose and need for this proposed action. During conversations with Basin State representatives, Reclamation identified and communicated concerns about imbalanced Basin impacts and lack of reservoir coordination.”), available at

[https://www.usbr.gov/ColoradoRiverBasin/documents/post2026/alternatives/Post-2026 Alternatives Report 20250117 508.pdf](https://www.usbr.gov/ColoradoRiverBasin/documents/post2026/alternatives/Post-2026%20Alternatives%20Report%20250117_508.pdf).

that the “Basin Hybrid Alternative” “reflects components of the proposals and concepts submitted by the . . . Lower Division States” and others, including the Upper Division States and Colorado River Basin Tribes.¹² The Lower Basin States objected to Reclamation’s cherry picking elements of the Lower Basin Alternative because the various elements of this alternative “work synergistically and . . . it would be inappropriate to separate individual elements and presume their stand-alone implementability.”¹³ The Lower Basin States also provided Reclamation an amended Lower Basin Alternative, which included refinements on the proposed releases from Lake Powell to better protect Lake Powell over the analysis period.¹⁴

On January 17, 2025, Reclamation published its Alternatives Report that described in more detail the five alternatives previously identified by Reclamation in its November 20, 2024, summary. In the Alternatives Report, Reclamation concluded that “as submitted in the spring of 2024” the Lower Basin States’ proposal did “not provide an appropriate basis for comprehensive and coordinated operations of Lake Powell and Lake Mead, a necessary component of the purpose and need for this proposed action.”¹⁵ Reclamation also claimed that it had “identified and communicated concerns about imbalanced Basin impacts and lack of reservoir coordination.”¹⁶

¹² *Id.* at ES-2 (“**Basin Hybrid Alternative** – This alternative reflects components of the proposals and concepts submitted by the Upper Division States, Lower Division States, and Colorado River Basin Tribes that could provide a basis for coordinated operations and may facilitate greater agreement across the Basin.”) (emphasis in original).

¹³ See Correspondence from Tom Buschatzke, Director, Arizona Department of Water Resources to Reclamation (Jan. 13, 2025 at 3:40:25 PM PST).

¹⁴ Specifically, in the original Lower Basin Alternative, the Lake Powell release criteria used an operational tier framework based on the combined system contents of Lake Powell and on the Upper Initial Units, namely Flaming Gorge, Blue Mesa, and Navajo Reservoirs (CRSP Capacity). Within this framework, the 30% to 80% operating tier relied on a three-year average of Upper Basin depletions to determine the water year release volume, while a CRSP Capacity below 80% could trigger a mid-year balancing adjustment. In contrast, the revised Lower Basin Alternative also used an operational tier approach based on CRSP Capacity, but differed in the capacity ranges defining each tier and added a 1.0 maf upward or downward adjustment to the water year release determination based on Lake Mead’s October 1st operating conditions. While both proposals shared the same upper release limit, they differed at the lower end, with the revised proposal considering a 5.5 maf release compared to the original proposal’s 6.0 maf minimum.

¹⁵ See Alternatives Report, Sec. 6.2, at 9.

¹⁶ *Id.*

On February 13, 2025, the Lower Basin States provided detailed comments to Reclamation on the Alternatives Report, and requested a meeting with Reclamation personnel "as soon as practicable" to, among other things, ensure that Reclamation fully understood the need for inclusion of the Lower Basin States Alternative in the Draft EIS because,

Without a detailed analysis of the Lower Basin Alternative, the EIS will not have considered a reasonable range of alternatives, will leave unevaluated a viable alternative that meets the project's purpose and need and is distinguishable from the other alternatives that Reclamation has carried forward for detailed analysis. These detailed comments were never addressed. Reclamation must comply with NEPA in this process and must revise its alternatives accordingly.¹⁷

On January 16, 2026, Reclamation published and initiated public comment on the Draft EIS, which included the following alternatives slightly revised from the prior Alternatives Report:

- No Action Alternative
- Basic Coordination Alternative
- Enhanced Coordination Alternative
- Maximum Operational Flexibility Alternative
- Supply Driven Alternative

But again, Reclamation omitted from its consideration the Lower Basin Alternative. Instead, Reclamation claimed that one of its alternatives (this time the "Supply Driven Alternative") "incorporates concepts from the separate proposals submitted by the Upper Division and Lower Division States, as well as ideas emerging from discussions with the Basin States during spring 2025."¹⁸ Yet Reclamation refuses to consider and carry forward the Lower Basin Alternative, despite the fact that the Lower Basin Alternative better meets the purpose and need of the proposed action than the alternatives advanced by Reclamation in the Draft EIS, as demonstrated below.

¹⁷ See Letter from Lower Basin States to Doug Burgum, Secretary of the Interior, regarding "Perspectives from the Lower Basin States on the Colorado River Post-2026 Operational Guidelines and Strategies for Lake Powell and Lake Mead," at 23–24 (Feb. 13, 2025).

¹⁸ Draft EIS, Sec. 2.1, at 2-2.

Current Low Flow and Megadrought Conditions

The Draft EIS acknowledges that water and other “resources are now at significant risk”:

[S]ince the onset of the current drought in 2000, the Basin’s primary reservoirs, Lake Powell and Lake Mead, have fallen to historically low elevations. Several of the major reservoir- and water-management documents and agreements developed to guide Colorado River operations through the persistently dry conditions expire in 2026, including the 2007 Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead (2007 Interim Guidelines; Reclamation 2007), the 2019 Colorado River Drought Contingency Plans (DCPs, Reclamation 2019), and key international agreements between the United States and Mexico. Despite the significance of these agreements, actions taken over the past two decades have not been sufficiently robust to prevent continued decline of the reservoirs.¹⁹

Furthermore, on February 14, 2026, Reclamation released its “February 2026 Most Probable 24-Month Study,” which provided revised projections indicating that Glen Canyon Dam elevations could drop below minimum power pool (3,490 feet) as early as July 2026.²⁰

DISCUSSION

I. Reclamation’s Proposed Action Violates the Law of the River

Reclamation acknowledges that its proposed action must comply with the Law of the River:

[T]he Secretary intends to consider, adopt and implement the proposed federal action consistent with the Law of the River, including the Colorado River Compact of 1922 (Compact; 43 U.S. Code [USC] § 617I), the Consolidated Decree entered by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of *Arizona v. California*, 547 U.S. 150

¹⁹ *Id.*, Sec. 1.1, at 1-1.

²⁰ Reclamation, *February 2026 Most Probable 24-Month Study* (Feb. 13, 2026), available at <https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/24mo.pdf>; see Reclamation, *24-Month Study Inflow Scenarios* (Jan. 16, 2026).

(2006) (Consolidated Decree), and other provisions of applicable federal law.”²¹

And yet, **none of Reclamation’s alternatives comply with the Law of the River.**

A. None of the Alternatives in the Draft EIS Complies with the Compact

The Compact apportions to the Upper and Lower Basin States, “respectively, the exclusive beneficial consumptive use of 7,500,000 acre-feet of water per annum, which shall include all water necessary for the supply of any rights which may now exist.”²² Under Article III(d) of the Compact, “[t]he States of the Upper Division will not cause the flow of the river at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an aggregate of 75,000,000 acre-feet [75 maf] for any period of ten consecutive years reckoned in continuing progressive series beginning with the first day of October next succeeding the ratification of this compact.” Furthermore, Compact Article III(c) requires the Upper Basin States to share in the annual obligation to deliver 1.5 maf of mainstream Colorado River water to Mexico.²³

Reclamation recognizes that “[t]he Lee Ferry Compact Point is the division point between the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin, as established by the 1922 Colorado River Compact,” and provides an analysis of its modeling for “for the 10-Year flow volumes at the Lee Ferry Compact Point under each alternative to assess how they perform over a range of hydrologic conditions.”²⁴ While the analysis provides useful information, the overall analytical approach fails to consider a reasonable outcome of a judicial determination that may constrain operations at Lee Ferry to a 10-year volume of 75 maf or 82.5 maf. **The analysis shows 10-year Lee Ferry Compact Point flows that would violate the Compact even under average flow conditions in some cases.** Moreover, Reclamation fails to analyze the impacts of these potential constraints on all affected resources and geographic areas. As a result, the analysis is unreasonably limited and insufficient to make a reasoned choice among alternatives to ensure

²¹ Draft EIS, Sec. 1.1, at 1-4 (referencing Compact, 43 U.S.C. § 617/) (footnotes and hyperlinks omitted).

²² Compact, Art. III(a).

²³ The annual Colorado River water debt owed to Mexico pursuant to international treaty obligations “shall be supplied first from the waters which are surplus over and above the aggregate of the quantities specified in paragraphs (a) and (b); and if such surplus shall prove insufficient for this purpose, then, the burden of such deficiency shall be equally borne by the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin, and whenever necessary the States of the **Upper Division shall deliver at Lee Ferry water to supply one-half of the deficiency** so recognized in addition to that provided in paragraph (d).” Compact, Art. III(c) (emphases added).

²⁴ Draft EIS, Tech. Appx. 3, Sec. TA 3.2.3, at 3-63 to 3-65 & Figure TA 3-23.

Compact compliance. Thus, if implemented, any of the Alternatives based upon Reclamation's own analysis would violate the Compact, and fail to satisfy NEPA's "hard look" requirement.²⁵ NEPA is not a shell game. NEPA requires that the lead agency identify and carry forward "reasonable alternatives" that "are technically and economically feasible, **meet the purpose and need** for the proposed action, are within the jurisdiction of the bureau, and, where applicable, meet the goals of the applicant."²⁶

Moreover, Article III(e) of the Compact provides that the Upper Basin States "shall not withhold water . . . which cannot reasonably be applied for domestic and agricultural uses." And the 2006 Supreme Court Decree prohibits Reclamation from treating unused water as "consumptive use" defined as "diversions from the stream less such return flow."²⁷ Reclamation fails to analyze and demonstrate compliance with these requirements under each alternative. Indeed, it appears from the modeling that during low flow conditions, each of the action alternatives violates delivery obligations to the Lower Basin States, as required by the Compact.

B. Reclamation Has Failed to Demonstrate How Each Alternative Complies with the 1968 and 1970 Long-Range Operating Criteria ("LROC")

Reclamation acknowledges that LROC Article II(2) states that the "objective shall be to maintain a minimum release of water from Lake Powell of 8.23 [maf]."²⁸ Reclamation recognizes that "variation in releases of water above and **below the minimum objective release of 8.23 maf** can, in **appropriate circumstances**, be adopted."²⁹ **Thus, Reclamation admits to failing to satisfy LROC during certain low flow conditions.** Yet, nowhere in its NEPA analysis does Reclamation explain what it believes are the "appropriate circumstances" for violating the "minimum" delivery requirements of LROC. Consequently, Reclamation's analysis

²⁵ See *Friends of Animals v. Burgum*, 164 F.4th 738 (9th Cir. 2026), 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 897, at *17 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2026) ("NEPA does not contain substantive environmental standards, but instead establishes action-forcing procedures that require agencies to take a **hard look** at environmental consequences.") (citing *Kern v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt.*, 284 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).

²⁶ DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES, 516 DM 1, § 6.1(v), at 25 (Feb. 23, 2026) (emphasis added) (cited throughout as "DOI NEPA Implementing Procedures"), available at <https://www.doi.gov/document-library/handbook/516-dm-1-handbook-national-environmental-policy-act-implementing>.

²⁷ See Supreme Court Decree in *Arizona v. California*, 547 U.S. 150, 153, 156 (2006) (Secs. I(A) and II(B)(6)).

²⁸ Draft EIS, Sec. 2.4.2, at 2-9.

²⁹ *Id.* at 2-9 (emphases added).

lacks transparency and integrity regarding this mandatory legal requirement. NEPA requires that the responsible bureau official ensure that the underlying analysis reflects “professional integrity, including scientific integrity” and makes “use of reliable data and resources.”³⁰ The preamble to the Federal Register notice to the NEPA implementing regulations of the Department of the Interior (“DOI”) emphasizes the importance of doing so in connection with preparing the no action and other alternatives.³¹

C. Reclamation Must, But Has Failed, to Exercise Authority to Operate the CRSP Initial Units in Compliance with the Compact

The Colorado River Storage Project (“CRSP”) Act of 1956 authorized development of a comprehensive water development plan for the Upper Basin that included constructing Glen Canyon Dam and other facilities.³² The Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968 (“CRBPA”) further establishes how such facilities would be operated to ensure required water deliveries below the CRSP reservoirs pursuant to Compact obligations and, as provided in CRBP Act § 602(a), water required to comply with the Mexican Water Treaty.³³ The relevant statutory language provides:

In order to comply with and carry out the provisions of the Colorado River Compact [of 1922], the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, and the Mexican Water Treaty, the Secretary shall propose criteria for the coordinated long-range operation of [the CRSP reservoirs and Lake Mead] **[T]he criteria shall make provision for the storage of water in [CRSP Reservoirs] and**

³⁰ 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D), (E); see Sec’y of the Interior Order No. 3441, Restoring Gold Standard Science (May 23, 2025); see also 43 C.F.R. § 46.105(c) (requiring bureau-directed contractors to submit professional integrity certifying the use of reliable data and resources).

³¹ See 91 Fed. Reg. 8738, 8379 (Feb. 24, 2026) (“NEPA further mandates that federal agencies ensure the professional and scientific integrity of environmental documents; use reliable data and resources when carrying out NEPA; and study, develop, and describe technically and economically feasible **alternatives.**”) (emphasis added).

³² The CRSP Upper Initial Units include Flaming Gorge, Blue Mesa (a component of the Aspinall Unit), and Navajo reservoirs. They are governed by Reclamation records of decision dated 2006, 2012, and 2006, respectively. See Draft EIS, Executive Summary, Sec. ES.2.3., at ES-17 at n.5.

³³ For example, the 1962 San Juan-Chama Authorization Act (Public Law 87-483) authorized Reclamation to construct and operate the San Juan-Chama Project as part of the CRSP Act. Section 16(a) of the 1962 Act makes clear that creation of the units and projects “shall in no way impair or diminish” the obligations of the “States of the upper division” to comply with Articles III C and D of the Compact.

releases of water from Lake Powell in the following listed order of priority: (1) releases to supply one-half the deficiency described in article III(c) of the Colorado River Compact, if any such deficiency exists and is chargeable to the States of the Upper Division . . . (2) releases to comply with article III(d) of the Colorado River Compact, less such quantities of water delivered into the Colorado River below Lee Ferry to the credit of the States of the Upper Division from other sources; and (3) **storage of water not required for the releases specified in clauses (1) and (2) of this subsection to the extent the Secretary . . . shall find this to be reasonably necessary to assure deliveries under clauses (1) and (2)** without impairment of annual consumptive uses in the upper basin pursuant to the Colorado River Compact: *Provided*, That water not so required to be stored shall be released from Lake Powell: (i) to the extent it can be reasonably applied in the States of the Lower Division to the uses specified in article III(e) of the Colorado River Compact [except when] the active storage in Lake Powell is less than the active storage in Lake Mead, (ii) to maintain, as nearly as practicable, active storage in Lake Mead equal to the active storage in Lake Powell . . .³⁴

Reclamation asserts that its alternatives analysis “shows the range of approaches to releases from CRSP Upper Initial Units to protect Glen Canyon Dam infrastructure, the maximum amount of conserved water that could be stored, assumptions about the amount of annual Upper Basin conservation, and rules for when Upper Basin conserved water would be converted to system water.”³⁵ Yet, Reclamation fails to describe how the release determinations required under Colorado River Basin Project Act § 602(a) will be factored into each alternative especially during low flow conditions.³⁶ Moreover, Reclamation’s discussion of the “activities above Lake Powell” is critical to benefit both Lake Powell and Lake Mead elevations, and meet water delivery obligations. Indeed, pursuant to CRBPA § 602(a), in 1970, Reclamation issued the Criteria for Coordinated Long-Range Operation of Colorado River Reservoirs to establish coordinated operations for reservoirs in the Upper and Lower basins, specifically when water releases from Lake Powell to Lake Mead should occur. In accordance with LROC, an “objective release” of 8.23 million acre-feet per year is targeted for downstream delivery. This issue is also relevant to Reclamation’s failure to address a reasonably foreseeable

³⁴ CRBPA § 602(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1552(a) (emphases added).

³⁵ Draft EIS, Executive Summary, Sec. ES.2.3., at ES-17.

³⁶ 43 U.S.C. § 1552(a); *see also* 69 Fed. Reg. 28945 (May 19, 2004) (adoption of an Interim 602(a) Storage Guideline for Management of the Colorado River).

Compact Call (discussed below) and obligations for the Upper Division to satisfy one-half of the water delivery to Mexico under the 1944 Treaty.

Furthermore, Section 14 of the 1956 Colorado River Storage Project Act ("CRSP Act") requires that:

In the operation and maintenance of all facilities, authorized by Federal law and under the jurisdiction and supervision of the Secretary of the Interior, in the basin of the Colorado River, the Secretary of the Interior is directed to comply with the applicable provisions of the Colorado River Compact, the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, the Boulder Canyon Project Act, the Boulder Canyon Project Adjustment Act, and the Treaty with the United Mexican States, in the storage and release of water from reservoirs in the Colorado River Basin.³⁷

This section of the CRSP Act requires that Reclamation manage **both** CRSP Upper Initial Units and other participating projects in compliance with the Compact. There is not a single alternative where Reclamation mentions, much less modifies, the operations of the federal projects subject to the CRSP Act to comply with the Compact or Section 602, including the paramount obligation to release water from the Upper Basin to satisfy one-half of the obligation to Mexico. In short, Reclamation has clear federal authorities for release regimes from CRSP reservoirs, but has entirely ignored its statutory obligations, as none of the alternatives address issues such as the reasonable foreseeability of providing water from CRSP units to meet obligations to Mexico.

D. Reclamation Failed to Describe for Each Alternative How it Would Exercise its Existing Legal Authority and What Additional Authority it Would Need to Meet the Purpose and Need, and Comply with the Law of the River

Reclamation repeatedly excuses itself from conducting the required detailed analysis of alternatives, including *how* it would exercise its legal authority to operate the reservoirs and deliver water during low flow conditions. Reclamation claims that the full scope and limits of its legal authority are unclear or have not been "tested" in the courts:

- In the Chapter 2 Alternatives analysis introduction, Reclamation gives a blanket excuse for not offering *any* action alternative that fully complies with its obligations under the Law of the River. After first acknowledging that "[t]he Secretary has the vested authority and responsibility to operate the System through coordinated operations . . . pursuant to applicable federal law, the Decree, contractual obligations, and other elements of the Law of the River[, t]he **full extent of**

³⁷ 43 U.S.C. § 620.

Reclamation's operational authority has not been tested to date—either operationally or through legislative or judicial review.³⁸ Nowhere does Reclamation describe the “extent” of its operational authority.

- Regarding the Basic Coordination Alternative, Reclamation admits that this alternative “may not provide adequate protection of critical infrastructure or the system and may be viable only in the short term given current reservoir conditions.”³⁹ To remedy this situation, in the event the Basic Coordination Alternative is selected, Reclamation plans to “identify the conditions under which further action would be required, including adjustment of operations and prompt action to seek **additional authorities**, if needed.”⁴⁰ Nowhere does Reclamation describe what “additional authorities” it would need to fully implement the Basic Coordination Alternative to satisfy its obligations under the Law of the River.
- The Enhanced Coordination Alternative applies a “pro rata Lower Basin shortage distribution to evaluate the potential impacts of distributing reductions among all mainstream lower Colorado River water users in Arizona, Nevada, and California” during low flow conditions with no similar reductions assigned to the Upper Basin States, explaining that “[a]**dditional agreements and other legal authorities would be needed** to implement any pro rata operations that are inconsistent with the Decree.”⁴¹ Nowhere does Reclamation describe what “additional agreements” or “other legal authorities” it would need to fully implement the Enhanced Coordination Alternative to satisfy its obligations under the Law of the River.
- Reclamation avoids setting out how it would maintain minimum releases of 8.23 maf from Lake Powell under the No Action Alternative (other than it would prioritize protection of Glen Canyon Dam due to infrastructure limitations) because the basin states “have **different legal positions** regarding how this LROC statement incorporates other Law of the River elements to determine annual releases.”⁴² Nowhere in the Draft EIS does Reclamation set forth how it interprets and would apply LROC during low flow conditions under the No Action Alternative.

³⁸ Draft EIS, Sec. 2.3, at 2-5 (emphasis added).

³⁹ *Id.*, Sec. 2.5, at 2-11.

⁴⁰ *Id.* at 2-11 to 2-12 (emphasis added).

⁴¹ *Id.*, Sec. 2.6, at 2-16 & n.18.

⁴² *Id.*, Secs. 2.4.2, 2.10, at 2-9, 2-23.

- Reclamation screened alternatives from detailed analysis, explaining that its analysis was “[i]nclusive of existing legal authorities and contractual obligations. This would not preclude the **reasonably foreseeable acquisition of certain new or modified legal authorities necessary to implement new interim guidelines**. However, **new legal authorities** that would result in impracticalities or are unlikely to be widely acceptable among stakeholders **are too speculative to include in this Draft EIS.**”⁴³ Ironically, even though they are “reasonably foreseeable,” nowhere in the Draft EIS does Reclamation describe or provide examples of necessary “new or modified legal authorities.” Nor does Reclamation discuss what efforts it has taken to evaluate the potential success of new or modified legal authorities.⁴⁴

Notwithstanding Reclamation’s repeated protests, Reclamation cannot hide behind regulatory or legal uncertainty to avoid advancing and fully analyzing a reasonable range of alternatives that meets the purpose and need of the proposed action *and* complies with the Law of the River.⁴⁵

First, by statute, NEPA requires that Reclamation comply with “**specific statutory obligations**” other than NEPA that require Reclamation to “to coordinate or **consult with** any other Federal or **State agency**,” which is precisely what the Compact and other requirements of the Law of the River impose on Reclamation as operator of the reservoirs.⁴⁶ Similarly, NEPA does not absolve Reclamation from, “to the **fullest extent possible**,” complying with the “policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States” which “shall be **interpreted** and administered” by Reclamation “in accordance with the policies set forth in [NEPA].”⁴⁷ Reclamation cannot satisfy these basic NEPA requirements without identifying and interpreting such laws and regulations. Indeed, DOI’s NEPA Implementing Procedures expressly direct that

⁴³ *Id.*, Sec. 2.9, at 2-35 to 2-36 & n.26.

⁴⁴ *Cf. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 177 F.3d 800, 814 (9th Cir. 1999) (Forest Service failed to consider reasonable range of alternatives when it did not explore requesting an appropriation); *see also Simmons v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs*, 120 F.3d 664, 669-70 (7th Cir. 1997) (Court found that Army Corps of Engineers failed to consider reasonable range of alternatives which may have included constructing two separate water projects. Without any discussion of why this potential alternative was omitted, the court could not determine the feasibility of the two-project approach).

⁴⁵ *Solar Energy Indus. Ass’n v. FERC*, 80 F.4th 956, 995 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[A]t least some degree of speculation is implicit in NEPA, agencies may not shirk their responsibilities under NEPA by labeling . . . discussion . . . as [a] crystal ball inquiry.”) (internal punctuation and citations omitted).

⁴⁶ *See* NEPA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 4334 (emphasis added).

⁴⁷ *Id.* § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (emphasis added).

Reclamation “identify consultations, permits, or licenses necessary under other environmental laws” and explain “how the bureau has met or will meet any such requirements that apply to the proposed action.”⁴⁸

Second, NEPA is not a shell game in which stakeholders and the regulated community must guess at Reclamation’s intentions with respect to how it intends to comply with its many statutory and regulatory obligations under the Law of the River under each alternative. As explained in DOI’s NEPA Implementing Procedures, NEPA requires that the lead agency identify and carry forward “reasonable alternatives” that “are technically and economically feasible, **meet the purpose and need** for the proposed action, are **within the jurisdiction of the bureau**, and, where applicable, meet the goals of the applicant.”⁴⁹ If Reclamation believes it lacks “jurisdiction” or legal authority, it should clearly articulate what legal authority it believes it has to implement an alternative and what specific additional authority it believes it needs by statute or contractual (i.e., by agreement among the Basin States) to implement the alternative. But it cannot carry forward an alternative that does not meet the purpose and need or comply with applicable legal requirements.⁵⁰ In addition, DOI’s guidance indicates that Reclamation should explain why an alternative was “eliminated from detailed study” due to lack of jurisdiction or for another reason.⁵¹

⁴⁸ DOI NEPA Implementing Procedures § 3.8(c), at 20 (Feb. 23, 2026) (emphasis added). One key consultation requirement applicable to Colorado River operations and this NEPA analysis is found in the Supreme Court Decree in *Arizona v. California*, 547 U.S. 150, 155-56 (2006) (Sec. II(B)(3)) (“If insufficient mainstream water is available for release, as determined by the Secretary of the Interior, to satisfy annual consumptive use of 7,500,000 acre-feet in the aforesaid three States, then the Secretary of the Interior, after providing for satisfaction of present perfected rights in the order of their priority dates without regard to state lines and after consultation with the parties to major delivery contracts and such representatives as the respective States may designate, may apportion the amount remaining available for consumptive use in such manner as is consistent with the Boulder Canyon Project Act as interpreted by the opinion of this Court herein, and with other applicable federal statutes, but in no event shall more than 4,400,000 acre-feet be apportioned for use in California including all present perfected rights[.]”).

⁴⁹ *Id.* § 6.1, at 25 (emphasis added).

⁵⁰ *Citizens’ Comm. to Save Our Canyons v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 297 F.3d 1012, 1031 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Alternatives that ‘do not accomplish the purpose of an action are not reasonable’ and need not be studied in detail by the agency.”); see *League of Wilderness Defs.-Blue Mts. Biodiversity Project v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 689 F.3d 1060, 1064 (9th Cir. 2012).

⁵¹ DOI NEPA Implementing Procedures, Appx. 1, at 39.

Third, Reclamation offers contradictory statements regarding its jurisdiction. In some instances, it claims to lack authority without specifying why. In other instances, it claims to hold sufficient authority to act but will seek additional **unspecified** legal authority in the future to fully implement an alternative. For example, Reclamation states the following with respect to the Basic Coordination Alternative:

[T]he Secretary has the vested authority and responsibility to operate the System through coordinated operations, including the ability to respond to exigent and emergency conditions, pursuant to applicable federal law, the Decree, contractual obligations, and other elements of the Law of the River. The full extent of Reclamation's operational authority has not been tested to date—either operationally or through legislative or judicial review. Accordingly, Reclamation's description of how this alternative would be implemented relies on legal, operational, and engineering judgment regarding future operations under a broad range of hydrologic conditions **This alternative proposes that the Secretary may seek new authorities to implement additional measures to protect critically low elevations at Lake Mead including additional shortages to Lower Basin water users.**⁵²

The lack of case law or other directives delineating Reclamation's authority in no way reduces NEPA's requirement to adequately describe Reclamation's authority and jurisdiction to implement a reasonable range of alternatives. It may well be appropriate for Reclamation at a future date to request additional statutory or contractual authority to meet the project purpose and need in the long-term. But Reclamation cannot hide behind a "future" request for authority—NEPA requires Reclamation to identify with particularity the technical, economic, and legal constraints and assumptions underlying the alternatives analysis.⁵³

⁵² Draft EIS., Secs. 2.5, 2.5.1.1, at 2-11, 2-13 n.16 (emphasis added).

⁵³ See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D)-(F) (requiring scientific integrity, use of reliable data, and study and development of technically and economically feasible alternatives); see also Sec'y of the Interior Order No. 3441, Restoring Gold Standard Science (May 23, 2025) (emphasizing that "[s]cience should be open and accessible with all components of the research process shared comprehensively" and that for "complex scientific challenges" agencies should use "multi-disciplinary integration of expertise, methodologies, and perspectives"); see also *Muckleshoot Indian Tribe*, 177 F.3d at 814 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that Forest Service failed to meet NEPA's requirements when it did not consider an alternative which required the Forest Service to make a request for appropriations).

Fourth, Reclamation fails to address what its default operations would be if it was unsuccessful in obtaining new, albeit unspecified, federal authorities or if water users failed to execute additional voluntary agreements. Nor does Reclamation describe the operational consequences and environmental effects from failing to obtain additional authorities. The failure to provide such analysis renders the Draft EIS incomplete and inadequate to inform decisionmakers and stakeholders.

Reclamation's approach fails to provide decisionmakers and stakeholders with the basic information to satisfy NEPA's twin aims to ensure that (1) federal agencies will "have available, and will carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental effects" of each alternative, and (2) "**relevant information** will be made available" to the public and other government agencies.⁵⁴ As the Supreme Court has emphasized, "by focusing the agency's attention on the environmental consequences of a proposed [action], NEPA ensures that important effects will not be overlooked or underestimated only to be discovered after resources have been committed or the die otherwise cast."⁵⁵ NEPA's procedural and analytical requirements are designed to ensure that all "**relevant information** will be made available to the larger audience that may also play a role in both the decision making process and the implementation of that decision."⁵⁶

For the purposes of this NEPA process, the most "**relevant information**" includes how, under each alternative, Reclamation must apply the Law of the River in "accordance with" and subject to the "statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations," and "procedures" set forth in applicable laws governing Colorado River operations. Reclamation's "operational elements" common to each alternative admit that "reductions in water deliveries" and "criteria to trigger reductions" mandate full consideration of how the Law of the River factors into each alternative.⁵⁷ If Reclamation fails to explain its interpretation of the key elements of the Law of the River and how they apply to each alternative especially during low flow conditions, the EIS analysis will be incomplete, lack transparency, and fail to meet the "hard look" requirement.⁵⁸

An agency's actions, findings, and conclusions are unlawful if they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in **accordance with law**," "in excess of

⁵⁴ See *Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizen's Council*, 490 U.S. 332, 349-50 (1989).

⁵⁵ *Id.* at 349.

⁵⁶ *Id.* (emphasis added); see also *WildEarth Guardians v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.*, 870 F.3d 1222, 1237 (10th Cir. 2017) ("NEPA has two purposes: prevent uninformed agency decisions and provide adequate disclosure to allow public participation in those decisions.") (citing *Methow Valley*, 490 U.S. at 349).

⁵⁷ Draft EIS, Sec. 2.2.1, at 2-4.

⁵⁸ See *Friends of Animals*, 164 F.4th at 738.

statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations,” or “without observance of **procedure required by law.**”⁵⁹ Reclamation’s analysis will not pass judicial scrutiny if Reclamation fails to identify its “statutory jurisdiction” and explain how it will implement the proposed action “in accordance with law” and observing all “procedures required by law.”

Fifth, Reclamation admits that it is “**reasonably foreseeable**” that it will need to acquire “**certain new or modified legal authorities necessary to implement new interim guidelines.**”⁶⁰ Given Reclamation’s admission, NEPA makes it mandatory that such reasonably foreseeable legal authorities be disclosed in the Draft EIS.⁶¹ While some uncertainty may exist regarding the precise timing and content of needed additional legal authorities, NEPA requires Reclamation to “utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will ensure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and in decisionmaking” based on available information known at this time.⁶²

II. Reclamation’s Failure to Include a Reasonably Foreseeable “Compact Call” Violates NEPA and the Secretary’s Obligations Under the Law of the River

As mentioned above, a core NEPA requirement is that an EIS must evaluate any “**reasonably foreseeable**” effects of the proposed action, such as a Compact Call (also known as a “Compact Curtailment”).⁶³ The term “Compact Call” refers to a potential request to the Secretary of the Interior from the Lower Basin States to order Reclamation and the Upper Basin States to deliver Colorado River water pursuant to the terms of the Compact in the event of any accumulated deficit at Lee Ferry under Articles III(c) and III(d).⁶⁴ Reclamation acknowledges in the Draft EIS that even without new legal authority or agreements, Reclamation has the “responsibility to operate the System through coordinated operations, including the ability to respond to exigent and emergency conditions, pursuant to applicable federal law, the Decree, contractual obligations, and other elements of the Law of the River.”⁶⁵ Reclamation further

⁵⁹ Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C), (D).

⁶⁰ Draft EIS, Sec. 2.9, at 2-35 to 2-36 & n.26.

⁶¹ *See id.*

⁶² *See* NEPA § 102(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (emphasis added).

⁶³ *See id.* § 102(2)(C)(i),(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i),(ii).

⁶⁴ Specifically, Compact Article III(d) imposes the following mandatory delivery obligation: “The States of the Upper Division will not cause the flow of the river at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an aggregate of 75,000,000 acre-feet [75 maf] for any period of ten consecutive years reckoned in continuing progressive series beginning with the first day of October next succeeding the ratification of this compact.”

⁶⁵ Draft EIS, Sec. 2.5, at 2-11.

acknowledges that its decisions are governed by the legal requirements comprising the “Law of the River,” and that low flow conditions exacerbating compliance with Compact water delivery obligations appear all but certain.⁶⁶

As explained above, Reclamation’s unwillingness to disclose how it will apply the Law of the River to each alternative and modeled scenarios contradicts Reclamation’s own admission that Reclamation itself is legally obligated to apply the Law of the River to future Colorado River operations.⁶⁷ Reclamation “kicks the can down the road,” rather than doing the hard work needed to analyze and disclose planned operations to satisfy water delivery obligations after expiration of the current operational guidelines. NEPA forecloses such an approach.⁶⁸ This also puts the Lower Basin States in the difficult position of issuing a Compact Call in the near future, which is highly likely given the breakdown in negotiations between the Upper Basin and Lower Basin States.

One excuse that Reclamation implicitly provides for not directly addressing the risk of a Compact Call is that the Basin States “have **different legal positions** regarding” application of the Law of the River “to determine annual releases” during low flow conditions.⁶⁹ It is true that such disagreements between the Upper Basin and Lower Basin exist, but they do not excuse Reclamation from disclosing the effects of a reasonably foreseeable Compact Call.

The following provides one crucial example of differing interpretations of application of the Law of the River to long-term Colorado River management under low flow conditions. The LROC requires Reclamation to create annual plans of operation for the Colorado River Storage Project (“CRSP”) units and Lake Mead. Such plans must include a determination, consistent with Colorado River Basin Project Act § 602(a)(3), as to how much water is needed in storage to satisfy future delivery requirements to Mexico and the Lower Basin States under 602(a)(1) and (2).⁷⁰ Importantly, the Upper Basin States have asserted that Section 602(a) “allow[s] the

⁶⁶ *Id.*, Sec. 1.8.2.1, at 1-13 to 1-16; *supra* § I.A. at pp. 7-8.

⁶⁷ *Supra* discussion at § I.

⁶⁸ See *Methow Valley Citizens Council*, 490 U.S. at 349 (“NEPA ensures that important effects will not be overlooked or underestimated only to be discovered after resources have been committed or the die otherwise cast.”).

⁶⁹ Draft EIS, Secs. 2.4.2, 2.10, at 2-9, 2-38.

⁷⁰ The relevant statutory language provides: “In order to comply with and carry out the provisions of the Colorado River Compact [of 1922], the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, and the Mexican Water Treaty, the Secretary shall propose criteria for the coordinated long-range operation of [the CRSP reservoirs and Lake Mead] **The criteria shall make provision for the storage of water in [CRSP Reservoirs] and releases of water from Lake Powell in the following listed order of priority:** (1) releases to supply one-half the deficiency described in

Upper Division States to continue to meet their obligations under the [Compact] without impairing their ability to consumptively use the waters of the Colorado River System apportioned to them in perpetuity by the Compact” notwithstanding the annual releases prioritized in 602(a)(1)-(2).⁷¹ However, nothing in Section 602(a) or the LROC suggests the conditions under which less than 8.23 maf would be released each year for the Lower Basin and Mexico.⁷²

In the reasonably foreseeable event of ongoing low-flow conditions, which Reclamation itself assumes is the case,⁷³ it is certain that Reclamation will be required to render its own interpretation of the Colorado River Basin Project Act and other elements of the Law of the River. As such, not only must Reclamation analyze the same for each alternative analysis, Reclamation must analyze how it will respond to a reasonably foreseeable Compact Call given that the Basin States are unlikely to reach a consensus approach.⁷⁴ The Lower Basin States have

article III(c) of the Colorado River Compact, if any such deficiency exists and is chargeable to the States of the Upper Division . . . ; (2) releases to comply with article III(d) of the Colorado River Compact, less such quantities of water delivered into the Colorado River below Lee Ferry to the credit of the States of the Upper Division from other sources; and (3) **storage of water not required for the releases specified in clauses (1) and (2) of this subsection to the extent the Secretary . . . shall find this to be reasonably necessary to assure deliveries under clauses (1) and (2)** without impairment of annual consumptive uses in the upper basin pursuant to the Colorado River Compact: Provided, That water not so required to be stored shall be released from Lake Powell: (i) to the extent it can be reasonably applied in the States of the Lower Division to the uses specified in article III(e) of the Colorado River Compact [except when] the active storage in Lake Powell is less than the active storage in Lake Mead, (ii) to maintain, as nearly as practicable, active storage in Lake Mead equal to the active storage in Lake Powell” CRBPA § 602(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1552(a) (emphases added).

⁷¹ See Letter from Upper Basin States to Reclamation, regarding “Reclamation’s Consideration of 602(a) Storage in the No Action Alternative,” at 1 (June 11, 2024).

⁷² For more information regarding the disagreement between the Upper and Lower Basin States on this issue, see Lower Basin States’ Letter to Reclamation regarding “Upper Division States’ June 11, 2024 Letter Regarding 602(a) Storage Considerations in the No-Action Alternative” (June 25, 2024).

⁷³ *Supra* pp. 6-7 & § II.

⁷⁴ See *Save the Colorado v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs*, No. 18-cv-03258, 2024 WL 4519201, at *14 n.24, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189322 (D. Colo. Oct. 16, 2024) (In concluding that the agency violated NEPA for other reasons, the court stated that given the “last few decades of severe aridity it is perplexing . . . that the Corps dismissed the possibility of a [1922 Colorado River] compact call in its analysis of a proposed water management project.”).

repeatedly submitted comments to Reclamation emphasizing the need to analyze the impacts of a Compact Call under each alternative and why a Compact Call is reasonably foreseeable.⁷⁵ To ensure a legally sufficient analysis of a reasonably foreseeable Compact Call, Nevada again requests that Reclamation include the following assumptions regarding a Compact Call in the analysis of each alternative other than the Lower Basin Alternative:

- **Required deliveries pursuant to Article III of the Compact:** The Compact requires the delivery of the following at Lee Ferry: 75 maf every 10 years, on a rolling basis, plus the Upper Basin States' share of the Mexico Treaty obligation.
- **Compact call by the Lower Division States:** As stated above, it is reasonably foreseeable that if deliveries at Lee Ferry fail to satisfy the Compact requirements, the Lower Basin States will make a Compact Call for delivery of the deficit.
- **Upper Basin curtailment or other reductions:** It is reasonably foreseeable that, in the event of a Compact Call, the Upper Basin States will take, or be compelled to take, the necessary steps to comply with the Compact requirements, whether through curtailment, demand management storage in Lake Powell, or voluntary conservation measures. If a particular alternative incorporates a demand management storage program in Lake Powell or other conservation measures, it would be appropriate to assume utilization of that program according to its terms. Otherwise, it should be assumed that the Upper Basin States will curtail users as necessary (i.e., implement reductions) to satisfy their obligation. The Lower Basin States would support modeling of curtailment consistent with the requirements of the 1948 Upper Colorado River Basin Compact and the 1922 Colorado River Compact.
- **Actions by the United States in management of federal reservoirs:** Congress directed Reclamation to operate all federal infrastructure, including federal reservoirs, consistently with the 1922 Colorado River Compact, and Section 602(a) of the Colorado River Basin Project Act directs the Secretary to manage Upper Basin federal reservoirs to prioritize releases for Compact compliance, second only to releases to satisfy the Treaty obligation to Mexico. The 1970 Long Range Operating Criteria provide for minimum annual releases of 8.23 maf to meet these priorities.

⁷⁵ See Letter from Lower Basin States to Doug Burgum, Secretary of the Interior, regarding "Perspectives from the Lower Basin States on the Colorado River Post-2026 Operational Guidelines and Strategies for Lake Powell and Lake Mead," Attachment 1, at 10-19 (Feb. 13, 2025); see also Letter from Lower Basin to Reclamation Commissioner regarding "Upper Division States' June 11, 2024 Letter Regarding 602(a) Storage Considerations in the No-Action Alternative" (June 25, 2024).

Given this, it is reasonably foreseeable the United States will need to comply with these and other related elements of the Law of the River in operating the reservoirs.

- **Actions needed in advance of a Compact Call:** In addition to releasing water from Upper Basin reservoirs in response to a Compact Call, we expect that the United States will take actions necessary to release water from those reservoirs in advance of a Compact Call. Recognizing that the existing environmental compliance, or even physical capacity, of the reservoirs may not permit single-year releases on the scale necessary to satisfy a Compact Call, the United States should prepare by moving water through the reservoirs in advance, to satisfy any potential, near-term Compact Call. These anticipatory measures will be particularly important considering the need to protect critical infrastructure.

Failing to address or include in its analysis the tools that Reclamation will use to meet Compact compliance, including managing releases from the upstream initial units and modeling Upper Basin reductions through curtailment—together with any meaningful look at the resulting Upper Basin social and environmental impacts—renders Reclamation's analysis unhelpful to stakeholders and in violation of NEPA and its obligations under the Law of the River.

III. Reclamation Has Proposed an Impermissibly Narrow Purpose and Need Statement

Every EIS must include “a statement of purpose and need.”⁷⁶ For agency proposed actions, Congress's goals, as expressed “in the agency's statutory authorization to act, as well as in other congressional directives” must guide the purpose and need.⁷⁷ “Alternatives that do not accomplish the purpose of an action are not reasonable and need not be studied in detail by the agency.”⁷⁸ For that reason, “an agency cannot define its objectives in unreasonably narrow terms” that would artificially constrain the consideration of alternatives.⁷⁹

Reclamation's purpose and need is impermissibly narrow. Rather than embrace the full scope of Reclamation's charge to manage the Colorado River for domestic, agricultural, and other uses, including the implicit purpose and need to protect human health and safety through Colorado River management, Reclamation focuses solely on the purpose to “update and

⁷⁶ NEPA § 107(d), 42 U.S.C. § 4336a(d).

⁷⁷ *Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey*, 938 F.2d 190, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

⁷⁸ *Citizens' Comm. to Save our Canyons v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 297 F.3d 1012, 1031 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); NEPA, § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii).

⁷⁹ *Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians v. Zinke*, 889 F.3d 584, 606 (2018) (citing *City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. U.S. Dep't of Transp.*, 123 F.3d 1142, 1155 (9th Cir. 1997)).

expand” the expiring 2007 Interim Guidelines to provide “greater predictability for water users,” “additional mechanisms” for water conservation, storage and delivery, enhance opportunities for Basin Tribes to benefit from their water rights, and accommodate future growth in the Basin.⁸⁰ Similarly, the need is limited to coordinating reservoir operations, replacing the expiring 2007 Interim Guidelines, and advancing more “robust” operational guidelines that meet stakeholder issues of concern, including those of the Basin Tribes.⁸¹

By limiting its view to only updating the 2007 Interim Guidelines with a more robust approach, Reclamation narrows the focus of alternatives, eliminating a number of “tools in the toolbox” for addressing drought conditions on the River, including the specific alternative proposed by the Lower Basin States in March 2024, and subsequently updated. Moreover, as discussed below, Reclamation should have included in the purpose and need (a) reparations of the Glen Canyon infrastructure limitations **and** (b) delivering the amounts required under the Article III(c) and (d) of the Compact to the Lower Basin of 8.23 maf of water per year and “not caus[ing] the flow of the river at the Lee Ferry Compact Point to be depleted below an aggregate of 75.0 maf for any period of ten consecutive years.”⁸²

At least two viable alternatives, i.e., an alternative to address the Glen Canyon Dam’s infrastructure limitations and the proposed Lower Basin Alternative, were impermissibly eliminated based on Reclamation’s artificially constrained purpose and need.

IV. Reclamation Failed to Consider a Long-Term Alternative to Address Glen Canyon Dam’s Infrastructure Limitations

A. Reclamation’s Failure to Address Glen Canyon Dam’s Infrastructure Limitation Violates NEPA

Reclamation identifies an operational constraint “common to all alternatives” which limits releases from Lake Powell at elevations below 3,490 feet: “Releases from Glen Canyon Dam may be unable to achieve the specified annual release volume when Lake Powell is below elevation 3,490 feet due to **infrastructure constraints**” and “**limitations**,” and the need to “**protect**” Glen Canyon Dam “**critical infrastructure**.”⁸³

⁸⁰ Draft EIS, Sec. 1.3, at 1-7.

⁸¹ *Id.* at 1-6.

⁸² *Id.* at 1-16 (citing Compact, Article III).

⁸³ *E.g.*, Draft EIS, Sec. 2.10, at 2-38 (emphasis added); Draft EIS, Appx. A, Sec. A.6.1, at A-14 to A-15 (“Assumptions Common to All Alternatives” include “Infrastructure Constraints at Low Elevations,” specifically “monthly releases can be constrained due to physical limitations at Glen Canyon Dam. Water can be released through the powerplant turbines until the pool

Elsewhere, Reclamation has explained the basis of the 3,490-elevation needed to address infrastructure limitations. Specifically, in April 2023, Reclamation conducted a “High Flow Experiment” (“HFE”) release to rebuild beaches and sandbars in the Colorado River. Thereafter, Reclamation discovered damage in the Glen Canyon Dam “river outlet works” (also known as “bypass tubes”).⁸⁴ The river outlet works consist of four steel pipes that move water from Lake Powell directly downstream into the Colorado River, bypassing the hydropower generating units. Reclamation explained that the river outlet works are the “only means for releasing water below elevation 3,490 ft” because “[w]ater cannot be released from the spillways below elevation 3,648 ft, nor through the penstocks below elevation 3,490 ft. Water can theoretically be released from the outlet works down to elevation **3,370 ft**, which is the intake invert and dead pool elevation.”⁸⁵

On March 26, 2024, Reclamation released a “Technical Decision Memorandum,” explaining that the April 2023 release and other HFE releases in 1996, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2016, 2018, and 2023 from the river outlet works, combined with flood control releases in 1984-1987 had over time damaged the original coal tar enamel lining as a result of “cavitation.”⁸⁶ Reclamation further explained in the Technical Decision Memorandum that it planned to replace the original coal tar enamel lining with a “solvent borne epoxy” at a cost of \$8.9 million from the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law.⁸⁷ Importantly, Reclamation explained that the removal and replacement of the lining of the river outlet works was a short-term fix, not a long-term solution for ensuring “continuous long-term operation” of Glen Canyon Dam:

[T]here is concern with using the outlet works to provide long-term releases, particularly at high flows In order to achieve a high level of confidence for continuous long-term operation of the

elevation drops below 3,490 feet. Once Lake Powell is below 3,490 feet, releases are made through four river outlet works. The capacity of the river outlet works varies with the elevation of Lake Powell; the higher the pool elevation, the higher the potential release through the river outlet works For modeling purposes, three out of four river outlet works are assumed to be available for use at any given time; this is because of the need for periodic inspections and any associated maintenance activities.”).

⁸⁴ Reclamation, Press Release, Glen Canyon Dam begins relining project as part of the President’s Investing in America agenda (Sep. 3, 2024), <https://www.usbr.gov/newsroom/news-release/4946>.

⁸⁵ Reclamation, *Technical Decision Memorandum: Establishment of Interim Operating Guidance for Glen Canyon Dam during Low Reservoir Levels at Lake Powell*, at 3-4 (Mar. 26, 2024) (emphasis added) (“Technical Decision Memorandum”).

⁸⁶ *Id.* at 6.

⁸⁷ *Id.* at 4; Reclamation Press Release, *supra* note 84.

outlet works, a **major overhaul or replacement of the hollow-jet valves should be considered . . .** .A value planning study is currently planned to inform whether to refurbish or replace the hollow-jet valve hydraulic operating system.⁸⁸

On September 3, 2024, Reclamation reiterated in a press release that the relining project will not address the risks to Glen Canyon Dam from cavitation: “While relining the outlets won't prevent the risk of additional cavitation when operating at low reservoir levels, Reclamation is working on reducing that risk through the recent development of interim operating guidance for the outlets and additional analyses.”⁸⁹

The Draft EIS elaborates on the Glen Canyon Dam infrastructure limitation as follows:

- Glen Canyon Dam was not envisioned to operate below minimum power pool (elevation 3,490 feet). Below this elevation, water cannot be released through the penstocks and must instead be released through the jet tubes at the end of the river outlet works. **Infrastructure concerns associated with extended operations through the river outlet works include damage to the outlet works pipes at low reservoir elevations**, erosion at the downstream base of the dam from outlet works operation, and the potential for additional unknown issues from operating the outlet works for extended periods. Any one of these factors could compromise the safety and stability of Glen Canyon Dam and **affect the ability to meet critical downstream water supply needs.**⁹⁰
- Should elevations drop below 3,490 feet, routine operations of Glen Canyon Dam would be discontinued, and hydropower can no longer be produced. Releases can still be made via the river outlet works down to elevation 3,370 feet (corresponding to dead pool), at which point water can no longer be delivered downstream. However, the outlet works

⁸⁸ *Id.* at 7 & n. 4 (emphasis added).

⁸⁹ Reclamation Press Release, *supra* note 84.

⁹⁰ Draft EIS, Sec. 1.8.4.1, at 1-22 (emphases added).

are **not designed nor intended for long-term use at low reservoir levels** (Reclamation 2024a).⁹¹

In addition, the Draft EIS Technical Appendix 15 states:

Four, 96-inch steel pipes comprise the river outlet works at a centerline elevation of 3,374 feet. The outlets have a maximum combined capacity of 15,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) at elevation 3,500 feet. Below 3,500 feet the capacity decreases. Below minimum power pool, the outlet works are the sole means of releasing water. An annual release of 8.23 maf equates to a continuous flow of up to 11,368 cfs. With all four outlets operational, this release can be maintained down to approximately elevation 3,440 feet, however, operations and maintenance constraints may limit these releases or the elevation. Since the construction of Glen Canyon Dam, the river outlet works are typically reserved for flood control, HFEs, augmenting powerplant and spillway discharges, or for periods when the powerplant is not operating.⁹²

Draft EIS Technical Appendix 15 further states:

Maintenance tasks for the river outlet works include lining repairs and hollow-jet valve maintenance. The interior of the river outlet works was originally lined with coal tar enamel. Relining of the river outlet works with solvent borne epoxy began in the fall of 2024. The fabrication of the river outlet works hollow-jet valves dates back to the original construction of the dam, with no rehabilitation since that time. In 2023, an inspection of the outlet works found that to continue long-term operation of the outlet works, **major repairs or replacement of the hollow-jet valves should be considered**, as well as increasing the frequency of regular operation and maintenance tasks. River outlet works conduits were relined between 2024 and 2025. **Refurbishment or replacement of the hollow jet valves is in the planning stages.**⁹³

⁹¹ *Id.*, Sec. 3.3.1, at 3-25 (emphases added).

⁹² Draft EIS, Tech. Appx. 15, at 15-5 (emphases added).

⁹³ *Id.* at 15-5 to 15-6 (emphases added).

Notwithstanding the above, Reclamation provides no quantification of sustainable outlet capacity as Lake Powell drops, no wear/failure risk analysis for frequent use, no contingency if some aspect of the dam must be taken out of service, and no discussion or acknowledgement of Reclamation obligations to make necessary repairs and modifications. Reclamation's approach to addressing the Glen Canyon Dam infrastructure limitations caused by damage to the river outlet works violates NEPA for the following reasons.

First, Reclamation does not include remedying the Glen Canyon Dam infrastructure limitations in the statement of "Purpose and Need" contained in the October 2023 Scoping Report, January 2025 Alternatives Report, or in the Draft EIS.⁹⁴ **However, Reclamation elevates maintaining the Lake Powell elevation above 3,490 feet to protect "Glen Canyon Dam infrastructure" to the highest de facto purpose of the proposed action.** Reclamation imposes this constraint on all the action alternatives and the no action alternative without including any alternative which provides a long-term design, reparation, or other solution to allow long-term use of the river outlet works at below the 3,490 ft elevation to deliver water to the Lower Basin at low flow conditions. By not including an action alternative that resolves Glen Canyon infrastructure limitations, Reclamation impermissibly limits the range of reasonable alternatives.⁹⁵

Second, as indicated above, Reclamation acknowledges that it is currently considering alternatives to eliminate the infrastructure limitation in a "value planning study" outside the NEPA process to ensure a "high level of confidence for continuous long-term operation of the outlet works" by overhauling or replacing the hollow-jet valves and other possible solutions (which may also include reengineering the dam or routing water through bypass tunnels).⁹⁶ A central purpose of the Draft EIS is to evaluate "additional mechanisms for the conservation, storage, and delivery of water supplies in Colorado River reservoirs," including "a range of operational alternatives for post-2026 reservoir management."⁹⁷ Reclamation further purports to evaluate "additional measures to protect critical infrastructure at Glen Canyon Dam including

⁹⁴ See *Scoping Report for the Post-2026 Colorado River Reservoir Operations* § 5.2, at 60-61 (Oct. 2023) available at https://www.usbr.gov/ColoradoRiverBasin/documents/post2026/scoping/Post2026Operations_ScopingReport_October2023_508.pdf; see also Alternatives Report § 5, at 6-7; Draft EIS, Sec. 1.3, at 1-6 to 1-7.

⁹⁵ See, e.g., *Env't Def. Ctr. v. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt.*, 36 F.4th 850, 877 (9th Cir. 2022) (agencies fail to meet their NEPA obligations when they do not "give full and meaningful consideration to all reasonable alternatives," including the reasonable alternatives presented by stakeholders).

⁹⁶ See Reclamation, Technical Decision Memorandum, *supra* note 85.

⁹⁷ Draft EIS, Secs. 1.1, 1.3, at 1-2, 1-6 to 1-7.

further reductions to releases from Lake Powell and additional use of the CRSP Upper Initial Units.”⁹⁸ Yet, Reclamation inexplicably fails to address the most obvious “measure” as part of the NEPA analysis, i.e., to repair the infrastructure limitations caused by river outlet works damage. Addressing the infrastructure limitations may be the one long-term measure that would best achieve operation and management improvements to the Glen Canyon Dam. Accordingly, Reclamation in this NEPA process must evaluate the impacts of infrastructure repairs, and modifications and enhancements at Glen Canyon Dam, including overhauling or replacing the hollow-jet valves and other possible solutions, which Reclamation acknowledges are feasible.⁹⁹

Third, it is unclear whether Reclamation is relying on a NEPA categorical exclusion to separately evaluate long-term repairs, modifications, and enhancements to the Glen Canyon Dam. Reclamation has a legal obligation to maintain federal water delivery infrastructure in good repair and operation, and no categorical exclusion permits Reclamation to ignore NEPA compliance with respect to the evaluation and implementation of major reparations of federal infrastructure that have significant consequences to downstream users.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, separately evaluating infrastructure repairs, modifications and enhancements in a separate planning process to the Glen Canyon Dam (i.e., the “value planning study”) contravenes the NEPA requirement that “[t]o the fullest extent possible, bureaus will prepare environmental documents or other NEPA compliance documents concurrently with and integrated with analyses and related surveys and studies required by other Federal statutes and regulations.”¹⁰¹ Moreover, repairing the Glen Canyon Dam infrastructure to better operate the reservoir and deliver water consistent with the Law of the River constitutes a “connected action” that must be addressed in the instant NEPA process.¹⁰²

⁹⁸ *Id.*, Sec. 2.5.2.1, at 2-15 & n. 17.

⁹⁹ NEPA’s 2023 Amendments direct agencies to discuss in an EIS “a reasonable range of alternatives to the proposed action . . . that are technically and economically feasible, and meet the purpose and need of the proposal.” NEPA § 102(2)(C)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii).

¹⁰⁰ No existing categorical exclusion would cover major repairs to Glen Canyon Dam. *See* 43 C.F.R. § 46.210 (2026) (list of DOI Categorical Exclusions); DOI NEPA Implementing Procedures, Appx. 2, § 14.5, at 92-95 (list of Reclamation Categorical Exclusions).

¹⁰¹ DOI NEPA Implementing Procedures, § 3.8(a), at 20.

¹⁰² *Id.* § 1.2(b)(1), at 4 (“In considering the potentially affected environment, the Responsible Official should consider, as appropriate to the proposed action, any connected actions, the scope of the affected area (national, regional, or local), reasonably foreseeable trends and planned actions within that area, and the affected area’s natural and cultural resources.”); *id.*, § 6.1(g), at 23-24 (“*Connected action* means a separate Federal action within the authority of a Federal agency that is closely related to the proposed action and should be addressed in a

Addressing the Glen Canyon Dam infrastructure repair needed to allow water deliveries to the Lower Basin States during low Lake Powell elevations cannot be teased out of the “course of action” establishing rules for coordinated operation of Lakes Powell and Mead. Moreover, it is difficult to envision how significant repairs to Glen Canyon Dam to address uncorrected infrastructure limitations that directly impact how much water is released to the Lower Basin States during low-flow conditions do not constitute a “major federal action” subject to preparation of an EIS.¹⁰³

Fourth, the reasonable range of alternatives requirement¹⁰⁴ requires that Reclamation evaluate alternative methods to protect the infrastructure at Glen Canyon Dam other than relying solely on reducing releases to the Lower Basin to maintain a hard elevation floor.¹⁰⁵ Such alternatives could include, for instance, short-term or long-

single environmental document because the proposed agency action: (1) Automatically triggers the separate Federal action, which independently would require the preparation of additional environmental documents; (2) Cannot proceed unless the separate Federal action is taken previously or simultaneously; or (3) Is an interdependent part of a larger Federal action that includes a separate Federal action, which mutually depend on the larger Federal action for their justification.”).

¹⁰³ NEPA § 102(2)(C)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii); *see also San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell*, 747 F.3d 581, 646, 695 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[M]ajor federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” require an EIS, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Under applicable case law, when faced with operational or structural changes which “change the status quo” operation of an existing dam to reduce flows to downstream users “where there are substantial questions about whether [the changes] . . . may cause significant degradation of the human environment,” NEPA requires that Reclamation consider such changes in an EIS) (remanding to Reclamation to prepare an EIS to evaluate changes in a dam’s operation that “reduce the flow rate . . . in times of less precipitation”), *aff’g Delta Smelt Consol. Cases v. Salazar*, 686 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1030, (E.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that “impact of coordinated operations of the Central Valley Project” in a manner that changed the “water delivery operations . . . to restrict project water flows . . . substantially alters the status quo in the Projects’ operations” requiring Reclamation to consider such changes).

¹⁰⁴ *See Supra* discussion at § III.

¹⁰⁵ *See 'Ilio'ulaokalani Coalition v. Rumsfeld*, 464 F.3d 1083, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006) (“When the proposed action is an integral part of a coordinated plan to deal with a broad problem, the range of alternatives that must be evaluated is broadened.”) (cleaned up); *Friends of Yosemite v. Kempthorne*, 520 F.3d 1024, 1039 (9th Cir. 2007) (agency violated NEPA because the “the action alternatives were not varied enough to allow for a real, informed choice”); *Alaska Wilderness Recreation & Tourism Ass'n v. Morrison*, 67 F.3d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 1995) (“An agency

term repairs or modification of the infrastructure at Glen Canyon Dam, conservation or curtailment in the Upper Basin, revised operation of federal infrastructure upstream of Lake Powell, or operational regimes such as proposed in the Lower Basin Alternative—that, assuming Reclamation adheres to the Law of the River, would both protect the infrastructure at Lake Powell and provide legally sufficient deliveries to the Lower Basin.¹⁰⁶ Proceeding on the basis of a mistaken or invalid assumption—namely that Reclamation can maintain Lake Powell above elevation 3,490 feet solely by reducing releases from Glen Canyon Dam—would invalidate Reclamation's alternatives analysis in the EIS.

Fifth, as explained below, Reclamation's apparent top priority of maintaining Lake Powell's elevation above 3,490 feet at the sole expense of the Lower Basin directly contravenes numerous foundational elements of the Law of the River including the Compact, the 1944 Treaty with Mexico, LROC, and the Colorado River Basin Project Act Section 602.¹⁰⁷

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, Reclamation's failure to consider the Glen Canyon Dam infrastructure limitations and potential reparations of the same as part of the alternatives analysis violates NEPA and the Law of the River.

B. Reclamation Must Pursue An Engineering Solution Without Burdening Lower Basin Water Users

As indicated above, Reclamation repeatedly acknowledges that during low flow conditions, releases from Glen Canyon Dam may not satisfy water delivery requirements in order to protect Glen Canyon's damaged and impaired river outlet works. For example, Reclamation explains that the Enhanced Coordination Alternative:

seeks to protect critical infrastructure while benefitting key resources (such as environmental, hydropower, and recreation) through an approach to distributing storage between Lake Powell and Lake Mead that enhances the reservoirs' abilities to support the Basin. It applies a pro rata Lower Basin shortage distribution to evaluate the potential impacts of distributing reductions

must look at every reasonable alternative, with the range dictated by the nature and scope of the proposed action, and sufficient to permit a reasoned choice.”) (cleaned up).

¹⁰⁶ See *infra* p. 36.

¹⁰⁷ See *infra* § II, VI and accompanying text.

among all mainstream lower Colorado River water users in Arizona, Nevada, and California.¹⁰⁸

While that alternative encourages use of conservation pools in both reservoirs— “[w]ater conserved by Upper Basin users would be stored in a pool in Lake Powell that can reach a maximum volume of 2.0 maf” and “[w]ater held in the Lake Powell conservation pool would be converted to system water and combined with Lower Basin shortages to provide system benefits based on the shortage curve”—Reclamation makes clear that “the Lower Basin would take the balance of shortages” presumably on a “pro rata Lower Basin shortage distribution” basis.¹⁰⁹

Nothing in this alternative or other alternatives includes mechanisms in which the Lower Basin States and Upper Basin states both bear the burden of reduced deliveries and consumptive uses. Such an approach is not only grossly inequitable but violates the Compact for the reasons stated above. Nor does Reclamation provide any analysis of low flow operational outcomes utilizing a repaired river outlet works to ensure required deliveries to the Lower Basin States during low flow conditions after exhausting other “proactive conservation and water user flexibility” storage and non-system mechanisms.¹¹⁰ Rather, Reclamation assumes as a given that the Lower Basin States alone must suffer delivery shortages.

In summary, Reclamation asserts that the river outlet works cannot be used for “extended periods,” but never analyzes the impacts nor alternatives to the infrastructure limitation, other than to say it is studying the issue. Reclamation fails to consider utilizing the bypass tubes for short periods during low flow conditions to meet the delivery requirements to the Lower Basin States. Reclamation further ignores that the Compact expressly makes hydro pool levels subservient to domestic and agricultural uses.

V. Reclamation Violated NEPA By Failing to Consider and Carry Forward the Lower Basin States Alternative

NEPA requires that an agency include in its environmental analysis “a reasonable range of alternatives to the proposed agency action . . . that are technically and economically feasible, and meet the purpose and need of the proposal.”¹¹¹ DOI’s Handbook of NEPA Implementing Procedures clarifies that Reclamation must include both an analysis of adverse environmental effects as well as “any positive or beneficial environmental impacts of implementing the

¹⁰⁸ Draft EIS, Secs. 2.5.4.2, 2.6, at 2-16 (emphasis added).

¹⁰⁹ *Id.*, Sec. 2.6, at 2-16 to 2-21.

¹¹⁰ *Id.*, Sec. 2.6.3, at 2-21.

¹¹¹ NEPA § 102(2)(C)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii).

proposed action or any reasonable alternatives.”¹¹² Moreover, Reclamation must consider an alternative that stakeholders show to be reasonable and distinguishable from other alternatives considered. Indeed, “[t]he existence of a **viable but unexamined alternative** renders the environmental review conducted under NEPA inadequate,” especially when the alternative is proposed by stakeholders to be impacted by the proposed action.¹¹³

A. The Lower Basin States Submitted a Detailed, Viable Alternative that Reclamation Ignored

The Lower Basin Alternative takes a science-based approach to Colorado River management, as explained in the Lower Basin States’ letter to Reclamation dated March 6, 2024:

The Lower Basin Alternative shifts away from the reliance in the 2007 Interim Guidelines on the 24-Month Study forecasts and elevations in Lake Powell and Lake Mead to determine reservoir releases and Lower Basin shortages. This [Lower Basin] Alternative instead primarily uses actual hydrology and total system contents—a recognition that, whatever the elevation of a particular reservoir in the system may be, sustainable management must be focused on contents that are actually available in the system as a whole. “Total system contents” includes the contents of Flaming Gorge, Blue Mesa, Navajo, Powell, Mead, Mohave, and Havasu. In addition to more holistically managing the system, moving away from forecasts and reservoir elevations and instead relying on actual hydrology and system contents should reduce disagreements among and between the Basins that have resulted from reliance on Lake

¹¹² DOI NEPA Implementing Procedures, § 2.3(a)(2)-(3), at 13.

¹¹³ *Env’t Def. Ctr. v. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt.*, 36 F.4th 850, 877 (9th Cir. 2022) (emphasis added; cleaned up) (invalidating an environmental assessment for failing to consider stakeholder-proposed alternatives); *see also High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 951 F.3d 1217, 1224-27 (10th Cir. 2020) (invalidating an environmental impact statement for failing to consider a stakeholder-proposed alternative that met the Forest Service’s statutory mandate, its objectives for the project, and was significantly distinguishable from the alternatives considered); *Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. FAA*, 161 F.3d 569, 576 (9th Cir. 1998) (A “specific, detailed counterproposal that ha[s] a chance of success” must be considered by agency); *New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.*, 565 F.3d 683, 711 (10th Cir. 2009) (an agency must evaluate a commenter-proposed alternative that “falls within the agency’s statutory mandate” and meets “the agency’s objectives for a particular project.”).

Powell and Lake Mead elevations and 24-Month Study forecasts in the past.¹¹⁴

Furthermore, the Lower Basin Alternative addresses “the impacts of drought and climate change through a holistic and sustainable approach to the coordinated operations of Lake Powell and Lake Mead that improves predictability for water users” by:¹¹⁵

- **Addressing the structural deficit in the Lower Basin.** It includes reductions from Lower Basin state apportionments and deliveries to Mexico by 1.5 maf (static reduction) under most system conditions. The static reduction is larger than the structural deficit in the Lower Basin regardless of the various ways that the structural deficit may be calculated.¹¹⁶
- **Operating the reservoirs based on system contents rather than elevations at Lake Powell and Lake Mead.** It shifts to a more holistic, systemwide approach in which operations are dictated by overall system conditions instead of forecasts and elevations in the two main reservoirs.
- **Sharing water use reductions broadly.** It recognizes the need to make water use reductions from state apportionments under most system conditions and shares those reductions predictably among the Lower Basin water users and Mexico. Under the most critical system conditions, the Lower Basin Alternative shares water use reductions between the Upper Basin and Lower Basin including Mexico.
- **Including provisions for storage and delivery of stored water.** It includes opportunities for storage and augmentation that will encourage innovation and investment.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ Lower Basin States Alternatives Letter to Reclamation, at 3-4 (Mar. 6, 2024).

¹¹⁵ *Id.* at 2.

¹¹⁶ See generally Reclamation, Lower Colorado River Mainstream Evaporation and Riparian Evapotranspiration Losses Report (Dec. 2023), available at <https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/4200Rpts/LCRBEvapReport/LCRBEvapReport.pdf>.

¹¹⁷ See *id.* at 2-3. Originally, the Lower Basin Alternative included a Powell to Mead release regime designed to reflect Upper Basin “hydrologic shortage” by varying the release in part based upon use volumes in the Upper Basin. As discussed *infra*, the Lower Basin altered the approach to ensure that Lake Powell operates above critical elevations in a broader range of hydrologies.

B. Reclamation's Stated Reasons for Not Considering and Carrying Forward the Lower Basin Alternative Lack Merit

As explained above, despite the Lower Basin States' repeated efforts to help Reclamation understand the environmental and long-term operational benefits and advantages of the Lower Basin Alternative, Reclamation has steadfastly failed to consider and include the Lower Basin Alternative in its alternatives analysis. More recently, Reclamation includes the following explanation regarding its omission of any serious consideration of the Lower Basin Alternative:

Upon receiving the revised Upper Division and Lower Division States proposals, Reclamation performed preliminary modeling and concluded that the revisions did not sufficiently address the lack of an appropriate basis for the comprehensive and coordinated operations of Lake Powell and Lake Mead that, based on preliminary modeling results, was found lacking in the original proposals.¹¹⁸

The above explanation fails to provide a sufficient and documented basis for not including detailed analysis of the entire Lower Basin Alternative in the Draft EIS.

First, Reclamation provides no evidence or discussion in either the text of the Draft EIS or in the attached technical reports of "preliminary modeling" indicating that the Lower Basin Alternative failed to meet the purpose and need of the proposed action. This is particularly troubling given the degree to which Reclamation relies on modeling to support its alternatives analysis and provides the public with web-based modeling tools to better understand the various options.¹¹⁹ Yet, when repeatedly asked to conduct modeling and analysis of the Lower Basin Alternative, Reclamation failed to do so in a transparent fashion.

Second, had Reclamation actually applied its models to the Lower Basin Alternative, Reclamation would have concluded, as Nevada did, that the Lower Basin Alternative was viable and arguably satisfied the purpose and need in a more sustainable and scientifically-based approach that solves many of the deficiencies of the

¹¹⁸ Draft EIS, Sec. 2.1, at 2-2.

¹¹⁹ *See id.*, Sec. 2.1, at 2-1 ("To facilitate public understanding and input on the alternatives, since December 2023, Reclamation has developed and hosted the Post-2026 Operations Exploration Web Tool, an online platform that allows stakeholders, interested parties and the public to independently or collaboratively design, model and explore a wide range of creative operational strategies. Use of the platform is not considered formal input to the Post-2026 Process, but insights from the 500-plus operational strategies entered into the platform were used to inform alternatives.").

alternatives Reclamation carried forward in the Draft EIS. Specifically, attached hereto is a “Technical Memorandum – Lower Basin Alternative,” prepared by SNWA hydrological modeling experts which set forth the following findings:

- “The Lower Basin Alternative performs as well as, and in some cases better than, the [Draft EIS] alternatives in meeting the stated purpose and need and should have been explicitly represented as a [Draft] EIS alternative.”
- “The simulated near-term system conditions are highly sensitive to the forecast used to set the starting modeling conditions. What is considered favorable or less favorable operating conditions for Lake Powell and Lake Mead are largely shaped by the initial reservoir conditions used in the analysis, and relying on an outdated forecast to initialize the model does not accurately reflect reasonably foreseeable system conditions and understates the near-term resource risks associated with reservoir elevations.”¹²⁰

Third, in each alternative carried forward in the Draft EIS, Reclamation assumes the need to indefinitely (or at least for the foreseeable future) maintain the power pool elevation of 3,490 feet in Lake Powell to protect Glen Canyon Dam infrastructure. But that assumption is mistaken. The Lower Basin Alternative, particularly as amended, provides adequate protection of Lake Powell elevations.¹²¹ Moreover, as explained, Reclamation must evaluate alternative methods to protect the infrastructure at Glen Canyon Dam other than relying solely on reducing releases to the Lower Basin to maintain a hard elevation floor.¹²²

¹²⁰ SNWA, “Technical Memorandum – Lower Basin Alternative,” at 1 (Feb. 26, 2026).

¹²¹ See, e.g., Lower Basin States Alternatives Letter (Mar. 6, 2024), at 3 (“storage [opportunities provided by the alternative] will help to protect infrastructure and habitat and provide predictability for water users”); 6-7 (“[B]ased on our preliminary reviews, the Lower Basin Alternative is highly effective at keeping Lake Powell above critical elevations. Even during drier hydrologies, when Lake Powell’s elevation may temporarily fall below 3500 feet, the use of total system contents . . . improves flexibility to protect critical infrastructure by enabling the movement of water through the system as necessary for infrastructure protection and environmental flows while satisfying water delivery requirements and Compact obligations.”); email correspondence from Tom Buschatzke, *supra* n.13 (providing modification to Lower Basin Alternative to provide “refinements to the releases from Lake Powell” for “Lake Powell release[s] to avoid critical elevations”).

¹²² *Supra* discussion at § IV.

Fourth, notwithstanding the deficiencies in the alternatives contained in the Draft EIS and the fact that Reclamation declined to consider and carry forward the Lower Basin Alternative, we believe that between now and issuance of the Final EIS, Reclamation could adopt the attached “Nevada Proposed Approach to Short and Long-Term Operations,” which (like the Lower Basin Alternative) better meets the stated purpose and need of the proposed action than the alternatives advanced by Reclamation in the Draft EIS.¹²³

VI. The Draft EIS Alternatives Analysis Includes Other Legal Deficiencies in Violation of NEPA Which are Particularly Detrimental Nevada's Interests

A. Reclamation Failed to Include a Legally Sufficient No-Action Alternative

The no-action alternative “sets useful reference against which the effects of the proposed action (and any action alternatives) would be measured” and “the reasonably foreseeable environmental trends and planned actions as they would occur should the bureau not implement the proposed action or any action alternatives.”¹²⁴ The no action alternative must provide “a focused scientific and analytic comparison of the proposed action and alternatives.”¹²⁵ It also “represents a continuation of the affected environment absent the Federal action under consideration.”¹²⁶ The Draft EIS's no-action alternative fails to achieve these objectives.

The Draft EIS explains the following regarding the no-action alternative:

- “Reclamation based the No Action Alternative in this Draft EIS on the operating guidance that was in place before the adoption of the 2007 Interim Guidelines ROD (2007 ROD) to provide a reasonable representation of how the system would continue to operate if no additional operating guidelines were adopted.”¹²⁷
- “Before the 2007 Interim Guidelines were in place, the basis for operations was the LROC, under which the Secretary made a number of determinations at the beginning of each operating year through the development and execution of the AOP, including the water supply available to users in the Lower Basin and the annual release from Lake Powell. The LROC does not include specific guidelines

¹²³ SNWA, “Nevada Proposed Approach to Short and Long-Term Operations” (Feb. 26, 2026).

¹²⁴ DOI NEPA Implementing Procedures, Appx. 1, at 39.

¹²⁵ *Id.* at 40.

¹²⁶ *Id.* at 41.

¹²⁷ Draft EIS, Sec. 2.4, at 2-6.

for such determinations, so the outcome of the annual determination in any particular year in the future could not be precisely known.”¹²⁸

- “[T]he Secretary makes a determination each year as to whether the consumptive use requirements of mainstream users in the Lower Division states will be met under a Normal, Surplus, or Shortage Condition. The LROC specify that the Secretary will consider all relevant factors in making a shortage determination and list some of the factors to be considered. However, there is no specific guidance as to exactly when, how, or to whom reductions in deliveries would be made. Therefore, **it is impossible to know exactly how the Secretary might make a shortage determination from year to year in the future.**”¹²⁹
- “The distribution of the shortages, summarized in Table 2-1, would be based on the interpretation of priority from the Consolidated Decree and CRBPA; not the distribution adopted in expiring guidelines . . . **Certain Lower Basin Colorado River water rights are “present perfected rights” or “PPRs,” which the Consolidated Decree quantified and defined as existing on June 25, 1929 (the effective date of the BCPA). PPRs are the highest priority Colorado River water rights.**”¹³⁰

Even if we were to concur with Reclamation’s decision to base the no-action alternative on the pre-2007 regulatory regime (i.e., application of the LROC and “present perfected rights”), we disagree that, for purposes of establishing a baseline, Reclamation can forego any disclosure of how the Secretary might make “shortage determinations.” Lead agencies frequently must establish “snapshot in time” baseline conditions using rolling averages, bounded (upper and lower) limits, modeling, and other recognized approaches provided the technical assumptions are fully disclosed. But such assumptions must be consistent with an agency’s transparent interpretations of its legal authority and applicable regulatory requirements.¹³¹ Here, Reclamation has provided no transparency with respect to how

¹²⁸ *Id.*

¹²⁹ *Id.*, Sec. 2.4.1.1, at 2-6 to 2-7 (emphasis added).

¹³⁰ *Id.* at 2-7 & n.8 (emphasis added).

¹³¹ See *Great Basin Res. Watch v. BLM*, 844 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 2016) (An agency “may estimate baseline conditions using data from a similar area, computer modeling, or some other reasonable method” but “whatever method the agency uses, its assessment of baseline conditions must be based on accurate information and defensible reasoning.”) (cleaned up).

Reclamation plans to apply the present perfected rights, which Reclamation concedes “are the highest priority Colorado River water rights.”¹³²

Reclamation introduces additional uncertainty regarding the no-action alternative: “While assumptions for adjustments to Lake Powell releases to forestall reaching physical elevation 3,490 feet have not been developed for this alternative, Reclamation maintains the **authority to modify operations to protect Glen Canyon Dam infrastructure.**”¹³³ While Reclamation claims such authority, it asserts that it has not developed the “assumptions” needed for adjustments to Lake Powell releases to protect the Glen Canyon dam and forestall infrastructure damage.¹³⁴ Without setting forth the “assumptions” supporting the “adjustments” needed to protect the Glen Canyon Dam, and the nature and extent of its authority, the no-action alternative lacks the clarity and specificity needed to establish baseline operations during low flow conditions. Courts have invalidated no-action alternatives that failed to provide sufficient details, clarity, and transparency to establish a baseline from which to compare reasonable alternatives.¹³⁵

Similarly, Reclamation fails to explain how, when, and under what circumstances it would make “shortage determinations” under its LROC authority. Reclamation acknowledges that LROC Article II(2) requires it to “maintain a minimum release of water from Lake Powell of 8.23 [maf],” but that the Lower and Upper Basin states “have **different legal positions** regarding how this LROC statement incorporates other Law of the River elements to determine annual releases. Reclamation also recognizes that variation in releases of water above and below the minimum objective release of 8.23 maf can, in **appropriate circumstances**, be adopted.”¹³⁶ Yet, nowhere in its NEPA analysis does Reclamation explain what it believes are the “appropriate circumstances.” Moreover, the fact that the basin states have different legal positions is irrelevant to the need for Reclamation to disclose the agency’s own understanding

¹³² Draft EIS, Sec. 2.4.1.1, at 2-7 & n.8 (emphasis added).

¹³³ *Id.*, Sec. 2.4.2.3 at 2-10 (emphasis added).

¹³⁴ *Id.*

¹³⁵ *Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Scarlett*, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1105 (E.D. Cal. 2006) *aff'd*, *Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Kempthorne*, 520 F.3d 1024, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding agency’s no-action alternative invalid because agency improperly defined the baseline); *N.C. Wildlife Fed’n v. N.C. DOT*, 677 F.3d 596, 604-05 (4th Cir. 2012); *see also Great Basin Res. Watch v. BLM*, 844 F.3d 1095, 1101-04 (9th Cir. 2016) (baseline condition discussion).

¹³⁶ *Id.*, Sec. 2.4.2, at 2-9.

of its legal obligations under the no action alternative in the event of low flow conditions. Rather, Reclamation claims that “it is impossible to know.”¹³⁷

DOI’s NEPA regulations require that the responsible bureau official ensure the “scientific integrity” of the NEPA analysis by “using reliable data and resources.”¹³⁸ The preamble to DOI’s NEPA regulations emphasizes the importance of doing so in connection with preparing the no action and other alternatives.¹³⁹ Courts have made clear that agencies cannot hide behind legal or scientific uncertainty, but must transparently disclose the technical and legal basis underlying the proposed action and the “no action” alternative.¹⁴⁰

B. Reclamation’s “Basic Coordination Alternative” Fails to Meet the Project’s Purpose and Need

The Draft EIS explains that the “Basic Coordination Alternative” is “designed to be implementable without agreements among Basin water users regarding distributions of lower Colorado River mainstream shortages, storage and delivery of conserved water from system reservoirs, or other voluntary agreements . . . **under an increasingly broad range of potential future hydrologic conditions would be more challenging than under historical operations** and would result in a number of highly undesirable consequences for many users.”¹⁴¹

We concur that given the decades-long megadrought trend, it is critical that Reclamation consider alternatives reflecting increasingly low flows. This reality is explicitly mentioned in the project purpose and need statement:

[The] [i]mbalance between water supply and demand will be exacerbated by increasingly likely low-runoff conditions: The Basin is experiencing increased aridity due to climate variability, and **long-term drought and low-runoff conditions are expected in the future**. These conditions will exacerbate the now widely recognized **imbalance between water supply and demand in the Basin**. Robust and flexible guidelines are needed to manage the Colorado River system

¹³⁷ *Id.*, Sec. 2.4.1.1, at 2-6 to 2-7.

¹³⁸ 46 C.F.R. § 46.105(c).

¹³⁹ See 91 Fed. Reg. 8738, 8738-39 (Feb. 24, 2026) (“NEPA further mandates that federal agencies ensure the professional and scientific integrity of environmental documents; use reliable data and resources when carrying out NEPA; and study, develop, and describe technically and economically feasible **alternatives**.”) (emphasis added).

¹⁴⁰ See *Lands Council v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 395 F.3d 1019, 1032 (9th Cir. 2004) (NEPA requires up front disclosure of informational shortcomings).

¹⁴¹ Draft EIS, Sec. 2.5, at 2-11 (emphasis added).

and its resources under a broad range of potential future hydrologic conditions.¹⁴²

The project purpose and need also acknowledges, as it must, that the expiring 2007 Interim Guidelines “are not robust enough to manage the system in a way that is sufficiently protective of the resources dependent on the Colorado River More robust and adaptive guidelines are needed for the efficient and sustainable management of the major mainstream Colorado River reservoirs and system resources.”¹⁴³ Thus, much more must be done to manage the Colorado River system.

Notwithstanding the project purpose and need, and priority deliveries to the Lower Basin that Reclamation must honor, Reclamation admits that the Basic Coordination Alternative “may not provide adequate protection of critical infrastructure or the system and may be viable only in the short term given current reservoir conditions.”¹⁴⁴ To remedy this situation, in the event the Basic Coordination Alternative is selected, Reclamation plans to “identify the conditions under which further action would be required, including adjustment of operations and prompt action to seek **additional authorities**, if needed.”¹⁴⁵ Reclamation should have screened the Basic Coordination Alternative and explained why it was eliminated from detailed study given that Reclamation admits it is not likely to meet the project purpose and need.¹⁴⁶

Reclamation admits that it has significant operational authority although the precise scope and parameters of which may not be entirely clear or may be debatable:

[T]he Secretary has the vested authority and responsibility to operate the System through coordinated operations, including the ability to respond to exigent and emergency conditions, pursuant to applicable federal law, the Decree, contractual obligations, and other elements of the Law of the River. The full extent of Reclamation’s operational authority has not been tested to date—either operationally or through legislative or judicial review. Accordingly, Reclamation’s description of how this alternative would be implemented relies on legal, operational, and engineering judgment regarding future operations under a broad range of hydrologic conditions This alternative proposes that

¹⁴² *Id.*, Sec. 1.3, at 1-6.

¹⁴³ *Id.*

¹⁴⁴ *Id.*, Sec. 2.5, at 2-11.

¹⁴⁵ *Id.* at 2-11 to 2-12 (emphasis added).

¹⁴⁶ See DOI NEPA Implementing Procedures, § 2.3(a)(3), at 13.

the Secretary may seek new authorities to implement additional measures to protect critically low elevations at Lake Mead including additional shortages to Lower Basin water users.¹⁴⁷

However, the lack of case law delineating Reclamation's authority in no way reduces NEPA's requirement to adequately describe the authority and jurisdiction it does have to implement a reasonable range of alternatives. It may well be appropriate for Reclamation at a future date to request additional statutory or contractual authority to meet the project purpose and need in the long-term. But Reclamation cannot hide behind a "future" request for authority to fully comply with NEPA.¹⁴⁸

Furthermore, Reclamation emphasizes the importance of the Basin States developing a consensus-based approach.¹⁴⁹ We agree that ideally the Basin States could have (and should have) reached a consensus approach for implementing enhanced conservation and allocation reductions. The Basin States have failed to do so. As a result, Reclamation should have provided an alternative that included mandatory conservation measures and reductions in consumptive uses under its existing authority as part of the Basic Coordination Alternative in order to meet the project purpose and need.

The most Reclamation appears to disclose regarding operations under this alternative during low flow conditions is the following: "If on October 1 Lake Powell is projected to fall below 3,500 feet within the upcoming WY, Reclamation would consider **additional measures** as necessary to protect critically low elevations, consistent with the Law of the River."¹⁵⁰ These "additional measures" remain undisclosed; however, they do not include "upper basin

¹⁴⁷ DEIS, Sec. 2.5 at 2-11, 2-13 n.6.

¹⁴⁸ *Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Jewell*, 740 F.3d 489, 497-98 (9th Cir. 2014) ("NEPA is not designed to postpone analysis of an environmental consequence to the last possible moment. Rather, it is designed to require such analysis as soon as it can reasonably be done.") (citation omitted); *Half Moon Bay Fishermans' Mktg. Asso. v. Carlucci*, 857 F.2d 505, 508 (9th Cir. 1988) (disclosing information after EIS defeats NEPA's goal of encouraging public participation during the decision-making process).

¹⁴⁹ See, e.g., Draft EIS, Sec. 2.2, at 2-3 ("Achieving a consensus-based approach to Basin reservoir operations has **proved critical to the long-term operating success of the Basin**. Given the importance of a consensus-based approach to operations in terms of the stability of the system, the Department will continue to pursue an agreement among various Basin entities.") (emphasis added).

¹⁵⁰ *Id.*, Sec. 2.5.2.1, at 2-15 (emphasis added).

conservation” purportedly because such measures “would require agreements outside of Reclamation’s control.”¹⁵¹

Furthermore, Reclamation explains that: “The maximum shortage volume is set at a level estimated by Reclamation to ensure that an assumed minimum flow is available for infrastructure protection and delivery for municipal use by [Central Arizona Project] users and other Fourth Priority mainstem entitlement holders in Arizona when mainstream shortage is distributed by priority.”¹⁵² Reclamation should be more specific as to the quantity of Arizona water reserved in their shortage calculation for the Basic Coordination Alternative.

C. Reclamation Failed to Include an Alternative Consisting of Voluntary and Mandatory Conservation Measures and Reductions

Reclamation explains that the proposed action is intended to promote water conservation:

- “Approaches that include opportunities for **conservation**, augmentation, demand management, or other water management strategies.”¹⁵³
- “**Expanded and innovative use of conservation** is needed: Recognizing the anticipated future low-runoff conditions in the Basin, the Department has also determined a need for guidelines that provide Colorado River water users, including Basin Tribes, expanded opportunities to conserve, store, and take subsequent delivery of water in and from Lake Mead and/or Lake Powell. The guidelines should also support and integrate future efficiency improvements and opportunities for augmentation.”¹⁵⁴
- “The purpose for the proposed federal action is to . . . provide additional mechanisms for the conservation, storage, and delivery of water supplies.”¹⁵⁵

Yet, Reclamation misses the opportunity to fully evaluate voluntary and mandatory enhanced conservation efforts. And it fails to sufficiently describe specific legal authority to impose mandatory conservation measures or incentivize voluntary conservation measures on the Basin States and Tribes. These points are discussed below.

¹⁵¹ *Id.*, Sec. 2.5.4.1, at 2-16.

¹⁵² *Id.*, Sec. 2.5.1.1, at 2-12.

¹⁵³ *Id.*, Sec. 1.2, at 1-5.

¹⁵⁴ *Id.*, Sec. 1.3, at 1-6.

¹⁵⁵ *Id.*, Sec. 1.3, at 1-7.

First, notwithstanding the stated purpose to promote water conservation measures, Reclamation contradicts itself by stating that it does not consider Upper Basin conservation measures in the NEPA analysis:

With respect to Upper Basin conservation, the nexus to the proposed federal action is the storage and delivery of that conserved water in Lake Powell. The effects of this storage in and delivery from Lake Powell are within the scope of the EIS, while specific activities that may be undertaken in the Upper Basin to generate the conserved water are not within the scope of this EIS. Any such activities are unknown at this time and will not necessarily require federal decision making. Any federal decisions associated with these conservation activities will be assessed outside of this EIS.¹⁵⁶

Reclamation provides no reason why it could not have requested information from the Upper Basin States documenting voluntary and mandatory conservation efforts currently underway and those planned for the future. If the Upper Basin States had nothing to report or refused to cooperate, that fact should have been noted in the analysis. But because the Draft EIS is not analyzing voluntary Upper Basin States conservation efforts/activities, this purpose of promoting water conservation is not satisfied under any of the alternatives.

A comprehensive conservation analysis would evaluate (a) existing and future voluntary conservation measures, (b) future incentivized water conservation measures, (c) mandatory water conservation measures, and (d) water conservation measures resulting from reductions in consumptive uses. Reclamation considers conservation efforts and programs underway in the Lower Basin but not the Upper Basin, and it provides no explanation for the disparate treatment of the two basins.¹⁵⁷ Reclamation's failure is particularly troubling given that Reclamation admits that failure to incorporate conservation measures in the modeling affects

¹⁵⁶ *Id.*, Sec. 1.5, at 1-9.

¹⁵⁷ *E.g.*, ICS Creation, DCP cuts (2019), 500K Plan, 1.5M Plan.

the impacts analysis during low flow conditions.¹⁵⁸ The time to evaluate conservation measures is now, not in the future when the Upper Basin States warm to the idea or the well runs dry.¹⁵⁹

Second, Reclamation states that a purpose of the proposed action is to “[p]rovide Colorado River water users a greater degree of **predictability** with respect to annual water availability in future years under anticipated increasing variability, low runoff, and low reservoir conditions.”¹⁶⁰ “Predictability” increases when the public knows the specific conservation programs/demand-reduction strategies that will be implemented. In contrast, Reclamation’s failure to include an analysis of conservation measures gives Upper Basin States ongoing license to not implement verifiable water conservation measures and strategies.

Third, the Draft EIS describes the opportunity for Tribes to store their unused water in the Lake Powell and Lake Mead in conservation pools or use conserved water as an Upper Basin conservation water volume.¹⁶¹ Reclamation should analyze the significant legal and technical questions regarding the availability of unused Tribal water for these purposes, including the extent to which previous beneficial use of such water has been measured and reported to ensure that credited volumes actually benefit the system and don’t represent a mere accounting of paper water rights. Reclamation should prepare supplemental analyses excluding unused Tribal water in the event of legal impediments so that the impacts of this element may be presented to the public and used in making a reasonable choice among alternatives.

¹⁵⁸ “The [Shortage Allocation Model] used to inform the [decision making under deep uncertainty] analysis **do not incorporate water management measures such as conservation programs or demand-reduction strategies**. These measures do not change entitlement amounts or shortages; however, as described in the affected environment section, **conservation programs and other management strategies can influence domestic water demand and help mitigate the operational pressures associated with shortage, uncertain supply, and population growth**.” See Draft EIS, Tech. Appx. 17, Sec. TA 17.2.3, at 17-29 (emphasis added).

¹⁵⁹ See generally *Grand Canyon Tr. v. Bureau of Reclamation*, 691 F.3d 1008, 1022 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The time for an agency to give a hard look at environmental consequences, and the opportunity for serious NEPA litigation on whether alternatives were adequately considered . . . [is when] an agency establishes operating criteria for a dam, or embarks on some significant shift of direction in operating policy.”).

¹⁶⁰ Draft EIS, Executive Summary, Sec. ES 1.1, at ES-5 (emphasis added).

¹⁶¹ Draft EIS, Sec. 2.6.3.3, at 2-22; Sec. 2.6.4.1., at 2-23; Sec. 2.8.4.1, at 2-35; Appx. B, Sec. B.6.1.2, at B-20).

Fourth, Reclamation states in its modeling assumptions that “[a]t low lake levels, the storage credits in Lake Powell may exceed the total storage in Lake Powell.”¹⁶² More information is needed on how this could occur and how it would affect releases from Lake Powell. Sufficient releases to satisfy the Compact should not be hindered by any Powell conservation water because the Lake exists most prominently to satisfy the Treaty with Mexico and the Compact.

D. Reclamation Failed to Identify a Preferred Alternative in the Draft EIS

Reclamation “has not identified a Preferred Alternative in this Draft EIS.”¹⁶³ Reclamation’s decision not to identify a preferred alternative in the Draft EIS is inconsistent with NEPA and the Law of the River. As a general matter, NEPA does not impose the statutory requirement that the lead federal agency identify a “preferred alternative” in the Draft EIS. However, prior to their rescission, the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) rules required that agencies identify in the draft NEPA document the agency’s preferred alternative if one existed unless another law prohibited such a preference.¹⁶⁴ This approach was consistent with NEPA guidance dating back to 1981: “The ‘agency’s preferred alternative’ is the alternative which the agency believes would fulfill its **statutory mission** and responsibilities, giving consideration to economic, environmental, technical and other factors.”¹⁶⁵

Since the CEQ regulations are rescinded, DOI and other agencies are developing their own NEPA implementing regulations and guidance.¹⁶⁶ DOI’s recently issued guidance tracks the CEQ 1981 guidance, i.e., the decision to include a preferred alternative is based on the agency’s mission and applicable regulatory requirements: “NEPA does not require bureaus to identify a preferred alternative in an EA or an EIS, although it may be helpful for situations in which the bureau considers a broad range of alternatives. [The bureaus] **should review program-specific requirements on this issue.**”¹⁶⁷ Furthermore, Bureaus should use their expert judgment and

¹⁶² See Draft EIS, Appx. B, Sec. B.2.1, at B-3.

¹⁶³ Draft EIS, Sec. 2.1, at 2-3.

¹⁶⁴ See 89 Fed. Reg. 35,442, 35,565 (May 1, 2024); (40 C.F.R. 1502.14(d) (“Identify the agency’s preferred alternative or alternatives, if one or more exists, in the draft statement and identify such alternative in the final statement unless another law prohibits the expression of such a preference.”). Identifying preferred alternatives in draft NEPA documents (especially those that are environmentally preferable) “will increase transparency and allow the public to comment on it.” 89 Fed. Reg. at 35,504.

¹⁶⁵ 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,027 (Mar. 23, 1981) (emphasis added).

¹⁶⁶ 36 Fed. Reg. 10,610 (Feb. 25, 2025) (removal of NEPA implementing regulations).

¹⁶⁷ See DOI NEPA Implementing Procedures, Appx. 1, at 39 (emphasis added).

exercise their discretion in identifying the reasonable alternatives, which must be **technically and economically 'feasible.'**"¹⁶⁸

Choosing a preferred alternative in the Draft EIS would have been helpful to all stakeholders—especially to the Basin States as they attempt to reach a “consensus approach”—so that they know what Reclamation believes to be the most “technically and economically feasible” alternatives to meet the purpose and need of the proposed action.

More importantly, the DOI guidance advises bureaus that agency personnel “should review **program-specific requirements** on [the] issue” of whether to include a preferred alternative in the Draft EIS. This direction makes clear that such requirements may eliminate the discretion not to set forth a preferred alternative.¹⁶⁹ In this context, as set forth in the non-exhaustive list of legal authority summarized below, the Law of the River contains numerous “program-specific requirements” pursuant to which the Secretary has various mandatory duties that mandate development of an agency preferred alternative under which Reclamation satisfies its legal obligations pertaining to Colorado River operations:

- **Colorado River Compact:** The Supreme Court has recognized that “interstate [water] compacts” enable “the federal government” to defend “distinctively federal interests” in litigation and, short of litigation, such compacts “inextricably intertwine[]” federal water projects with “Downstream Contracts” under which the federal government “assume[s] a **legal responsibility** to deliver a certain amount of water.”¹⁷⁰ That is equally true in the case of the Colorado River Compact which imposes legal obligation on Reclamation to deliver water to satisfy its Treaty obligations with Mexico and water delivery contracts in the Lower Basin.
- **Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928 (“BCPA”):**¹⁷¹ This act (1) ratified the 1922 Compact; (2) authorized the construction of Hoover Dam and related irrigation facilities in the lower Basin; (3) apportioned the lower basin's 7.5 maf among the states of Arizona (2.8 maf), California (4.4 maf) and Nevada (0.3 maf); and (4) authorized and directed the Secretary of the Interior to function as the sole contracting authority for Colorado River water use in the lower basin. Relevant legal authorities include BCPA § 4 (establishing the Lower Basin State’s allocations), BCPA

¹⁶⁸ *Id.*

¹⁶⁹ *See id.* at 38-39.

¹⁷⁰ *See Texas v. New Mexico*, 602 U.S. 943, 955 (2024) (quoting *Texas v. New Mexico*, 583 U.S. 407, 413 (2018) (emphasis added)).

¹⁷¹ 45 Stat. 1057, as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 617 et seq.

§ 5 (establishing that no one can divert Colorado River water in the Lower Basin without having a delivery contract with Secretary of the Interior).

- **Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956 (“CRSP Act”):**¹⁷² This act addresses construction and operation of the CRSP reservoirs, provides a comprehensive Upper Basin-wide water resource development plan, and authorizes the construction of Glen Canyon, Flaming Gorge, Navajo and Curecanti dams for river regulation and power production, as well as projects for irrigation and other uses.
- **Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968 (“CRBP Act”):**¹⁷³ CRBP § 602(a) provides that “to comply with and carry out the provisions of the Colorado River Compact [of 1922], the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, and the Mexican Water Treaty, the Secretary shall propose criteria for the coordinated long-range operation of [the CRSP reservoirs and Lake Mead] The criteria shall make provision for the storage of water in [CRSP Reservoirs] and releases of water from Lake Powell in the following listed order of priority: (1) releases to supply one-half the deficiency described in article III(c) of the Colorado River Compact, if any such deficiency exists and is chargeable to the States of the Upper Division[.]; (2) releases to comply with article III(d) of the Colorado River Compact, less such quantities of water delivered into the Colorado River below Lee Ferry to the credit of the States of the Upper Division from other sources; and (3) storage of water not required for the releases specified in clauses (1) and (2) of this subsection to the extent the Secretary . . . shall find this to be reasonably necessary to assure deliveries under clauses (1) and (2) without impairment of annual consumptive uses in the Upper Basin pursuant to the Colorado River Compact: Provided, That water not so required to be stored shall be released from Lake Powell: (i) to the extent it can be reasonably applied in the States of the Lower Division to the uses specified in article III(e) of the Colorado River Compact [except when] the active storage in Lake Powell is less than the active storage in Lake Mead, (ii) to maintain, as nearly as practicable, active storage in Lake Mead equal to the active storage in Lake Powell[.]”
- **43 C.F.R. Part 417 (“Procedural Methods for Implementing Colorado River Water Conservation Measures with Lower Basin Contractors and Others”):**¹⁷⁴ These regulations implement the BCP Act and *Arizona v. California*, 376 U.S. 340 (1964) (the “1964 Decree”), and require, among other things, that Reclamation to make annual determinations of each contractor’s water orders to ensure “that deliveries

¹⁷² 70 Stat. 105, 43 U.S.C. §§ 620–620o.

¹⁷³ P.L. No. 90-357, 82 Stat. 885 (Sep. 30, 1968) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1521(b)).

¹⁷⁴ 37 Fed. Reg. 18076 (Sep. 7, 1972).

of Colorado River water to each Contractor will not exceed those reasonably required for beneficial use.”¹⁷⁵ In addition, under the regulations, Reclamation may limit irrigation methods, crop types and cropping practices, amount and rate of return flows, and impose other limitations designed to conserve water.¹⁷⁶

Given the above mandatory duties arising from its authority to establish reservoir operating parameters, Reclamation’s failure to provide a preferred alternative that describes how such authority would be exercised during low flow conditions under the post-2026 operations guidelines violates NEPA and defeats NEPA’s main purpose as recently articulated by the Supreme Court: “The law ensures that the agency and the public are aware of the environmental consequences of proposed projects. Properly applied, NEPA helps agencies to make better decisions and to ensure good project management.”¹⁷⁷

E. Reclamation Failed to Consider Under Each Alternative Lake Mead’s Protection Pool and Conservation Reserve and Interrelationships with SNWA’s Intentionally Created Surplus Accounts

As explained above, SNWA relies on Intentionally Created Surplus (ICS) and Tributary ICS water. Similarly, the Lake Mead Protection Pool promotes conservation opportunities for Basin Tribes. While SNWA and CRCNV acknowledge and appreciate that Reclamation referenced these conservation measures in the Draft EIS, SNWA and CRCNV provide the following comments and criticism of the analysis of the same.

First, one element of the Enhanced Coordination Alternative is the Lake Mead Protection Pool.¹⁷⁸ Reclamation explains that “[t]he Protection Pool could be used for a range of purposes, including, but not limited to, meeting federal firming obligations, other federal delivery obligations, protecting Lower Basin water supplies, protecting infrastructure, and providing environmental benefits.”¹⁷⁹ Similarly, the Maximum Operational Flexibility Alternative proposes establishment of a “Conservation Reserve” as “a flexible tool for water conservation and management.”¹⁸⁰ The Draft EIS explains that “Reclamation would determine how to allocate the Conservation Reserve volume . . . to meet . . . resource goals”¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁵ 43 C.F.R. § 417.2.

¹⁷⁶ *Id.* § 417.3.

¹⁷⁷ *Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle Cnty.*, 605 U.S. 168, 177 (2025).

¹⁷⁸ See Draft EIS, Sec. 2.6.3, at 2-21.

¹⁷⁹ *Id.*, Appx. B, Sec. B.6.3, at B-29.

¹⁸⁰ *Id.*, Sec. 2.7, at 2-23 to 2-24.

¹⁸¹ *Id.*, Appx. B, Sec. B.7, at B-33.

Furthermore, “[a]t Reclamation’s discretion and in coordination with appropriate Basin entities, additional adjustments to Lake Powell [Water Year] release volumes could be made to mitigate potential negative impacts to resources between Glen Canyon Dam and Hoover Dam.”¹⁸²

Nevada notes that the Draft EIS text pertaining to the Lake Mead and Powell protection/conservation pools is treated strikingly different than another element related to pro rata shortage sharing, namely this description found in the Enhanced Coordination Alternative: “[A]dditional agreements and other legal authorities would be needed to implement any pro rata operations that are inconsistent with the Decree.”¹⁸³

At a minimum, Reclamation fails to acknowledge any additional agreements and other legal authorities that would be needed to operate the Lake Mead and Lake Powell protection/conservation pools as described. There are no equivalent qualifying statements recognizing the need for additional agreements or other legal authorities for the Conservation Reserve described in the Maximum Operational Flexibilities alternative. Because there are unresolved issues associated with controlling and operating the Lake Mead Protection Pool and Conservation Reserve, including potential connected federal actions that may be subject to inclusion in the Draft EIS, Reclamation must provide an explanation of potential additional agreements and legal authorities that may be needed to effectuate these elements, and then incorporate these actions into the proposed actions, as appropriate.

Second, the alternatives analysis should include not only existing, but also the creation and release of new, Tributary Conservation ICS. The Interim Guidelines creating this conservation mechanism state that “the provisions of this Forbearance Agreement for creation, and release . . . of Tributary Conservation ICS shall continue in full force and effect after termination of this Forbearance Agreement until the earlier of (1) the termination of the period provided in the ROD for the creation, release, and use of Tributary Conservation ICS and Imported ICS, or (2) fifty years from the date of execution of this Forbearance Agreement.”¹⁸⁴

¹⁸² *Id.*, Sec. 2.6.2.3, at 2-20.

¹⁸³ *Id.*, Sec. 2.6, at 2-16 and n.18.

¹⁸⁴ LCR ICS Forbearance Agreement, at 5 (executed December 13, 2007), available at <https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/documents.html>. The Forbearance Agreement and SNWA’s Delivery Agreement provide the legal basis for any ICS or other conserved water that is created by SNWA to remain available in Lake Mead for SNWA’s exclusive benefit until SNWA requests delivery of the ICS. ICS creation and delivery benefits are also available during periods of declared shortage through two mechanisms. The Developed Shortage Supply (DSS) mechanism found in Section 4 of the 2007 Interim Guidelines allows for the creation and delivery of some types of ICS during a declared shortage, and Exhibit 1 to Attachment B of the Agreement Concerning Colorado River Drought Contingency Management

For SNWA's Tributary Conservation ICS from the Muddy and Virgin rivers, both these timelines end in 2057. Yet, the Draft EIS fails to adequately describe that for all alternatives, including the No Action Alternative, SNWA is authorized to create and deliver Tributary Conservation ICS to 2057.

Third, the significant reduction in volumes available for Nevada to create, store, and deliver ICS in the Enhanced Coordination and Maximum Operational Flexibility alternatives is arbitrary and unacceptable. Similarly, it is not clear how or whether Reclamation intends to protect ICS that is stored in Lake Mead, or to allow deliveries of ICS water to other uses as Lake Mead declines. Given the existing legal and binding agreements governing ICS water to which Reclamation is a party, SNWA's volume of ICS, Drought Contingency Plan ICS, and Developed Shortage Supply water should not be delivered to other contractors even if the Secretary of the Interior declares a shortage condition exists. As the smallest State entitlement holder and most sustainable water conservation actor in the Colorado River Basin, Nevada must specifically be allowed to at minimum retain the opportunity to create, store, and deliver ICS at or above current allowances. Reclamation should prepare supplemental analyses adopting Nevada ICS volumes across all of the alternatives that are at or above the current volumes allowed. As analyzed, the Enhanced Coordination and Maximum Operational Flexibility alternatives include ICS volumes that are insufficient and unacceptable to Nevada, and they represent roadblocks toward Nevada achieving water security. Moreover as a general matter, modifications should be made under extremely limited circumstances such that ICS that is stored in Lake Mead is available when Lake Mead is below elevation 1,025 feet to the contractor that stored the water if sufficient protections can be provided to satisfy the public health, safety, and welfare needs of municipal water users.

Fourth, the Draft EIS includes modeling assumptions that indicate that both the creation and delivery of Tributary Conservation ICS is considered, but the more important description of alternatives found in Chapter 2 does not.¹⁸⁵ The alternatives analysis should include not only existing, but also creation and release of new Tributary Conservation ICS.

Fifth, the Maximum Operational Flexibility Alternative does not utilize Lake Mead storage as part of the Glen Canyon Dam release determinations, but Lower Basin shortages are based on the combined system storage. Modifying Glen Canyon Dam releases based on a system wide storage approach would improve reservoir coordination.

and Operations authorizes the creation and delivery of Drought Contingency Plan ("DCP") ICS during periods of declared shortage.

¹⁸⁵ See Draft EIS Appx. B, Secs. B.4.2.5, B.6.2.5, and B.8.2.5. For example, Draft EIS, Sec. 2.1.3.2 references only the delivery of ICS that remains in Lake Mead in 2027.

Sixth, Appendix B mentions that lower priority water users, such as MWD, CAP, and SNWA, would not be able to take delivery of unused water from the Lower Division Tribes stored in the Protection Pool, but Appendix H states that some Arizona Priority 4 users would. Appendix H should explain which contracts are unable to take delivery.

F. Reclamation Failed to Consider Nevada's Contract Rights to Withdraw Lake Mead Water During Dead Pool Conditions

Nevada appears to be included in the group of water users to which dead pool-related reductions are distributed; however, this assumption fails to recognize that SNWA is able to take delivery of water in Lake Mead at dead pool elevation while other water users are not. Specifically, the Boulder Canyon Project Act ("BCPA") contract includes a provision regarding the "[d]elivery of Water by the United States" which states that the "United States shall . . . deliver to the Authority such quantities of water as may be determined reasonably required for beneficial use by the Authority within the limitations hereinafter specified and to the extent such water is available for delivery to Nevada."¹⁸⁶ Moreover, SNWA's third drinking water intake and low lake level pumping station provide the facilities necessary to ensure that any water that may be stored below dead pool is available for delivery to SNWA.¹⁸⁷ Under dead pool elevations, while stored water is unavailable to all other BCPA contract holders, it is exclusively available to SNWA. This fact should be included in and analyzed the alternatives analysis.

G. Reclamation Failed to Analyze for Each Alternative Equitable Reductions of Evaporation and Storage Losses

Reclamation indicates that the Hydrologic Model used in the NEPA analysis included evaporation rates for reservoirs.¹⁸⁸ While the modeling assumptions do include an annual evaporation deduction (equal to the conservation pool's proportional share of total evaporation in Powell), none of the alternatives nor modeling assumptions include any complete analysis in parity with the Lower Basin's. As SNWA has previously indicated to Reclamation, equivalent equitable reductions of evaporation and storage losses remain an important element which should be adopted into one or more alternatives and included in the impacts analysis.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁶ SNWA Contract for Delivery of Colorado River Water, Contract No. 2-07-30-W0266, § 4(a) (1992); see also Contract No. 2-07-30-W0266 Amendment No. 1, § 4(a) (1994).

¹⁸⁷ SNWA 2026 Water Resource Plan, at 8, 23.

¹⁸⁸ See Draft EIS, Sec. 3.2.4, at 3-7.

¹⁸⁹ See Letter from John Entsminger (SNWA) and Eric Witkoski (CRCNV) to Tanya Trujillo (Dec. 20, 2022).

Moreover, a lack of parity of creation and evaporation/loss assessments exists between the Upper and Lower Basins. Specifically, the Enhanced Coordination Alternative provides for a 7% assessment to Lower Basin conservation creation, but assigns no equivalent assessment to Upper Basin conservation.¹⁹⁰ Reclamation should address these deficiencies in supplemental analyses.

H. Reclamation Failed to Include an Alternative that Addresses Conservation Opportunities to Mexico

Reclamation explains in the Draft EIS that:

Determination of deliveries to Mexico is not a part of the proposed federal action. Any such determination would be made in accordance with the 1944 Water Treaty. Nevertheless, modeling assumptions regarding water deliveries to Mexico are necessary in order to analyze the potential impacts to hydrologic and other environmental resources. Reclamation's modeling assumptions are not intended to constitute an interpretation or application of the 1944 Water Treaty or to represent current United States policy or a determination of future United States policy regarding deliveries to Mexico. The United States will conduct all necessary and appropriate discussions regarding the proposed federal action and implementation of the 1944 Water Treaty with Mexico through the IBWC in consultation with the Department of State.¹⁹¹

Reclamation's failure to include conservation opportunities to Mexico in the alternatives skews the analysis to the detriment of the Lower Basin States and Mexico. Furthermore, assumed reductions in deliveries to Mexico have been modeled, but assumed conservation was not modeled in any alternative. Anticipated conservation activities should have been included. The 1944 Mexican Water Treaty has allowed Mexico to develop conservation water and store it in Lake Mead and future water conservation by Mexico is a reasonable assumption that should be included in the analysis.

I. Reclamation Failed to Include the 417 Process in the Alternatives Analysis

Reclamation acknowledges that the "Procedural Methods for Implementing Colorado River Water Conservation Measures with Lower Basin Contractors and Others," found at 43

¹⁹⁰ See Draft EIS, Sec. 2.6.3.2, at 2-22; *id.* Appx. B, Sec. B.6.3.6, at B-32.

¹⁹¹ *Id.*, Sec. 2.2, at 2-3.

C.F.R. Part 417, are included in the Law of the River.¹⁹² However, Reclamation fails to analyze how implementation of the “417 Conservation Process” can be incorporated into the proposed action to advance the purpose and need of promoting water conservation. Reclamation should update and apply 417 “reasonable and beneficial use determinations” to the NEPA analysis to promote conservation and reduce the risk that delivered system water is being wasted.

J. Reclamation Failed to Equitably Reduce Water Availability between the Upper and Lower Division States Given Projections of Future Inflows

Reclamation failed to equitably reduce water availability between the Upper and Lower Basin States, given projections of future inflows. Maximum shortage volume is set at a level estimated by Reclamation to ensure that an assumed minimum flow maximum; shortage volume is set at a level estimated by Reclamation to ensure that an assumed minimum flow.

The recent multi-decadal drying trend in the Colorado River Basin and subsequent reduction in Colorado River flow has been confirmation of what climate scientists have been reporting that regarding future flows of the Colorado River. However, instead of allocating these basin-wide impacts equitably between the Upper and Lower Division States, Reclamation unreasonably disadvantages the Lower Division States, thus unfairly assigning blame to the Lower Division States for diminished future inflows. For example, in the Enhanced Coordination Alternative, reductions above 1.5 maf are applied at a 2 to 1 ratio with the Lower Basin required to reduce consumptive use twice as much as the Upper Basin.¹⁹³ Also under the Enhanced Coordination Alternative, Reclamation improperly imposes the burden on the Lower Basin to make up any shortage amount not available to the Upper Basin in its conservation pool. Reductions in future inflows should be shared equitably among the Upper and Lower Basins.

¹⁹² *Id.*, Sec. 1.8.2.1, Table 1-1, at 1-14.

¹⁹³ *See id.*, Sec. 2.6.3.1, at 2-21 (“Water held in the Lake Powell conservation pool would be converted to system water and combined with Lower Basin shortages to provide system benefits based on the shortage curve in Figure 2-5. When Lower Basin CY shortages are greater than 1.5 maf, a volume equal to one-third of the volume above 1.5 maf would be converted from the Lake Powell pool into system water such that the total of Lower Basin shortages and conversion of Upper Basin water equal the required total shortage volume (i.e., above 1.5 maf, there is a 2-to-1 Lower Basin shortage-to-Upper Basin conversion ratio). If the prescribed 2-to-1 volume is not available in the Lake Powell conservation pool, 100 percent of the available volume would be converted, and the Lower Basin would take the balance of shortages.”).

K. Reclamation Should Have Considered a Phased Alternative to Address Long-Term Measures to Meet the Purpose and Need

Reclamation states in Draft EIS, Chapter 1, that:

To provide stability and predictability to Basin water users, the Secretary intends that the interim period extend approximately 20 years; however, given the ongoing efforts toward achieving consensus among various Basin entities regarding appropriate post-2026 operations, the Secretary remains open to a shorter duration or phased implementation as part of a longer-term framework.¹⁹⁴

For the reasons below, Reclamation must issue a supplemental environmental impact statement that includes an alternative that identifies and analyzes long-term measures to meet the purpose and need.

First, Nevada recognizes that the current operational guidelines expire at the end of this year and that Reclamation must shortly implement the proposed action. However, the proposed action does not include some of the longer-term and more sustainable measures to meet the project purpose and need and to comply with the Law of the River. Some of the longer-term measures include, but are not limited to, reparations of the river outlet works, penstocks, and trailrace, implementation of voluntary or mandatory conservation and/or consumptive use reductions on the Upper Basin States, and creation of a conservation pool program in Lake Powell. Without these longer-term measures, the proposed action and the alternatives analysis to satisfy the purpose and need on a long-term basis is incomplete and violates NEPA—it is incumbent on the lead agency, not stakeholders, to identify and analyze a reasonable range of alternatives that fully satisfies the project purpose and need.¹⁹⁵

Second, without an alternative that includes long-term measures that require additional time and effort to develop, Reclamation violates its obligations to maintain the infrastructure in working order and to comply with water delivery requirements in low flow conditions as required by the Law of the River.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁴ Draft EIS, Sec. 1.1, at 1-2.

¹⁹⁵ NEPA § 102(2)(C)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii).

¹⁹⁶ *Supra* p. 23.

Third, phased (or “staged”) alternatives are commonly used when the proposed action must be implemented in phases rather than all at once, but must be considered in a single NEPA document to avoid segmentation of connected actions.¹⁹⁷

VII. Reclamation's Model Used to Develop and Compare Alternatives Includes Numerous Errors and Inaccurate and Incomplete Assumptions

Nevada identifies the following issues regarding the modeling Reclamation used to develop and compare alternatives.

First, the demand schedules used and the sensitivity analysis applied to the modeling, as shown in Appendix I, show Lake Powell and Mead's critical elevations are highly sensitive to the Upper Basin demand inputs in all but one of the action alternatives.¹⁹⁸ This raises the question about the modeling's reliability.

Second, as to the sensitivity analysis in Appendix K, Method B assigns a reduction volume to Mexico that is proportional to the total volume of reductions taken by the United States. The United States' reductions come from law and policy that have reduced Lower Basin allocations, and in consideration of has been referred to as “hydrologic shortages” in the Upper Basin. Hydrologic shortages are calculated as the difference between the Upper Basin's demand schedule and the modeled water delivery.¹⁹⁹ Without sufficient support, Reclamation's Upper Basin demand schedule is highly optimistic because it assumes surplus water can meet some of the demands. In other words, the model is not sophisticated enough to determine whether an Upper Basin water user is, in fact, shorted. The methodology thus considers any unmet demand as a shortage based on unwarranted assumptions that the supposed shortage to a water user is, in fact, a shortage, rather than a junior use that is rarely available because of over-appropriation.

All river basins have various categories of use (both formally and informally). These can loosely be characterized into base-flow water rights and surplus or flood-flow water rights. Surplus-flow rights are issued subject to the understanding that the water right will not be satisfied every year because surplus water is simply not available every year. Similarly, basins may be over-appropriated, meaning that more water rights were issued than can be routinely satisfied. Neither a surplus/flood flow water right nor a water right issued in an over-appropriated basin should be considered as the amount of water the Upper Basin is being “shorted.”

¹⁹⁷ See *Kleppe v. Sierra Club*, 427 U.S. 390, 409-10, 96 S. Ct. 2718, 2730 (1976); *Del. Riverkeeper Network v. FERC*, 753 F.3d 1304, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

¹⁹⁸ Draft EIS, Appx. I.

¹⁹⁹ Draft EIS, Appx. K.

To adequately address this issue, a significantly more rigorous analysis is required rather than simply relying on the nodes in which the Upper Basin demands are aggregated (approximately two dozen points for the entire Upper Basin). At an absolute minimum, a water-rights based model and/or an inventory of each tributary, with an understanding of the historical use and availability of each water user's rights/entitlement is necessary. The historical availability of a water right should ultimately determine whether the "unavailability" of that right can be considered shortage. For example, if a water right was issued in 1920 and has been satisfied in over 90% of years, then the inability to satisfy that right would likely be a shortage. But, if a water right was issued in 1968 and it has only been fully met once every 5 years, the other four years should not be considered shortage.

Furthermore, the Colorado River Simulation System ("CRSS") model increases demand throughout time, further exacerbating the deficiencies noted above. If the demand node is already experiencing "shortage," and every single model node does, and more demand is added, the result is not shortage, but rather over appropriation. The Upper Basin's failure to manage uses to the water supply available to them, and to issue water rights accordingly, should not be the basis of calculating shortages. Numerous courts within the Upper Basin have questioned the sufficiency of analysis for future projects or denied projects based on the requirement to curtail use under the Compact. Thus, stakeholders broadly understand that, at present, new water rights issued are likely to be curtailed and the reductions to those rights issued with that understanding would not constitute a shortage.²⁰⁰ Thus, the methodology of simply subtracting the depletion from the demand schedule, while still allowing the schedule to grow throughout time, is fatally flawed and should be eliminated from this analysis.

VIII. The Four "Operational Elements" Used to Establish the Operational Assumptions Underlying Each Alternative and to Compare Impacts Contain Errors and False Assumptions Which Skew the Analysis of Alternatives and Impacts

Reclamation provides four "Operational Elements" to establish the operational assumptions underlying each alternative and to compare their respective impacts. One such element, identified as "Additional Activities Above Lake Powell," includes "conservation by Upper Basin water users to support critical elevations at Lake Powell and other important system goals."²⁰¹ However, Reclamation provides no details regarding the specific conservation measures referenced, nor does Reclamation assign conservation volumes to specific Upper

²⁰⁰ See *Water Horse Resources v. Wilhelmsen*, 2025 UT 43, 11-12, 16 (2025) ("The Upper Basin is required to deliver the entire 7.5 MAF (or 75 MAF every 10 years) before taking its allocation"); *Save the Colorado v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers*, 2024 WL 4519201 N. 24 (D. Colo. Oct. 16, 2024) ("it is perplexing to this Court that the Corps dismissed the possibility of a compact call in its analysis of a proposed water management project").

²⁰¹ Draft EIS, Sec. 2.2.4, at 2-5.

Basin States or users. Generally mentioning conservation without specific details provides insufficient information to factor into the analysis, especially given the reluctance of Upper Basin States to implement meaningful conservation measures.

With respect to the Operational Element relating to “Delivery of Conserved System and Non-System Water,” Reclamation explains that “[w]hile delivery of some existing stored water remains available after 2026 pursuant to existing agreements, Reclamation will establish guidelines for administration of a **new** storage mechanism as part of this public NEPA process. The guidelines will set forth **Reclamation requirements** for verification of the conservation action and water accounting procedures.”²⁰²

Reclamation should have been more specific regarding which basins would be subject to “new” storage mechanisms and identify and analyze “future” conservation verification and water accounting procedures. Moreover, the Lower Basin has been required to provide Reclamation with detailed annual planning and verification reports since the Intentionally Created Surplus (“ICS”) program began in 2008. Reclamation should hold the Upper Basin to the same planning and verification standards as the Lower Basin.

IX. The Draft EIS Impacts Analysis Violates NEPA

NEPA requires federal agencies to consider the reasonably foreseeable environmental effects of major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, as well as alternatives to proposed actions.²⁰³ Agencies generally accomplish this procedural mandate by preparation of an EIS, a “detailed statement” that serves NEPA’s twin aims to ensure that (1) federal agencies will “have available, and will carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental effects” and (2) “relevant information will be made available” to the public and other government agencies.²⁰⁴ When “[p]roperly applied, NEPA helps agencies to make better decisions and to ensure good project management.”²⁰⁵

In considering environmental effects, DOI guidance directs agencies to consider, “as appropriate to the proposed action,” “any connected actions, the scope of the affected area . . . reasonably foreseeable trends and planned actions within that area, and the affected area’s natural and cultural resources.”²⁰⁶ The agency must take into account both short- and long-term effects, beneficial and adverse effects, effects on public health and safety, economic

²⁰² *Id.* (emphasis added).

²⁰³ 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i), (iii).

²⁰⁴ *Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizen’s Council*, 490 U.S. 332, 349-50 (1989).

²⁰⁵ *Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle Cnty.*, 605 U.S. 168, 177 (2025).

²⁰⁶ DOI NEPA Implementing Procedures, § 1.2(b)(1), at 4.

effects, and effects on the quality of life of the American people.²⁰⁷ The agency must “make use of reliable existing data and resources.”²⁰⁸

NEPA’s action-forcing provision demands that agencies take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of proposed federal actions.²⁰⁹ To satisfy the “hard look” requirement, “an agency must provide ‘a reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the probable environmental consequences.’”²¹⁰ Agencies should use “the best available information and the quantitative and or qualitative analyses to provide a reasoned basis for making a choice among alternatives.”²¹¹ In reviewing an EIS under the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard, the court considers whether the agency “considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choices made.”²¹²

Reclamation’s Draft EIS impact analysis is not consistent with NEPA’s “hard look” standard. In some instances, the analysis is incomplete, confusing, or lacking in detail. In other instances, Reclamation resorts to listing numbers of affected acres or tallying the number of affected counties without discussing in sufficient detail the actual impacts. General statements about possible effects are not sufficient to adequately disclose the potential impacts of the alternatives to the public or inform the decisionmaker.²¹³ The following examples discuss the deficiencies in key areas.

A. Reclamation’s “Continued Current Strategies (CCS) Comparative Baseline” Fails to Provide a Reasonable Basis to Compare Impacts from the Various Alternatives

Reclamation describes the “CCS Comparative Baseline” scenario as follows:

[A]s described in Chapter 2, due to the expiration of current domestic and international implementing agreements, the No Action Alternative represents a change in operations. As such, the No Action Alternative in this EIS does not serve as an appropriate

²⁰⁷ *Id.* at § 1.2(b)(2).

²⁰⁸ *Id.* at § 3.7.

²⁰⁹ *Cascadia Wildlands v. Bureau of Land Management*, 153 F.4th 869, 879 (9th Cir. 2025).

²¹⁰ *Id.* at 902 (quoting *350 Montana v. Haaland*, 50 F.4th at 1254, 1265 (9th Cir. 2022)).

²¹¹ *See 350 Montana v. Haaland*, 50 F.4th 1254, 1265, 1279 (9th Cir. 2022).

²¹² *N. Cascades Cons. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 136 F.4th 816 (9th Cir. 2025).

²¹³ *W. Watersheds Project v. Abbey*, 719 F.3d 1035, 1047 (9th Cir. 2013).

baseline to compare impacts. To address this challenge, a CCS Comparative Baseline scenario is provided to assess the impacts if operations continued under the current direction and strategies. While the CCS Comparative Baseline is not an action alternative, it is a contemporary set of operations that stakeholders are familiar with that can be used to comparatively evaluate the performance of the alternatives (including the No Action Alternative).

The [CCS] modeling assumptions were designed to reflect a continuation of the primary existing agreements for Colorado River management including the 2007 Interim Guidelines, the 2019 DCP and Minute 323 of the 1944 Water Treaty.²¹⁴

Similar to the Reclamation's failure to incorporate a legally sufficient no action alternative, as addressed above, here the Reclamation falls short of NEPA's evaluation and disclosure requirements in its use of the CCS scenario. Reclamation fails to include in either the CCS or no action alternative the steps it will actually have to take to comply with the Law of the River if there is no action by Reclamation and no agreement reached among the Basin States.

As the Ninth Circuit has explained, the "no action alternative in an EIS allows policymakers and the public to compare the environmental consequences of the status quo to the consequences of the proposed action. The no action alternative is meant **to provide a baseline against which the action alternative . . . is evaluated.**"²¹⁵ A "true 'no action alternative'" establishes a baseline reflecting the elements of existing management plans that comprise the "status quo."²¹⁶ So too here. An accurate baseline scenario must incorporate those concepts.

Given the uncertainties regarding operations after expiration of the 2007 Interim Guidelines, Reclamation could have used multiple no action alternatives or scenarios to evaluate such a baseline such as an extension of the 2007 Interim Guidelines as well as operations without an extension of the 2007 Interim Guidelines.²¹⁷

²¹⁴ Draft EIS, Sec. 3.2.3, at 3-5.

²¹⁵ *Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep't of Interior*, 623 F.3d 633, 642 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).

²¹⁶ *See Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Kempthorne*, 520 F.3d 1024, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 2008) (striking down SEIS for Merced River Wild and Scenic Comprehensive Management Plan for improper use of no action alternative in violation of NEPA).

²¹⁷ *See Mandelker, NEPA Law and Litigation* § 10:33 (2022 ed., Aug. 2022 update) ("[N]othing in NEPA prevents an agency from considering multiple no action alternatives"); *see Center for*

While Reclamation was not required to consider multiple no action alternatives, or baseline scenarios, Reclamation's failure to use the No Action Alternative as a status quo baseline to consider any reasonably foreseeable impacts beyond 2026 vitiates NEPA's alternatives analysis requirements. As a result, the Draft EIS underplays the socioeconomic and other impacts under the No Action Alternative, which are projected to increase over time.

B. Reclamation Failed to Adequately Consider Economic, Population, and Land Use Impacts on the Lower Basin States

Socioeconomic impacts extend beyond Clark County. The Draft EIS analysis area for socioeconomic effects in Nevada accounts "solely for Clark County."²¹⁸ The Draft EIS explains that "[s]hortages in Nevada would be limited to Southern Nevada Water Authority's service area," so the impact analysis was limited to that area.²¹⁹ But the reality is that the effects of water shortages in Clark County, Nevada, which is the state's largest metropolitan area, will affect the entire state.

Southern Nevada obtains about 90 percent of its water supply from the Colorado River.²²⁰ Clark County's population accounts for 70 percent of the State of Nevada and more than 70 percent of Nevada's economic output.²²¹ One study concluded that Colorado River water accounts for approximately \$115.4 billion of Nevada's gross state product:

The total impact of the loss of Colorado River water for one year for the State of Nevada economy is estimated at \$115.4 billion GSP, over 1.4 million jobs, and approximately \$70.6 billion labor income (2014\$). To put this into perspective, an estimated 87.4% of the State of Nevada's annual GSP could be lost if Colorado

Biological Diversity v. FERC, 67 F.4th 1176, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (upholding use of "true no-action alternative" and "likely no-action alternative" in order to avoid confusion in connection with authorization to construct natural gas pipeline and related facilities); *Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Army Corps of Eng'rs*, 636 F.Supp.3d 33, 66-67 (D.D.C. 2022) (upholding use of multiple no action alternatives used in Army Corps of Engineers NEPA analysis of impacts from dredge and fill permit to support oil pipeline construction).

²¹⁸ Draft EIS, Sec. 3.16.1, at 3-171; *id.*, Sec. 3.17.2, at 3-187 (same).

²¹⁹ *Id.*, Tech. Appx. 16, Sec. TA 16.1.1, at 16-3.

²²⁰ See generally SNWA 2026 Water Resource Plan, at 13.

²²¹ See Draft EIS, Sec. 3.16.1, at 3-172 (Clark County accounts for 74% of Nevada employment).

River water is no longer available to residents, businesses, industry, and agriculture.²²²

Contraction of the economy in Clark County has implications for the economy of the state as a whole, including the functioning of state government services on a broadscale. The relative importance of SNWA's water supply to economic growth in the entire state merits careful consideration and comparison among alternatives. Failure to conduct such an analysis renders the Draft EIS incomplete and inaccurate.

The socioeconomic effects analysis fails to take a hard look at the effects on municipal water use. NEPA requires a robust evaluation of direct and indirect effects, especially the socioeconomic impacts of managing the supply of water to 40 million people and of generating hydroelectric renewable power for western energy markets.²²³ Courts have noted the importance of addressing socioeconomic impacts to ensure NEPA compliance in connection with other Reclamation water supply projects.²²⁴

²²² See Arizona State University, *The Economic Importance of the Colorado River to the Basin Region*, at 15-16 (Dec. 18, 2014), available at <https://protectflows.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/PTF-Final-121814.pdf>.

²²³ See NEPA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (purpose of NEPA “to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the **social, economic**, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.”) (emphasis added); *id.* § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (“[A]ll agencies of the Federal Government shall— . . . include in every recommendation [for] major Federal actions significantly **affecting the quality of the human environment**, a detailed statement . . . on reasonably foreseeable environment effects.”) (emphasis added); see *Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy*, 460 U.S. 766, 773-74 (1983) (“To determine whether [NEPA] § 102 requires consideration of a particular effect, we must look at the relationship between that effect and the change in the physical environment caused by the major federal action at issue,” looking for “a reasonably close causal relationship between a change in the physical environment and the effect at issue.”).

²²⁴ *Nat'l Wildlife Fed. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv.*, 184 F. Supp. 3d 861, 904 (D. Ore. 2016) (remanding decision to Reclamation and Army Corps to prepare an EIS that among other things considered “socioeconomic processes” relating to “harvest, hatchery production, and hydropower operations” in connection with change of operations of the Federal Columbia River Power System); *Center for Env't Law and Policy v. Bureau of Reclamation*, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1193 (E.D. Wash. 2010) (upholding EIS in part because Reclamation included in the EIS a detailed “discussion of effects on socioeconomics and land use in the []downstream communities” and impacts on “existing agricultural activities” in connection with Lake Roosevelt Drawdown Project).

The Draft EIS's analysis of impacts to municipal water users falls short in several respects. *First*, the focus of the analysis is on population **growth** and loss of opportunity for population growth—i.e., people who do not yet live in the impact area—without adequate attention to impacts to **existing** populations that already depend on Colorado River water supplies to support their daily lives.²²⁵ The analysis evaluates the robustness of alternatives based on which “would likely result in fewer potential indirect impacts on **population growth**.”²²⁶ For Nevada, the discussion addresses how water deliveries will affect “constraints on **new** housing, commercial development, and essential municipal services that depend on water supply,” and that alternatives with lower reliability are likely to “limit the **capacity of communities to expand**, influence land use patterns, or delay **new** construction projects.”²²⁷

Reclamation acknowledges in Chapter 1 that “balancing the potentially profound impacts of water delivery reductions with the need to maintain reservoir storage” is an important tradeoff to be considered in evaluating alternatives.²²⁸ Yet, the only open acknowledgement of impacts on the people who live and work in communities dependent on Colorado River water is the shockingly cavalier statement that “[s]hould shortages result in a reduction or elimination of legal access to municipal water, widespread impacts on social and economic conditions could also be possible.”²²⁹ Indeed, “[i]n some scenarios, municipalities could find the need to pursue alternative water sources or hauled water, **if available**, as an alternative to support continued services.”²³⁰

Other than these offhand statements, there is no analysis of the very real and dire effects to millions of municipal water users if the taps are turned off, or water use must be significantly curtailed. There cannot be a more profound impact than a situation in which a municipal region, like Southern Nevada with a population of more than 2 million residents, must consider providing “hauled water.” The economic cost of such an impact would be astronomical. And the social costs are unfathomable. A few throwaway statements that portend a grim future for lower basin communities do not reflect the mandatory “hard look” at the effects of Colorado River management or a considered tradeoff between the impacts of

²²⁵ See Draft EIS, Sec. 3.17.1, at 3-184 (“Population growth can increase the demand for domestic, agricultural, and industrial use and increase pressure on existing water sources. Studies have shown that population growth can be a dominant driver of long-term municipal water demand.”).

²²⁶ *Id.*, Sec. 3.17.2, at 3-189 (emphasis added).

²²⁷ *Id.*, Sec. 3.17.2, at 3-191 (emphases added).


²²⁸ *Id.*, Sec. 1.1, at 1-2.

²²⁹ *Id.*, Sec. 3.17.2, at 3-193.

²³⁰ *Id.* (emphasis added).

delivery reductions with maintaining reservoir storage. NEPA requires Reclamation to fully consider the weight of the socioeconomic and population impacts, including to the landscapes and people that live there.

Second, the analysis assumes that population effects are tied to water availability without any consideration of the critical element of water conservation. Southern Nevada continues to implement one of the most progressive water conservation programs in the nation that has yielded significant water savings over the last 20 years.²³¹ Southern Nevada has decreased per capita water use by 55 percent between 2002 and 2024, even as population in Clark County has increased by 55 percent during the same timeframe.²³² The figure below shows Southern Nevada’s progress in water conservation, reaching a per capita water use of approximately 100 gallons per day.²³³ It is this conservation that has sustained Clark County’s capacity for population growth, given that Southern Nevada’s Colorado River apportionment has remained unchanged for decades.



²³¹ See SNWA Water Resources Plan (2025); see also *supra* pp. 1-3, above.

²³² See SNWA Water Resources Plan (2025), at 38.

²³³ The Draft EIS report that Southern Nevada’s water use is “approximately 126-150 gallons per day” is incorrect. See Draft EIS, Appx. 17, Sec. TA 17.1.2, at 17-4.

While water conservation remains a top priority, the opportunities for additional water savings per capita are fewer in southern Nevada where substantial conservation gains have already been made.²³⁴ Southern Nevada's ambitious water conservation goal is to reach 86 gallons per day by 2035.²³⁵

By contrast, in some areas served by the Colorado River, conservation has not been prioritized, and opportunities for large water savings at lower costs continue to exist.²³⁶ These disparities in costs of water conservation measures must be factored into the socioeconomic impact analysis to inform the public and Reclamation's decision.

Third, the Draft EIS does not consider the economic costs to municipal water agencies of decreased supply. While NEPA does not require quantification of all environmental impacts or a full cost-benefit analysis, where an agency chooses to quantify some socioeconomic costs and benefits, it must similarly quantify other socioeconomic costs and benefits to avoid the type of one-sided, misleading impact analysis that courts have repeatedly rejected.²³⁷

Reclamation takes into account potential economic losses in the agricultural sector and to river-based recreation, but fails to similarly quantify the economic, including workforce,²³⁸

²³⁴ See Statement of John J. Entsminger, General Manager, Southern Nevada Water Authority before the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources (June 14, 2022); and Southern Nevada Water Authority Operating and Capital Budget 2025, available here.

²³⁵ SNWA 2026 Water Resources Plan, at 39.

²³⁶ See generally Heather Cooley, NRDC, Agricultural Water Conservation and Efficiency Potential in California (June 2014), available at <https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/ca-water-supply-solutions-ag-efficiency-IB.pdf>; California Water Resources Control Board, Imperial Irrigation District Alleged Waste and Unreasonable Use of Water available at Imperial Irrigation District Alleged Waste and Unreasonable Use of Water (June 1984) available at https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/board_decisions/adopted_orders/decisions/d1600_d1649/wrd1600.pdf.

²³⁷ *Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA*, 538 F.3d 1172, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (agency "cannot put a thumb on the scale by undervaluing the benefits and overvaluing the costs").

²³⁸ See Draft EIS, Sec. 3.16.1 at 3-173. The first paragraph under the heading "Nevada" presents employment in Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation (NAICS 71) in Clark County. However, for a tourism-based economy such as Clark County's, the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Leisure and Hospitality supersector provides a more appropriate measure of tourism-related employment. As defined by the BLS, the Leisure and Hospitality supersector combines Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation (NAICS 71) with Accommodation and Food Services (NAICS 72), offering a more comprehensive view of employment associated with visitor-driven economic activity. The EIS

losses associated with reductions in domestic/municipal and industrial (M&I) water.²³⁹ This disproportionate treatment allows Reclamation to obscure the full extent of economic costs to cities like Henderson and Las Vegas, Nevada (including costs that may result from changes to bond ratings, increased borrowing costs, reductions in urban landscape/tree canopy, increased extreme urban heat, and increased rate pressure on users) by choosing not to put those costs in dollar figures similar to the losses to agriculture- and recreation-based communities. The differences are stark.²⁴⁰ In fact, available information indicates that the economic impacts associated with loss of a single acre-foot of water for domestic/M&I users in major metropolitan areas are levels of magnitude greater than the economic impacts associated with loss of an acre-foot of water on an irrigated field.²⁴¹ Reclamation should add a Clark County-specific analysis that links modeled Colorado River shortage conditions to restrictions, storage use, and cost/rate pressures, and identifies the most affected communities and sectors.

Fourth, there is zero analysis or comparison among alternatives of socioeconomic impacts to agriculture, recreation, and communities in Upper Basin states. This is an outgrowth of Reclamation's failure discussed above, to consider alternatives that include shortage sharing by the Upper Basin states and its artificial limitation of the geographic scope of impact analysis

should be revised to include employment from Accommodation and Food Services (NAICS 72) sector.

²³⁹ See *id.*, Sec. 3.16.2, at 3-175 (IMPLAN economic model considered loss of agriculture jobs and income and loss of jobs and labor income in the recreation industry), 3-177 (socioeconomic impact indicators consider changes in jobs and income for agriculture and recreation industries).

²⁴⁰ In addition to the direct losses to the Southern Nevada economy, indirect effects will also be felt by local governments as the economy constricts. The Draft EIS does not consider the potential impact of Colorado River shortages on tax revenues to support government services in Clark County, other Counties in Nevada, and the State of Nevada.

²⁴¹ Reclamation should apply existing methodologies to quantify socioeconomic impacts to domestic/M&I users. At least two metrics are available to quantify the cost of an acre-foot of water in urban communities. See White, W. T., Carroll, T. M., Schwer, R. K., *The Impact of a water-imposed interruption of growth in the Las Vegas region* (1992), available at https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1115&context=water_pubs; Hobbs, Ong & Associates, *The Impact of a Growth Interruption in Southern Nevada* (2004), available at <http://water.nv.gov/hearings/past/Spring%20Valley%202006/exhibits/SNWA/527.pdf>. While these methodologies are not without limitations, Reclamation's choice to avoid quantifying socioeconomic impacts to Clark County altogether violates NEPA's principles of informed decisionmaking.

to the river corridor at Lake Powell and below.²⁴² Comprehensive and coordinated management of the Colorado River requires commitments from all the basin states and means every community that makes use of Colorado River water will be affected, not just those below Lake Powell. The failure to even consider the socioeconomic effects on Upper Basin states is a glaring omission that reflects Reclamation's impermissibly narrow purpose and need and alternative approaches to Colorado River management.

In sum, the Draft EIS socioeconomic analysis is fundamentally inadequate because it evaluates water-shortage impacts only through agriculture, water-based recreation, and non-market values, ignoring the far broader economic, social, and equity consequences to existing municipal water users. The analysis also relies on an unsupported assumption that population growth drives increased consumptive water use when, in fact, conservation policies, not population, are the true drivers of demand. By overlooking entire sectors of the economy (including rural economies²⁴³), public-health implications, impacts on disadvantaged communities, and empirical regional data, the analysis fails to provide decisionmakers and stakeholders with an accurate or sufficient assessment of socioeconomic effects.

C. Reclamation Failed to Adequately Consider Public Health and Safety Impacts

Previous Reclamation EIS's have recognized the need to address the public health and safety concerns that inherently accompany any change to Colorado River operations.²⁴⁴ The 2023 Supplemental Draft EIS recognized that the Secretary's authority includes the reserved right to operate Reclamation facilities in a manner that is "prudent or necessary for safety of dams, **public health and safety** and other emergency situations."²⁴⁵ Yet, in the post-2026 Draft EIS, Reclamation fails to mention, much less define "public health and safety," nor identify any measure for evaluating impacts to public health and safety, or consider impacts in any detail. This omission is particularly evident in several key sections of the Draft EIS.

Reclamation fails to analyze the impacts of health and human safety in the proposed alternatives despite including operations that significantly increase the depletion of state or water users' apportionment.²⁴⁶ For example, in the Supply Driven alternative, Reclamation

²⁴² *Supra* § VI.J.

²⁴³ In Nevada, some rural customers have energy portfolios heavily dependent on Hoover energy allocations. These rural areas would be negatively impacted as elevations decline below 1,035. Economic analysis is needed to determine the impacts to rural energy customers.

²⁴⁴ 2023 Draft Supplemental EIS § 2.7, at 1.3, at 1-8.

²⁴⁵ 2023 Draft Supplemental EIS § 2.7, at 2-7–2-8 (emphasis added).

²⁴⁶ Draft EIS, Sec. 2.1, at 1-42.

includes a 96.4% (.29 maf) depletion of Nevada's apportionment but offers no analysis on the depletion's impact to the health and human safety of southern Nevada communities. Further, the shortage allocation models distribute shortages to agencies until the entitlement decreases to zero.²⁴⁷ As such, health and human safety calculations should be developed, explained, and incorporated into the shortage allocation model to realistically show the impacts of large reductions on cities.

Reclamation should have also considered how Nevada's water use is different than other states. Nevada has maximized conservation through return-flow credits, requiring the removal of decorative turf, and even banning new septic systems to enhance return-flow credits. These efforts helped Southern Nevada reduce its consumptive use by 100,000 afa, while adding over 875,000 new residents. With no significant agricultural uses, there are few if any options to further augment water supplies. With rainfall so low and temperatures so high, additional reductions to Nevada would severely impact urban forests and canopy coverage, and adversely impact the health and human safety in the communities served by SNWA. A more calculated analysis is therefore warranted and should be completed for each of the communities served by SNWA's member agencies, given the significant impacts that will occur if further reductions to Nevada's consumptive use are imposed.

The public health and safety analysis for the Draft EIS contravenes DOI NEPA guidance, which directs agencies to consider the environmental effects on "public health and safety" and the "quality of life of the American people."²⁴⁸ Reclamation should have applied human health and safety thresholds to assess the effects of proposed shortages to municipal users in Nevada and Arizona whose health and safety may be threatened by implementation of the Action Alternatives. From a water needs perspective, Reclamation could have referred to existing state materials for guidance or insight on identifying the minimum amount of water that might be necessary per person to prevent adverse impacts to human health and safety.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁷ Draft EIS, Appx. C., Sec. 5.2.1, at C-71 to C-73.

²⁴⁸ DOI NEPA Implementing Procedures, § 1.2(b)(1), at 5.

²⁴⁹ See generally Southern Nevada Health District, How much water should I store?, <https://www.southernnevadahealthdistrict.org/faq-items/how-much-water-should-i-store/> (detailing that water is the "most important supply during an emergency" and that one gallon of water per person per day should be stored in an individual's emergency supplies, with more water for children, nursing mothers, and those with health ailments); see also Nev. Admin. Code § 618 Sec. 8.2 (employers must provide employees with potable water that is "fresh, pure and cool" in an amount of one quart per hour per employee for the entire shift with limited exceptions).

Reclamation's failure to consider this available information is inconsistent with NEPA's "hard look" requirement and obligation to "make use of reliable existing data and resources."²⁵⁰

D. Reclamation Failed to Adequately Consider Impacts on Lake Powell Hydropower Generation

As indicated in detail above, the Draft EIS does not adequately address repairs to critical infrastructure associated with the Glen Canyon Dam. As such, Reclamation's impacts analysis overstates the reliability of Lake Powell's hydropower generation in low flow years. Reclamation states that the river outlet works "are not designed nor intended for long-term use at low reservoir levels" and that the hollow-jet valves still need major refurbishment.²⁵¹

Yet, Reclamation fails to analyze the associated risks in modeled releases or power generation capacity. Nor does the analysis describe operational limits to power generation, *e.g.*, how long the outlets can run before inspections, what shutdowns would be required during repairs, and how those outages would reduce dependable power during extended low-water periods. Without this logical follow-through, the interested public and decisionmakers cannot fully assess hydropower risks.

Moreover, the Western Area Power Administration ("WAPA") partnered with Argonne and produced a report entitled "Post-2026 Environmental Impact Statement Rate Analysis for the Colorado River Storage Project." The report addresses the WAPA rate impacts in the Upper Basin. In the DEIS, the report is incorporated by reference but the numerical data from that report should have been directly added into the DEIS. They do state the conclusions from the report but do not show any of the supporting analysis. It should be made clear that a direct connection exists to the rate impacts discussed in that report and the health of the Basin Fund which may not be obvious to the reader. In other words, if one or more of the alternatives creates more frequent rate increases which rely on customer willingness to pay them, that translates to risk to the Basin Fund. More importantly, an analysis of similar robustness, and using similar metrics should have been done for Hoover Dam to aid in the understanding of the tradeoff between Glen Canyon Dam and Hoover Dam.

This problem is further compounded by the fact that Reclamation expressly delays any analysis of impacts on electricity rates and reliability.²⁵² Postponing this analysis for Lake

²⁵⁰ See DOI NEPA Implementing Procedures, § 3.7, at 20.

²⁵¹ Draft EIS, Sec. 3.3.1, at 3-25

²⁵² *Id.*, Sec. 3.15.2, at 3-169 ("DMDU analysis of electricity rates and the market value of the electricity generated at Glen Canyon Dam are being developed and will be included in the Final EIS.").

Powell contravenes NEPA's goals.²⁵³ "NEPA is not designed to postpone analysis of an environmental consequence to the last possible moment. Rather, it is designed to require such analysis as soon as it can reasonably be done."²⁵⁴ This improperly denies the public the opportunity to make its position known on potential rate issues.²⁵⁵ In short, the Draft EIS presents elevation-based robustness and vulnerability results, but fails to include in the proposed action needed reparations and stops short of translating current conditions into engineering, dam safety, maintenance, and impacts to power generation.

E. Reclamation Failed to Adequately Consider Protection of Lake Mead Infrastructure and Impacts to Hydropower Generation

The Draft EIS fails to adequately consider and put into plain language the risks to Lake Mead infrastructure and hydropower generation. As mentioned above, the Draft EIS conveys facts and figures to stakeholders and decision makers, but it lacks the necessary detail to explain the practical implications of each alternative.²⁵⁶

For Lake Mead infrastructure, the Draft EIS conveys three main points. *First*, the Draft EIS identifies critical water levels for infrastructure and hydropower (975 feet), minimum power pool (950 feet) and dead pool (895 feet).²⁵⁷ *Second*, the Draft EIS conveys how each alternative performs against those levels by discussing how alternatives keep Lake Mead above 975 feet and how often dead pool-related reductions are avoided.²⁵⁸ And *third*, the Draft EIS recognizes spillway thresholds at high lake levels.²⁵⁹

The status of infrastructure and need for repair at Hoover Dam is discussed in a manner that downplays the need for critical infrastructure repairs and the increased risks to infrastructure associated with certain alternatives (e.g., the No Action Alternative). The Draft

²⁵³ *Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Jewell*, 740 F.3d 489, 497-98 (9th Cir. 2014).

²⁵⁴ *Id.* (citation omitted).

²⁵⁵ *Half Moon Bay Fishermans' Mktg. Asso. v. Carlucci*, 857 F.2d 505, 508 (9th Cir. 1988) (disclosing information after EIS defeats NEPA's goal of encouraging public participation during the decision-making process).

²⁵⁶ *Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 442 F.3d 1147, 1160 (9th Cir. 2006) (An EIS "must be organized and written so as to be readily understandable by governmental decisionmakers and by interested non-professional laypersons likely to be affected by actions taken under [the EIS].") (abrogated in part on other grounds by *Winter v. NRDC, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7 (2008)).

²⁵⁷ Draft EIS, 3.3.2, at 3-33—36.

²⁵⁸ Draft EIS, Sec. 3.3.2, at 3-36 (Fig. 3-11), 3-50 (Fig. 3-13).

²⁵⁹ Draft EIS, Tech. Appx. 15, Sec. TA 15.2.5, at 15-47.

EIS discusses that Hoover Dam's Dam Safety Priority Rating is a Category 5, "Reclamation's lowest-priority rating from dam-safety risk standpoint, indicating that the facility poses the lowest risk to the public."²⁶⁰ While there is discussion of Hoover Dam's "current condition," the focus of the discussion is a passing overview of past repairs and mention that intake towers and penstocks cannot be replaced.²⁶¹ However, there's no discussion about current or near-term future repairs. The Dam is nearly a century old and in the near future will require substantial major planning and investment over and above routine operation and maintenance. Reclamation is aware that operating the Dam below 1035 feet will drastically diminish generation since only 5 of the 17 turbines are equipped with wide head turbines to manage generation at lower lake elevations.²⁶² Operating at or below 1035 feet will force the 5 wide head turbines to operate around the clock and that then will increase the operating and maintenance needs on those units. And, as Reclamation notes at 1035 feet, "the cost of producing power exceeds its value."²⁶³ Thus, it is imperative on Reclamation to include in its preferred alternative an aggressive schedule for purchasing and installing wide head turbines on the remaining 12 units.

The Draft EIS's effects discussion relating to infrastructure covers the frequency of reservoir elevation drops at Lake Mead.²⁶⁴ For each alternative, Figure TA 15-11 discusses what percentage of futures Reclamation predicts Lake Mead elevations will be at least 950 feet. Under the No Action Alternative, only 30% of futures will meet the 950 feet elevation.²⁶⁵ Under the No Action Alternative, operating Lake Mead below minimum power pool and dead pool are likely realities, especially because the Proposed Guidelines will be effective for decades during significant climate uncertainty.

But it is unclear what wear and failure risks will be presented should low elevations last for a significant amount of time or whether certain alternatives will threaten infrastructure more than others. The Draft EIS contains no discussion of mechanical risk, cavitation, vibration, wear, thermal/oxygen shock impacts, or maintenance burdens from Hoover Dam operating at low elevations. These degradation effects are foreseeable, especially based on analogous issues

²⁶⁰ *Id.*, TA 15.1.3, at 15-5.

²⁶¹ *Id.* at 15-10.

²⁶² *Id.* at 11-12.

²⁶³ *Id.* at 11.

²⁶⁴ Draft EIS, Sec. 3.15.2, at 3-165.

²⁶⁵ Draft EIS, Tech. Appx. 15, 15.2.3, at 15-23.

described for Glen Canyon, and Hoover Dam's "critical aging infrastructure."²⁶⁶ And until Hoover Dam upgrades are fully implemented as Congressionally directed under the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 2026, structural degradation risks will persist. It is unclear whether Hoover Dam infrastructure will deteriorate more under the No Action Alternative than other alternatives (although this is presumably so). The Draft EIS provides no analysis of whether Hoover Dam's operations under long-duration sub-950 or sub-1,035 feet conditions would result in increased wear, unplanned outage risk, or added O&M burden on ratepayers.

And the Draft EIS does not translate this outcome into its other realities— that sustained sub-950 feet elevation or approaching dead pool or sub-1035 feet would severely constrain Hoover Dam releases and hydropower. The Draft EIS does not assess the practical duration and feasibility of meeting Lower Basin municipal and agricultural deliveries under those conditions or the secondary socioeconomic impacts.

Further, just as Reclamation failed to analyze risks to hydropower generation from Glen Canyon Dam associated with the various alternatives, Reclamation fails to consider impacts to loss of hydropower and ratepayer increases from Lake Mead, which is particularly concerning since, as provided above, Reclamation is aware that at 1035', a significant amount of Hoover Dam's hydropower generation is lost without the replacement of wide head turbines on the other 12 units. Yet, the Draft EIS acknowledges without analysis that "[i]mpacts on electricity rates and the market value of the electricity generated by Hoover Dam are being developed and will be included in the Final EIS."²⁶⁷ Similarly, the corresponding Technical Appendix reviews only how "changes in firm capacity and energy generation impact the electricity rates and the market value of electricity" at Glen Canyon Dam.²⁶⁸ As more fully discussed above, postponing NEPA analysis of foreseeable impacts to Hoover Dam until the last minute violates NEPA, and denies stakeholders the opportunity to meaningfully engage in Reclamation's analysis.

F. Reclamation Failed to Adequately Consider Impacts to Cultural and Tribal Resources

The Draft EIS discussions of cultural and tribal resource impacts are devoid of any analysis of the real-world effects of changing river flows and lake levels on cultural resources

²⁶⁶ Statement of Deputy Commissioner David Palumbo, H.R. 7776, the Help Hoover Dam Act, before the House Committee on Natural Resources, Water, Wildlife, and Fisheries Subcommittee (May 22, 2024).

²⁶⁷ Draft EIS, Sec. 3.15.2, at 3-169.

²⁶⁸ Draft EIS, Appx. 15, Sec. TA 15.2.7, at 15-54.

and important tribal practices. The primary focus of both discussions is on the number of sites (based on modeled assumptions) that will be either inundated or exposed under the various River management alternatives.²⁶⁹ The presumption is that inundated sites are better preserved and thus, consistent and higher water levels have less impact to cultural and tribal resources. Thus, the analysis focuses almost exclusively on a detailed textual summary of the modeling results focusing on the number of sites that will be exposed or inundated under various alternatives.

This analysis overlooks an important aspect of the problem in violation of NEPA's "hard look" requirement. Cultural resources and historic sites are not eligible for protection solely because of the physical preservation of artifacts or materials at the site, but also when they possess integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association, and are associated with events that have made a significant contribution to the broad patterns of our history, are associated with the lives of persons significant in our past, or embody a distinctive characteristic or type, period, or method of construction.²⁷⁰ This includes properties "of traditional religious and cultural importance to an Indian tribe," which are also eligible for protection.²⁷¹ In other words, impacts to cultural resources are more than just impacts to objects and things. Impacts to cultural resources, and particularly to tribal resources, are impacts to experiences—i.e., the opportunity to experience a place with the integrity of location, setting, and feeling that made it eligible for protection in the first place. For a tribal cultural property, the place may be associated with cultural practices, beliefs, and traditions important to maintaining cultural identity and essential to current cultural experiences that have far more to do with setting than preservation of artifacts.

The Draft EIS focuses almost exclusively on physical impacts to archeological resources.²⁷² The Draft EIS does not include any discussion that captures either quantitatively or qualitatively the potential effects to individuals and communities, and critically to tribes, that may value a site based primarily on its setting or atmosphere and important for its continuing relevance to traditional practices, beliefs, and traditions. This absence is glaringly apparent in relation to the Grand Canyon, which itself is considered by numerous tribes as a traditional cultural property.²⁷³ Yet there is no discussion of cultural experiences of the Canyon, whether

²⁶⁹ See Draft EIS, Sec. 3.11.2, at 3-123 (cultural resource analysis summarizing "the potential for archeological resources to be exposed").

²⁷⁰ 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (2025).

²⁷¹ 54 U.S.C. § 302706(a).

²⁷² See Draft EIS, Sec. 3.11.2, at 3-122 (making assumptions about the limits of physical impacts), at 3-128 (limiting analysis of river flows to physical impacts on archeological sites based primarily on aeolian sand modeling).

²⁷³ *Id.*, Sec. 3.13.1, at 3-143.

tribal or otherwise, and how those are affected by Colorado River management. Is the culturally significant experience of the Grand Canyon or sites within the Canyon affected by water levels, and if so, how do the alternatives fare in protecting that experience? The Draft EIS does not say.

Another example is the analysis of impacts to natural resources of important to Native peoples, including vegetation. The Draft EIS assumes that the best alternative is the one that maintains historic vegetation patterns, and the remainder of the discussion summarizes the effects to vegetation from Chapter 3.9.²⁷⁴ It concludes that under all alternatives, “the first decade is expected to have greater variability and reduced woody riparian habitats, compared with historic conditions,” and that conditions “improve in the second and third decades.”²⁷⁵ But what vegetations are important to tribal practices and what does reduced woody riparian habitat mean for tribal cultural experiences that may be dependent on native vegetation? Again, the Draft EIS does not say.

Overall, Reclamation’s focus on inundation of archeological sites paints too narrow a picture of cultural and tribal resource impacts. Cultural and tribal resources are more than archeological sites—they encompass sites that are made significant by their integrity of place, location, and setting and their connection to history and tradition. In some cases, those sites support contemporary practices of living cultures that help maintain connections to tradition. The failure to discuss impacts to these sites and practices violates NEPA’s “hard look” requirement.

X. Reclamation Failed to Designate States and Local Governments as Cooperating Agencies, and Solicit Feedback on Issues Within Their Jurisdiction or Areas of Expertise

An agency should request the participation of cooperating agencies to assist with the analysis when preparing a NEPA document. A cooperating agency is a federal, state, tribal, or local agency “that has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved in a proposal.”²⁷⁶ The federal agency “shall” “request the participation of each cooperating agency at the earliest practicable time” and “give consideration to any analysis or proposal created by a cooperating agency.”²⁷⁷

Despite NEPA’s focus on public disclosure and participation by interested stakeholders here, Reclamation failed to invite the participation of state, regional, or local Nevada stakeholders as cooperating agencies. SNWA and CRCNV have significant technical expertise in

²⁷⁴ *Id.*, Sec. 3.13.2, at 3-148.

²⁷⁵ *Id.*

²⁷⁶ NEPA § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 4336a(a)(3).

²⁷⁷ *Id.* § 4336a(a)(2).

the environmental effects of Colorado River management on Nevada's resources, and a deep understanding of the importance of Nevada's Colorado River apportionment to the economic stability of not only Clark County, but surrounding communities in Nevada. Reclamation did not avail itself of this information and participation.

In addition to NEPA, Section 602(a) of the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968²⁷⁸ requires the Secretary to "propose criteria for the coordinated long-range operation of" Federal reservoirs in the Colorado River Basin (i.e., criteria referred to as Long-Range Operating Criteria or LROC) and Reclamation acknowledges that determinations of annual water release volumes from Glen Canyon Dam pursuant to the LROC are currently implemented through the 2007 Interim Guidelines.²⁷⁹ Through the contemplated actions in the Draft EIS, the Secretary is proposing to modify how the LROC are implemented but the Secretary may modify the LROC "only after correspondence with the Governors of the seven Colorado River Basin States and appropriate consultation with such State representatives as each Governor may designate."²⁸⁰ This required consultation has not been completed, and must be conducted before Reclamation can issue a Decision that will modify how the LROC are implemented.

Further, the 2007 Interim Guidelines Record of Decision ("ROD") states that the "Secretary shall first consult with all the Basin States before making any substantive modification to these Guidelines" and "upon a request to resolve any claim or controversy arising under these Guidelines ... the Secretary shall invite the Governors of all the Basin States, or their designated representatives...to consult with the Secretary in an attempt to resolve such claim or controversy by mutual agreement."²⁸¹ Consultation amounts to more than just providing an opportunity to comment along with the general public.²⁸² This required consultation has not been completed, and must be conducted before Reclamation can issue a Decision that will modify how the 2007 Interim Guidelines are implemented.

In sum, Reclamation failed to designate state and local governments with expertise as cooperating agencies under NEPA, or to consult with the Colorado River Basin Project Act, and

²⁷⁸ Pub. L. 90-537, 82 Stat. 885 (Sep. 30, 1968) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1556).

²⁷⁹ See Glen Canyon Dam Long-Term Experimental and Management Plan Record of Decision, at 1.

²⁸⁰ CRBPA § 602(b), Pub. L. 90-537, 82. Stat. 900) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1552(b).

²⁸¹ Record of Decision, Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and the Coordinated Operatoins for Lake Powell and Lake Mead (Dec. 2007) at 54, available at <https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/RecordofDecision.pdf>.

²⁸² *California Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy*, 631 F.3d 1072, 1086–90 (9th Cir. 2011) (vacating agency decision where agency failed to engage in "consultation" with the States; merely providing a notice and comment period was insufficient).

its own 2007 Interim Guidelines. Nevada should be invited to participate as a cooperating agency in the NEPA process moving forward, and formal consultation under the Act and 2007 Interim Guidelines must occur before a final decision.

CONCLUSION

Nevada appreciates the opportunity to provide these comments on the Post-2026 Operational Guidelines and Strategies for Lake Powell and Lake Mead Draft EIS. We have a particular interest in avoiding potential impacts from the proposal to Southern Nevada while supporting successful approaches to Colorado River management. Nevertheless, as set out above, Reclamation's Draft EIS fails to comply with the full scope of the agency's NEPA obligations and warrants a draft supplemental EIS given that the many Draft EIS shortcomings undermine NEPA's twin goals of informed decision-making and informed public participation.

Furthermore, Reclamation's Draft EIS has not made sufficient information available for the public, stakeholders, the Basin States, and others to adequately comment on the proposed action. Of particular concern, Reclamation failed to provide information and documentation regarding its plan to remedy the critical infrastructure deficiency at Glen Canyon Dam. For that reason, we prepared and submitted a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request to obtain the needed information given its importance to long-term sustainable operation of the reservoirs and management of Colorado River.²⁸³

Accordingly, we request that Reclamation consider and incorporate the above comments into a draft supplemental EIS and recirculate that updated analysis for public and stakeholder comment as soon as possible. Specifically, at a minimum, the updated analysis should:

- Carry forward in the alternatives analysis full consideration of the Lower Basin Alternative;
- Include full consideration of the attached Nevada Proposed Approach to Short- and Long-term Operations;
- Include full consideration of alternatives and impacts relating to reparation of the Glen Canyon Dam river outlet works; and
- Include in all future analyses Reclamation's planned compliance with the Law of the River.

Should there be any questions or concerns regarding this letter, please contact John Entsminger at your earliest convenience. Thank you for your consideration of these comments.

²⁸³ See FOIA Request to Reclamation (Feb. 23, 2026).