

restoration of their basic human rights and freedoms, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. SABATH:

H. Res. 198. Resolution providing for the consideration of H. R. 3096 relating to the acquisition and disposition of land by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Federal Civil Defense Administration; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. LYLE:

H. Res. 199. Resolution providing for the consideration of H. R. 3464 to authorize the Secretary of the Navy to proceed with the construction of certain naval installations, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Rules.

#### MEMORIALS

Under clause 3 of rule XXII, memorials were presented and referred as follows:

By the SPEAKER: Memorial of the Legislature of the State of Arkansas, relative to ratification of a proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to the terms of office of the President; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the Territory of Alaska, urging election by the people of the Territory of the Governor of the Territory; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

#### PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. FINE:

M. R. 3752. A bill for the relief of the legal guardian of Beatrice Merzer, a minor; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MCCORMACK:

H. R. 3753. A bill for the relief of Petrag Ristani; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. STAGGERS:

H. R. 3754. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Jessie Sibert; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

#### PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

229. By Mr. GROSS: Petition of Rev. Robert James Watson, registrar, Webster City Association of Congregational Churches and Ministers, bearing the signatures of some 70 ministers and church members, urging that the time of admission for displaced persons be extended indefinitely beyond June 30, 1951; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

230. By the SPEAKER: Petition of Margaret Fulton Powers, president, National Society Daughters of the American Revolution, Richmond, Ind., protesting the dismissal of General MacArthur as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander in Chief, Far East; and Commanding General, United States Army, Far East; to the Committee on Armed Services.

## SENATE

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 1951

(Legislative day of Tuesday, April 17, 1951)

The Senate met at 12 o'clock meridian, on the expiration of the recess.

The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D. D., offered the following prayer:

God, our Father, whom we seek in all our need and through all the mystery and perplexity of life; without whom we cannot live bravely or well: Show us Thy will in all the maze of paths our uncertain feet may take. As now in prayer we draw near to Thee, do Thou graciously draw near unto us until we become more sure of Thee than of midday light. Come to us in the common life that entangles us, meet us in the thorny questions which confront us, make Thy highways through the encircling gloom that surrounds us; breathe through the heats of our desire Thy coolness and Thy balm.

Open our ears and our hearts this day to hear and heed Thy ancient covenant, which is to all generations: "If My people shall humble themselves and pray, and seek My face and turn from their wicked ways, then will I hear from heaven and will forgive their sins and heal their land." Fulfilling these conditions may Thy redeeming power surge through our individual lives and the life of our Nation. We ask it in the Name that is above every name. Amen.

#### THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. McFARLAND, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Tuesday, April 17, 1951, was dispensed with.

#### MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Miller, one of his secretaries.

#### MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Chaffee, one of its reading clerks, returned to the Senate the reengrossed bill (H. R. 3587) making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1951, and for other purposes.

The message announced that the House had passed the following bills and joint resolutions, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate:

H. R. 316. An act to amend the Veterans Regulations to provide a minimum rate of compensation for World War II veterans who have arrested tuberculosis;

H. R. 318. An act to amend the Veterans Regulations and the World War Veterans' Act, 1924, as amended, to provide additional compensation for the loss or loss of the use of a creative organ;

H. R. 512. An act conferring jurisdiction upon the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts to hear, determine, and render judgment upon the claim of Mrs. Walter J. Bickford;

H. R. 907. An act conferring jurisdiction upon the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas to hear, determine, and render judgment on certain claims of the legal guardian of Charlie Joe Starnes;

H. R. 1431. An act for the relief of Tetsuko Hidaka;

H. R. 1764. An act to authorize the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to settle, pay, adjust, and compromise certain claims for damages and for salvage and towage and to execute releases, certifications, and re-

ports with respect thereto, and for other purposes;

H. R. 1789. An act for the relief of Sgt. Benjamin H. Martin;

H. R. 1799. An act for the relief of Bella and Archie Kennison;

H. R. 1821. An act for the relief of Izumi Maklyoma;

H. R. 1844. An act for the relief of Capt. William Greenwood;

H. R. 2401. An act to increase criminal penalties under the Sherman Antitrust Act;

H. R. 2785. An act for the relief of Kimi Hatano;

H. R. 2952. An act to authorize the attendance of the United States Navy Band at the final reunion of the United Confederate Veterans to be held in Norfolk, Va., May 30 through June 2, 1951;

H. R. 3291. An act to amend subdivision a of section 34 of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended;

H. R. 3292. An act to amend subdivision a of section 55 of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended;

H. R. 3330. An act for the relief of Mrs. Anna L. De Angelis;

H. R. 3495. An act for the relief of Mrs. Cora B. Jones;

H. J. Res. 171. Joint resolution to suspend the application of certain Federal laws with respect to attorneys employed by the select committee of the House of Representatives authorized by House Resolution 93, Eighty-second Congress, first session; and

H. J. Res. 197. Joint resolution to provide for continuation of authority for regulation of exports.

The message also announced that the House had agreed to the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 12) favoring the suspension of deportation of certain aliens, with amendments, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

The message further announced that the House had agreed to a concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 90) favoring the granting of the status of permanent residence to certain aliens, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

#### APPOINTMENT OF COMMITTEE TO MEET GENERAL MACARTHUR

The VICE PRESIDENT. Yesterday the Senate adopted the resolution (S. Res. 128) authorizing the Chair to appoint eight Senators as a committee to welcome, on behalf of the Senate, General MacArthur when he arrives at the airport tomorrow. The Chair has been informed that he is expected to arrive at approximately 1:30 in the morning. The Chair will withhold making appointments until he has had an opportunity to canvass the situation and to determine that the Senators who are appointed will be able to attend. The Chair feels that the committee should have equal representation from both sides of the aisle and, with perhaps one or two exceptions, should be composed of members of the Committee on Armed Services. However, the Chair is not committing himself in that respect. He will make the appointments as soon as possible.

The VICE PRESIDENT subsequently said: As provided for in the resolution (S. Res. 128), adopted yesterday, the Chair appoints as the Senators to meet General MacArthur at the Washington Airport on his arrival the following Senators, whose names will be read by the clerk.

The legislative clerk read the list, as follows:

MESSRS. HUNT, WHERRY, CHAVEZ, BRIDGES, JOHNSON of South Carolina, MARTIN, STENNIS, and HENDRICKSON.

**MILITARY POLICY IN MEETING COMMUNISM—STATEMENT BY GEN. OMAR BRADLEY**

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I believe that all Members of the Senate will be deeply interested in the views of General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on our military policy in meeting the aggressive power of communism.

General Bradley is recognized as one of our greatest soldiers. His brilliant achievements as a strategist were vital factors in our victory over the Axis Nations in World War II.

I ask unanimous consent to place in the RECORD the text of General Bradley's address of April 17 at a meeting of the National Association of Broadcasters in Chicago.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times of April 18, 1951]  
TEXT OF ADDRESS BY GENERAL BRADLEY ON FOREIGN POLICY OF UNITED STATES

CHICAGO, April 17.—Following is the text of an address today by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley at a meeting of the National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters:

"It is hard to realize that our relatively small-scale military operations in Korea hold the key to the success or failure of our world-wide strategy.

"In the hands of our United Nations soldiers, sailors, and airmen, fighting the unwarranted attacks of twice as many North Korean and Chinese Communist aggressors, rests the possibility for peace. Success in Korea may prevent a new incident, and may prevent world war III. Failure in Korea will only invite another aggression.

"When our forces were in the throes of withdrawal last December, many people, who saw no point to further struggle, were recommending that we give up the fight. Nothing could have been more disastrous for the South Koreans, the United States, the United Nations, and the ultimate chances for peace in this world.

"As much as I hate war, if we had abandoned Korea under any less circumstances than being driven out, we would have dealt a tragic blow to the hopes of free men everywhere for peace.

"Adding up the military pros and cons of the situation, there is no early end in sight to the Korean War under present conditions. As far as we can see now there is nothing transitory, nothing temporary about the Communists' determination to drive us out of Korea, and, if possible, to destroy our forces completely. We may strive for peace, and a cessation of hostilities, but while so doing we must continue to fight."

**ASPECTS OF POLICY CITED**

"Foreign policy is the expression of a nation's instinct for survival. Military policy comprises the practices of a people in the organization of their military resources for defense.

"There is little immediate danger of this country being overrun, but our way of life, our freedom, and our Nation have the best chances for survival by keeping peace in the world.

"This is the overriding consideration of our national foreign and military policies. Any recommended course of action which would enlarge the present war is contrary to our best interests, and by jeopardizing world peace ultimately would threaten our security.

"In Korea our foreign policy and our military policy are united in three basic objectives:

"First, to protect and maintain our form of government and our way of life against any challenge. On this point we recognize no limitation of expenditures or of exertion.

"Second, to seek peace by every means at our command. We will not provoke a war against anyone. And we will not wage a so-called preventive war even against an arch enemy, for this certainly destroys peace. But there is one price we will not pay—appeasement.

"Third, to assure peace, not only for ourselves, but for all others. For this reason we support the United Nations, realizing that world peace is an integral part of American security.

"I would like to emphasize that our military action in Korea is closely related to our North Atlantic Treaty efforts in Europe.

"The same guiding principles govern our actions there. We joined in the North Atlantic Treaty as a collective defense effort for mutual security. In collective action we multiply our defensive strength. Bound together in a pact, the individual nations gain strength from their close ties, and individually are more secure.

"Not only are we trying to contain communism, but we hope to deter all forms of aggression in order to bring peace to the world.

"Through our efforts in connection with the North Atlantic Treaty and our even more positive action in Korea, we have drawn the line—giving unmistakable evidence that appeasement of communism is not part of American policy.

"In Korea communism went, without warning, one step further than it had ever gone before, and for the first time resorted to open and organized armed aggression to gain its oppressive ends, shedding even its pretense of peaceful intention."

**THREE PEACE FACTORS IN MIND**

"The United Nations had to take some quick, positive action.

"The decision to support the Republic of Korea, first with air and sea power, and then with ground forces, was heralded in this country as a sound decision, and given wholehearted support. Like every other international political decision from time immemorial, there had to be some authority behind it to make it stick, and the task of establishing that authority was assigned to the Armed Forces.

"As we proceed with the assigned military task in Korea, your military advisers and planners are keeping these three important factors in mind:

"Because we are intent upon preventing world war III, we are not making moves that might lead to an enlargement of the present conflict, whenever it is militarily practicable;

"Furthermore, because we seek peace and an end of this war in Korea, our Government is cautious in every decision that might prolong this conflict. I might add that it has been difficult for the men in the field to refrain from attacking the air bases in Manchuria. However, Communist air intervention has not been a factor in the ground action to date. Neither has it been any serious threat to our Air Force;

"And, third, every decision we have recommended has supported United Nations unity in the conduct of war. With these principles in mind, we of the United Nations are now doing an outstanding military job.

"Conjecture in military affairs is always risky and often unwarranted, but I would like to give my personal opinion as to some of the accomplishments of the Korean decision that may have escaped public attention. I doubt that even those who supported this move at the time realized how much more was being gained toward world peace.

"I believe that our positive action in support of the United Nations resolution was unexpected by the Kremlin-dominated Communists. I think we scored an advantage, and disarranged their plans for Asia.

"I think our positive action in support of the United Nations slowed down the plans for world domination, not only in Asia, but in other areas in the world.

"The Communist action in Korea indicated to me that the people in the Kremlin are willing to risk world war III. I believe the United Nations action in Korea gave them pause for thought.

"I would also estimate that our action in Korea may have prevented, at least temporarily, Chinese Communist aggression toward Indochina. It may have saved Thailand. It may have preserved Formosa. At least it gained time in all of these areas.

"There was no doubt in the minds of free men that we had to draw a line somewhere. Appeasement would have forfeited our chance to stop communism, and encourage them to continue picking off helpless nations one by one. Eventually the international situation would have become intolerable as the Red-dominated areas covered more and more space on the map.

"Today, we are carrying out the military operations to enforce this political decision.

"As we carry out these actions, even though it would possibly result for a time in a military stalemate, we have already achieved an international victory.

"As long as we are able to confine the battles to Korea and continue to destroy the Communist aggressors, we are making progress toward our international objective of preventing world war III. As long as we are keeping Communist forces occupied and off balance and keeping the war confined to Korea, we are minimizing their chances for world domination.

"We are going to be faced with some difficult decisions in Korea in the next few months.

"To solve them, we must realize that Korea is not a brief, acute attack of a new disease; it is a symptom of a chronic ailment which must be cured.

"In outlining my thoughts on this matter, I have no intention of entering the foreign-policy field or even urging a particular policy in the conduct of foreign affairs. Conduct of foreign affairs is a civilian responsibility. But a soldier can often see strategic perils that the layman might overlook. However, it is fundamental that our foreign policy must be based upon our military capabilities to back it up.

"We cannot take the chance of trying to anticipate immediate Communist intentions. We can only determine their capabilities, and prepare to meet them. Otherwise we would be in a guessing game without a referee. We would be playing Russian roulette with a gun at our heads."

**IMPATIENCE IS NO SOLUTION**

"Fundamentally we Americans are apt to become impatient with a situation that has no foreseeable conclusion. We all would like to know when the war in Korea will be over.

"I wish that I might tell you: my job would be less difficult if I knew.

"If we examine the Communist capabilities in Korea, we find indications that the Chinese Communists are building up for another drive. We must prepare to meet it.

There is no assurance that even when this attack is dispelled that the war will be over.

"In the case of Korea, those who despair of an early solution are apt to become frustrated and discouraged. There have been recurring and louder whispers in favor of forcing a show-down and in delivering an ultimatum to those who encourage such "local wars" and who continue to obstruct sincere efforts for peaceful negotiation.

"Any such direct, unilateral solution to the problem would be militarily infeasible.

"I wonder if these responsible citizens have pondered the conditions of such an act. Any ultimatum must state clearly the irreducible minimum of what we would regard as satisfactory and it ordinarily, if not always, implies a threat to use force if the demands are not met. These dissatisfied and impatient strategists—and they are not representing the views of responsible Air Force officials—suggest the threat of bombardment as part of the ultimatum.

"Our policy is to avoid war, and to promote peace.

"Our best chance for the survival of our way of life, and our freedom is to continue cooperation in mutual security efforts, and to continue negotiation in this world-wide conflict as long as possible. An ultimatum would either commit us to a so-called preventive war, or gain for us only a temporary respite from war until the enemy feels that conditions for his victory were more favorable.

"Enlarging the battle to a full-scale war is never an economical or morally acceptable solution to a limited conflict. If at all possible, Korea should be settled on the present battleground."

#### ROLE OF DIPLOMACY IS SET

"The confinement or extension of the area of combat is in the realm of diplomacy and international politics.

"However, the military consideration is an intrinsic part of this problem. Our Armed Force will continue to carry out the tasks assigned to them until conditions permit a political decision to be reached.

"I have mentioned the complexity of the United Nation's problems only to encourage us in a steadfast course of patience and preparedness.

"The United Nations forces in Korea have done a magnificent job and have exhibited a cooperative spirit that is more effective than anyone could have previously imagined.

"The Air Force and the Navy have performed wonders in supporting the ground forces in Korea. They have exercised ingenuity and imagination in carrying out missions that could not have been anticipated. The Marines have performed heroically side by side with our soldiers.

"I am especially proud of the United States Army.

"The soldiers entered the war in platoon strength, building up to a force of six divisions which have fought through fierce summer heat and bitter winter, usually against great odds, and with platoons and companies, battalions and regiments which were for a long time understrength.

"The American people can be very proud of their Armed Forces and of the spirit which these men have shown.

"If we here at home can only measure up to their standards of sacrifice and devotion—to their achievements in patience and courage—there is every reason to believe that the war in Korea can ultimately be concluded on honorable terms, contributing to a hoped-for permanent peace in our times."

#### TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE BUSINESS

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senators be

permitted to present petitions and memorials, submit reports, introduce bills and joint resolutions, and transact other routine business, without debate and without speeches.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate the following communication and letters, which were referred as indicated:

#### PROPOSED REVISION OF LANGUAGE, FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY (S. Doc. No. 26)

A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting a proposed revision of language for the Federal Security Agency, in the form of an amendment to the budget for the fiscal year 1952 (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

#### REPORT ON REASSIGNMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF PROPERTY WITHIN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES

A letter from the Director of the Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on the reassignments and transfers of property within executive agencies where the reassignments and transfers are between activities which are financed by different appropriations, for the fiscal year 1950 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.

#### SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION OF ALIENS—WITHDRAWAL OF NAME

A letter from the Attorney General, withdrawing the name of John Liu alias Yoh-Han Liu from a report relating to aliens whose deportation he suspended more than 6 months ago, transmitted to the Senate on January 16, 1950; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

#### LAWS ENACTED BY MUNICIPAL COUNCILS OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN AND ST. CROIX, V. I.

A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting, pursuant to law, copies of laws enacted by the Municipal Councils of St. Thomas and St. John and St. Croix, V. I. (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

#### AUDIT REPORT ON CORPORATIONS OF FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION

A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, an audit report of Corporations of Farm Credit Administration, for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1950 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.

#### REPORT OF MOTOR CARRIER CLAIMS COMMISSION

A letter from the Chairman and Commissioners of the United States Motor Carrier Claims Commission, Kansas City, Mo., transmitting, pursuant to law, a report of the Commission for the period from April 12, 1950, to April 12, 1951 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

#### REPORT OF JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, AND DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE, UNITED STATES COURTS

A letter from the Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Washington, D. C., transmitting, pursuant to law, a report of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 1950, and the annual report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1950 (with an accompanying document); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

#### PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS

Petitions, etc., were laid before the Senate, or presented and referred as indicated:

#### By the VICE PRESIDENT:

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of Arkansas; to the Committee on the Judiciary:

#### "House Joint Resolution 1

"Concurrent resolution ratifying the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States and known as the twenty-second amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to the terms of office of the President

"Whereas the House of Representatives on February 6, 1947, and the United States Senate on March 12, 1947, both by the constitutional two-thirds thereof passed a proposed constitutional amendment to be known as the twenty-second amendment to the Constitution; and

"Whereas said proposed amendment was submitted to the States for ratification upon March 26, 1947, and said proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, is in the following words, to wit:

"SECTION 1. No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than 2 years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of President more than once. But this article shall not apply to any person holding the office of President when this article was proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as President during the remainder of such term.

"Sec. 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within 7 years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress': Be it

"Resolved by the House of Representatives of the State of Arkansas (the Senate concurring), That the proposed amendment No. 22 to the Constitution of the United States of America be and the same is hereby ratified by the Legislature of Arkansas; be it further

"Resolved, That certified copies of the foregoing preamble and resolution be immediately forwarded by the secretary of state of the State of Arkansas, under the great seal, to the President of the United States, the President of the Senate of the United States, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the United States."

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of Tennessee; to the Committee on Public Works:

#### "Senate Joint Resolution 23

"Whereas a committee composed of leading citizens residing in eastern Kentucky, in Virginia, and in east Tennessee and representative of the business and industry of said tri-State area, have met and adopted a resolution relating to the deplorable state of the interstate highway between Middlesboro, Ky., and Knoxville, Tenn., being U. S. Routes 25E and 33, and have united their efforts by the formation of the tri-State road committee, of which William P. Wilson, of 1612 Broadway NE., Knoxville, and W. Hoyle Campbell are chairmen and Bennett Ward is secretary; and

"Whereas said tri-State road committee in session at Middlesboro, Ky., have adopted resolutions calling attention to the fact that the highway from Middlesboro to Knoxville is a vital link in an important north and south highway route available for the movement of troops, material, and supplies necessary to national defense and in addition essential to the welfare of business industry and the population of the tri-State area at large; and

"Whereas said road is one of the routes leading to the Federal establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission at Oak Ridge and the Tennessee Valley Authority at large with its many major industries: Now, therefore, be it

*"Resolved by the Senate of the Seventy-seventh General Assembly of the State of Tennessee (the House of Representatives concurring),* That the Governor of Tennessee, the highway commissioner of Tennessee and the government of Tennessee as a whole apply to the Government of the United States through its Bureau of Public Roads and War Department for a declaration that the United States Highway 33 from Knoxville to Tazewell and U. S. 25E from Tazewell to Middlesboro is a strategic military highway and as such should be a four-lane highway in the construction of which the United States Government will make a large contribution which along with that contributed by the State of Tennessee will be sufficient to build a new four-lane highway from Knoxville, Tenn., to Middlesboro, Ky., and the Virginia boundary; be it further

*"Resolved,* That the aforesaid State officials call upon the Federal Government for immediate cooperation in the construction of this project due to its necessity from the standpoint of national security and especially to the people of the tri-State area; be it further

*"Resolved,* That the secretary of state will furnish certified copies of these resolutions to the United States Secretary of War, to the Chief of the Bureau of Roads, and to the Governor of the State of Tennessee.

Adopted March 15, 1951.

WALTER M. HAYNES,  
Speaker of the Senate.

McALLEN FOETCH,  
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Approved March 16, 1951.

GORDON BROWNING,  
Governor."

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of California; to the Committee on Appropriations:

**"Assembly Joint Resolution 23**

*"Joint resolution relative to economy in Federal Government expenditures and services*

"Whereas the United States faces a threat of war with Communist forces; and

"Whereas, to meet the urgent needs of national defense and to preserve our freedom, our forces must be armed at heavy expense; and

"Whereas these expenses must be met, under present proposals, not only by higher taxes, but by continued deficit spending; and

"Whereas the threat of increasing Federal debt, further devaluation of the dollar, and continued inflation are the cause of great concern to persons in all walks of life: Now, therefore, be it

*"Resolved by the Assembly and Senate of the State of California (jointly),* That the Legislature of the State of California respectfully memorializes the President and the Congress of the United States to immediately and drastically reduce nonmilitary expenditures, eliminate nonessential services, and consider and study every means to eliminate unnecessary military expenditures; and be it further

*"Resolved,* That the chief clerk of the assembly be hereby directed to transmit copies of this resolution to the President and Vice President of the United States, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to each Senator and Representatives from California in the Congress of the United States."

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of California; to the Committee on Armed Services:

**"Senate Joint Resolution 27**

*"Joint resolution relative to memorializing Congress to allow States a credit for civil defense expenditures made prior to the effective date of any Federal appropriation made to match civil defense expenditures by States*

"Whereas many States, including California, are anxious and ready to make immediate expenditures in order to establish an effective civil defense program; and

"Whereas there is no doubt that some of the expenditures so made would be in categories which would qualify for Federal sharing if incurred after a Federal appropriation to match States' expenditures becomes available; and

"Whereas the Federal Civil Defense Administration has indicated that it will not ask Congress for authority to match civil defense expenditures made by States before such an appropriation act is enacted; and

"Whereas such a position taken by the Federal Government would result in penalizing those States which are striving to put an effective civil defense program into action at the earliest possible time in accordance with the request of the Federal Government, and would deter prompt action as to civil defense on the part of the States, cities, and counties: Now, therefore, be it

*"Resolved by the Senate and the Assembly of the State of California (jointly),* That the Congress of the United States is hereby memorialized and requested to provide in any appropriation act enacted to match States' expenditures for civil defense that States making civil defense expenditures prior to the effective date of the appropriation act shall receive a credit for such expenditures; and be it further

*"Resolved,* That the Secretary of the Senate is directed to transmit copies of this resolution to the President and Vice President of the United States, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to each Senator and Representative from California in the Congress of the United States."

Two concurrent resolutions of the Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii; to the Committee on Appropriations:

**"Senate Concurrent Resolution 33**

*"Concurrent resolution requesting the Congress of the United States of America to enact legislation appropriating funds for flood control at Kawaimui Swamp, Kailua, Oahu, authorized by Public Law 516, Eighty-first Congress, second session, section 204*

"Whereas Public Law 516, Eighty-first Congress, second session, section 204, authorized expenditure for the first step of flood control at Kawaimui Swamp, Kailua, Oahu; and

"Whereas the drainage from said swamp in times of flood has caused grievous loss to the entire section surrounding the same and leaves such section vulnerable to further serious losses; and

"Whereas on March 24, 25, and 26, 1951, the floods were so serious and prolonged as to necessitate the evacuation of hundreds of people and the calling out of the National Guard for the protection of persons and property, and the setting up of a unit of the Red Cross, which, in mid-April, is still

operating to relieve the homeless and distressed in said areas: Now, therefore, be it

*"Resolved by the Senate of the Twenty-sixth Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii (the House of Representatives concurring),* That the Congress of the United States of America be, and it is hereby, respectfully requested to enact legislation which will appropriate the amount of \$848,094 previously authorized for this purpose; and be it further

*"Resolved,* That the Honorable JOSEPH RIDER FARRINGTON, Delegate to Congress from Hawaii, be, and he is hereby, respectfully requested to afford every assistance and aid possible in seeking passage of such legislation; and be it further

*"Resolved,* That duly certified copies of this concurrent resolution be forwarded to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, to the Secretary of the Interior, and to the Delegate to the Congress from Hawaii."

**"House Concurrent Resolution 30**

*"Concurrent resolution requesting the Congress of the United States of America to enact legislation appropriating funds for flood control at Hanapepe, Kauai, authorized by Public Law 534, Seventy-eighth Congress, second session, section 10*

"Whereas Public Law 534, Seventy-eighth Congress, second session, section 10, authorized expenditures for the first step of flood control at Hanapepe, Kauai; and

"Whereas, by Act 306, session law, 1941, the Territory of Hawaii appropriated \$50,000 of which \$49,000 has been held in reserve for the purpose of meeting local requirements in connection with said flood-control project, and the county of Kauai floated county bonds in the amount of \$50,000 under Act 64, session law 1939, for the same purpose; and

"Whereas the Twenty-fifth Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii by Joint Resolution No. 9 requested the Congress of the United States of America to make the necessary appropriation of \$235,000 in accordance with the previous authorization for flood control at Hanapepe; and

"Whereas the last Congress of the United States of America failed to provide the money needed for carrying out the provisions of Public Law 534, Seventy-eighth Congress, second session, section 10; and

"Whereas the Territory of Hawaii has paid into the Federal Treasury in taxes amounts far in excess of the sums spent in the Territory of Hawaii by the Federal Government: Now, therefore, be it

*"Resolved by the House of Representatives of the Twenty-sixth Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii (the Senate concurring),* That the Congress of the United States of America be and it is hereby again most respectfully requested to enact legislation which will appropriate the amount of \$235,000 previously authorized for the purpose of flood control at Hanapepe, Kauai; and be it further

*"Resolved,* That duly authenticated copies of this concurrent resolution be forwarded to the President of the United States, the President of the Senate of the United States, the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the United States, the Delegate to Congress from Hawaii, the chairman of the Senate Committees on Appropriations, Interior and Insular Affairs and Public Works and to the chairman of the House Committees on Appropriations, Interior and Insular Affairs, Public Works, and Ways and Means."

A letter in the nature of a petition from the Falls Cities Carpenters District Council of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Louisville, Ky., signed by T. A. Pitts, business agent, relating to the

equalization of prices and wages; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

A petition signed by Patrick F. Reynolds, and sundry citizens of the United States, relating to the recall of General MacArthur; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

A resolution adopted by Federal Service Post 549, the American Legion, favoring the enactment of legislation to provide a 17-per cent increase in compensation for postal employees; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

A telegram in the nature of a memorial from the Hollis-Bellaire Post, 980, the American Legion, of New York, N. Y., signed by Lester C. Yohey, commander, relating to the replacement of General MacArthur; ordered to lie on the table.

By Mr. FERGUSON:

A concurrent resolution of the Legislature of the State of Michigan; to the Committee on Armed Services:

"Senate Concurrent Resolution 33

"Concurrent resolution requesting the Members of the Congress of the United States from Michigan to cause a full and complete inquiry into the reasons underlying the removal of Gen. Douglas MacArthur

"Whereas the brilliant and successful military career of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Commanding General of the United Nations Forces in the Asiatic theater of war, has been arbitrarily and abruptly terminated by the action of the President of the United States, as reported to this body over press wires; and

"Whereas the action of the President of the United States in terminating the services of this great and magnificent leader of both the American and United Nations forces has caused grave concern to the parents of men in the American fighting forces; and

"Whereas the loss of the leadership and services of Gen. Douglas MacArthur has left this Nation floundering in a sea of despair: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the senate (the house of representatives concurring), That the Members of the Congress of the United States from Michigan be and are hereby requested by the Michigan Legislature to cause a full and complete inquiry into the reasons underlying the removal of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, and to make their information known publicly forthwith; and be it further

"Resolved, That pending the action suggested herein the members of the Michigan Legislature express to Gen. Douglas MacArthur their utmost faith and confidence in his military leadership; and be it further

"Resolved, That copies of this resolution be transmitted to the Michigan Members in the Senate and House of Representatives of Congress and to Gen. Douglas MacArthur.

"Adopted by the senate April 11, 1951.

"FRED I. CHASE,

"Secretary of the Senate.

"Adopted by the house April 11, 1951.

"NORMAN C. PHILLO,

"Clerk of the House of Representatives."

DEFERMENT OF COLLEGE STUDENTS FROM DRAFT—RESOLUTION OF RICHARD ELLIS POST 205, THE AMERICAN LEGION, JANESVILLE, WIS.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, like my colleagues, I have received a tremendous number of protests against the college-deferment program announced by President Truman and General Hershey.

Innumerable Wisconsinites, both individuals and organizations, have indicated that they feel that deferment for

college studies is a form of class legislation, and as such is discriminatory, particularly against youngsters who cannot afford to go to college.

I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD a resolution sent to me by Commander Harold L. Hill of the American Legion Post in Janesville, Wis., and request that it be referred to the Armed Services Committee.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### RESOLUTION REGARDING DEFERMENT OF COLLEGE STUDENTS

Whereas by Presidential order, high-school youths entering college, and college students, may be granted deferment from military service to finish college by passing an aptitude test; and

Whereas we feel that this system of deferment is inequitable, sets up preferential categories, and is un-American in principle; and

Whereas draft for service can only be justified on a universal basis which is fair to all alike, and where deferment or exemption, other than for incapacity, should be within the frame-work of existing selective-service regulation; and

Whereas the Presidential order deferring college students, violates every concept of this general principle: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by Richard Ellis Post, No. 205, Janesville, Wis., assembled in regular meeting this tenth day of April 1951, at Janesville, Wis., That we denounce this plan and urge Congress to take appropriate action to rescind at once, and further that selective service continue student deferment status as it is in existing law, that copies of this resolution be sent to Senators ALEXANDER WILEY and JOSEPH MCCARTHY; Congressman LAWRENCE SMITH; State Selective Service; Rock County Board Selective Service; American Legion Department of Wisconsin; the Beloit Daily News; and the Janesville Daily Gazette.

#### REPORTS ON DISPOSITION OF EXECUTIVE PAPERS

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina, from the Joint Select Committee on the Disposition of Executive Papers, to which were referred for examination and recommendation three lists of records transmitted to the Senate by the Archivist of the United States that appeared to have no permanent value or historical interest, submitted reports thereon pursuant to law.

#### BILLS INTRODUCED

Bills were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. MURRAY (for himself, Mr. HILL, Mr. KILGORE, Mr. NEELY, Mr. DOUGLAS, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. LEHMAN, Mr. PASTORE, Mr. KEFAUVER, Mr. LANGER, Mr. FERGUSON, and Mr. IVES):

S. 1347. A bill to amend the Railroad Retirement Act and the Railroad Retirement Tax Act, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

By Mr. YOUNG:

S. 1348. A bill to amend section 5 (1) of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, as amended, to eliminate the requirement that an adopted child of a deceased railroad employee whose death resulted from accident

have been adopted for 12 months prior to the deceased employee's death in order to qualify for a child's annuity; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

By Mr. PASTORE (by request):

S. 1349. A bill to establish a department of food services in the public schools of the District of Columbia, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. TAFT:

S. 1350. A bill to amend title III of the Army and Air Force Vitalization and Retirement Equalization Act of 1948 to provide for the crediting of certain service performed in the Military or Naval Academy prior to August 24, 1912; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. DIRKSEN (by request):

S. 1351. A bill for the relief of Alpaslan Reyhan; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HILL:

S. 1352. A bill for the relief of Benjamin F. Ethington; to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. MURRAY (for himself, Mr. HILL, Mr. NEELY, Mr. DOUGLAS, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. LANGER, and Mr. IVES):

S. 1353. A bill to amend the Railroad Retirement Act, the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

By Mr. BRICKER:

S. 1354. A bill to provide for the reimbursement of certain local educational agencies for loss of tax revenue caused by Federal acquisition of real property; to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. LONG:

S. 1355. A bill for the relief of Katherine S. B. Hsia; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. RUSSELL (by request):

S. 1356. A bill to authorize and direct the Administrator of General Services to transfer to the Department of the Navy certain property located at Decatur, Ill.; to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.

#### HOUSE BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS REFERRED

The following bills and joint resolutions were read twice by their titles and referred as indicated:

H. R. 316. An act to amend the Veterans Regulations to provide a minimum rate of compensation for World War II veterans who have arrested tuberculosis; and

H. R. 318. An act to amend the Veterans Regulations and the World War Veterans' Act, 1924, as amended, to provide additional compensation for the loss or loss of the use of a creative organ; to the Committee on Finance.

H. R. 512. An act conferring jurisdiction upon the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts to hear, determine, and render judgment upon the claim of Mrs. Walter J. Bickford;

H. R. 907. An act conferring jurisdiction upon the United States District Court for the northern district of Texas to hear, determine, and render judgment on certain claims of the legal guardian of Charlie Joe Starnes;

H. R. 1431. An act for the relief of Tetsuko Hidaka;

H. R. 1789. An act for the relief of Sgt. Benjamin H. Martin;

H. R. 1799. An act for the relief of Bella and Archie Kennison;

H. R. 1821. An act for the relief of Izumi Makiyoma;

H. R. 1844. An act for the relief of Capt. William Greenwood;

H. R. 2401. An act to increase criminal penalties under the Sherman Antitrust Act;

H. R. 2735. An act for the relief of Kimi Hatano;

H. R. 3291. An act to amend subdivision a of section 34 of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended;

H. R. 3292. An act to amend subdivision a of section 55 of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended;

H. R. 3330. An act for the relief of Mrs. Anna L. De Angelis;

H. R. 3495. An act for the relief of Mrs. Cora B. Jones; and

H. J. Res. 171. Joint resolution to suspend the application of certain Federal laws with respect to attorneys employed by the select committee of the House of Representatives authorized by House Resolution 93, Eighty-second Congress, first session; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 1764. An act to authorize the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to settle, pay, adjust, and compromise certain claims for damages and for salvage and towage and to execute releases, certifications, and reports with respect thereto, and for other purposes; and

H. R. 2952. An act to authorize the attendance of the United States Navy Band at the final reunion of the United Confederate Veterans to be held in Norfolk, Va., May 30 through June 2, 1951; to the Committee on Armed Services.

H. J. Res. 197. Joint resolution to provide for continuation of authority for regulation of exports; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

#### HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION REFERRED

The concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 90) favoring the granting of the status of permanent residence to certain aliens was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

#### ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE APPENDIX

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the Appendix, as follows:

By Mr. LEHMAN:

#### PROPOSED ASSISTANCE FOR ISRAEL—ADDRESS BY SENATOR BENTON

Address delivered by Senator Benton at West Hartford, Conn., on April 16, 1951, before the members of the Temple Beth Israel.

By Mr. BUTLER of Nebraska:

#### PRESERVATION OF AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER LAKE MICHIGAN—STATEMENT BY SENATOR BUTLER OF NEBRASKA

A statement presented by him to the House Committee on Public Works on April 11, 1951, with reference to the construction of the St. Lawrence seaway.

By Mr. BUTLER of Nebraska:

#### HOME RULE FOR ALASKA

An editorial entitled "First Things First," from the Fairbanks (Alaska) News-Miner.

By Mr. BUTLER of Nebraska:

RADIO POLL IN NEBRASKA ON MILITARY POLICY  
News release giving results of poll in Nebraska on questions of military policy and the war in Korea.

By Mr. MARTIN:

#### REPLACEMENT OF GENERAL MACARTHUR

Statement entitled "Americans All," by Dr. Daniel A. Poling, on the subject of General MacArthur's dismissal.

By Mr. MARTIN:

#### REPLACEMENT OF GENERAL MACARTHUR

Editorial entitled "Appeasement 1951 Style," published in the Altoona Tribune of April 13, 1951.

By Mr. MARTIN:

#### REPLACEMENT OF GENERAL MACARTHUR

Editorial entitled "Gen. Douglas MacArthur Is Fired, But 'Mink Coat' Brigade Marches On," published in the Washington (Pa.) Observer.

By Mr. SALTONSTALL:

#### THE WAR IN KOREA

An editorial entitled "The Initiative in Korea," published in the New York Times of April 18, 1951.

By Mr. KILGORE:

#### FREEDOM OF THE PRESS—ADDRESS BY BENJAMIN M. MCKELWAY

An address on the subject Freedom of the Press by Benjamin M. McKelway on March 5, 1951, to members of the Delta Tau Delta Fraternity.

By Mr. KILGORE:

#### THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL—ARTICLE BY THOMAS STOKES

An article by Thomas Stokes, published in the Fairmont (W. Va.) Times of April 13, 1951.

By Mr. KILGORE:

#### THE PRESIDENT ROSE IN STATURE—EDITORIAL FROM THE CHARLESTON (W. VA.) GAZETTE

An editorial entitled "With Time Comes Reason," from the Charleston (W. Va.) Gazette of April 17, 1951.

By Mr. JENNER:

#### STEPHEN BRUNAUER

An article dealing with the investigation into the loyalty of Stephen Brunauer, published in the Wisconsin State Journal of April 16, 1951.

By Mr. JENNER:

#### SENATOR MCCARTHY AND COMMUNISM—ARTICLE FROM THE SPRING VALLEY SUN

An article entitled "'Jumping Joe' in Action," published in the Spring Valley (Wis.) Sun of April 12, 1951.

By Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado:

#### TELEVISION HEARINGS OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

Three editorials from Broadcasting magazine, the issues of March 26, April 2, and April 16, 1951.

By Mr. MCCARTHY:

#### ASIA MILITARY POLICIES AND ADDRESS BY GEN. OMAR N. BRADLEY—ARTICLE BY CONSTANTINE BROWN

An article entitled "Gun Jumped on MacArthur," written by Constantine Brown and published in the Washington Star of April 18, 1951.

By Mr. MCCARTHY:

#### PUBLIC SPEECHES BY MILITARY OFFICERS—COMMENTS BY GEN. OMAR N. BRADLEY

An article entitled "Bradley Utters the 'Party Line,'" published in the Washington Star April 18, 1951.

By Mr. ANDERSON:

#### FAMINE IN INDIA—EDITORIAL COMMENT

An editorial entitled "Famine in India," published in the Christian Science Monitor, and an editorial entitled "A Race With Death," published in the Washington Post.

By Mr. BENTON:

#### CIVILIAN SUPREMACY IN OUR CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

Letter to the Washington Post entitled "MacArthur and the Constitution," published in the Washington Post of April 18, 1951.

By Mr. BENTON:

#### A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY FOR GENERAL MACARTHUR

Article by Anne O'Hare McCormick published in the New York Times of April 18, 1951.

By Mr. KILGORE:

#### PATIENCE WORN THIN—EDITORIAL FROM THE FAIRMONT (W. VA.) TIMES

An editorial entitled "Patience Worn Thin," published in the Fairmont (W. Va.) Times of April 13, 1951.

By Mr. KERR:

#### REPLACEMENT OF GENERAL MACARTHUR

A letter from Clarence Robison, of Shawnee, Okla., regarding the replacement of General MacArthur.

By Mr. MCCARTHY:

#### REPLACEMENT OF GENERAL MACARTHUR—LETTER FROM JOE KORNFEDDER

A letter from Joe Kornfedder discussing the replacement of Gen. Douglas MacArthur.

#### DISPERSAL OF GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 218) to authorize a program to provide for the construction of Federal buildings outside of, but in the vicinity of and accessible to, the District of Columbia, and for other purposes.

Mr. HOLLAND obtained the floor.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. McFARLAND. I think it is rather important that we have more Senators on the floor, now that we have disposed of the transaction of routine business. If the Senator will yield for the purpose, I should like to suggest the absence of a quorum, with the understanding that the Senator will not lose the floor.

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield for that purpose. However, Mr. President, before the absence of a quorum is suggested, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. W. E. Reynolds, Commissioner of Public Buildings, and Mr. Ramsey D. Potts, special assistant to the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, may be permitted to be present in the Senate during the course of the debate. My reason for making the request is that the committee has had so many off-the-record hearings and closed hearings that questions may come up during the course of the debate on which I may wish to have the opportunity of consulting with the gentlemen.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will call the roll.

The roll was called, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Ellender	Kilgore
Anderson	Ferguson	Knowland
Bennett	Flanders	Langer
Benton	Frear	Lehman
Brewster	Fulbright	Lodge
Bricker	Gillette	Long
Bridges	Green	McCarran
Butler, Md.	Hayden	McCarthy
Butler, Nebr.	Hendrickson	McClellan
Byrd	Hennings	McFarland
Cain	Hickenlooper	McKellar
Capehart	Hill	McMahon
Carlson	Hoey	Malone
Case	Holland	Martin
Chavez	Humphrey	Maybank
Clements	Hunt	Millikin
Connally	Ives	Monroney
Cordon	Jenner	Morse
Dirksen	Johnson, Colo.	Mundt
Douglas	Johnson, Tex.	Murray
Duff	Johnston, S. C.	Neely
Dworshak	Kefauver	Nixon
Eastland	Kerr	O'Mahoney
Ecton		Pastore

Robertson	Smith, N. C.	Weiker
Russell	Sparkman	Wherry
Saltonstall	Stennis	Wiley
Schoepfel	Taft	Williams
Smathers	Thye	Young
Smith, Maine	Underwood	
Smith, N. J.	Watkins	

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I announce that the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE] and the Senator from Maryland [Mr. O'CONNOR] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] is absent by leave of the Senate on official committee business.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY] is absent on official business.

The Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The VICE PRESIDENT. A quorum is present.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, before taking up the debate on the pending measure, Senate bill 218, I wish first to make a brief statement.

In its very essence this bill has to do with a vital security matter, that is, the ability of our Government to continue to function at its most vital levels in the event atomic war should come upon us, either with or without a declaration preceding a bombing attack.

The subcommittee which has conducted hearings on this measure has proceeded in a completely bipartisan manner throughout the hearings. As members of that subcommittee we have had, from the majority side of the table, the late Senator Chapman, of Kentucky, who was later replaced by the junior Senator from Missouri [Mr. HENNING], who, in addition to the speaker, as chairman of the subcommittee, comprised the representation from the majority side.

The hearings started with the junior Senator from Washington [Mr. CAIN] and the senior Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. MARTIN] as the minority members. Because of the redistribution of committee work, later the senior Senator from Idaho [Mr. DWORSHAK] and the junior Senator from South Dakota [Mr. CASE] were assigned from the minority party.

I feel that the gratitude of the country is due the members of the subcommittee—other than the chairman, of course—because they have studied this question seriously, and have rendered a completely patriotic service in a definitely nonpartisan manner.

The ultimate subcommittee which made a report on the bill, with the amendments, as it now comes before the Senate, consisted of two members from each party, which speaks rather loudly of the bipartisan approach under which the bill has been studied and reported.

I think that throughout the debate we must remember that it is a fundamental fact which we cannot escape that we are living in the atomic age. The imperative necessity, as I see it, for the enactment of this so-called dispersal bill, S. 218, as amended, results from the fact that we are living in the atomic age. Since the time during World War II when our Nation entered into the expensive and successful process of pro-

ducing atomic bombs, we have expended several billion dollars in the atomic field, either directly or indirectly. Some four billion dollars have gone directly into research, production of the bombs themselves, and experimental explosions of bombs in New Mexico, Nevada, and the far away islands of the Pacific.

Other vast sums, perhaps greater than the \$4,000,000,000, have been expended in the production of huge bombers which are primarily designed to deliver the atomic bomb, in the construction of airfields at strategic spots literally all around the Northern Hemisphere, in the production of jet-propelled fighters for use both to escort our bombers and to intercept attacking bombers, in guided-missile experimentation, in the development of radar and radar screens, and in the development of other features of our defense against attacking bombers or other transportation units which may carry atom bombs. We have regarded these vast expenditures as necessary and highly valuable investments, first in the winning of World War II, and then in protecting the security of our Nation and its allies and in safeguarding world peace.

But up to this moment, Mr. President, we have been slow to act on the unquestionable fact that the atom bomb presents grave threats to the security of the Capital of our Nation and to the ability of our Government to continue to function as an organized government in the event successful atomic assaults are launched against us. It seems to me we will be most unwise if we do not quickly do those things which are necessary to give assurance that the Federal Government will continue to function at its most indispensable levels, and that our people will continue to be served through their most vital agencies, both military and civilian, even though a successful atomic attack may be directed against us.

The primary purpose, therefore, of the bill under consideration, is to assure continuance of operation of the most vital activities of the Federal Government by so dispersing and protecting the necessary facilities, records, and personnel that such operations would not be seriously disrupted or discontinued by enemy bombing of Washington.

Mr. President, I have already stated the primary purpose of the bill, and I want to accentuate it before I enter upon a discussion of the measure itself. Those of us on the committee who looked carefully for its primary purpose are completely assured that its primary purpose and its principal justification is to enable our Government to function regardless of what may happen, that may be now at all foreseen, to the Capital, to the District of Columbia, and to the area immediately surrounding the District of Columbia.

We regard it as a matter of primary importance that, no matter what grave catastrophe may fall upon us—and I hope, of course, and pray, that none may befall us—nevertheless our Government can continue to function in those most vital agencies which would be more important to our Nation the morning after

such a blow had been struck than they would be before that time. In other words, in the event of successful atomic attack on our Nation, and particularly on Washington, the vital agencies of the Government would be even more vital then than now, or in any other normal time.

Mr. President, the pending bill is not drawn out of thin air. It follows nearly 4 years of careful study by those men who, of all men available to our Government, should know most about this field. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended in 1949, made the National Security Resources Board responsible for advising and recommending to the President such measures as might be necessary to assure the continuous operation of the Federal Government in any time of crisis and when attack by a potential enemy might be threatened. Pursuant to this responsibility, a committee composed of representatives of the National Security Resources Board, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the General Services Administration, and the Bureau of the Budget, made a detailed study of this problem beginning in early 1948, which culminated in the plan of dispersal recommended and transmitted to Congress. The original bill, S. 218, embodies the principles of that recommended plan coming from those highly reputable sources.

The amendments to S. 218 which have been reported and which are now being considered represent certain modifications and adaptations of the original plan which are recommended by the committee.

Mr. President, not only was this measure subjected to that searching investigation prior to the time it came to our committee, but it has been heard by the committee in a series of searching open and closed hearings. For the RECORD, and to call the matter to the attention of the Senate, I remind them that the hearings began on December 13, 1950, at that time being conducted on S. 4232 of the Eighty-first Congress. Those hearings are shown by a printed record which is on the desk of all Senators and which, incidentally, has been incorporated in toto in the hearings of the more recent committee of the Eighty-second Congress, which continued to hold open and closed hearings upon S. 218 of the present Congress, which is a bill identical with S. 4232 of the preceding Congress. The record of the open hearings of the present Congress is also available to the Senate in printed form and is upon the desks of all Senators.

I may say while speaking of these hearings that, because the hearings have been both open and closed, and because the committee in the very nature of affairs had to hear many matters which must remain classified and must remain off the record, I asked and secured the consent of the Senate to have present throughout the debate not only for the advice of the committee, but also for the advice of any other Senators who may wish to advise with them, the three gentlemen who are seated here with me: Mr. Bassett, who, of course, is of the

staff of the Public Works Committee; Mr. Reynolds, the Public Buildings Commissioner of the Federal Government; and Colonel Potts, who is the assistant to Mr. Symington, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. I wanted them to be here for two reasons: First, so that I may be advised by them regarding any matter which comes up, regardless of whether it is on the record or off the record, or whether the information is classified or is public. In any case I wished to have the benefit of their present and their advice. In the second place, I wished to have them here so that any other Senator who desires to have the benefit of the same privilege or of any other information within the knowledge of these three gentlemen, may have that information available.

Mr. President, let me discuss in some detail, but as briefly as I can, the contents of Senate bill 218 which is now before the Senate and is under debate. I may say that I shall devote my statement, not to the original bill, but to the bill as it would be changed by the various amendments suggested by the subcommittee and later by the full Senate Committee on Public Works. Let me say that I hope all those amendments will be adopted by the Senate and will be incorporated into the bill.

Section 1 of the bill deals with the question of dispersal. Section 3 deals with the question of decentralization. Section 2 deals with the question of demolition of certain buildings within the District of Columbia. Section 4 deals with the creation of a proposed joint watchdog committee of the Senate and House of Representatives, which would see this program through in its entirety and would speed it in every way within its power. Section 5, the last section of the bill, has to do with the authorization of expenditures in the amount of \$107,000,000 to carry out the objectives of sections 1 and 2 of the bill.

If I may discuss briefly the various objectives of the bill in the order in which I have named them, as they are contained in the bill as now proposed, with amendments, I should like first to take up for discussion the dispersal portion of the bill, as it appears in section 1.

Let me say, before beginning the discussion, that the entire bill and its entire approach are predicated upon the conclusion reached by the President, reached by the agencies affected, and reached, I am sure, by the Congress and by the public of the United States, namely, that Washington not only is now the Capital City of the Government of the United States, but will remain so, and must remain so, regardless of what may happen in the nature of attack from outside the Nation.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. LANGER. Does the bill contain any provision whereby someone will keep some kind of supervision over the land which is purchased, the roads which are built, and the size of the buildings to be erected in connection with the program provided by this bill? In that connection I call attention specifically to the

Pentagon Building. At the time when we voted to have the Pentagon Building erected, the amount of money authorized for that purpose, as I recall, was in the neighborhood of \$15,000,000 or \$16,000,000. However, before that building was finished, it cost more than \$70,000,000. Not only that, but we paid a very large price for the land itself; and, in addition, the roads leading to the Pentagon Building cost several million dollars more.

So let me ask what provision is here proposed, so that in connection with the dispersal program there will be some kind of supervision which will be definite? I note that at one point the statement is made that buildings for approximately 5,000 employees will be constructed. Can the Senator from Florida point out in the bill any restriction on the power of the military to increase that number to 10,000 or 15,000 or 20,000 employees after the program is begun?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I appreciate the question the Senator has asked, for it is a most constructive and excellent one. The committee had in mind exactly the situation the Senator from North Dakota has mentioned. Because of that, the committee has voted to incorporate in the bill several provisions which it is believed will carry out that objective. The first of those provisions is that further authorization must be secured before the authorized expenditures of \$107,000,000 or the authorized objectives as laid down in the bill and in the report can be exceeded.

The second of those safeguarding provisions is to be found in section 4 of the bill, on pages 4 and 5, where it is proposed that there be appointed a joint committee of the highest standing, to consist of five Members of the Senate and five Members of the House of Representatives, to see this program through and to pass upon all phases of it which may require submission to such a joint committee. That certainly will include the question of the choice of sites and certainly will include any departure whatever from the well-laid-out program which now is embodied in the bill and in the report. It also will include the requirement that the committee shall follow through eagerly on the objective of decentralization and on the objective of dispersal, and shall also follow through eagerly on the question of the demolition of certain temporary office buildings which are firetraps within the District of Columbia.

If the Senator from North Dakota will be so kind as to listen throughout the discussion and debate on the bill, I think he will see that the very point he has so ably brought out thus early in the debate is well cared for by the bill and the suggested amendments.

Let me say that I would be derelict if I did not attribute to the colleague of the Senator from North Dakota, the junior Senator from South Dakota [Mr. CASE], whom I see on the floor at this time, the responsibility for having advanced, along with the senior Senator from Idaho [Mr. DWORSHAK], the insistent suggestion from time to time that such provisions should be incorporated in the bill by our committee action.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, I should like to call the attention of the distinguished Senator from Florida to the fact that in every instance which has come to my attention the amounts ultimately expended have been far in excess of the amounts which were originally authorized. For instance, let us consider the situation at Sitka, Alaska. The Federal construction there cost between \$50,000,000 and \$60,000,000, although, as a matter of fact, the amount authorized for that purpose was very much smaller. However, after a small amount is authorized, we are later informed that additional money is required to finish the project or the program.

So I hope the joint committee provided for in the bill will keep strict watch in the case of this program.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I appreciate the Senator's suggestion, with which I am in complete accord.

I should also state one other point, which will be covered under the committee amendment to the fourth section of the bill, namely, that it will be the duty of the joint committee not only to keep the Public Works Committee of the Senate and the Public Works Committee of the House informed as to the progress made on the program and as to the adherence to the objectives of Congress in connection with the program, if Congress passes the bill, but also to report to Congress itself from time to time upon the progress made and upon any aspect of the entire program which the joint committee thinks should be called to the attention of Congress.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. McMAHON. The Senator from Florida may have covered the point I have in mind, for I entered the Chamber a short time after he began his remarks. However, let me ask whether the report on the bill is a unanimous report on the part of the committee.

Mr. HOLLAND. The report is not unanimous. I think it should be stated for the RECORD that at the time when the bill was reported by the committee, 10 members of the committee were present. Nine of them voted to report the bill, and one of them voted against reporting the bill. Another member of the full committee came in within a few minutes after that action was taken, and asked that his name also be entered as approving the report. So the real action is 10 to 1, with two members of the committee unavoidably detained on public business at the time of the committee meeting. I should say that the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN] was in Mississippi, conducting a hearing for the Senate; and the Senator from Washington [Mr. CAIN] was also necessarily absent on public business at the time.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one more question?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield further.

Mr. McMAHON. Have the views of the dissenting member been filed?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; the dissenting member has not filed his views. He is available today. He is the senior Sen-



ator from Pennsylvania [Mr. MARTIN], who has indicated to me that he might wish to make a brief statement, or might confine himself to addressing certain questions to other Senators who may debate this measure as the debate proceeds. No minority views have been filed. Perhaps it would be improper for me to attempt to quote the senior Senator from Pennsylvania, but, at least as I understood his position, it was based upon the fact that he thought the need of economy was so great that, notwithstanding the fact that there were certain values in this program, he felt that it should not be approved, primarily because of the financial condition of the Nation. I note that other members of the committee are present. If they feel that this is not a fair statement of the position of the Senator from Pennsylvania, I hope they will interrupt, and I shall be glad to yield to them.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield further.

Mr. McMAHON. I fully sympathize with the position which has been taken by the Senator from Pennsylvania, so far as a desire for Government economy is concerned. However, I would recommend to him that he consider an answer which Dr. Robert Oppenheimer gave to the original Special Committee To Investigate Problems Relating to the Development, Use, and Control of Atomic Energy, under date of December 5, 1945, as shown at page 191 of part 2 of the hearings. Dr. Oppenheimer was asked by the Senator from Colorado [Mr. MILLIKIN]:

I mean that we in normal warfare, as it's now carried on, have mine-detecting devices which are rather effective if used thoroughly. I was wondering if anything of that kind might be available to use as a defense against that particular type of use of atomic bombs?

In other words, I may say to the Senator that the subject under discussion was the smuggling of atomic bombs into Washington. I invite the Senator to listen to what Dr. Oppenheimer said in reply:

If you hired me to walk through the cellars of Washington to see whether there were atomic bombs, I think my most important tool would be a screwdriver to open the crates and look.

I intend to speak more at length about this matter before the close of the debate, but I wanted to call the Senator's attention to the fact that we would be serving the country very poorly indeed if, in the interest of economy, we permitted the possibility of the Soviet Government's smuggling atomic bombs into the city of Washington and exploding them here as they were exploding them in other places in the country.

The Speaker of the House of Representatives recently stated that we were in terrible danger. Press reporters came to me to ask whether in my opinion it was true. I said it was true, and I told them that every day the atomic factories are turning their wheels behind the Ural Mountains their stockpile is mounting and therefore our danger increases. Total power is coming into the

hands of the totalitarians, and anyone who overlooks the possibility of their smuggling the bombs into our cities and exploding them simultaneously has neglected properly to appraise the situation. No one has explained to me the kind of defense to be employed against such a threat other than, as Dr. Oppenheimer said in 1945, "a screwdriver to open the crates and look."

Senators may talk economy all they care to, but if, as the result of an occurrence of that kind, the seat of our Government were to be destroyed, it would mean that the effective direction of the defense of this country would be wiped out at one fell swoop.

Mr. HOLLAND. I thank the able Senator from Connecticut for his excellent contribution. Before leaving this subject, I feel that I should say that there was not, on the part of the senior Senator from Pennsylvania, the slightest evidence of partisanship or of any motive other than sincere conviction; and the same remark must be made over and over again with reference to every member of the committee, because I think every member of it recognizes that we are dealing with a matter that may not under any circumstances be considered from a partisan point of view.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one more question?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. McMAHON. I am glad the Senator stated that the senior Senator from Pennsylvania had no partisan approach to the question. I am sure of it. I certainly did not wish to insinuate any such thing, and I am sure the Senator from Florida did not think that I was insinuating it, for I have said on more than one occasion that if atomic bombs should be exploded, they would explode on Republicans, Democrats, and even Socialists, alike.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; that is correct—and even Communists, if any of them were near enough to be affected by the blast; and some of them could easily be near enough.

Mr. President, the dispersal feature of the bill as found in section 1 is changed by the committee from the original dispersal provision. The committee thought the change justified, and what we are discussing on the floor of the Senate is a committee proposal, to which I shall now address myself.

In the first place, instead of beginning with eight dispersal sites, as recommended by the Commission which studied the subject, the Senate bill would reduce the number of dispersal sites to four. Instead of beginning with eight finished office buildings, therefore, the program is reduced by the bill, as reported, to four finished office buildings, each of which would have a capacity sufficient to accommodate approximately 5,000 Federal employees.

One of the dispersal sites would be located on what is known as the Beltsville tract, a portion of which is occupied by the Department of Agriculture.

The reason for locating a building on that site, under the recommendations of the committee, is, first, that the site al-

ready belongs to the Government, and, second, that the Department of Agriculture has under way plans for the moving of some of its activities and personnel to that area, above and beyond those persons presently employed there, and can make immediate use of the proposed building to the full extent of its capacity, by moving to that area activities now conducted within the District of Columbia. That, of course, would not be done unless the threat of war should vanish, and unless the need of a continued defense effort should cease to exist. But the committee felt that by reason of the facts mentioned, there was justification for placing one of these buildings on that site, about 14 or 14½ miles distant from the zero milestone in the District of Columbia.

We regretted that our idea of the distance from Washington of each of the dispersal sites could not be followed with reference to the building at Beltsville, but the other three sites will conform to the views of the committee and the views of all the experts who advised the committee with reference to the extreme distance from Washington for the location of sites, which is approximately 20 miles from the zero milestone in the city of Washington, D. C.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield to the Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. LONG. Are we to understand that there is at present a building at Beltsville?

Mr. HOLLAND. There are already certain buildings at Beltsville on portions of the tract, which is a very large tract. The site chosen is at a greater distance from Washington than are the present buildings, which are now all occupied, and it would make available a completely new building, located, however, on the portion of the Beltsville site farthest away from Washington, at a distance of some 14½ miles from Washington.

Mr. LONG. Is there any plan to vacate some of the existing buildings at Beltsville in order to make more room, or is it contemplated that the same persons who are there will remain at Beltsville?

Mr. HOLLAND. It is contemplated that the same persons who are there will remain there, and the proposed building will not be close enough to the location where they are now functioning to interfere with them, nor would they interfere with those who would be housed in the new building.

There is another good reason for the location of a building there, which is the fact that it is so accessible both by highway and by rail, it being very close to the B. & O. Railroad, and to the two highways—that is the one which has been completed, and the new parkway which is under construction between Washington and Baltimore. It would be a rather ideal site from the standpoint of permanent use as an office building outside the District of Columbia.

The other three sites and the other three buildings would be located approximately 20 miles from the District.

That is the approximate distance. That is the distance which the experts of the Atomic Energy Commission, the experts of the National Security Resources Board, the Air Force, and the Department of Defense approved as being a completely acceptable and secure distance insofar as hazard from atomic bomb explosions in or adjoining the District of Columbia might be concerned.

I think I have already said that there would be one new office building on each of the four sites, with a capacity each of some 5,000 employees, or 20,000 employees all told, to be accommodated and housed for office purposes at these four dispersal sites.

In addition to the buildings, I think the Senate should be advised about the other plans in connection with the construction and use of the buildings. It is contemplated, and the report so shows, that a site of some 250 or 300 acres is all that should be taken for each of these projects. The presence in the picture of the "watchdog committee" as well as the limitation upon funds, which appears in the authorization and which will appear in the appropriation, should certainly provide adequate safeguard of this objective.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I gladly yield.

Mr. LONG. Does the space contemplated include space for additional housing in the dispersal areas?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. The locations would not be chosen with reference to any immediate plans for additional residential housing. I think the plans of the committee will be made a little more clear as we go along. The location would be at such a site as would be available for the construction of an additional semifinished building for 5,000 employees. In the event the situation should become worse instead of better, or in the event world war III should come upon us, which God forbid, there would be immediately available sites for the construction of additional buildings with accommodations for 5,000 persons, which would make 10,000 employees on each dispersal site. The utilities, parking facilities, water, sanitation, and so forth, which would be installed at each site in the beginning would be adequate to serve double capacity if that were required.

With reference to residential housing, I may say that the committee felt, in the first instance, that that was a problem of long duration and that it would work out over a period of years. If the proposed buildings were ready for occupancy today, no such problem would come into being tomorrow or at the very date the user began. On the contrary, these buildings would be, in many cases, just about as far in the reverse direction from where employees are now living as are the places where they are now employed, and it would not mean, necessarily, that a great number of new residences or new business facilities would be required in those areas. Ultimately, and with continued use, it was the view of the committee that there would probably come close-by developments at places which might be chosen

by community planners and by the people themselves, by the county authorities, the local authorities, and the State authorities. The Senator will find that the report recommends strongly that the Congress at the proper time shall, with sympathy, consider and cooperate in the solution of the problem of which the Senator has spoken, but which will not be immediate.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. LONG. Of course the availability of material for housing on the project could easily be provided as the project is being constructed, under the Defense Housing Act, by simply declaring those areas to be defense-housing areas.

Mr. HOLLAND. Perhaps so; but no one knows how many persons would want to change their homes and live there. Furthermore, I think the Senate should be advised from the beginning that the committee wanted to take action which would make it perfectly clear that it did not favor anything which even looks like the establishment of new Federal districts or Federal cities. We much prefer to have the local communities and States have every advantage which will accrue to them. Naturally, some disadvantages will accrue to them, but certainly great advantages will accrue to them from building up in an orderly way their communities so as to house more and more of the people who will be employed in the buildings.

Mr. President, I believe I had just stated that facilities and utilities would be installed at each site at the time of original construction, sufficient to serve double the number of employees; in other words, sufficient to serve the original building and an additional one of the same size if it should be needed and constructed.

Mr. President, I come next to the question of communications facilities.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question before he reaches that point?

Mr. HOLLAND. Gladly.

Mr. LONG. The Senator has not discussed the point, I am about to mention, and if he intends to discuss it later on I shall be glad to withhold my question. However, the junior Senator from Louisiana is curious to know the reason why the additional four locations were not agreed to by the committee. Why were they omitted?

Mr. HOLLAND. I shall be glad to answer insofar as my own opinion may go.

Some members of the committee were not persuaded that eight sites were needed. They were not persuaded that the 4 sites and 20,000 spaces would not be adequate to house the most vital personnel in the most vital agencies of the Government. Some members of the committee felt that this was a good beginning to make, and that if we had to go further we could do so.

I may say to the Senator that we did try to view the situation against the background of other programs which are under way at the same time. The Senator is familiar, of course, with the

fact that not too many miles farther, in the mountains of Pennsylvania and Maryland—I think it is in Pennsylvania—there is being constructed a substitute communications system, at least it is so described by the Department of Defense, which would be free from the hazard of atomic attack. Likewise, I think the Senator may have seen in the newspapers this morning the announcement of something which has not been published up until today, namely, the fact that the bomb shelter at the White House is being very largely strengthened and made of sufficient strength and quality to safeguard the President and his family who are required, of course, to live in the District of Columbia. That also includes the President's intimate employees, those members of the President's staff who should be with him at all times, not only as against the danger of bombing and incendiary attacks as in the case of the original refuge which was constructed in 1942, but as against all known hazards at this time, namely, radiation and other types of damage and injury which would be sustained in the event of the explosion of an atomic bomb in the District of Columbia.

There are other programs under way, such as a program of civilian defense, and others of which I cannot speak here. The Senator will realize that discussion of some of them is proscribed somewhat by the necessities of the situation.

I may say that some members of the committee thought that four sites, having in mind the whole picture, were sufficient at this time. I personally was not in accord with that position. I hope the Senator from Louisiana and other Senators will refrain from offering any amendments to increase the program, because the committee discussed the matter at great length, and we are agreed upon this program as being the minimum necessitous, urgent security program, and we want to get it under way.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, I am sure that the Senator from Florida, as a member of the committee, and as chairman of the subcommittee handling the subject, has done everything in his power to protect what he considers to be the most vital needs of the Government. Certainly, having the information available which the Senator has had made available to him in connection with the pending bill, I am sure he realizes that by eliminating the four additional buildings, in the event we should have an atomic attack we shall have to expect the death or injury, which injuries may disable persons for a long period of time, of tens of thousands of Federal employees who might be vitally needed to carry on needed functions of the Government.

Mr. HOLLAND. I agree with the Senator in his conclusion—that instead of having 40,000 employees, as was contemplated by the construction of the eight buildings which were originally recommended, we can take care of only 20,000. It means necessarily that 20,000 persons who were intended to be served will not

be served. I may say that I am not thinking primarily in terms of employees. I am thinking primarily in terms of vital functions which such employees perform, and of the necessity of safeguarding continued performance of those vital functions, regardless of any disaster that may occur in Washington. However, at least it is true that the most important 20,000 employees would be housed in the 4 buildings. Therefore, the 20,000 employees who are eliminated would be in lower echelons of importance than the 20,000 who would be housed outside of Washington. I may say that when I use the word "importance" I am not thinking of individuals; I am thinking of the functions which they perform, and of the necessity of having the functions continued the day after a disaster strikes, when we may need such functions to be performed a great deal more than we needed them the day before the disaster.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield further.

Mr. LONG. I am sure that the Senator realizes that in the event we should not have a war the committee, in striking four of the proposed locations for necessary and essential Federal employees, would have performed a wise and economical action. However, in the event war should come, if we should be forced into war, the committee, on the other hand, would have done a very foolhardy thing in striking the four additional buildings, and it would not have been in the interest of the Government.

Mr. HOLLAND. The Senator will have to choose his own words. Personally I give full credit to every member of the committee for having voted his full convictions on the subject. Even the dissenting member of the committee was, I am sure, in accord with the restriction of the original program in certain regards, at least as understood by the senior Senator from Florida. I hope the Senator from Louisiana will at least accord to all members of the committee the benefit of having voted their deep convictions from a complete nonpolitical approach, because that is exactly what happened in connection with the long continued hearings and discussions of the subject.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield further.

Mr. LONG. The junior Senator from Louisiana certainly knows that the senior Senator from Florida has done everything in his power to make certain that the Nation is properly prepared, and he hopes that the provisions of the bill will be adequate. He salutes the senior Senator from Florida for what he has accomplished in getting the bill before the Senate for its consideration and action.

Mr. HOLLAND. I thank the Senator from Louisiana. One additional fact should be called to the attention of the Senate. Originally a much smaller decentralization program was involved. By decentralization we mean the removal of agencies or parts of agencies

to remote distances from the Capital. These would be agencies which can function just as well at a distance from the Capital as they can in Washington. The 8,000, which were included in the original program were stepped up during committee discussions, largely as a result of committee insistence, to 25,000. So while it is not a complete answer to the question, because we are still talking in terms of decentralization—and that means nonvital agencies—there will still be a greater improvement in the present congested situation in the District of Columbia by the construction of the four dispersal sites, plus decentralization, than would appear to be the case if we did not take into consideration the much larger decentralization figure now incorporated in the bill.

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield to the Senator from Kansas.

Mr. CARLSON. In view of the discussion between the Senator from Louisiana and the Senator from Florida, I wonder if it would not be well to mention that in each of the four proposed locations the utilities provided would be able to take care of an additional building of exactly the same size as the original building, and thus it would be possible to use the total capacity and increase the number of employees who might be housed there.

Mr. HOLLAND. I appreciate the comment of the Senator from Kansas. I believe that fact was mentioned before the Senator came into the Chamber, but I am glad to have it accentuated again. We can get speedy construction on sites already available, with facilities already available, with even temporary quarters, if needed. Of course, that does not completely meet the point of the distinguished Senator from Louisiana. The Senator from Florida has great sympathy for his views; but the bill represents the collective thinking of the members of the committee and represents a materially enlarged program in the field of decentralization from the one originally suggested, and a materially enlarged required program of demolition of hazardous buildings within the District of Columbia. The demolition program has been made a complete condition to the accomplishment of the program by the amended bill, and we hope to carry it through under a joint committee which would see to it that the objectives are attained. I yield again to the distinguished Senator from Kansas.

Mr. CARLSON. I should like to state that it was also brought out in committee that we would use a large amount of critical materials in creating public utilities which would be necessary in the construction of the four buildings. There again we think we not only can save some money for the Government, but also a large amount of critical materials which would be needed in the construction of the separate groups of buildings.

As the distinguished chairman of the committee, who is entitled to much credit for the hard work that has been done, well knows, I had extreme diffi-

culty in going along with him even as far as I have, because, first, of financial reasons and, second, because of the use of a large amount of critical materials, in addition to the establishment of a new program of dispersal. I think I should state very frankly that had it not been for the fact that we are going to decentralize and destroy the temporary, old buildings, which I believe nearly everyone will agree should be destroyed, I would not have gone along with the pending legislation.

Mr. HOLLAND. I thank the Senator from Kansas. He is another one of the Senators who have with deep conviction worked effectively in bringing forth the bill which is before us. The bill represents the combined thinking of the committee. I pay tribute to the positions taken by the Senator from Kansas and other members of the committee. I yield now to the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I am sorry indeed that I was not in the Chamber to hear the forepart of the distinguished Senator's remarks. In the exchange which took place on the floor I heard several times the use of the word "decentralization." I wish to say that for years I have sensed an imperative need of the Federal Government to proceed with the idea of decentralization and to make it operative. I wonder if the Senator from Florida has discussed a wider plan to decentralize the Federal structure?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. The committee discussed plans. We took a big chunk out of the program by requiring mandatorily, under committee amendments which appear in the bill, that 25,000 positions within nonvital agencies—that is agencies which, while important to the Government, do not have to exist the morning after a disaster in order to keep the Government functioning—must be decentralized and moved to remote parts of the Nation, as a part of the program. The Senator will find that the decentralization program has been made an integral part of the bill and of the whole objective to be obtained and is to be subject to the supervision of a joint committee, whose duty it would be to see through to completion the decentralization objective, the dispersal objective, and the final demolition objective, the discussion of which we have not yet reached.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. HOLLAND. I will yield, but before doing so, Mr. President, I may say that I am exceedingly glad that the Senator from Kansas mentioned the subject of critical materials. The question arose during the hearings, and the committee was concerned about using critical materials and the employment of artisans needed in the defense program.

The question was referred to Mr. Reynolds, the able Public Buildings Commissioner. It was subjected to a real study, and a report was made to the committee and is printed in the record of the hearings.

It is certainly true that there is less involvement of critical materials and

critical labor in the program as reported than would have been the case in the full program incorporated in the original bill. That does not mean that all Senators felt that the saving in that field compensated for the loss in other fields; but, as the Senator from Louisiana will see, there were, and should have been, different methods of approach. The Senator from Kansas and others were insistent upon going into the question of critical materials and critical labor supply.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield again to the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. WILEY. I assume that the Senator's last remarks relate to the question of constructing buildings on the dispersal basis, so to speak, within a radius of 20 or 25 miles of Washington. That is what the Senator was talking about in connection with strategic materials; is it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. The Senator is correct.

Mr. WILEY. I am thinking in terms of the larger issue. I am wondering whether this particular dispersal idea is symptomatic of the larger idea, that is, the need for decentralization in government. If so, then it seems to me, if the atomic age is what we think it is, and if warfare becomes what it may become, that we must think throughout the future in terms of having Government agencies so dispersed throughout the Nation that if one arm of government were destroyed, government itself would not be destroyed. Let us take a concrete example. Is there any recommendation as to what should be done with respect to the Agricultural Department, for example?

Mr. HOLLAND. To make it concrete, the Senator from Florida will say that the committee felt that it would be entirely out of reason at this time to inaugurate a heavy building program at points remote from the Capital. Therefore, we were confined to the existing capacity for housing in an effective way the agencies which are nonvital and which can function just as well away from Washington as they can function here. There are some agencies in that category.

The problem, therefore, was to find out the total accommodations now available in existing buildings in various parts of the Nation remote from Washington; also what we could do about seeing that those available spaces were filled. We decided upon a program of 25,000 positions to be moved out at this time.

To return to the question of the Senator from Wisconsin, we requested that the Bureau of the Budget make available to us its studies. It speeded those studies so as to report to us during the course of the hearings. The Bureau of the Budget submitted three different lists of agencies scheduled for decentralization. In round figures the lists were about as follows: An (a) list, consisting of 5,000 positions; a (b) list, consisting of 14,000 positions; and a (c) list, consisting of between 5,000 and 6,000 positions, to bring the total to 25,000.

I will say to the Senator from Wisconsin that various portions, agencies, bureaus, and activities of the Department of Agriculture are frequently found within the (a), (b), or (c) lists, which are scheduled for removal under the decentralization plan.

Under the insistence of the committee, and with the complete cooperation of the heads of the affected agencies, particularly the Bureau of the Budget and the Commissioner of Public Buildings in the General Services Administration, this decentralization has already been going on. It happened that appropriations were already available for decentralizing about 1,700 or 1,800 positions; and I am happy to state that in a report dated only yesterday we were shown that under the progress already made during the course of the hearings, and since, approximately 540 positions have already been decentralized.

To read them into the RECORD without reading the numbers opposite each, they cover a variety of agencies and activities—for example, the Housing and Home Finance Agency. One of its branches has already moved out.

One of the branches of the Department of Commerce has moved to Hagerstown, Md.

The Production and Marketing Payroll Unit of the Department of Agriculture has moved to Atlanta, Ga. There are 60 employees, by the way, in that particular movement, which has already been accomplished.

In the Department of Defense, the Department of Air Force, Chief of Staff Comptroller, a fiscal agency, consisting of 187 positions, has already been moved to Denver, Colo. It was moved while the committee was studying the matter and before the report was made.

In the Department of Defense, the Research and Development Command has been moved to Dayton, Ohio. That accounts for 200 positions.

So I do not think we should leave the impression that there has been any dragging of feet on the part of the administrative agencies. They have been doing all they can to speed the operation. However, authorizations are necessary before they can accomplish any worthwhile decentralization, because the total number of positions for which both appropriations and authorizations already exist amounts to some 1,800, as I recall the figure. So to accomplish a decentralization of 25,000, this bill, or something like it, is an absolute necessity.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HOEY in the chair). Does the Senator from Florida yield to the Senator from Wisconsin?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. WILEY. I have been so busy in the Foreign Relations Committee and elsewhere that I have not had much opportunity to study the subject. What I should like to know is whether or not we have now laid the foundation for what some of us think is imperatively necessary, namely, a concerted effort to decentralize the Federal Government.

Such decentralization includes political decentralization—turning back to the States some of the activities which the Federal Government entered into during the war, so that the Federal Government can take care of the big job of defense. I want to know whether or not a plan is laid to decentralize the Government administratively, so that if an atomic bomb falls upon Washington the administrative activity of Government will not be ruined. We have taken steps to decentralize militarily, so that one bomb would not put out of business the executive and the military staff in the Pentagon.

I am very serious about this matter, because once the head of government is gone, we have chaos. Apropos of what will happen tomorrow when General MacArthur comes, the reason we did not bomb Tokyo with the atom bomb was that it would have destroyed the head of government, and we were advised that to destroy the head of that Government would mean chaos. We did bomb Nagasaki and Hiroshima, but not the head of government.

That is not what the Russians will do. The Russians will destroy all government, if they can.

I am concerned with the question of whether we have really done something, or whether this is only a drop in the bucket.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I appreciate the concern of the Senator. While I am on this point, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this place as a part of my remarks an exhibit showing the 540 positions already decentralized under the program of 25,000. These 540 positions have been decentralized while we were considering the problem.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXHIBIT A UNDER VI, DECENTRALIZATION	
Agencies which have been decentralized and financed from available funds:	
Housing and Home Finance Agency, community facilities regional office to Philadelphia, Pa.....	24
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, regional office to Hagerstown, Md.....	53
Department of Agriculture, Production and Marketing Payroll Unit to Atlanta, Ga.....	60
Department of Defense, Department of Air Force, Chief of Staff Comptroller to Denver, Colo.....	187
Department of Defense, Research and Development Command to Dayton, Ohio.....	200
Total.....	527
Interior Department, Bureau of Mines, already moved as follows: <sup>1</sup>	
To Pittsburgh, Pa.....	8
To Mount Hope, W. Va.....	1
To Denver, Colo.....	1
To Wilkes-Barre, Pa.....	1
To Birmingham, Ala.....	1
To St. Clairsville, Ohio.....	1
Total.....	13
Grand total.....	540

<sup>1</sup> An additional 16 positions will be moved in next 6 months, and Bureau of Mines has money to finance move.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I will gladly yield in a moment. However, there is one thing which I should like to say to my friend from Wisconsin. I agree with him entirely as to the need for further decentralization. I recognize, of course, as I am sure he does, two facts which I think should be mentioned in connection with decentralization. First, some agencies, by their very nature, are not susceptible to decentralization, because their presence here is required by the Congress, required by the executive department, or required by the presence here of the diplomatic corps from the nations which are friendly to us, or for other good reasons. From the very nature of things, there are numerous agencies which are not susceptible to decentralization.

My second point—and I wish I might have the ear of the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. WILEY] as I try to answer his question—with reference to decentralization is this: I remind him that decentralization has been under way a long, long time, and that we fully agree with him that we must make more progress speedily. But as a matter of fact of the more than 2,000,000 civilian employees of the Federal Government only slightly over 200,000 are in Washington and its environs. So that between 85 and 90 percent of the total of the civilian employees of the Nation, either deliberately or because of the kind of employment in which they are engaged have already been decentralized to other parts of the Nation.

I gladly yield now to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, in connection with the decentralization objectives, it seems to me it is wise to consider the legislative situation. The Bureau of the Budget submitted a request for \$20,000,000 for financing a program of decentralization of 19,000 positions covering the period to June 30, 1952. That was submitted to the House Appropriations Committee. In the report of the House Appropriations Committee, dated April 6, 1951, on the third supplemental appropriation bill, the committee made these statements:

The committee has disallowed the budget request of \$20,000,000 for financing the program of 19,000 positions covering the period to June 30, 1952. The proposal was presented as a means of helping to relieve the serious space problem existing in the District of Columbia and adjacent area due to the expanding defense program.

Then the committee says:

The question of decentralization, as well as dispersal, is now pending before the appropriate legislative committees of the Congress. It is the opinion of the committee—

And this is the particular sentence I think the Senate should note—

It is the opinion of the committee—

That is the House Appropriations Committee—

that an appropriation should not be provided—

That is, for decentralization— until an over-all plan has been considered and basic legislation providing for a comprehensive program is enacted.

In other words, the decentralization which everyone desires is stalled at the present time by the failure to have any funds to carry it out, and the House Appropriations Committee says that the reason they do not provide the funds is that they think decentralization and dispersal are related problems, and that there should be a comprehensive program dealing with them; that the matter of decentralization as well as dispersal is now pending before the appropriate legislative committees of the Congress, and that until they have presented a program, an over-all plan, the money will not be available for decentralization.

In other words, what we are here doing is seeking to present to the Congress, so far as the committee could agree on it, a comprehensive program which comprehends decentralization, and we try to spell it out by providing for the transfer of not less than 25,000 positions in the Federal Government that must be made, and at the same time taking care of the related things, which would make it a comprehensive program by meeting a situation which is caused by the mere presence of great numbers of people.

Mr. HOLLAND. I thank the Senator. His remarks are most appropriate, and they hit the nail right on the head.

The authorization included in the bill is a complete requirement, is a prerequisite before we can move forward with further decentralization. To make it clear that the committee wanted not merely an authorization but the machinery to see the program through, the Senator will find on consulting the printed copy of the bill that in section 4 there is included a provision for a watchdog committee to see that the objective of decentralization as well as the other objectives of the bill are carried out.

Mr. President, before I leave the building situation, if I have not already done so, I desire to make it clear that the bill as now drawn would not authorize additional buildings even on the four sites without authorization by Congress prior to the seeking of appropriations for such buildings.

Now to come to the question of communications on the dispersal sites. The question of which units shall be kept close to Washington is determined, of course, by their vital nature and by the fact that they must be kept close enough so that conferences on a face-to-face basis and frequent communications may not only be possible but may actually take place from minute to minute, hour to hour, and day to day during the conduct of the public business. The objective of the program to keep these dispersal employees and their functions close by where they can be available to each other and available to the Capitol, to the public, to Congress, and to the Executive, would be defeated unless there were installed a most intricate and effective system of intercommunication. The Members of the Senate will find that such a system is authorized, and they will find that the authorization provides \$4,500,000 for its installation. The communication provided for is, of course, absolutely necessary for the outlying units to communicate with each other and communicate with Washington and with the outside world.

Of course, the matter of accessibility of these sites is of prime importance, and for that reason the authorization includes thirty-two and one-half million dollars for highway construction, of which the larger part, \$28,000,000, is provided to construct roads, bridges, and acquire the rights-of-way, and so forth, for what is called a circumferential highway around most of the District of Columbia at a distance of about 11 miles from the zero milestone. Such a circumferential highway has been needed for a long time. It would promote the convenience of access to and through Washington at all times. It would provide a belt line by which Washington could be bypassed by thousands of people from day to day throughout all the years. It is a highly important part of the project from the standpoint of intercommunication during these troublous defense days and during wartime, if war should come. But it is also a highly valuable addition to the highway network of this section of the Nation.

The remainder of the funds, the four and one-half million dollars awarded for highway construction, have to do with the means of access off the principal highways giving complete access to the sites where the dispersal buildings will be, and completely convenient routes to get into and out of those sites.

Mr. President, that concludes my discussion of the dispersal part of the program. There has been much reference made to later provisions of the bill, through questions, and I am glad we have had the questions raised and that such interest is displayed by Senators in this very vital security matter. Furthermore the questions will probably enable me to run much more quickly through the rest of the discussion of the bill.

The second feature of the bill, already referred to, in the colloquies, is decentralization. The original bill had a goal of 8,000 positions for decentralization, and had very little to say about the decentralization program. It simply proposed to amend the pertinent section of existing law on that subject by making it clear that agencies or parts of agencies could be decentralized from Washington even though it was required by existing law that they be here; in other words, even though the law creating the agencies stated that they must be located in the District of Columbia or that they must function here, or contained both provisions.

However, the decentralization provision now included in the bill, as I have already described, relates to the decentralization of 25,000 positions as a part of this effort. That is an integral part of the whole effort, to bring greater security to the Nation and greater security particularly to those who will be living in Washington or who will be here at that time. That program of decentralization becomes a much more important part of the whole program under the committee amendment.

The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. CASE] has already brought out a most important point in connection with decentralization, namely, that the need for

an authorizing bill in this field was recognized, just a few days ago by the report and finding of the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, which was not able to appropriate needed funds for decentralization because of the absence, up to this time, of authorizing legislation.

Mr. President, in order that all of us may understand that this program is not only a bipartisan one but is one in which both the legislative and executive branches of the Government have vital interests, and which they are equally attempting to carry through, I wish to make it clear that the Bureau of the Budget and the Commissioner of Public Buildings and their staffs have done a monumental amount of work in hastening this program and making it more extensive, and in accomplishing up to the present time, during our deliberations, the decentralization of more than 540 positions. I hope the problem of decentralization and the necessity for it may be recognized as being a part of the complete picture in connection with this measure.

In order that the RECORD may show how necessary a part of the complete program it is, I remind my colleagues that the next section of the bill I shall discuss has to do with the demolition of firetraps in the District of Columbia which now are occupied by 31,000 Government employees. It is quite obvious that the mere dispersal of 20,000 employees or positions to the outskirts of the city could not result in such demolition in and of itself, and that there must be a further moving out of positions in order to accomplish that objective, which is one of the three objectives of the bill—namely, the demolition of those firetraps—the World War II temporary buildings. By moving out 25,000 under decentralization and by dispersing 20,000 to the 4 dispersal sites, or a total of 45,000, not only will it be possible to demolish those temporary buildings, as the Senate will see, but there will also be some room still for the growth—and there will be a necessary growth—of some of the agencies having to do with the defense of the Nation. As our defense activity grows, so must the defense agencies grow in personnel.

While I am on this point, let me say that I am one of those who wish to see the nonvital agencies of the Government reduced in personnel, and I think my remarks on this floor heretofore have rather abundantly demonstrated my position on that matter. I remember having made two addresses, or I hope they were regarded as such, during the pendency, last year, of the so-called Byrd-Bridges amendment, by which the Senate, under the action taken by it in that connection, proposed to force a 10-percent reduction in the appropriations for most of the Government civilian agencies. A few were omitted, but certainly the proposal included most of the agencies which have no definite relation to the defense effort. Our primary purpose then was, of course, to force a reduction in personnel.

I shall be making the same effort at this session and at any other session

when I think there is an overstaffing, as there is now, of many of the civilian agencies of the Government.

However, the remarks I have just made about an increase which must be anticipated in some of the defense agencies are predicated, of course, on the only possible realistic point of view as our Armed Forces increase in number. As our defense activities become greater and greater under the legislation which already has been enacted, we may expect, because they will be required, larger numbers of employees in certain of the agencies which serve the military, as well as in the civil agencies which have to do with the mobilization of the civilian power of the Nation.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Will the Senator from Florida identify the buildings which the administration plans to tear down in connection with this program?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; they are the temporary World War II frame structures. I intend to cover that subject in the next portion of my remarks. Perhaps the Senator will be kind enough to wait until I deal with that subject, and then will question me again, if that proves to be necessary. Perhaps I shall make clear just what buildings will be affected in that connection, so that the Senator will not find it necessary to question me further. However, if he does wish to ask further questions at that point, I shall be glad to respond.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I notice that the Senator from Florida has referred to buildings constructed during World War II and buildings constructed prior to World War II. I wonder whether the Senator can identify them by specific name or designation.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; they are the World War II buildings, but not the World War I buildings.

Let me say, for the information of the Senator from Delaware and for the RECORD, that there are two types, generally speaking, of temporary buildings in the District of Columbia. One of them consists of the temporary buildings which were constructed during World War I, and they include the so-called Navy Building and the Munitions Building and the temporary building E. All of them are concrete buildings. None of them is a firetrap or a fire hazard. They are not permanent buildings; they are not decorative buildings; they were not built with the idea of being used as long as they have been used. However, they are being used, and they are quite efficient for use in the future. So there is no plan at this time, or at least there is no plan in connection with this bill, for the demolition of those buildings.

During World War II, other buildings were constructed, in groups with which I am sure the Senator from Delaware is familiar—buildings along Constitution Avenue, along Independence Avenue, around the Reflecting Pool between the Lincoln Memorial and the Washington Monument, and at various other sites around the District of Columbia with

which I am sure the Senator from Delaware is familiar. Those buildings are so temporary that they constitute a terrible fire hazard. In the first place, they are of wood frame; they are built out of 4-by-4 wood pieces, as I understand, with some 2-by-4's in the roofs. They have composition roofing which has just about outlived its usefulness. They have for siding, as I understand, pressed boards made of asbestos and asphalt; and in the case of many of those buildings there is nothing but that outside board which is approximately 1½ inches thick. In other buildings, there is a somewhat thinner board on the inside, in place of ceiling; and that has even less fire-resistant qualities than do the outside walls. I am told by Mr. Reynolds, and we are told by others, that not only have those buildings lived through the period of time for which they were designed to be used, but they now constitute a horrid firetrap for the 31,000 human beings who are employed in them. Even in the event of a conventional bombing, those buildings would go just like straw. In the event of an atomic bombing, of course, the heat being so much more tremendous, the situation would be even more disastrous.

I call to the attention of the Senator from Delaware, and to the attention of the public generally, the fact that presented in this connection is not alone the question of safeguarding the 31,000 persons who work in those buildings—although, of course, that is a most worthwhile objective—but we also have the question, which is most serious, that in the event of an atomic attack, those buildings would burn with such heat as to completely close Independence Avenue, Constitution Avenue, and other vehicular arteries which simply must be kept open if people are to go in and out in order to accomplish the evacuation which would then be necessary.

Mr. President, what I say now is said with complete calm and complete coldness, because the committee approached this entire problem impersonally and objectively, in an endeavor to size it up from the point of view of what we must do for the good of the Nation. I cannot too strongly emphasize the fact that those buildings must go, and their continued existence brings great peril and threat of disaster not only to the 31,000 employees who work in those buildings, but also to many others who will have to use, for purposes of evacuation or ingress, depending on the way they will go at such times, the streets and avenues in the vicinity of those firetraps. Those streets would have to be used by all persons who would bring succor of one kind or another to hard-hit sections of the city at such times. All the relief and rescue personnel for those sections of the city would have to use those streets; they would have to have access, by means of Constitution Avenue, Independence Avenue, and other highways, to the places where the disaster might be the greatest.

Mr. President, I am very sure I speak for every member of the committee when I say that we are completely convinced that this is something which simply must be accomplished as one of the objectives

of the legislation now proposed, something which should not be continued in an uncompleted state a day longer than is necessary to have employees moved outside of Washington and dispersed so that the temporary buildings can be destroyed.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Did the committee of which the Senator from Florida is a member give any consideration to the fact that we might close certain of these agencies and send the employees home, and let them stay there?

Mr. HOLLAND. I may say to the Senator that I have considerable sympathy for his feelings, which he has made very clear on the floor of the Senate from time to time. I respect them. Sometimes I have been with him, sometimes I have not. I have felt that the Senator has sometimes wanted to employ too sharp an ax. I shall be with him completely in many of his objectives, but I call to the attention of the Senator the fact that the committee was without jurisdiction to consider any other aspect of decentralization than that which was necessary to the accomplishment of the objective of the proposed legislation; that we are not in the position, for instance, of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, or in the position of the President under the reorganization bill. We are not able, by a measure brought forth by our committee, to effect the kind of wholesale reorganizations which the Senator has in mind, and with some of which, at least, I am in distinct sympathy.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield gladly to the Senator from Delaware.

Mr. WILLIAMS. The Senator from Florida will agree with me, will he not, that that is the answer to the entire problem?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I certainly do not. If the personnel in Washington were confined to those who are handling nothing but the vital agencies, if there were ample space in many of the buildings in Washington, we should still be in the position of offering a fanatically open invitation to any enemy to come with atomic bombs, knowing that the use of atomic bombs over such a concentration of people engaged in the performance of vital functions, could, almost by one blow, render this Nation helpless to serve itself through the continued functioning of those vital agencies. I do not at all agree with the sentiment of the Senator that the answer to this entire question is the reduction of personnel, though I am in complete accord with many aspects of his approach to the question.

Mr. WILLIAMS. The Senator will admit, will he not, that we have on the payroll today more than double the number of employees we had when we entered World War I, and that we have four times the number of employees we had 18 years ago? Does not the Senator think that is rather excessive?

Mr. HOLLAND. The Senator is probably thinking of the over-all picture of

employees, certainly not of the number of employees within the District of Columbia, or within this area. I do not understand exactly to which situation the Senator addresses his question, but certainly I am in accord with the Senator on one of his approaches, namely, that we have too many employees in civilian agencies. Last year, after we in the Senate had passed a specific requirement that there be a reduction of 10 percent in the budgets for certain of these civilian agencies, which we knew must be reflected in the reduction of personnel, and when the House had passed a somewhat similar measure, which was specific, and when both Houses had exempted certain objectives of worth-while national importance, as, for example, the construction of hospitals, and when, because of a lack of time, we finally had to bring out of conference a provision which left it to the civilian agencies themselves to work out the question of where the ax should be applied, I was distressed, as I am sure the Senator from Delaware was, to find that the reduction in the number of civilian employees which we had expected, not only by our action in the Senate but also by the somewhat similar action of the House, was not accomplished, and that instead such worthy objectives as the construction of needed hospitals were badly hurt.

The Senator will remember that the authorization for hospital construction was reduced from \$150,000,000 to \$75,000,000, notwithstanding the fact that States, counties, cities, and other units of government throughout the Nation, responding to a program which had been authorized by the Congress, and which showed the recognition by the Congress of the need of more hospital space, in conjunction with Federal officials, had worked out their part of the program, because, in most cases, they had to supply the major part of the funds. They had worked out the program in many instances through the issuance of bonds and other financial arrangements, and were ready to go ahead, yet the Budget Bureau reduced the figure from \$150,000,000 to \$75,000,000, and dealt a disastrous blow to the efforts of many Members of the Senate and of the House, who I think are level-headed, in their desire to meet the question of better serving the health of the Nation, but to meet it through some other methods than the proposals which sometimes have come from persons of high rank in the Capital of the United States.

Mr. President, I think we have wondered afield, but I do want the Senator from Delaware to know that I have some sympathy for certain of his positions, and that my votes have so indicated in the past, and will continue so to indicate in the future. But at this time we have this emergency program linked to the vital security of the Nation. It is a question of vital importance to the Nation as to whether our most important agencies, both military and civilian, can continue to function.

For instance, suppose that the Central Intelligence Agency, with its vast accumulation of information, were wiped out on the very eve of a great war, as might happen, since we might be bombed

as the first stroke of a war, without war having been previously declared; or suppose the FBI, with its knowledge of where subversive persons are, and as to where they can be picked up speedily, were wiped out overnight.

I wish to repeat, without indicating the precise agencies which are affected, that Senators well know that there are such civilian agencies, and that there are key portions of the Military Establishment, both in the Defense Department itself and in the several component departments which are generally referred to as the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. There are within each of those great departments vital agencies which must be able to function after we have been subjected to an assault. We should determine this question, and should then proceed to do what our consciences impel us to do in the other fields about which the Senator from Delaware has so ably spoken.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President—

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. CASE. The distinguished Senator from Florida I think has well placed emphasis upon a positive result which should be accomplished, a positive need of facing the preservation of operations of the vital agencies of the Government. At the same time, I believe the Senator will agree with me that the committee in its deliberations gave consideration to the reduction of personnel. I recall an observation made by the distinguished chairman of the committee, the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ] whom I would not venture to quote except that he is present, and who if I misquote him, will correct me.

The chairman expressed the belief that there is need of a reduction of general civilian employment to the extent of from 10 to 15 percent, and he expressed the hope that it could be accomplished.

The committee considered the possibility of writing into the bill a directive which would place in the hands of the Bureau of the Budget a personnel ceiling for the various agencies of the Government. However, it was suggested that the committee did not have the necessary jurisdiction, and that it would be appropriate for the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service or the Committee on Appropriations to consider that subject. But, whatever we may have reported, or whatever may be embodied in the bill, it should not be construed, so far as I am concerned, and, I think, so far as the members of the committee generally are concerned, as in any degree lessening the belief of the committee that civilian personnel should be reduced as far as possible, and that appropriate committees, which can take effective action in that regard, should be encouraged to take the steps necessary to accomplish that purpose.

Mr. CHAVEZ rose.

Mr. HOLLAND. I thank the Senator from South Dakota, and before I yield to the chairman of the committee, I may say that the Senator from South Dakota has correctly stated the situation. Not only did he and other members of the committee take the position which he

has indicated, but the able chairman of the committee, who sponsored this proposed legislation, effectively took that position. I think I am entirely within the facts in stating that the committee felt that the farthest it could go was to insist upon the decentralization of the 25,000 persons as a necessary concomitant to the dispersal, believing that both those factors would be necessary to the accomplishment of the other great objective about which we have been talking.

I now yield to the chairman of the committee.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, from the beginning of the consideration of the proposed legislation, I have been insisting on three things: reduction of personnel, which I think can be accomplished; decentralization—and I mean real decentralization, because dispersal without decentralization does not do very much good so far as getting rid of the confusion and the harassment of many persons may be concerned—and the demolition of buildings.

I may also say to my good friend from South Dakota that I started hearings before the Subcommittee on Federal Security and the Department of Labor of the Committee on Appropriations, and at the beginning of those hearings I made the statement to each and every person who was to appear that I would insist on the Bureaus connected with Federal Security and the Department of Labor telling us where they could reduce personnel and costs. So I am trying to carry out the basic idea with which we started.

But, as stated by both the Senator from South Dakota and by the chairman of the subcommittee, there are many things which the Committee on Public Works cannot do. Of course, it can make recommendations. If the reduction of personnel is to be accomplished, the question should go to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. My personal opinion is that, irrespective of authorization by law proceeding from the proper committee, it will be necessary to have a reduction in appropriations before we will have any reduction of personnel.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of the committee for his observations, which are certainly timely.

I believe I have dwelt sufficiently already upon demolition, without pursuing the subject further at this time. To repeat only briefly, after having accomplished dispersal and decentralization of a sufficient number of positions one of the major objectives of the proposed legislation is to destroy and demolish the World War II temporary buildings, which now house 31,000 persons. We do not have to wait upon the completion of the entire program in order to have that accomplished. As we get some of the dispersal projects occupied, as we accomplish some of the decentralization, I think the buildings should be demolished at the places where they offer the greatest hazard by way of blocking avenues of ingress and egress to the center of the District, where so many persons are employed. I

am sure it will be a proper function of the "watchdog committee" to see that such an approach is followed.

Mr. President, in concluding, I may say, because I do not believe this point has been mentioned, that in addition to the buildings which were constructed in World War II, and which I have previously described as being very inflammable, very unsubstantial, as being fire hazards and death traps, there are extensions upon some of the World War I buildings of fourth stories which were built exactly as the World War II buildings were built. This program embraces the demolition of those stories which were added to the World War I buildings in exactly the same way as it involves the demolition of the complete buildings which were built during World War II.

Mr. President, the next provision of the bill, which is section 4, has to do with the "watchdog committee." I believe I have made sufficient reference to it heretofore, in replying to various questions, to bring out the essential facts about that committee. I think that section is a real addition to the proposed legislation. It represents the collective thinking of the members of the committee, that the committee would not be doing its full duty if it did not provide an authoritative agency of the legislative arm of Government to keep in closest touch with the program, to urge its completion in every possible way, and to press each part of the triple objective with equal vehemence. In other words, we want the dispersal completed; we want the decentralization completed; we want the demolition completed, and we felt that the best way to accomplish those results was to have five Members of this body and five Members of the House comprise a joint committee to keep right behind the program, with the requirement that it report to the Congress from time to time, and with the requirement that it report to the Public Works Committees from time to time. That means that in each case if Congress wants a report, it can get it, and if committees of the House and Senate want a report they can get it, because the "watchdog committee" will have a positive duty to see to it that not only in carrying out the broad objectives but also in following the plans and purposes of the program, there will be a restriction of expenditures in developing the whole program according to the plan which the committee has approved.

Mr. President, the last section has to do with authorization. Under that section, an authorization of \$107,000,000 would be provided, contrasted with the authorization of \$190,000,000 in the original bill. I remind the Senate that the \$190,000,000 authorization would have been for a much larger program than this one. In other words, it would have included eight sites and eight new buildings, rather than four sites and four new buildings. The expenditures with reference to highways would be almost the same. The expenditures with reference to communications would be nearly as great, but not entirely so.

Mr. President, the authorization is broken down into items, and I want to put them into the RECORD so that the

program may be measured in the future against the plans of the committee.

The committee is not guaranteeing that costs will not go up; we could not do such an absurd thing as that; but we are willing to show in the RECORD just what we have been advised and what we have found would be the cost of the respective parts of the program.

For buildings, facilities, and equipment at \$16,400,000 each, there would be a total of \$65,600,000.

For the three sites which will have to be acquired, of 250 to 300 acres each, a total of \$4,400,000.

For the access highways other than the circumferential highway, \$4,500,000.

For the circumferential highway including the bridge across the Potomac River approximately 11 miles out, \$28,000,000.

For communications, \$4,500,000.

The total is \$107,000,000 to carry out the dispersal objectives and the demolition objectives.

To be perfectly frank with the Senate, with reference to the cost of carrying out the demolition, I do not believe it will cost us anything. I think the wrecking of those buildings can be accomplished without any expense to the Government, but we wanted to have the authorization so that there would be no question about it, no matter what problem might come up in regard to demolition.

We have not covered in the authorization the costs of decentralization because they are already covered under the existing Decentralization Act, which is intended to be amended by the pending bill, and to which is added a definite objective for the decentralization of 25,000 employees under the terms of the bill. The cost of the decentralization would be covered either by existing appropriations, which are available for some 1,800 of the total number of positions to be decentralized, or by new appropriations to be sought of Congress. The Senate will recall that only a few days ago a supplemental request for an appropriation of \$20,000,000 was submitted, which, as the Senator from Florida understands, is sufficient to cover the cost of decentralizing about 19,000 of the positions which are incorporated in the program. The request was turned down by the House Committee on Appropriations, as has already been stated in the RECORD, partly at least, and I think primarily, because no authorization, plan, or program already existed under substantive law. The enactment of the pending bill would cure the defect.

Mr. President, I have concluded my discussion of the proposed legislation. I hope it has been sufficiently clear to give a picture of it in the RECORD and also to the Members of the Senate who are on the floor. The committee feels that it is a vital national objective which must be carried through. I repeat that Washington is not only the National Capital but that all considerations of morale and all considerations of national stability require that it shall remain the National Capital. I am certain that Congress does not propose through any legislation, any spoken word on the floor of the Senate, or any word coming forth from any open or closed hearing



even remotely to indicate any other plan or objective than that Washington shall remain the Capital of the Nation; I hope, always, the Capital of a Nation at peace, but if we be at war, still the Capital of the Nation while it is at war. We think the program is necessary to serve the purpose of continuing the vital functioning of the Government, regardless of any disaster which may befall the National Capital.

Mr. President, I think it would be well at this time to touch upon the personnel upon whom the committee relied in the course of its hearings, so that I may not only pay tribute to them, but indicate to the Senate that we must have had before us, as we did have before us, much information which cannot be discussed with safety on the floor of the Senate. I regret that that is the case, but it is the case.

We had before us Maj. Gen. William R. Schmidt, who is the director of the Continental United States Defense Planning Group. He is the head of the important agency, in the Department of Defense, which is charged with the duty of making plans for the defense of our Nation, particularly for the defense of its Capital.

We had before us Mr. W. E. Reynolds, the Commissioner of Public Buildings. Most of what he could say was said in open hearings, but some of what he could say had to be transmitted to us in closed hearing.

We had before us two of the high level employees of the Atomic Energy Commission. Their testimony, in the very nature of things, had to be communicated to us in closed hearing.

We had before us Col. Ramsay D. Potts, Jr., special assistant to the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, Mr. Stuart Symington. He is the right-hand man of the Chairman. I wish to describe briefly the nature of his experience, so that in the RECORD there may appear clearly the type of information which he could bring to us and the kind of experience upon which his information was based. In the first place, he was the commander of a long-range bombing group in our Air Force for a while in Europe or North Africa. He was later in command of the unit which had to do with the control of air-bombing operations from England for a considerable period of time. In other words, it was his duty to plan the bombing program. He was one of the officers in high position upon whom the responsibility fell for sending forth the thousands of our boys in the thousands of our planes which wreaked such terrific havoc on the cities and war plants of Germany and other cities on the continent. Following his experience he was called back to serve as one of the advisers to the commission which was charged with the duty of surveying the demolition accomplished in Europe and in Japan by bombing operations during World War II, including both conventional bombing operations and the atom bombing operations at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

So classified had been the work and so classified had been its result that I

suspect most of those who are now listening to me do not know that for a period of months a large group of our outstanding experts, not only military, but industrialists, construction engineers, and experts in the field of health, as well as in other fields, made a careful survey, with a painstaking compilation of all the information which could be gained by a study of the locale of the heavy bombing operations, a study of the records of cities and governments, civilian and military, a study from actual interviews with survivors, and a study in every other way that could be made, to show what demolition was accomplished and what the result was upon civilian morale, military morale, military production and every other vital field.

Colonel Potts was called back to serve with Mr. Symington largely because of his experience. He was available to our committee. I have gone to this great length in describing his experience in order that the Senate may know that we had available what must be the best information that is available anywhere on the various subjects which I have mentioned, and which have to do with the vital question before us.

Mr. President, while other excellent purposes would be served by the passage of the bill, purposes which I have endeavored to describe in my discussion of it, none of them is of such a nature as to require our going into the immediate fulfillment of the program included in the bill, other than the primary purpose of assuring a continuance of operation of the most vital functions, both military and civilian, of the Government.

Insofar as I am concerned, I would not be urging the passage of the bill at this particular time of economic strain in the defense effort, and at this time of shortage of materials and lack of manpower, were it not for my deep conviction that there is a vital question of national security involved in the program, and therefore for that compelling reason we dare not any longer delay it.

Mr. President, I wish to discuss next the nature of the threat of a bombing of Washington by an enemy using atomic bombs against us. Of course this is no time for hysteria. I repeat what I said in the beginning of my remarks. It is a time for Congress and the American people to use good, sound common sense to appraise the situation, not only calmly but even coldly, with all possible detachment and objectivity. Our committee followed such a course, and we are bringing the problem to the floor of the Senate with that point of view in mind, and we propose to continue to follow it throughout the discussion of the bill.

I mention first the vulnerability of Washington to attack by atomic bombs. I am sorry that the remarks in that regard will have to be scanty and not too specific, but they will be as specific as we can make them. In the first place, Washington is in a location which is identifiable from the air by day or night, regardless of overcast, through the use of radar, with such complete certainty that there is no possible way for an ex-

perienced group of bombers to miss it if they are in this general part of the country.

We have placed in the rear of the Chamber a map which shows the general layout of this area. The black area is the urbanized area in and surrounding the District of Columbia. It includes not only the District of Columbia, but also Arlington, Alexandria, Bethesda, Takoma Park, and other adjoining areas. In short, the highly settled urbanized areas in the vicinity of the District of Columbia are marked in black.

Two circles appear, one at a distance of 10 air-miles from the zero marker in the District of Columbia, and the other 20 miles distant from that marker. I remind the Senate that the three dispersal areas and buildings which I have mentioned would be located on or near the 20-mile circle surrounding the District. The purpose of calling attention to the map at this time, however, is to ask the Senate to note that there is a great river pointing in from Chesapeake Bay, with a tremendous arm of the ocean lying at the point indicated, which makes it completely easy and almost primary work from the standpoint of a navigator on a bomber to find his way in at great heights, and regardless of what kind of atmospheric conditions prevail.

In order that Senators may see just what a bomber sees on his radarscope, I have before me two pictures which, of course, cannot be printed in the RECORD, but which can be passed around. One is taken at 8,000 feet over the city of Washington, and over that part of the river which is immediately adjacent to the city of Washington. It shows clearly many details which anyone could recognize at once—for example, the runways at the National Airport, the bridges across the Potomac, the juncture of the Anacostia River with the Potomac River, and the juncture with the estuary—I call it an estuary; I do not know what it is called here—or the basin in which the ships come up to the docks. The three-pronged juncture of the Potomac, the Anacostia, and the estuary stands out like a sore thumb through a radarscope at 20,000 feet, or at heights well above that.

The other picture which I wish to show Senators is found in a highly restricted book on radar intelligence which I ask Senators to safeguard and pass back to me, because I am under injunction not to let it leave the floor of the Senate.

The second picture is taken at 20,000 feet, much nearer Chesapeake Bay than the Potomac. It shows clearly the Chesapeake Bay, the Potomac, and distinctive markers on the Potomac. It is perfectly clear that a bomber coming in, as was the plane from which the picture was taken, at 20,000 feet, in the murk of a cloudy night would have no difficulty at all in finding out where he was and in getting to the place where he could drop his bomb with the greatest effectiveness.

Mr. President, there are no "if's" or "and's" about it. We know beyond peradventure that through the use of radar

such as that which existed in World War II—and I ask Senators to catch this point particularly—this city could be discovered and clearly identified regardless of atmospheric or weather conditions.

I want the Senate to know that those pictures were taken years ago with World War II radar. They represent the photograph of a radarscope. They do not show the picture even as clearly as the radarscope itself shows it. I want Senators to know that our advancement in the field of knowledge which has to do with radar has been great since World War II, and since the creation of the equipment by which these two pictures were taken. So, Mr. President, it is perfectly clear that the District of Columbia is a vulnerable area from the standpoint of ease of identification.

My second point is that it is a highly vulnerable area to atomic attack because of the conformation of the land. There are no high hills. I ask that Senators follow this point, because it is of great importance. By comparison of the atomic damage done at Hiroshima and at Nagasaki, it is easy to see what important protection is given by the existence of hills—the protection which the shoulder of a hill gives to buildings on the reverse side.

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. MARTIN. Would the Senator suggest moving the capital to some other locality because of the adverse terrain in this section?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. If we were starting from the beginning, if we were just thinking about establishing a capital, if George Washington had not ridden here and chosen this site, if all the traditions connected with this site did not exist, adding greatly to the wealth of our tradition and to the height of our spirit; and if all the billions of dollars' worth of improvements which mark the present location of Washington had not already been installed, perhaps the answer to the Senator's question could be "Yes." However, I believe that any thought of abandoning the Capital of this Nation at this time, when we are under pressure and when we are being tested with a war of nerves, against which we must be peculiarly cold and peculiarly adamant in our reaction, must be rejected. I believe that any suggestion for moving the Capital of the United States would be completely out of line with what the Congress could approve.

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. HOLLAND. I gladly yield.

Mr. MARTIN. If we were to favor—and I do not favor it—moving the capital because of the adverse terrain, that would be one thing. But if we are to move a part of the capital, does not that indicate that possibly after a while we may move the entire capital?

Mr. HOLLAND. My answer to the Senator is that the measures which are embodied in the pending bill certainly

do not indicate in the slightest degree that we have in mind the displacement of the capital of the Nation. To the contrary, they show rather clearly that we intend to maintain the capital here, and that we propose to put in the most favored and secure positions in which we can place them our vital agencies of Government, so that they will be protected, just as we have placed on the sacred soil of the Senator's own State the location for the duplicate communications center which the Senator and I have discussed at some length heretofore. The fact that we are building that duplicate communications center in the hills of Pennsylvania is no evidence of the fact that we are abandoning the capital. It is simple evidence of the fact that we propose to insure ourselves against whatever may come, and that we intend to preserve the ability of the Nation to function at its vital levels, regardless of what may come.

Certainly the Senator from Florida, in his remarks today from the beginning up until the present time—and he intends to continue that effort up to the end of his remarks—has tried to make it crystal clear that the thinking of the committee—and on the committee the Senator from Pennsylvania was a valued member—was that under present conditions it would be unthinkable to talk about moving the capital of the United States.

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. MARTIN. Have we any data or information from scientists, engineers, and others who have studied this question as to whether or not the decentralized buildings would be removed far enough from the center of Washington so that they would be safe from bombs in the future?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am glad the Senator asked that question. We do have such evidence, implicit evidence from the experts from the Atomic Energy Commission, who gave us the benefit of their experience and knowledge. We have evidence from such men as Colonel Potts, General Schmidt, and others, that the 20-mile distance is completely adequate to protect against bombs dropped in or on the areas immediately adjacent to Washington. The Senator may be referring to the hydrogen bomb. I am sorry I cannot discuss that. As a matter of fact I know so little about it that my discussion of it would not add much to the sum of knowledge here.

The statements which most impressed me about the hydrogen bomb were two. First, that there was very great uncertainty as to whether the hydrogen bomb can be produced. Some of the scientists apparently think it cannot. Secondly, that as to the actual operation of the hydrogen bomb there is a certain reason why, if it passes a certain degree of intensity, most of that intensity will be operative outside this atmosphere, will blow outwards, so to speak, because of the fact that it meets less resistance in that direction.

Mr. President, all I can say is that with the best available men appearing before

us—and I am sorry the Senator from Pennsylvania was not able to attend the particular closed session to which I am now referring—we felt that there was no question at all about our being clothed with authority to say to the Senate that insofar as we may be concerned with any foreseeable result at this time from any bomb or other weapon we know about which detonates, which explodes, that the distance of 20 miles does give the insulation, does give the security which we are seeking, and that we gain by that dispersion not only the greater safety that comes from dispersal itself, but also by reason of distance.

The Senator from Pennsylvania, to whom I pay tribute as one of our great soldiers, knows perfectly that it has been an established principle of warfare throughout all the centuries that dispersal of targets itself is one of the objectives which is most helpful. He knows that back to the beginning of our Nation we have understood that men cannot march abreast in assaulting breastworks as they attempted to do under Braddock, or as they attempted to do at New Orleans, and get any results at all as against dispersed fire from concealed and protected individuals who are firing at them. And he knows perfectly well that it is one of the established precepts of defense that dispersal has a value of its own.

But in addition to that value I am able to say that the experts who testified before our committee stated that they felt that the 20 miles distance was ample to give security as against foreseeable weapons. That does not mean that a bomber could not pick one of these buildings as an objective and attempt to hit it, but it would mean that instead of having here concentrated in the District in one place all the vital agencies of Government, or most of them, where, as a matter of fact, all of them could be wiped out by one bomb, or almost all—we would have dispersal units out there where they would constitute separate targets, very precarious targets, difficult to hit, and not prime targets at all, because the amounts of destruction which could be accomplished at any one of them would not compare to the attractiveness which Washington now has as a congested central target, or not compare with the attractiveness of many other prime targets throughout the Nation, which I shall not attempt to mention; targets which are highly attractive to any bombing through the use of atom bombs. So that the dispersal does give a real measure of security—not complete security, but a real and substantial measure of security.

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. President, will the Senator again yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SPARKMAN in the chair). Does the Senator from Florida yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Florida has made a very fine statement as to the dispersal of positions to provide against attacks with bombs and weapons of the kind that might be used against us in the future. I should like to make the

observation that when the site of the Capitol Building was located here, when work was begun on building the Capitol in Washington, its location was at a safe distance from fire from ships. It is not now. The White House was located at a safe distance from firing from ships, but it is not safe from such fire now. I contend that if we make this dispersal, we should place the buildings at a much greater distance from Washington than is now anticipated.

Thirty years ago, in World War I, the range of a rifle was not one-third so great as the distance the rifle we have at present can fire. We are advancing rapidly in the development of arms and weapons. I am afraid that what we are proposing to do now will be most expensive, and that probably in the future we will find that we have not accomplished what some now anticipate will be accomplished.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I appreciate the candor and the depth of conviction of the Senator from Pennsylvania. I do not agree with his conclusions. I think the program is a minimum security program in this field. I think that economically it is a sound program. I think, for instance, the circumferential road, costing \$28,000,000 of the total of \$107,000,000, is of itself a highly desirable and long-needed objective. I recall having heard the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania tell of the difficulties which he encountered on bringing troops through this era on certain occasions in the past.

In addition to the circumferential highway which I feel will be of tremendous value to this area—not just now, not just in times of continuing threat of war, but always—there are other factors in the picture which are of great value. Demolition of the temporary buildings is of great value because they are a fire hazard even based on the ordinary standards of peacetime and they should be removed. The construction of the four dispersal buildings represents permanent construction which can be used, and for which there is excellent use, even if the threat of war should disappear before the buildings were completed.

At this time, and in connection with that subject, I should like to remind the Senator that one of the four buildings already has a peacetime use. The Department of Agriculture needs it. The other three between them, if they were all to be used for storage and for the filing of records, would not begin to meet the needs that are now being felt and supplied by the leasing of space in the District area for records and for warehousing.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have placed in the RECORD at this point a statement compiled for me yesterday by Mr. Reynolds, the Commissioner of Public Buildings, showing the situation with reference to the square footage of space now employed for storage of records and for warehouse storage in the District area.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SQUARE FOOTAGE IN STORAGE AND RECORDS,  
WASHINGTON AREA

Total records only, 4,975,000 square feet. (Includes 400,000 square feet at Cameron, west of Alexandria, and 750,000 square feet at Archives.)

Total storage, 3,041,000 square feet. (Includes 456,000 square feet for Government Printing Office and 420,000 square feet for General Services Supply Depot.)

Total records and storage, approximately 8,000,000 square feet.

One building, 812,000 square footage space, gross. (Would take 10 such buildings to equal the volume in storage and records already in Washington area.)

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I should like to comment on some of the figures. There are at present used for the storage of files and records and the like 4,975,000 square feet in the Washington area. That contrasts with 812,000 square feet of space in each of the four buildings. In other words, if the whole of any one of these buildings were used for storage of records alone it would make available 812,000 square feet, compared with 4,975,000 square feet of space, most of it now occupied for storage in the District.

With reference to warehousing, that is, the storage of other things than files and records, at the present time there are 3,041,000 square feet of building space being so used in the Washington area.

So, Mr. President, it ought to be crystal clear that if there should not be need for these four buildings for office space—and I personally think there will be; I think that is their preferred use; I think that even in time of peace we have too much congestion here in the District, and that it would promote distinctly the growth of the District and its development, and the growth of the whole area and its development in a logical and reasonable way to build up these dispersal areas as permanent office facilities—but in case they should not be so used, there is not, in all four of those proposed buildings combined, enough space by themselves to solve the needs for buildings of the Government for storage here in the District area.

So I put that in the record.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. CAPEHART. The Senator from Florida has partially cleared up a question I wished to ask, namely, whether the additional floor space referred to is needed. I cannot quite understand why it is needed. Today there is more floor space available to the Federal Government in Washington than was available here 6 years ago, during World War II. At that time we had between 13,000,000 and 14,000,000 men under arms. The Senator says today the Government needs more floor space. However, instead of erecting more buildings, why do we not attack the problem on the basis of getting rid of many of the Government employees and getting rid of many files which are of no use, and thus reducing the Government to a size for which at least the taxpayers will be able to pay without breaking their backs?

Why do we need additional buildings? Why is it necessary today to erect additional Government buildings, when today we have more buildings than we had at the end of World War II?

Mr. HOLLAND. I appreciate the Senator's question. If he had been here throughout the debate, I think he would have found that we have gone through that subject repeatedly and in some detail.

Briefly, again, let me say that we need these four buildings in order to obtain the security which will come from their existence at the distance from Washington at which they will be built. We need those four buildings because when the vital agencies of the Government—some military and some civilian—are housed in them, they will be relatively secure against bombing attack. They will be entirely secure as against an attack by atom bombs falling in or near the District of Columbia, and they will be able to carry on the vital functions of Government, both military and civilian, which will be entrusted to them, and which functions will be worse needed the day after such an attack than they are needed now or immediately before such an attack.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, perhaps I am mistaken, but I simply do not understand that by the means here proposed we shall obtain any dispersal which will help in case of an attack by means of atomic bombs or in the case of any other attack, if the buildings are separated from the District of Columbia by a distance of only 20 miles. Today a jet plane goes 20 miles in 2 minutes. Yet it is stated in the report, and the committee is asking the Senate to believe, that by locating additional buildings at a distance of 20 miles from the District of Columbia, we shall help the situation from the standpoint of bombing.

Mr. HOLLAND. That is exactly what the committee is saying, and the committee bases its statement upon the statements made to the committee in open session and in executive session by the best-informed men the Nation has to advise it in regard to such matters.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, if the Senator will further yield—

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. CAPEHART. Let me say that it seems to me that by erecting four buildings within a perimeter of 20 miles from Washington, we would simply have four sitting ducks, so to speak.

The situation would be different if the proposal were to locate the buildings at a distance of 100 miles or 200 miles from Washington. However, according to the report the buildings will be located 20 miles from the zero milestone in the District of Columbia. If the committee is serious in its proposals for dispersal, I should think the committee would wish to have the buildings located at least 50 or 100 miles from Washington, instead of 20 miles from Washington.

Furthermore, Mr. President, let me say that I do not understand why more Government buildings should be erected in the District of Columbia when the Government is already spending so

much money. I do not understand that more buildings are needed here. If they are needed for storage purposes, to provide additional storage space, at least we do not need the kind of buildings which are referred to in the report. If additional space is needed for storage purposes, why are not storage facilities built underground; or, at least, if the purpose is to obtain additional space for the storage of Government files, why is not it proposed that the Government construct buildings of a warehouse type, which are very much less expensive than the kind of construction referred to by the committee and in the report.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I appreciate the Senator's remarks. He is an able businessman; and I ask him to follow for a moment the figures I shall state: We propose that four buildings be constructed, to house 20,000 Government employees. We propose, as a very vital part of this effort, to tear down, in the District of Columbia, the temporary buildings which were constructed during World War II, and which are a hazard, as they now exist. Those buildings presently house 31,000 Government employees.

Mr. CAPEHART. Why are those buildings a hazard?

Mr. HOLLAND. They are a hazard because they are frame structures with a wood framework of 4-by-4's, for the most part, with some 2 by 4's used for the roofs. The roofing is light composition material. The wallboard which is used for the siding of those buildings leaves much to be desired from the standpoint of substantiality. Those buildings now have fulfilled their purpose. At the present time they constitute a hazard to the life of the 31,000 Government employees who work in them.

What is more, those buildings constitute a hazard to the lives of all persons who may remain in the District of Columbia at a time when disaster from atomic sources may come to us, or even when the District of Columbia may be subject to conventional bombing, because those buildings extend right up to and follow along such highways and vehicular arteries as Constitution Avenue, Independence Avenue, and other arterial highways and important streets which simply will have to be kept open if succor is to be brought to the city in case of such attack, if relief is to be brought to the people who are injured, and also if the persons who then are caught in the District of Columbia, but are not injured, are to be able to leave. They must have a chance to leave under such circumstances.

So I assert that the Senator, with his horseback opinion, which I recognize and respect, nevertheless is flying in the face of the most expert advice that is available to the Nation, from men who have become experts in regard to such matters, and many of whom have left their civilian employment and have come to serve the Nation in connection with the defense effort. The Senator is flying in the face of the findings of the committee, whose members have studied this matter since December. The Senator is flying in the face of the informa-

tion secured by the committee by means of the appearance before it of leading scientists of the Atomic Energy Commission, who have given us information which we cannot bring to the Senator, but on the basis of which we can tell him—and I do tell him now, with all the conviction I can muster—that the demolition of those temporary buildings is absolutely necessary if we are to demonstrate that we are not just a bunch of ostriches with our heads in the sand and that we do not realize that the developments in atomic energy and atomic bombs, in which we have made tremendous investments, mean something in their implications to the District of Columbia.

Of course the Senator has voted for the measures by which we have spent over \$4,000,000,000 in creating the atomic bomb and in experimentation and research in that field and in radar and in building B-36 bombers and jet-propelled planes, and to set up a radar screen and to build airports and air bases all around the world, from Okinawa to Arabia, Africa, Turkey, England, Greenland, Canada, and Alaska. We have spent the immense amount of over \$4,000,000,000 on atomic research production and experimentation alone, and we have spent probably a similar amount on the other things I have just mentioned. All that money has been spent by us because of the implications of the atomic bomb. It is the deep conviction of the committee and is the complete conviction of the witnesses who appeared before the committee, who have the latest information available not only to the Nation but to the world, that the developments which have been made in the field of atomic energy and atomic bombs pose a terrific threat to Washington, D. C., and to the security of the Nation, and to the ability of the Nation to continue to be served by its most vital agencies, both military and civilian.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, if the Senator will further yield, let me say there is no question that an atomic bomb, if dropped in Washington, would be disastrous, regardless of whether we do or do not continue to use the old buildings. In any case, it would be very, very disastrous.

Mr. HOLLAND. I appreciate that concession on the part of the distinguished Senator.

Mr. CAPEHART. But, Mr. President, we do not cure that situation by erecting four buildings at a distance of only 20 miles from the center of the city of Washington. Talk about experts. I have been here now for nearly 7 years, and I have been following the experts, as have the Senator from Florida and other Senators, for 7 years. My observation is that they have taken us from bad to worse. So far as I am concerned, I am going to use my own judgment, which I consider to be as good as that of the experts, who have done nothing but run up the tremendous debt which we now have, get us into war, and bring about other undesirable things, such as controls, and so forth and so forth. I am going to use my own judgment. I am going to give the Senator my opinion, after which I

shall not bother him further. My own opinion is that this idea of dispersal, when it is proposed to go out only 20 miles from Washington, is merely an excuse to spend more money and to build four new buildings which practically would be in Washington.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I shall not take issue with the learned Senator on that point. I simply say that not only once, but several times in the course of my debate, until now, I have repeated this as being my conviction and my belief in the matter, that, except for the existence of this prime question of the security of the Nation and the ability of the Nation to have the service of its vital agencies after an atomic attack, I would not support this program, even though there are many other fine objectives which are served by it. I thoroughly realize that economic conditions now would not justify such a program without the existence of this emergency national defense question.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President—

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, if the Senator yields, I merely want to say one word, after which I am going to leave the floor. I would much prefer to spend the money for highways, so that people could get in and out in case of attack, than to spend it for a building.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am glad that the Senator approves, then, that part of the program for roads, \$32,500,000 of the total authorization of \$107,000,000.

Mr. CAPEHART. I approve of that, but I would like to spend the entire \$107,000,000 on highways, so the people could get in and out of the city in case of an attack.

Mr. HOLLAND. In other words, the Senator from Indiana feels that the people of Washington will have advance notice of an attack.

Mr. CAPEHART. No.

Mr. HOLLAND. So that the approximately 800,000 people residing in the District and those living immediately around the District in the urbanized area making a total of about 1,500,000, could leave the city and its environs, and be that far away. With that conclusion, the Senator from Florida is not in accord, because, in the first place, he knows that we shall not have much advance notice, and we might not have any; and in the second place, the Senator knows that it is impossible to have a mass movement of people in anything like that degree, as would be apparent to him if he had ever attempted to move folks out of a city which was burning.

If the Senator will permit me to digress a moment, at the time of the great fire in Atlanta, involving about 76 blocks, the Senator from Florida was a humble private in officer's training camp in the United States Army, in training there, at Fort McPherson. I was engaged for some 30 hours in meeting conditions growing out of that fire, and I want to tell the Senator that, with nothing going on except an ordinary fire, it was a terrible task to move the people out of that small area, although its population was limited. For days, we did not know with certainty how many did not get out. So the problem posed by such a thing

as an atomic attack made by bombers, which I believe the Senator has said travel at the rate of 10 miles a minute, if I understood him correctly a while ago, simply cannot be predicted or foreseen far enough in advance to permit everyone to take up his cot and leave.

Mr. CAPEHART. The Senator is proceeding on the assumption that they are all going to be killed. They will not be, and I say that the most important thing we can do is to build highways in and out of Washington, so that, in the event of bombing, the people of the city can get out of the city and supplies can be brought in.

Mr. HOLLAND. If the Senator will allow me, I may say that he is wrong in one part of his statement. The Senator from Florida is not going on the assumption that all would be killed. The Senator from Florida has gone to considerable difficulty to determine, after getting all the information he could, as to what might happen in the case of the explosion of an atomic bomb here. He knows there will be tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands of people alive, and he knows that it is going to be a very vital question to them as to how to get in and out, and that there are going to be many people alive, to the degree that they will get well, but that they will be hurt in one way or another, and that they will have to be evacuated.

The Senator from Florida believes that the demolition of these firetrap buildings is one of the most necessitous parts of this program. The Senator from Florida had hoped that in addition to the approval of the highway part of this construction, the able Senator from Indiana would also approve that part which had to do with the demolition of firetrap buildings, which now house 31,000 persons. If the Senator from Indiana approved that, the Senator from Florida had hoped then that the Senator from Indiana would agree that these 31,000 persons, or at least many of them, would have to be housed elsewhere, which would call for the construction of safer places where they could be housed and where they could perform their duties. That is exactly what is proposed by this dispersal program.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, I am one who does not believe that a Federal employee needs better buildings in which to work than do the people who pay the taxes, or that merely because one works for the Government he ought to have an air-conditioned office with a marble floor and much better working conditions than the people who pay the taxes have.

Mr. HOLLAND. I appreciate the remarks of the Senator.

Mr. CAPEHART. I do not know why we have to give them expensive offices and expensive facilities, when the people who pay the taxes do not have them. I do not at all subscribe to it.

Mr. HOLLAND. I appreciate the remarks of the Senator, but I want to disabuse his mind of one other misconception he has of this program. It does not provide for expensive office space, but for very economical office space. The buildings will not be ornate. They will

not be such buildings as the Commerce Building and the other important, beautiful and highly expensive buildings to which the Senator is accustomed here. These will be real office buildings, modern buildings, but not in any sense ornate; and they will be the same type of office buildings that people work in elsewhere.

In concluding that part of my remarks, I may say that the Senator from Florida realizes perfectly well that the Senator from Indiana does not propose to give preferred treatment to Federal employees. Neither does the Senator from Florida wish to do that. He wants to give fair and decent treatment to them, and he does not believe that is done when they are housed and crowded in temporary wooden buildings, which are nothing but firetraps. He wants to give decent treatment to the other hundreds of thousands who are affected, if their lanes of escape and their lanes of relief and rescue are closed.

In terminating this part of the debate, and in complete good nature, I wish to say to the Senator from Indiana that the committee knows perfectly well that there are many expendable people around Washington, and the contemplation of this bill is that the Congress itself is within that classification, because there is no preferred treatment given to the Congress of the United States. The only people who are preferred—and not on their own account—I repeat, in all seriousness, to my good friend, the senior Senator from Indiana, are those who, by reason of the functions which they are performing in the most vital agencies of our Government, whether military or civilian, will be the most needed immediately, if such an attack should occur, because the functions which they are trained to perform must go on at such a time. If those functions do not go on, we shall have chaos and catastrophe and a complete disorganization of the Government. We are trying to prevent any such catastrophe.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, if it were proposed to go out a distance of 50 miles, or 75, or 100, I would agree with him; but when it is proposed merely to go to the outskirts of the city, I simply am unable to agree with him.

Mr. HOLLAND. I understand the point of view of the Senator, and I accept it in good nature. All I am saying is that his opinion differs completely from the opinion of the best trained atomic experts we have, and of the best trained military experts we have, and of the best trained experts in checking the results of demolition, both by atomic and other bombs, following World War II. With one voice, they tell us 20 miles is an adequate distance to go.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, I have learned within the past 4 or 5 days that military experts and other experts are supposed to speak and say only the things which the man at the top tells them to say; so I am not so certain that any of them would ever go against the wishes of those who thought up the bill.

Mr. HOLLAND. I would not debate that point with the Senator from Indi-

ana, but I think he will realize that there are a good many members of the Senate Committee on Public Works who have not followed that philosophy, one of whom is the Senator from Florida, who is now speaking.

Mr. CAPEHART. I certainly agree with respect to the Senator from Florida, but he was stating that he had been advised by experts. They are experts, but they are all employed by the Government, and take orders from the big boss in the White House. The big boss has told us that he is the boss; and God help anyone who says anything about his ideas or thoughts.

Mr. HOLLAND. Let me say this to the Senator, because I realize that he does not want to lose his good humor, and neither do I. One of the experts who has testified most specifically is a young man who went into the Air Force from his law office and served with great distinction in the Air Force. So well did he serve that he was given the job of directing the bombing of places in Europe. After that he was attached to a commission to study the subject of bombing in both Europe and Japan. When he finished that assignment he went back to his law office, but his Nation said to him, "You happen to have experience which is very vital to the Nation." He did just as the Senator from Indiana did when he came to serve his country in the Senate. He came to serve the Nation in a time of peril. I think the Senator from Indiana would not question such an experience or information—

Mr. CAPEHART. Who was the gentleman?

Mr. HOLLAND. Colonel Potts, from Memphis, Tenn., whom I have already described.

Mr. CAPEHART. He testified that a distance of 20 miles is sufficient?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; he did. The Senator was not present when we went into the question of personnel with some of the most able witnesses.

There was Maj. Gen. William R. Schmidt, a professional soldier of high rank and high standing. He is the head of the continental United States defense-planning group, with lifelong service. He cannot be fired from the service. He serves his Nation in a high place of responsibility, and he comes before us and tells us that this program is vitally necessary.

Here is Colonel Potts, who sits by me here. He is serving his country and has experience which cannot be equaled by any other American in his particular field.

Here is Mr. Reynolds. I think Senators on both sides of the aisle will readily agree that he is a good house builder and house manager. I do not believe the Senator from Indiana would want to say that he will do something because someone tells him to do it.

Mr. CAPEHART. I only want to say—

Mr. HOLLAND. There are two gentlemen serving on the Atomic Energy Commission, serving our Nation in that most vital field, who, with the permission of the Joint Committee on Atomic

Energy, testified before our committee. We cannot tell the Senate all they said, but they did say that the 20-mile zone was sufficient to give the sort of insulation which is desired.

If the Senator from Indiana cannot accept that type of information from that kind of a source, I would be helpless to furnish him anything that would be satisfactory to him.

I now yield to the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, it may be that the intuition of the Senator from Indiana is better than all the advice and the testimony to which the Senator from Florida has referred, but I very much doubt it. I have not polled the members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, I have not polled the Committee on Armed Services, but I dare say, speaking for the committee, that I should be very much surprised if any member of the committee votes against this bill. Perhaps we have been indulging in needless fears during the past 5 years, or perhaps all the information which we have received in the course of a couple of hundred meetings does not mean anything, or maybe the Senator from Indiana is correct. But I do not think he is correct. When we talk about experts and say they do not amount to anything, I know the Senator from Indiana would not care to have his own manufacturing plant operated on any such basis. He got the best experts who were available to him, and I am sure he followed their advice.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. When the Senator from Connecticut has concluded, I shall be glad to yield.

Mr. McMAHON. I believe, if the Senator will permit me to say so, the Senate will be better advised to take the advice of the committee which has heard the testimony, supported, as I am sure it will be, by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, than to take the advice of the Senator from Indiana, who, so far as I know, is restricted to observation of the situation without any special study of the subject.

Mr. President, there is a moving picture downtown which I recently saw and which I wish the Senator from Indiana would take the time to see. It is a picture showing an atomic attack. I believe it should be displayed all over the country. If the Senator will agree with me and if he can find time to do it, I should like to take him to see that picture. Perhaps after looking at it the Senator would change his mind.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. CAPEHART. I agree with the Senator from Connecticut, and I should like to see the picture. An atomic bomb is a terrible thing. That is why I think we should go out 40, 50, 60, or 100 miles in connection with the dispersal which is being discussed. I still say we do not need more buildings in Washington; we need fewer buildings and fewer employees. I should much prefer investing the money in highways, which, to my

mind, would be of more help in an atomic bomb attack, because everyone in Washington and other persons would get the benefit of them as they come to the city or leave the city. We would then be investing money in something that would do all the people much good. In my opinion, roads would be more help in an atomic attack than building four buildings in a 20-mile radius from Washington.

Certainly I am not going to go against the best judgment of the experts who are sitting beside the Senator from Florida, but if the atomic bomb is as serious as we think it is, I cannot understand why they should say that we should not go more than 20 miles from Washington to construct these buildings. I am not an expert, but it does not make sense to me.

It has been suggested that I always use experts in my own business. I always have used them; but if they had got themselves into the mess and confusion this country is now in, I certainly would have fired them.

Mr. HOLLAND. Still, I think the Senator from Indiana would agree that if he had the earache he would certainly go to a doctor who was trained in the treatment of the ear.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I want to make one more reply to the Senator from Indiana. I want to remind him that the purpose of dispersal is by no means to place these new buildings clear out of reach of an attack by bombers. The purpose is to scatter the targets, and it scatters them so that a bomb carried by a bomber cannot be used in such a way as to wipe out a whole bunch of targets at once, but only one. We believe that a target consisting of one building, housing only 5,000 persons, will not be attractive. The cost of getting ready to deliver and actually delivering a bomb is tremendous. We propose to leave no prime targets in this area, if possible. One bomb can destroy but one of these targets, whereas at this time we have all our eggs in one basket.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I beg the Senator's pardon. I promised to yield to the Senator from Louisiana. He has been on his feet for some time.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, can the Senator from Florida tell us how many lives were lost by the bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am informed by Colonel Potts that the best figures we have been able to get indicate that 70,000 persons were killed, and fifty to sixty thousand others died shortly thereafter as the result of their injuries.

Mr. LONG. It could be estimated that the total number of casualties would probably be 150,000 killed and injured by one bomb. Many persons were injured, in addition to those who were killed.

Mr. HOLLAND. The Senator is correct if he is talking about the Nagasaki type of bomb. The Senator well knows that we now have developed a much more efficient and deadly bomb. That fact has been announced.

Mr. LONG. The committee's report mentions the fact that most of the Government employees are concentrated in Washington within a radius of 1½ miles.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am glad the Senator has brought up that fact. I was going to bring it up myself. I know all Senators are equally interested in this matter and want to do the right thing, and I hope they will follow me as I illustrate it on this map.

The red lines represent air distances between well known points in the District of Columbia and its environs. The air distance from the White House to the Pentagon is 2½ miles. The figures were prepared by Mr. Reynolds. I am sure they are accurate. He prepares accurate data. The distance from the White House to the Agricultural Building is seven-eighths of a mile. The distance from the White House to the so-called triangle group of buildings, with which Senators are familiar, is one-half a mile. The distance between the White House and Union Station is 1½ miles. The distance from the White House to the Capitol is 1½ miles. I would say to Senators, having in mind the specific information given to us by experts of the Atomic Energy Commission and by other persons who are well qualified to do so, it would be possible for a bomb, properly placed as near the center of the area occupied by the various places I have mentioned as it would be possible to place it, to have an effective killing and destroying range sufficient to cover all the points that I have mentioned and many other points which lie within the circle of the effect of such a bomb.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. LONG. The Senator has not overlooked the fact that the enemy may decide to use more than one bomb, in order to saturate the target, even though we know he has a limited number of bombs available. Therefore if we took out even so small a group of employees as 5,000, the potential target would be rendered that much less attractive than it presently exists in Washington.

Mr. HOLLAND. The Senator is correct. The chance of survivors getting out of the area would be enhanced by the demolition of the wooden buildings, and the chance of rescuers coming in to patch up broken water mains and broken gas mains would be greatly improved. The bill offers something in the way of our ability to continue our Government in the event a grave disaster in the nature of an atomic bomb attack comes upon the Capital.

Mr. LONG. Is it not also possible that in the event such an attack should come there might not be enough bandages available with which to treat the wounds of the people who might be the victims of such an attack? Is it not also true that the people who would be moved out could at least help as temporary relief workers in assisting the people who were being evacuated from the Capital?

Mr. HOLLAND. As to the second part of the Senator's question the answer is "Yes." As to the first part of the Senator's question, the Senator from Florida does not have sufficient infor-

mation available with respect to bandages and other relief material which would be available. However, he understands that under the able planning now going on in the field of civil defense our people would not be without the necessary things to bring relief and furnish medical care in the event we have an atomic bomb disaster.

The Senator remarked on the possibility of having more than one bomb dropped on Washington. Of course such a possibility brings me to a discussion of the atomic bomb, not in any scientific way, but rather in a practical way, which I hope will appeal to Senators. People have talked about the use of an atomic bomb as if the use of such a bomb involved the wiping out of this whole area and destroying all buildings within the area. That is not the case with the use of any weapons now known to exist, even those considerably stronger than the Nagasaki type of atomic bomb.

If Senators will look at the first map they will notice that the urbanized area comprises, as I recall—Mr. Reynolds worked it out for me—about 200 square miles. It is the black area shown on the map. The demolition area of an atomic bomb of the high type is something like 6 square miles. Therefore Senators will see that the use of one bomb or even of several bombs by no means assures complete disaster or complete wiping out of all the people. It means—and we know this from the Nagasaki and Hiroshima experiences—that there will be tens of thousands of people who will require aid, and whose lives could be saved if we could bring to them the assistance they need. In other words, there are other aspects of the subject to be considered other than how many people would be killed.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I should like to mention one more point. It has to do with the hydrogen bomb, which was mentioned a little while ago. Scientists do not think that any of the massive weapons which could cover much greater areas would be used, for the very logical reason that such is not the effective way to use either atomic energy or the other kind of bomb, if it is used. The reason for this is—and I hate to admit it to my learned colleagues, but the Senator from Florida had to refresh and renew his knowledge of spherical trigonometry—that when such a bomb bursts the shape of its effective area, if there is no movement of air, is a sphere. Therefore, we deal with spherical values, particularly with spherical trigonometry. Instead of having stepped up the capacity of damage in direct proportion to the intensity of the bomb burst, we have stepped it up only by the cube root of increase in strength of the bomb. Let me make it specific. Let us say that a Nagasaki-type bomb is used and that it destroys, for all practical purposes, an area which we shall call 1 in size. In order to produce a bomb which would destroy an area three times as great, or 3 in size, it would be necessary to have a destructive power 27 times as great as that of the Nagasaki bomb. It is the cube root

of increase which represents the increased effectiveness in destruction. The actual increase in the area covered, when reduced to a flat area on the earth, is a little bigger. In order to get a force three times as great at a given distance from the center, or point of implosion, as it is called, it would be necessary to get a force at the center 27 times as great as the force with which we originally worked. Therefore, it is completely provable that there is a practical limit, aside from the question of weight, aside from the question of difficulty of transportation, aside from the question of the type of plane used, and aside from the question of having too many eggs in one basket. More demolition is obtained and more destruction is created by the use of relatively smaller bombs than by the use of any of the juggernaut-size bombs of the type that have been discussed. So we think we are on sound ground. I will say to the Senate that never has the Senator from Florida studied any subject more sincerely or more closely. He believes that statement to be exactly true of every other member of the committee. We knew that if we were to accept the responsibility of coming to the floor of the Senate and suggesting appropriations to construct additional buildings, highways, and other facilities, and to spend public money to the extent of \$107,000,000, we must be very sure that we had obtained the best information available, and that we had facts on which we could base very deep convictions and make very strong recommendations.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I now yield to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. FERGUSON. Did any of the experts from the departments oppose this plan?

Mr. HOLLAND. No such experts opposed the plan in any way. I will say to the Senator that there were some of the experts, including even one from the Atomic Energy Commission, who felt that we did not need to go out the complete distance of 20 miles; but the 20-mile zone was approved by everyone as being adequate. There was not a single expert, and not a single individual who had specialized knowledge in this field, who did not admit that there was a critical problem because of the impact of the atomic energy field of science and knowledge upon the Capital of the Nation and upon the ability of the Nation to continue to be served by its vital agencies of government in the event that there should be atomic disaster here.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. Is it the intention, under this plan, to erect dwellings?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. FERGUSON. So we shall find that we have office buildings and storage buildings at a distance of 20 miles from the city, or whatever distance is specified, while the people will come back to Washington and occupy the same quarters at night. If there is to be a bombing, how are we to save any lives by this

process? Is it not this only a means of saving records?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid the Senator has not followed the argument very closely.

Mr. FERGUSON. I asked about erecting dwellings.

Mr. HOLLAND. The zone which is disastrously affected by an atomic bomb is something like six square miles in area. It is a circle approximately  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles in radius, or 1.4 miles, or something like that. The area is approximately 6 square miles. That compares with a total of 200 square miles of area in the urbanized district which comprises the District of Columbia and the adjoining heavily built-up communities.

Mr. FERGUSON. The question is, Is it proposed to erect any dwellings in connection with this plan?

Mr. HOLLAND. We do not propose to do so under this bill.

Mr. FERGUSON. That would mean that the city of Washington would be fully occupied, and that there would be the same number of people in it as there are now, or probably more.

Mr. HOLLAND. I should say that at the height of the defense effort there would be more.

At least, in World War II, that was the case.

Let me point out, if the Senator will follow me—

Mr. FERGUSON. How would lives be saved if no one was moved out of Washington?

Mr. HOLLAND. Let me point out to the Senator that at the 20-mile limit we have the approximate location of three of these agencies. One of them would be in the outskirts of the Agricultural Research Center at Beltsville, about  $14\frac{1}{2}$  or 15 miles out. Let us take the Beltsville location as an example. I invite the attention of the Senator to the fact that a great many people living in the northeastern portions of this heavily urbanized district are now closer to that location than they are to the Pentagon or to other buildings in that part of the area across the river.

I invite the attention of the Senator to the fact that persons living in northwest Washington, out as far as Bethesda and the surrounding area, would be closer to the dispersal unit, if one were located beyond that vicinity, than they are to many places where they now work in the urbanized area.

I point out to the Senator also—  
Mr. FERGUSON. I ask the question again—

Mr. HOLLAND. I point out to the Senator also that if these buildings were constructed and ready for occupancy today, it would be a period of years before the stabilization of the intentions of the people who work there, as to where they prefer to live, would become clear. Some people living reasonably close to the new places of work would stay where they now live. Some others might want to move to Rockville, Laurel, or somewhere else. They might want to build homes out there. If they did, they could do so. Certainly we are not interfering with private enterprise. To the contrary, we have restricted each of these

sites to an area not exceeding 300 acres, in an effort to get away from the further federalization of the area around the District of Columbia.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. If the city of Washington is bombed, I think it is fair to assume that it will be done by the Soviets or their satellites. Would it not be fair to assume that they would try to destroy the officials and employees of the Government, and that if they were trying to do so, they would do it at night, and at night such officials and employees would be in Washington. If we are assuming that the Soviets are coming here to bomb some records, I think we are mistaken. I think they are going to try to bomb people, and to destroy the will to resist. - If Americans are as smart as I think they are, they will not only move valuable records 20 miles out, but they will try to move them to places where even enemy agents will not be able to locate them. If we are merely going to provide buildings for records, I do not see how that will prevent the bombing of Washington and stop the destruction of the lives of the people who conduct the affairs of the Government in Washington.

Why did not the committee hear from some of the experts in the Departments on some of these questions? I cannot understand how officials from the various departments could all agree that it was necessary to go out 20 miles with the dispersal units, and that we could expect to save lives by allowing the people to continue to live in Washington.

Mr. HOLLAND. We heard from the best experts of the Nation. We would have heard more if we had known where they could be found. We found no debate whatever among them on the important points of the program.

I specifically invite the attention of the Senator to this point: If the Senator thinks the attack is going to be primarily on personnel, he must remember that a night attack on the concentrated area we have been talking about around the Capitol, and between here and the Pentagon and the White House, will probably not occur, because not too many people live in that area.

We know that the Capitol and other Federal buildings are symbols of government. They are the buildings in which the most important agencies of government are housed. The employees of those agencies, including their most vital personnel, live in Washington. Those agencies will be the preferred targets, even when certain other agencies have been moved out. But the target will not be nearly as attractive as it was before the movement out took place.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. Let me complete my answer.

In the first place, we do not believe that there is going to be any general assault on personnel. I invite attention to the fact that the Soviet Embassy houses here a great many hundred Soviet citizens of high rank. The same obser-

vation is true with reference to Poland and all the other satellite states. It is also true with reference to the embassies of all the peoples in the world whom the Soviets hope to have as their friends at some time or other.

In view of such a situation, does the Senator believe that the Soviets, instead of trying to blast the Capital of the Nation and the workshop of the vital agencies, is going to drop enough bombs to destroy the people in an area of 200 square miles, when a bomb is effective over an area of only about six square miles. It would require a larger number of bombs than we think the Soviets have even to cover this area, leaving them no bombs with which to attack other prime targets in the Nation. I am afraid that the Senator has not thought through the situation.

Mr. FERGUSON. The Senator from Michigan has thought through the question of what he anticipates a Russian Communist would do. If I can judge the Russians at all correctly, if they are going to bomb Washington their embassy is not going to be full of Russians.

Therefore I do not anticipate that they are coming here to bomb at night record buildings which are empty so far as personnel is concerned. If they would have such a purpose, the placing of such buildings 20 miles outside Washington would mean that they would be located there like sitting ducks, which could easily be hit. I assume it would be the purpose of those who might come here to bomb Washington to take the lives of those who operate the Government, and not simply to destroy the records. If we are smart at all we will not have the records here.

Mr. HOLLAND. If the Senator assumes that, he would have to assume that the Soviet has much vaster strength than the number of atomic bombs which it is thought to possess, than the number of long-range bombers which it is estimated to have, and that it has engaged in a greater amount of preparation than any estimate of preparation which is now in the hands of our military staff and which now is, they think, within their knowledge.

Mr. FERGUSON. The Appropriations Committee had this matter before it. We heard experts testify. The Appropriations Committee turned it down last year.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. CHAVEZ. I hope the Senator from Florida will yield so the Senator from Michigan may answer the question I am about to propound. While it is true that the Appropriations Committee turned down the proposal last year, it was done because the Congress had not authorized the appropriation, by reason of the fact that we had not had the hearings which were later held by the Committee on Public Works and so we did not have the information as to the necessity for doing the work. It was not because anybody was against a dispersal plan. I think the Senator from Michigan misses the point completely. If there were any objections whatsoever

against the proposed legislation it was when it was thought that the committee was going to recommend a great housing project surrounding the dispersal areas. I ask the Senator from Florida if that is not so?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, that was one of the grounds of objection, and a very strong one. Another one was that it was feared we were going to have Federal cities, Federal districts out there, which we are not proposing to establish. Another ground for objection was the proposal for too many buildings, for too many sites. It was felt that too much material and too much labor would be used. There were various grounds for objection to the original program.

Another ground for objection was that not enough decentralization was contained in the original program. That has been placed in the program by the bill. Another objective was that there was no certainty of demolition of the firetraps in the District of Columbia. We placed such a provision in the bill. Another objection was the absence of a watchdog committee, and we have taken care of that.

I may say to the Senator that I do not recall any single word of opposition to the program, in open hearing or in closed hearing, by anyone having any specialized knowledge of what is the potentiality of atomic weapons.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield so I may answer the question propounded by the Senator from New Mexico?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield to the Senator from Michigan, without losing the floor thereby, so he may answer the question propounded by the Senator from New Mexico.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from Florida may yield to the Senator from Michigan under the condition stated.

Mr. FERGUSON. The Senator from Michigan has not an idea as to what was in the minds of other Senators when they voted in the Appropriations Committee. He knows his reason for voting. He did not vote solely on the ground that the proposal was not approved by a legislative committee. The Senator from Michigan had in mind that it was not proved to his satisfaction that the proposal would be of value.

I felt also that we were demonstrating at that time, not only to the people of America, but to the people of Russia and her satellites, that we were panicky over this matter; that we had not thought it through; that we should think it through; and that the industrial areas, such as the city of Detroit, were just as important to the Nation as the city of Washington. I did not see how any problem at all would be solved by moving, as was proposed at that time, the House and the Senate out of the District of Columbia, but allowing us to come back here at night.

Mr. President, the same problem that exists here exists with respect to all the industrial cities. There will ultimately be attempt made to destroy the machine that makes the weapon. But it is a dif-



ferent thing to talk about the actual records of the FBI, and other valuable records being placed in the hills or the mountains of Pennsylvania or other places.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, it is true that all the heavy industrial centers will have their hazards, and that there must be effort made to help them meet their problems. The Senator from Florida is in accord with that. But there is only one capital of the Nation. There is only one place where the vital agencies of the Nation are now all congested into a relatively small place which a man can walk across in a few minutes. There is only one place which offers that primary target attractive to any atomic bomber because he realizes that if he hits it at the right time he may strike facilities, records and personnel, and that if he hits it at any time he will destroy facilities and records, and that he will wipe out a symbol which is of tremendous importance to the people of the Nation and to the morale of the people of the Nation.

Incidentally, there are going to be people left outside this area. We want to give them some consideration in this situation. Do they want to have and is it worth while for them to have assurance that the Government is going to continue at its vital level, or at least that everything we can do under human foresight and with the best advice we can secure will guarantee that end? It seems to me the question is hardly arguable from that point of view.

To come back to the appearance before the Appropriations Committee. The Senator from Florida did not have the pleasure of being there, but the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] was there, waiting to perform a function which he had as a member assigned from the Public Works Committee to the Appropriations Committee. My information on that came immediately from him, and then later from other members of the committee with whom I have talked. I know perfectly well that the members of that committee felt that the subject had not been sufficiently studied. It certainly was not shown in completion at all by the very scanty picture made available to the Appropriations Committee.

I feel the Appropriations Committee did the reasonable thing by insisting that the matter be made the object of a careful, specific study by a legislative committee—which has been done. I am not prepared to say that because the Appropriations Committee, with the scanty knowledge and advice then made available to them, ruled against a program something like the present one, though it was a great deal larger than this program, such fact precludes the examination of the program later, and really that different way should have been followed before the matter was taken to the Appropriations Committee. I do not think it wipes out at all the specific evidence and the clear and conclusive showing made by every expert in the Nation who should know most about this field, to the effect that as things are now we are in the ridiculous

position—and I call this to the attention of the Senator from Michigan—we are in the ridiculous position of having with his affirmative vote and mine, spent upward of \$4,000,000,000 in the development of atomic energy, atomic bombs, or for the atomic energy field—the AEC program—and an amount as great or even greater for the construction of bombers, airfields, and so forth, and yet we have not by the slightest act of Congress evidenced that we have any idea at all of what may happen to the people of the Nation in the event of the failure of government to function as an organized government in the event of a successful atomic attack.

So far as the Senator from Florida is concerned, he feels keenly that it would be the part of utter folly—utter folly, and he repeats that expression—for the able Senator from Michigan, or any other Senator, to act like an ostrich and put his head in the sand and try to fancy that the atomic world does not exist simply because he cannot see it when he has his head in the sand.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LONG in the chair). Does the Senator from Florida yield to the Senator from Michigan?

Mr. HOLLAND. I shall yield in a moment, Mr. President.

Let me say now that it seems to me that we have discussed about long enough the facts which were brought out before the committee. Senators who do not wish to accept those facts, stated in good faith and as meticulously and as clearly as, at least, I am able to state them, do not have to accept them; they can decide that the question of the ability of the Capital of the Nation to continue to function is not at issue; they can decide that the problem presented in that connection, in terms of dispersal of our vital agencies, is not at issue; they can decide that there is not at issue, in this connection, anything which would affect public morale throughout the Nation, as a result of the possible destruction at many of the levels of Government, both Government personnel and Government facilities and Government equipment, here in Washington. Senators who take that view have a right to do so. However, I do not believe they could possibly have come to that conclusion if they had heard the testimony presented to the committee and if they had looked into the eyes of the witnesses who testified before it. It is only for that reason that I am so insistent in presenting the facts and in stating what has been conclusively shown, in our judgment, by the witnesses who appeared before the committee.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. McMAHON. When what the Senator from Florida wishes to guard against and provide against comes to pass, there will not be an opportunity for the Senator from Michigan to submit another resolution calling for an investi-

gation, because he might be "knocked off." That would be a great tragedy.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, let me say in good humor that I agree that it would be a terrible and terrific tragedy, because the Senator from Michigan has served his State and his Nation very well indeed. I am sure that all of us are completely in good humor in connection with this matter; certainly I am.

However, I feel with all the depth of conviction which I can possibly possess that if the Senator from Michigan [Mr. FERGUSON], with his keen mind—and he has as keen a mind as any I have ever observed—had had the opportunity—which unfortunately he has not had—of sitting with the committee and hearing the testimony of the witnesses and appraising their knowledge, he would have reached the conclusion I have reached. I am just as sure of that as I am sure that I am standing here.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. I appreciate the kind words of the distinguished Senator from Florida, and I know that he would not join in the remarks made by the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FERGUSON. Just a moment, Mr. President.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I shall yield when I conclude my presentation of this point.

Mr. McMAHON. If the Senator will permit me—as I am sure he will—I wish to say that if it can possibly be inferred from what I just said that I was hoping that any such thing would come to pass, then any remarks susceptible of that interpretation should be deleted from the RECORD. As I consider the matter, I do not believe that such an implication might be made. I am sure the Senator from Michigan realizes that I do not want him to make any such implication at all.

However, I thought it well to point out to the Senator from Michigan that whereas he could submit a resolution calling for the investigation of Pearl Harbor, which is some 4,000 miles away, yet in discussing the matter now before us he is talking about himself as well as all the other residents of the city of Washington, and there simply would not be a chance for him to inquire into the question of whether he was right or was wrong. I simply wish to drive that point home.

I would not want the Senator from Michigan to think that any other thought was implied.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, I appreciate the Senator's explanation.

I also appreciate that the Senator from Florida is very sincere in the position he takes in connection with this matter. He feels beyond any doubt that he is correct. However, I do not reach the same conclusion that he does, on the basis of certain facts, namely, that undoubtedly the bombing would occur at night, and undoubtedly it would be

aimed at the personnel living here, and one of the purposes would be the psychological effect such an attack would have upon people living elsewhere in the United States; that if the Capital of the Nation were bombed at all, it would be bombed for the psychological effect such bombing would have, and the purpose would be to kill or injure as many of the Government employees as could possibly be done.

Of course, America acts differently in such matters. For instance, when it came to the bombing of Rome, we—even without an agreement—practically declared Rome to be an open city, and did not bomb it. We gave warning before we bombed other places. We bombed first the industrial plants.

However, I assume that Russia will deal differently with us; the Russians will try to affect the psychology of America by the destruction, if possible, of the city of Washington, rather than the files and records of the Government. That is my point. So, if we are going to disperse the Government agencies now located in the city of Washington, we had better do so by really dispersing them, by sending them to other parts of the country, rather than by locating them at points only a short distance from the city of Washington, on highways which will lead to those points, with the result that if an enemy wished to destroy the records, he could do so.

Mr. HOLLAND. I thank the Senator from Michigan for his observation. Of course, our committee is just as much in favor of decentralization as is the Senator from Michigan. We have in this bill an enlarged program of decentralization—in other words, a program for the sending of Government agencies to points remote from Washington—than the dispersal program, which calls for the transfer of Government agencies to the perimeter of the Washington area, about 20 miles out. However, we feel strongly that certain of the Government agencies—because of their vital nature and because of the necessity of having them administered together, so that the officials will have a chance to consult each other face to face and to make plans, while consulting each other face to face, regarding all the problems affecting the safety of the Nation—simply cannot be dispersed long distances from Washington without bringing chaos and without destroying organized Government as we know it.

Earlier in the debate, before the able Senator came to the floor, I pointed out that already we have accomplished a great deal of decentralization. We have in the Washington area only a little more than 10 percent of the total number of the civilian employees of the Nation's Government, and we are preparing to send 25,000 more of them to remote places in the United States.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, in view of the reference which has been made, in relating the history of this proposal, to the action of the Senate Appropriations

Committee, it occurred to me that probably it should be made a part of the record that the proposal first was presented to the House Appropriations Committee on August 31 of last year. That came about as the result of the submission of a budget estimate, in a Senate document, as I recall; but the Subcommittee for Independent Offices Appropriations of the House Appropriations Committee was meeting on August 31 of last year, preparatory to reporting a supplemental appropriation bill prior to the prospective adjournment of the House of Representatives or the taking of a recess for 10 days over Labor Day. The matter was presented there affirmatively, I think, in a presentation lasting about three-quarters of an hour. I happened at that time to be a member of that particular subcommittee. It was the same subcommittee which handled the appropriations for the Atomic Energy Commission. So the background of the entire atomic-bomb picture, as it enters into this matter, was a part of the background which was before the subcommittee at that time.

At that time the proposal varied somewhat from the one now before us. Then the request was for \$139,000,000, and only \$14,000,000 was requested for highways. Since that time the program has been changed somewhat.

The point should be made that the presentation of this bill at this time is the result of long deliberation on the proposal, and not hasty action. This proposal has been worked over and has been deliberated upon with a view to working out a program which will meet the needs of the Nation in the situation.

There is another angle to which consideration was given at that time by the House Appropriations Committee, namely, that the House of Representatives has a rule that an appropriation item for which there is no legislative authorization may not be presented in an appropriation bill. I happened to raise that particular question in connection with this matter at that time, and I insisted that the legislative committee should have an opportunity to consider the program; that a short presentation on one afternoon, one day, or one day and one-half before the House was proposing to take a recess for some time, was not adequate for the deliberation on a program such as this one. That is why the matter did not come before the House of Representatives at that time; and, regardless of the fact that it had some urgency or that it might have been presented to the Senate committee, that is why that matter could not come before the House of Representatives then, under the rules of the House, without legislative authorization.

I see the Commissioner of the Public Buildings Administration sitting here; and he was present at the hearings at that time, and will recall that I raised the question of legislative authorization.

True, it was suggested that, under the Public Buildings Act of 1926, and a subsequent public law, there was authority for decentralization, but it was the opinion of the members of the House committee at that time that that authoriza-

tion for decentralization did not constitute affirmative authority for a broad program of new buildings and dispersal, and that was why it was not reported at that time, and why we insisted that the legislative committees of the Congress should have an opportunity to consider the question.

Mr. HOLLAND. I deeply appreciate the comments of the distinguished Senator from South Dakota. He bears out the statement which I had made as to why I felt that the Appropriations Committee had turned down the item. He shows, through the lips of one who participated in the handling of this matter last fall in the House Appropriations Committee, that they declined the issue, they declined to approve the appropriation, because of the lack of time, in the first place, with but a few hours in which to hear it, and because it had not been carefully worked out, but particularly because they felt that it should be passed upon by a committee which could work out substantive legislation of this kind. That sort of action has been taken. Exhaustive hearings have been had, as witnessed by two long printed reports, one covering the hearings of last December, the other, the hearings since the first of the year; and as witnessed also by the statement in the RECORD that we had closed hearings, at which we could not reduce to writing the information which was brought to us, information which adds, and adds very greatly, to the information stated in the two printed reports of the hearings.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, will the Senator from Florida yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield to the Senator from New Mexico.

Mr. CHAVEZ. The history related by the Senator from South Dakota as to what happened on the House side in connection with the appropriation, shows that it was identical with the action taken by the Senate Committee on Appropriations.

Mr. CASE rose.

Mr. CHAVEZ. I listened to the testimony of those who wanted the money last summer to be appropriated. The refusal to do so was entirely because of the fact that we thought there was no authority whatever, and that the project was of such vast interest and was so large that it would be better, in the interest of sound legislation, if a committee were to pass on the matter after listening to the testimony of those who were proposing it. That happened. Two separate hearings have been held on the Senate side, one during the last session of the Congress. The committee had time to act upon the testimony adduced at those hearings.

As the Senator from South Dakota knows, in the detailed hearings the Senator from Florida and other Senators who assisted him in the subcommittee were patient, notwithstanding the fact that originally one might be against the idea on philosophical grounds. Senators listened patiently to the testimony. We have to trust someone. We get information from the best available sources, and, after listening to the testimony, the Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND] and other members of his subcommittee

reported to the full committee, which, in turn, reported the bill.

Mr. HOLLAND. I thank the distinguished chairman of the committee.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. CASE. I merely wished to add that if anyone desires to fortify the action taken, it should not be difficult for him to do so because there was a considerable amount of classified information presented to the committee at that time. A transcript of the hearings was kept. However, there was so much classified information in it that, at the request of Mr. Larson, of the General Services Administration, it was not printed. But I have, since those hearings were held, consulted the transcripts which are in the bound copies of typewritten but unprinted hearings of the Appropriations Committee of the House.

Mr. HOLLAND. I thank the Senator. Mr. President, I was in the course of trying to bring out some of the facts which show the highly vulnerable quality of Washington to atomic-bomb attack. I first mentioned the fact that it is so easily identified; and, to make my point entirely clear, I merely wish to say that, high as the bombers could go, radar would show the three-fingered situation where the Potomac River, Anacostia River, and the estuary virtually come together in such a grotesque way as to make that symbol stand out absolutely inescapably on a radar scope, as shown by pictures taken in the ancient radar system of World War II. The radar system of that time is spoken of as being ancient because there has been so much improvement and so much progress since then.

Second, there are no high hills here. As a whole, it is a gentle valley, like the cup of a man's hand, without any natural bulwark to defend the reverse side of hill slopes from the atomic blast.

Third, we have the highly congested area which is indicated on the map, which could be wiped out, if things were just right, and if the point of detonation were properly and successfully picked, resulting in the destruction of practically all our vital Government agencies at one fell swoop.

Incidentally, on that very point, I wish to call to the attention of the Senate the fact that we have no assurance as to what time a possible attack would be made. I questioned the experts who appeared before us regarding that, particularly the experts of the Air Force, and those who know about our radar screen and who are familiar with the time factor employed in traveling from known bases in Europe and Asia to this country. I find that most of them, among those I could talk to, are of the opinion that the attack would come somewhere between 3 o'clock in the morning and midmorning, and they think that by all means the logic of the situation would be to have the attack come after all the employees were at work, after the beginning of the workday, in the morning. Certainly an attack is aimed not only at facilities, not only at equipment, not only at records,

not only at buildings, not only at the symbolic value which is here in the Capital of the Nation, but it is aimed at the personnel.

I wish to remind the Senator from Michigan, that in the highly congested condition which prevails, to catch all the employees at the places where they now work is indeed to catch them like sitting ducks, whereas, if the atomic attack came at night, when they were scattered over this area of approximately 200 square miles, which is highly urbanized, with many of them living out even further than that, a single bomb placed at any one spot could not even begin to have sufficient effectiveness in itself to make the bomb function properly in carrying out the destruction of a prime target, because only a small percentage, at most, of the employees of any particular agency, would be adversely affected.

Mr. President, there are two other reasons for saying that this area is highly vulnerable to such attack. One of them is the presence of the rivers. I am not talking about the rivers making it possible to identify the area, after the bombers get here, but I am mentioning it on two other grounds. First, the added hazard, by reason of the small number of bridges, and the disastrous effect which follows from the immediate interruption of communications from one bank of the rivers to the other. Second, the added radiological danger which comes by reason of the presence of the water.

There are some things with reference to atomic energy and the atomic bomb about which I am not at liberty to talk, but there are other things which are printed and made matters of public knowledge. Some of them are published in this book on the effects of atomic bombs, published under the direction of the Los Alamos Laboratory, Los Alamos, N. Mex., in cooperation with the United States Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission. Therefore, in mentioning briefly some of the things with reference to atomic bombs and the danger coming from atomic bombs, I am completely protected, provided these matters are disclosed in this book.

In the first place, I want to mention the fact that a bomb dropped and detonated in a river or in water presents an added hazard, and an added effect upon personnel, in particular, which is not present when such a bomb is detonated in the air. In the event of a watery explosion, the additional kind of damage occurring from the explosion of an atomic bomb is from the spreading of radioactive products of fission over the surrounding region, because of their accompanying beta and gamma activities, both of which are very dangerous to human life, these are a source of very greatly added danger to human life.

So we know that is at least one of the vulnerable points found in the Washington scene.

In order to make the record complete at this time, I should like to say that the same book shows that there are four kinds of damage which are regarded as major in the event of the explosion of an atomic bomb. The first is the me-

chanical or blast damage which varies only in degree from the damage caused by a conventional bomb; that is to say, the concussion, the blast damage.

The second damage is from radiation, and that is of two kinds, so that I shall make them two separate kinds of damage. One is the thermal or heat radiation, terrific, intense heat. The damage done from that terrific heat, which is more than 1,000,000 degrees centigrade, is, of course, one of the terrible items of damage that may be expected to come out of an atomic bomb attack.

In order that the Record may be clear on this point, and so that people will understand what the atomic bomb is as compared with the conventional bomb, the heat created by an atomic bomb is a little more than 1,000,000 degrees centigrade, whereas the ordinary bomb containing high explosive produces a maximum temperature of approximately 5,000 degrees centigrade. In other words, it is not a comparison, but a contrast—5,000 degrees centigrade as contrasted with 1,000,000 degrees centigrade.

So the damage done from that terrific fire, that terrific heat is, of course, a terrible part of the damage.

The third kind of damage is produced by what is called nuclear radiation, consisting of gamma rays and neutrons, causing physiological damage, even death. That is, burns to the individual, burns to the structure of his muscles and bones, which sometimes are fatal weeks or months afterward, and sometimes are fatal very shortly after the time of the explosion.

The fourth type of damage is present only when the explosion takes place in water and when the fragments of water and radioactive products with them are thrown out over the surrounding area.

Mr. President, there is only one more remark which I should like to make about the atomic bomb at this time, before I go to the concluding part of my talk, and that is that the effective energy released by the explosion of a bomb of the Nagasaki type is roughly equivalent to that produced by the explosion of 20,000 tons of TNT. Roughly, this vast amount of TNT produces the same sort of explosion, insofar as its intensity is concerned, as is produced by the explosion of the Nagasaki type of atomic bomb. I have already stated that we have improved considerably on our atomic bombs since the use of the Nagasaki type of bomb.

Mr. President, we must not get the idea that the atomic bomb means the end of all things, because that is not true. It is a dwarf as compared with forces of nature which we take for granted. In this same booklet we are told:

A strong earthquake involves almost as much energy as would be supplied by a million atomic bombs of the type under consideration.

That is the Nagasaki bomb. So we are not dealing with something that is going to destroy all mankind at once, and we should not approach the subject with fear, much less with the hysteria which sometimes occurs when atomic bombs are mentioned. We must approach it

with all the coolness and deliberation we can assemble as we consider its implications upon our Capital, among other things, and upon the ability of our Government to function. We must understand what may result from the creation of this monstrous thing which we helped to bring into being, atomic energy, and its use through the atomic bomb.

One Senator, in the course of the debate, remarked that it is, of course, true that Russia is the only potential enemy that has to be considered, and particularly in connection with the possible use of the atomic bomb. It is with that aspect of the matter that I shall deal from here on, and I shall hurry to my conclusion as rapidly as possible. I apologize to the Members of the Senate for having taken so much time, but it will be recalled that Senators have been generous in their questions, and there have been a good many colloquies.

It is, of course, true that the only potential enemy of our Nation whom we must consider in this connection is Soviet Russia. We shall continue to hope that there will be no general war between Soviet Russia and ourselves. We are doing everything within our power to prevent such a war, and I am sure we shall persist with all our strength in following that course. At the same time, Mr. President, we all know that it is the threat of such a war, along with the effort to avoid it, that lies back of our immense defense program to which we are dedicating billions of dollars of our fortune and tremendous energies in hundreds of different fields. If there were no reasonable ground to fear that in spite of all our efforts we may yet have war with Russia, we would not be engaged in this huge defense program. So the impact of such a war, if it should come, upon our Nation's Capital and, through the Capital, upon all our people, is a subject which very properly engages our serious attention and our patriotic concern.

I hardly think it is necessary to argue the point that if such a war should come, and if Russia possesses atomic bombs and the capacity to deliver them, there will be no question about her willingness to use them in an attack on our cities, industrial centers, and upon our Capital as the nerve center of the Nation. Such use before a formal declaration might be the first incident of war. I shall not labor this point, for I am sure that every Senator knows it is fundamental to the Communist philosophy that the end justifies the means, and that atomic bombs would surely be used wherever they would be useful to the Soviet cause. If at any time it serves the purpose of the Politburo in their objective to obtain world Communist domination, then, with or without a prior declaration of war, they will drop atomic bombs on Washington and on other prime targets in this country. We have ourselves in formal declared warfare twice used the atomic bomb upon urban areas of Japan which we regarded as proper war-industry targets, even though the lives of tens of thousands of ordinary civilians were snuffed out.

Our whole program of atomic preparedness on the vast scale on which it now exists is designed to give us the power to use, though only in formal, declared warfare, atomic bombs, if we must, upon prime targets. Surely there is no need to argue the undoubted fact that Russia would not hesitate to drop atomic bombs on Washington.

It seems to me, therefore, that in considering the threat of possible atomic attack by Russia on the city of Washington, it is vital that we consider at this time two questions in the following order:

First. Is it reasonable to conclude that Russia has the atom bomb in dangerous numbers?

Second. Assuming that Russia has the atom bomb, is she capable of effectively delivering atomic bombs on prime targets in this country?

I shall first discuss the question as to whether or not it is reasonable to conclude that Russia has the atom bomb.

On September 23, 1949, the President announced:

We have evidence that within recent weeks an atomic explosion occurred in the U. S. S. R.

There is now no doubt in the mind of any responsible Government official that the Russians have numbers of atom bombs. In closed hearing, our committee was assured by highly responsible employees of the Atomic Energy Commission that they regard it as a conclusively established fact that the Russians do have atom bombs.

One of the most dangerous beliefs to our national security has been the complacent feeling that formerly persisted in some scientific circles, in some engineering circles, and in the minds of some of our leaders, that it would be many years, perhaps as late as 1960, before the Russians could produce an atomic bomb. Today, of course, all of the evidence points to the fact that instead of being a decade behind the United States in producing atomic weapons, the Soviets may actually be close behind us and will, at least by 1952, have a substantial stockpile of their own. Mr. President, in all soberness I remind Senators that the Russians do not have to catch up with us in the number of atom bombs on hand in order to make of themselves a vital threat to the peace of the world through the possible use of atomic bombs.

In this connection, here are a few facts about atomic weapons development that we should not forget:

I first mention the fact that the basic theories on which the development of the atomic bomb depended have for a long time been well known to scientists all over the world, and contributions to this basic theory were made by scientists from a great many countries: Fermi, an Italian; Nils Bohr, a Dane; Lord Rutherford, an Englishman; Einstein, a German-naturalized American; and many others could be named. I emphasize that there is no monopoly or near monopoly in this realm of basic scientific knowledge.

I next call attention to the fact that our own atomic development work, al-

though thought during the war to be absolutely secure, was in fact penetrated by Soviet agents at a great number of points. We now know that Dr. Alan Nunn May from Canada, Klaus Fuchs, David Greenglass from Los Alamos, the Rosenbergs, and various other persons passed atomic secrets to Soviet Russia. There are undoubtedly others about whom we do not know. Fuchs, of course, was himself one of the discoverers of the technique of exploding the bomb. In the light of the above it seems necessary for us to assume that the Russians now know most, if not all, of what we know about the atomic bomb.

I likewise call attention to the fact that in addition to gleaning information by spying on our atomic developments and production techniques, the Russians also have outstanding nuclear scientists of their own, such as Peter Kapitza. Since the war, in addition to their own scientists, they have utilized scores of captured German nuclear scientists. And there are many nuclear scientists from western countries such as Joliot-Curie of France and Pontecorvo of Italy who, as Communists, willingly serve the Soviet Union. Pontecorvo is now said to be behind the iron curtain.

Most important of all, Russia has been under a strategic compulsion to develop and produce atomic weapons as rapidly as possible. This is why in 1946 Lavrenti Beria, the No. 3 man in the Communist hierarchy, head of the NKVD and a recognized administrator of outstanding ability, was appointed to head up the Soviet atomic program. Since that date the Soviet Union has been engaged in accelerated, all-out development of atomic weapons. With Soviet Russia feeling compelled to develop her atomic program as rapidly as possible, who can doubt that over the period of the next decade there will be a geometric increase in the rate of Russian production of fissionable materials.

Since it is logical to assume a geometric increase in Russian production, how many bombs does it take before such a number in the hands of Soviet Russia becomes significantly dangerous to the United States?

Here is a comparison which gives a rough idea of what numbers of atomic bombs can mean. Throughout the course of World War II, the Royal Air Force and the United States Army Air Force dropped on Germany a total number of bombs equivalent to 1,500,000 tons of TNT. One hundred Nagasaki-type atomic bombs are the equivalent in explosive content of 2,000,000 tons of TNT, or one-third more than was dropped on Germany throughout the entire course of World War II. And we are now told by our scientists that the Nagasaki-type bomb is a crude, inefficient, and obsolescent type. On this basis 100 bombs are more than dangerous—they could wreak catastrophe.

How many bombs does Russia have today? That I do not know, but, even if numbered by tens, she must have enough to cause great havoc to us and our Allies.

I shall now discuss the question of whether Russia is capable of effectively

delivering atomic bombs on prime targets in this country, including Washington, the Capital and Government nerve center of the Nation. The intricate study which has been made of this subject includes not only the primary question of Russian air power and effectiveness, but also the questions of the possible firing from submarines of guided missiles with atomic war heads and the possible planting of atomic bombs by saboteurs. Both methods have been mentioned in the debate today.

Because of the highly classified nature of the last two of these subjects I must confine my discussion of this point to Russian air power and her capacity to deliver atom bombs in this country through the use of long-range bombers. Does Russia have the planes and other equipment to deliver bombs effectively on targets in this country?

It is interesting in connection with this question to recall that in 1937, 14 years ago, a single-engine Soviet-built monoplane, piloted by Mikhail Gromoff, flew nonstop from Moscow to San Jacinto, Calif., a distance of 6,262 miles. The flight was made directly over the North Pole and the plane was in the air for 62 hours and 2 minutes. This flight established a new world's record for non-stop long-distance flying. And just 3 weeks prior to this flight another Soviet air crew had flown another Soviet-built plane from Moscow to Vancouver, B. C., also over the North Pole. Both of these flights were well planned and were executed as planned, and both used radio and weather facilities established in the Arctic by Soviet Russia. This took place 14 years ago.

Again we know that our design and production secrets are not secrets at all to the Russians. I emphasize that. Almost all of the data on the design and production of our planes are available to the Russians in one form or another, either through trade magazines or through information passed to them by their spies. As an example of this I can cite two recent cases of outstanding scientists in the field of aircraft design who have been unmasked as Soviet spies. Dr. Sidney Weinbaum, a scientist who worked in the California Institute of Technology in the secret jet-propulsion laboratory, has been named as a Soviet spy, and William Perl, said by some to be the No. 2 specialist in aircraft design and jet propulsion in this country, has also been named as a Soviet spy.

In addition to data on our aircraft designs and developments, the Soviets captured in Siberia in early 1945 a completely intact B-29.

Also they have available to them the advice of many of the leading German experts in aircraft design and development, and Germany at the end of World War II was 2 years ahead of the rest of the world in jet aircraft and in guided missiles.

Russia also has had advanced types of jet engines delivered to her in quantity, notably the British Nene engine.

Besides all this, of course, they have their own aircraft design experts and engineers, many of the same ability and

skill who built the planes that in 1937 flew from Moscow across the pole to the west coast of North America.

There are besides actual reports in our possession upon which we can rely implicitly. From actual sightings over Moscow and other sources we know that the Soviets have several hundred B-29 type aircraft. We know that they are working on bombers of improved advance design. We know that in the one recent instance where our own combat planes have engaged Russian-made planes in combat, the Russian planes proved to be about equal to ours in performance. By that I mean that the Russian built MIG-15 has proved in combat in Korea to be about equal to our own latest jets, the F-86 and the F-84. In summary, the Russians have the planes now to deliver the atomic bomb to targets in this country, and in the future we can expect and anticipate that they will have better planes and more of them.

As to the equipment which, along with the planes, is necessary to effective bombing, the Russians are also probably well supplied. One field in which the Russians have been estimated to be weak is the field of electronics. In order to navigate and bomb in all kinds of weather and at night, the Soviets must have radar equipment.

I have already shown to Senators what could be done with the radar equipment of World War II, and we now have vastly improved equipment. Certain facts make us doubt that Russia is now so weak in this field. During the last war we voluntarily shipped to Russia many items of radar equipment. Mr. President, there is no reason for us to gag at that. We did it. We might as well admit it. We did it thinking that they were our friends. We were working with them as sincere allies at the time.

The B-29 which was captured by the Russians contained radar bombing equipment. Also, as in other fields of technical development, the Russians have had spies in this country passing to them the latest secrets in the field of radar and electronics, and as usual, this data is passed to them by an expert in the field. The latest electronics and radar spy to be exposed is the recently convicted Morton Sobell, recognized as an expert in this field. He was convicted only a couple of weeks ago, at the end of a long trial in New York City. Here also the Russians have available to them Czech and German experts in the field, and they have been free to purchase equipment from companies in Switzerland and Sweden, which are recognized as leaders in the manufacture of electronics equipment.

Mr. President, we do not have a stranglehold on the knowledge, the science, and the ability of mankind. To the contrary, we must wake up to the fact that others have access to the same facts, skill, and knowledge that we have; and, of course, they have acted as we have acted with that type of skill and that type of expert guidance. We can assume, I believe, that at least for the

purpose of aiming her atomic bombs Russia must have very good radar equipment.

One essential ingredient in any formula for enemy attack upon this country would be a knowledge of our targets. Here again the Russians have complete information. Most of our major cities are located on bodies of water such as lakes, rivers or bays, and this land-water contrast makes any such city an ideal radar bombing target.

I have already exhibited to the Senate two radar pictures taken back in the Second World War, showing how clearly and easily identifiable Washington is, by radar, because of the Potomac River and the other bodies of water which run into it, or into which it empties. Washington, of course, is a prime target in this sense. In addition to the near certainty that the Soviets have radar photographs of our major cities, and detail maps of our entire country, there is also the prospect that an initial attack upon this country would receive the aid of radar marker beacons planted at the target by Soviet agents. None of our defense agencies can give us assurance that this will not happen.

I cannot discuss that subject in as much detail as I should like; but part of the reason for the existence of subversive elements in this country is to do this very kind of guiding service, by the planting of radar beacons if ever the time comes for attacks. We must not be blind to that knowledge.

This Russian capability, of course, could be set at naught if their planes could be prevented from reaching our targets. On this subject, General Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, has recently had something to say. Let me quote from General Vandenberg's recent article in the Saturday Evening Post issue of February 17, 1951. Incidentally, this is in accord with the testimony before our committee. Some of it will be found printed in the record of the committee. Some of it was given on the basis that we should not print it.

I quote from General Vandenberg's article in the Saturday Evening Post:

Should war come, we can be expected to destroy no more than 30 percent of the planes making an attack in strength on the United States before their bombing missions are completed. And our preparations today are not yet beefed up to achieve even that figure. Even if we had many more interceptor planes and antiaircraft guns and a radar screen that blanketed all approaches to our boundaries, a predictable 70 percent of the enemy's planes would penetrate our defenses despite the extraordinary valor and skill of our pilots.

I am sorry that some Senators who complained of the type of evidence which we were taking, or at least questioned it, are not present. Here is a man now recognized as our responsible air leader, who has considered this subject to be of sufficient importance that he has gone into print. His entire professional and military reputation is at stake in this statement:

My estimate of a 30-percent loss inflicted on an enemy air attack is based on the assumption that the raid would be made by at least 100 heavy bombers.

He is not talking about an attack by one or two or three bombers. He is talking about a heavy attack, and the fact that they would have a better chance to survive under those conditions.

If an enemy attempted to sneak through one plane or five, it is entirely possible no American city would be damaged. But the bleak and blunt evidence of the last war proved conclusively that no bombing attack mounted in sufficient strength by the Americans, British, or Germany ever was turned back by the most strenuous defensive action. The offense always has had a crushing advantage in aerial warfare, and there is no prospect that the balance will change in the foreseeable future.

In summary, then, there is a grave and present threat hanging over our heads, and the prospect is that this threat will grow with the passage of time. Washington, as the nerve center for the functioning of the Government, is a prime target for any enemy attack. To meet this threat our defense preparations should be realistic and consistent in the sense that they should be based upon the known capabilities of the enemy and should not vacillate from day to day as we try to interpret the enemy intention of what he will or may do tomorrow.

If we accepted the premise that it is imperative to preserve the capability of our Government to function as a government, then the facts I have recited point clearly to the need for going ahead with these plans to provide dispersed locations for elements of the key agencies of the Government.

Mr. President, the next and only point I shall deal with before concluding is the question of appraising this present effort, as embraced in the bill, with its committee amendments, as to its effectiveness, as to its adequacy, as to whether or not it is worth while, as to whether or not it will give us at least reasonable assurance that our Government can continue at its vital levels in the event we are confronted with atomic bombing attack from any potential enemy, and particularly—because that is the only one we now know who is in position—particularly from Soviet Russia.

The question then briefly is: Is it a fact that this dispersal program, as included in the pending measure, involving not only dispersal, but involving some decentralization, and involving some demolition, and involving some continued urging from the Congress, through its watchdog committee—is it a fact that S. 218, with its amendments, presents a reasonable answer to our problem? Our answer must be considered against the background of our knowledge that the decision has been made that the District of Columbia will remain the seat of our Government. Other important decisions have already been made, and the activities involved in such decisions are under way. I mentioned some of these other decisions in the course of the debate, and I mention them again in concluding.

The press this morning carried public notice of what we have known, for example, with reference to the reconstruction of the bomb shelter which was built in 1942 for the late President Roosevelt and his family so that the new and more

impregnable shelter will give protection to the President, his family, and his intimate staff against an A-bomb blast and against radioactive particles.

Announcement was made through the press several weeks ago of the construction under way in the Pennsylvania mountains near Hagerstown, Md., where what the Department of Defense calls a supplemental communications installation is being installed. We know, of course, that many important civilian defense activities are under way, some of which cannot here be mentioned.

While I cannot truthfully say to the Senate or to the public that I regard the dispersal program now under debate as being completely adequate, I do say that it is a long, long step in a completely necessitous direction and that it constitutes a reasonable minimum program for us to undertake immediately with every emphasis upon completing it at the earliest possible time.

As to the effectiveness of this program, I state again that I regard it as an irreducible minimum program for the safeguarding of the Nation's ability to continue to be served by vital military and civilian agencies in the event of attack by atomic bombs on Washington.

From the standpoint of its cost—and some of this has come out in the colloquys that have taken place heretofore—I regard it as a highly economical measure, almost every portion of which has a real and continuing permanent value of great importance to people who live and work in the vicinity of the Capital and those many others who come here to transact public business. The circumferential highway, for instance, is badly needed. The demolition of the temporary frame structures of the World War II period is a needed objective from many points of view, the primary one being the protection of those hundreds of thousands of people who will remain in Washington to live and work here even after the dispersal and the decentralization programs are complete.

I want to call attention to that, Mr. President. We are not planning to decentralize, we are not planning to disperse all the people who are here. To the contrary, our plans under the bill call for the dispersal of 20,000 and for the decentralization of 25,000. All of us know perfectly well that in the vicinity of 218,000 are in the District, upon our Federal civil payrolls, just at this time, without including some persons employed in the manufacturing enterprises of the Government, such as the Naval Gun Factory on the Anacostia River.

As to the four permanent dispersal buildings, one of them is already needed for use by the Department of Agriculture if ever normal times shall come again. The other three buildings will all be suitable for permanent use and will subserve objectives which already exist. Of course, their first use should be for permanent office space, but in the event some situation should develop in the future which would make their use as offices undesirable, I again call to the attention of the Senate the fact that even now the amount of square footage employed by the Federal Government for

storage of records and for warehousing in the Washington area is vastly greater than that which would be made available by all of these dispersal buildings if they should all be adapted to be used for those purposes.

I have already had placed in the Record the exhibit prepared yesterday covering this question of warehousing and storage of records in the District. I simply remind the Senate again that whereas each of these dispersal buildings has a gross storage space of about 800,000 square feet, that we are already employing more than 10,000,000 square feet for those two storage objectives right here in the District and adjoining the District, largely through lease.

I further call attention to the fact that the program can be accomplished with relative speed—we think in a year, and certainly it should not take much longer. I regard the program presented by Senate bill 218, as amended by the committee, to be of the highest priority in the protection of a vital national objective, and I hope the Senate will see fit to approve this measure by a large and completely bipartisan vote.

In closing I wish to compliment every Senator who served upon the committee upon the completely objective bipartisan, nonpartisan, American attitude which he displayed in passing upon this vital problem, and I assure the Senate and the public that there was not a member of that committee who would have reported this expensive program—expensive in money and in hours of labor to be utilized—unless we had come to the conclusion first, as we did, that here is a vital security program for safeguarding and securing our Nation against the possibility of complete collapse of our Government, of the complete disorganization of our Government, and complete inability of our Government to perform the most vital services, both military and civilian, in the event we are subjected to atomic attack here in the District of Columbia.

#### PROPOSED EXTENSION OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE

Mr. MORSE obtained the floor.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for 2 minutes?

Mr. MORSE. With the understanding that I do not lose my right to the floor thereby, I shall be very happy to yield to the Senator from Wisconsin.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from Oregon may yield to the Senator from Wisconsin, without losing his right to the floor by doing so.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I have been waiting all afternoon to be recognized. I thought I was the next on the list of those to be recognized.

Mr. MORSE. The Senator did not rise fast enough.

Mr. WILEY. I must endeavor to find what oomph the Senator from Oregon has that I do not possess. When I become the possessor thereof I shall probably have a better chance of being recognized.

Mr. President, yesterday there was a brief discussion on the floor respecting

Senate Resolution 129. The RECORD indicates that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON] was then acting as majority leader. The Senator from Nebraska [Mr. WHERRY], the minority leader, got into the picture by having an understanding entered into that the resolution was to go over until after 2 o'clock yesterday. The Senator from Connecticut meanwhile was to see the majority leader, because apparently the majority leader knew nothing about the resolution we proposed to have considered. However, the subject matter of the resolution has been discussed in the majority and minority conferences many times. The question dealt with by the resolution is the proposed continuance of the so-called Kefauver committee.

Today I asked the majority leader—and I am glad to see him on the floor of the Senate now—whether he had taken up the subject with the majority policy committee. He told me he had not had time to do so.

Mr. President, this resolution was submitted by myself, on behalf of myself and the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY]. Yesterday I explained what is involved in the resolution. I have prepared a statement regarding it, and I shall ask to have it printed in the RECORD, rather than to deliver it at this time.

Mr. President, at this point I ask the majority leader whether he is willing to consent that this resolution be made the order of business for next Tuesday. I wish to say that the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. KEFAUVER] informed me that he was perfectly willing that it be considered.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I have no desire to delay unduly the consideration of the resolution. However, I was not consulted yesterday about the proposal to take it up; at least I was not consulted until after the Senator made his statement on the floor of the Senate.

The distinguished Senator from Wisconsin says the matter has been discussed in both conferences. I assume that he knows what was discussed in the conference among Senators on his side of the aisle; but I can assure him definitely and positively that this matter has never been discussed formally or informally, either in the majority policy committee or in the majority conference. I do not know where the distinguished Senator obtained his information, but wherever it was, it was erroneous.

I do not propose to give consent for the taking up of measures until I know what the program for the Senate is to be. I can assure the Senator that so far as I am concerned there is no disposition to delay consideration of his resolution or the making of his motion on that subject. However, before anything is brought up on the floor of the Senate, I have heretofore always consulted the minority; there has not yet been a bill which I have had the Senate take up, about which I have not conferred in advance with the minority. I expect the same courtesy from the other side. The custom here, as I understand it, is for the majority to have something to do about arranging the schedule of legislation to

be considered. The minority leader has always cooperated with me fully, and has discussed with the Senators on his side their views in regard to such matters; and we have gotten along very well indeed.

I want the Senator from Wisconsin to understand that I have no desire, nor do I know of any desire among Senators on our side of the aisle, to delay consideration of his resolution; but at this time I cannot say whether we would be able to have it taken up on Tuesday.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield for 1 moment further?

Mr. MORSE. Yes, on the same conditions, if that is understood.

Mr. WILEY. Yes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator may yield under the conditions previously stated.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I am glad to have the assurance of the majority leader that he will not obstruct. Now we shall see what the future will bring forth in that respect.

Mr. President, at least I am a Member of the United States Senate, and I have my rights as a Senator. I could make the motion now. However, I shall wait until next Tuesday. Then if the majority leader will not agree that the resolution may be taken up at that time, I shall move its consideration. There are 96 Members of the Senate, and no one Senator has a monopoly on the procedure in the Senate.

Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD, following these remarks by me, a statement which I have prepared on the following subjects:

New York hearings could have been extended weeks, months; undirected public opinion cannot clean up crime; what a New York columnist said; why a watchdog committee will have bark but no bite; tommy-gun boys not afraid of popguns; why put live committee in coffin? What the original crime resolution provided; and so forth.

Mr. President, I wish to say that the statement which I have had prepared covers those subjects and certain others. I ask unanimous consent to have the statement printed at this point in the RECORD, following my remarks; and I also ask unanimous consent to have printed following it an address I made on this issue, which I delivered by transcription over station WLS, the prairie farmer station, in Chicago, on April 14.

There being no objection, the statement and the address were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR WILEY—APPEAL FOR UNANIMOUS CONSENT FOR VOTE NEXT WEDNESDAY ON CRIME COMMITTEE RESOLUTION

Yesterday I introduced Senate Resolution 129 to extend the life of the Senate Crime Investigating Committee until January 15, 1952, and to grant \$150,000 to that committee.

My colleagues will find the discussion of the reasons for this extension, beginning on page 3952 in the April 17 RECORD and continuing to page 3955. I should like to say just a few words more on this issue and

then I should like to ask unanimous consent to schedule a vote next Wednesday on it.

I want to point out that time is ticking out in the life of this committee. Every single passing day in which no action is taken on this issue is a delight to the forces of the American underworld. I am not of course in any way questioning the worthy motives of any of my colleagues. I know that they want adequate time to evaluate this resolution and they have every right to do so. I want to point out, however, that if any Senator or Senators delay this resolution to death, they will have to account to the American people.

I trust that no Member of the Senate will try to excuse the killing of the Crime Committee on the basis of the fact that the job is allegedly done. I proved conclusively yesterday that the job is not done. I proved that there are whole areas of crime that have barely been looked into, much less adequately exposed.

NEW YORK HEARINGS COULD HAVE BEEN EXTENDED WEEKS, MONTHS

Ask any executive member of the committee staff who was in New York, and he will tell you that there were enough unheard witnesses in New York alone, enough scandals still to be exposed, enough rottenness, crime and corruption that could have been brought before the public light to have merited the extension of the committee's life in New York alone for several weeks and even months. That is not my judgment; I could not be there because of Foreign Relations Committee duties. That was the judgment of expert staff members.

UNDIRECTED PUBLIC OPINION CANNOT CLEAN UP CRIME

Let no one think that an aroused public opinion alone is sufficient to take care of this problem all by itself without any instrumentals. I have in my hand a column written by Mr. H. I. Phillips which goes under the regular title, "The Sun Dial," as published in the New York World-Telegram and Sun. This column takes up the issue of Crime Committee extension. While the column is somewhat facetious and raises extraneous issues, I believe it comes close to the nubbin of the problem in at least one respect. Let me read from the column.

WHAT A NEW YORK COLUMNIST SAID

"Senator KEFAUVER evidently thinks a Senate crime committee should quit when it is ahead. But it is not that far ahead.

"Those scattered community probes won't do the trick. And present public indignation won't do it. There isn't a hoodlum in the underworld who isn't rooting for a complete fade-out by the Senate probes April 30. They are top students of public reactions, and they will lay you better than 25 to 1 that, with those boys (the Kefauver committee) out of the way, Crime, Inc., will be pretty much back at the old stand without too much delay. And it's curious how confident some of the top mobsters are that the Senate will not give any Senate committee the green light to go after them with the efficiency of the Kefauver group. Maybe they have inside dope.

"It is utterly fantastic," declares Senator WILEY, one committee member, "that the committee should end its work and that some of the most defiant underworld characters, who evaded its summonses all winter, should get away with it as they have done so far." He was referring especially to three or four top underworld witnesses who paid no attention to a subpoena until the other day, thus escaping any public grilling whatever, and getting prompt release on no more bail than is asked for picking lilacs in a park. The general public is with him on that.

"Senator KEFAUVER seems to think the underworld can now be taken care of by public indignation and special crime probes in

various infected communities. He was never so wrong. The public cools off fast and needs the fire, color, and drama of the Kefauver routine to stir it up for at least another 6 months."

#### WHY A WATCHDOG COMMITTEE WILL HAVE BARK BUT NO BITE

A joint Senate-House watchdog committee simply will not do the trick. It will have a feeble bark but no bite. There is no question but that it might partly be successful in serving to stimulate the various investigative agencies of the Federal Government and serving to help keep alive legislation which the crime committee will have recommended.

#### TOMMY-GUN BOYS NOT AFRAID OF POPGUNS

But, I want to repeat that it takes a small army of investigators to unearth interstate crime. The gangsters of America are not afraid of a watchdog committee. The only thing they are afraid of is a committee which has enough skilled investigators to do what the various investigative agencies of this country have not thus far done either because of jurisdictional problems, as in the case of the great FBI which has a strictly limited area or because of other reasons. If you set up a watchdog committee and give it practically next to nothing in funds, if you set it up on the basis that it will not conduct investigations, then the gangsters of America will laugh out loud. You will be aiming a popgun at them, and these tommy-gun boys simply are not afraid of popguns.

Moreover, the investigative agencies of the Federal Government will simply come back at you and say there is "no more interstate organized or syndicated crime," just as several supposedly qualified Federal officers said before the crime committee was set up. They will dare the watchdog committee to prove its case. But the watchdog committee will simply not be able to do it.

So what I am proposing is that we prove to these agencies and to the American public that we have still barely skimmed the surface of interstate crime and that the greatest job is still to be done.

#### WHY PUT LIVE COMMITTEE IN COFFIN?

I repeat what I said yesterday. I am considerably concerned about various individuals wanting to shove the crime committee into a coffin, pull down the lid, seal it, and pronounce the final burial service even before the crime committee is dead.

I said that the crime committee should be a very live organism. I said that it should carry on the great job which it has done. I wish that I personally could have had the time to devote to it that it so eminently deserved, but unfortunately this was not the case.

It is not with the spirit of criticism in my heart that I make these comments but rather with the spirit of humility, because every one recognizes that this Nation is indebted to the great chairman of the Senate Crime Committee, the junior Senator from Tennessee [Mr. KEFAUVER], and to his staff, headed by Mr. Halley.

#### WHAT THE ORIGINAL CRIME RESOLUTION PROVIDED

I want to point out that in the original Senate Resolution 202, as agreed to on May 3, 1950, the crime committee was authorized and directed "to make a full and complete study." Now my contention, Mr. President, is that this study has neither been full nor complete (not because of any lack of diligence but because the problem is so huge). I challenge any Member of the Senate to disprove my contention as to incompleteness when I point out the tremendous number of areas of interstate crime that have not been touched.

The committee was authorized to investigate "whether organized crime utilizes the

facilities of interstate commerce or otherwise operates in interstate commerce in furtherance of any transactions which are in violation of the law of the United States or of the State in which the transactions occur, and, if so, the manner and extent to which, and the identity of the persons, firms, or corporations by which such utilization is being made, what facilities are being used, and whether or not organized crime utilizes such interstate facilities or otherwise operates in interstate commerce for the development of corrupting influences in violation of law of the United States or of the laws of any State."

Well, we have very definitely determined that organized crime does utilize the facilities of interstate commerce. But can it be said that we have fully identified the persons, firms, or corporations by which such utilization is being made? I say that the answer is "No." To be sure, we have indicated that Western Union is being utilized by the racketeers, that telephones are being used by the racketeers. But without having gone to various areas of this country which are pleading for the crime committee to come to them, can we say that we very definitely know all of the facilities that are being utilized—all of the technical tricks in electronics, etc.? Can we say that we have fully explored the extent to which interstate mail is being utilized? I say that the answer is "No."

#### LET US VOTE NEXT WEDNESDAY

Yesterday I indicated I was going to ask unanimous consent that this issue be voted up or down next Monday.

The Senator from Tennessee indicated that he could not be on hand, so I gladly deferred my suggestion until next Wednesday. I want to point out, however, that Wednesday is but four legislative days prior to the end of this month. If this resolution goes to committee, first to the Judiciary Committee and then to the Rules Committee, we recognize that it may become bogged down because of the heavy workload facing those committees, particularly my colleagues on the Senate Judiciary Committee.

#### LONG DEBATE IS HARDLY NECESSARY

Surely no one can claim that they have not adequately read or heard of the crime committee. Surely there is no issue in this country which has been more broadcast, televised or written up than this crime committee.

#### WATCHDOG IDEA PRESUMES HOME IS RELATIVELY SAFE

I repeat that a watchdog committee will be a watchdog without teeth unless you give it sufficient money to hire investigators to carry on the job. But the whole idea of a watchdog presupposes that the home is relatively safe and that only an occasional burglar may enter. Nothing like that is the case. Our "home" has already been invaded by the burglars. It is crawling with burglars, and what we need is not one watchdog but a crew of trained investigators to rout the burglars out.

I repeat what I said yesterday. I do not want to see the crime committee go on indefinitely. I do not want it to become a little grand jury, prosecuting attorney, Department of Justice rolled into one, but neither do I want it to assume that it has completed a job which it has definitely not finished.

#### FOREIGN AFFAIRS WILL PREOCCUPY US

All of us know that the attention of the Senate today is riveted on this foreign-policy issue. All during the next week, no doubt, there will be extensive debate on this problem. It is essential that we fix a day certain by setting up a special order, so to speak, so that we can vote on this crime issue. This problem must not be lost in a fast shuffle.

#### IF COMMITTEE DIES, OUR PEOPLE WILL FEEL IGNORED

If the crime committee is allowed to die, if it is replaced by an innocuous entity, a popgun committee, then I say that the American people will feel that they might just as well not have sent the 50,000 or so letters that they did to the committee appealing for genuine extension. Then, I say the ministers of America might just as well not have adopted the resolutions that they did not for extension of the committee.

I respectfully urge my colleagues that they permit the type of handling of this resolution that I am recommending. Let us vote this issue up or down openly on the Senate floor next Tuesday. Let us not allow this committee to die by default. Let us not allow it to be done in, behind the scenes.

#### IF COMMITTEES COULD REPORT BY THURSDAY, THAT WOULD BE SATISFACTORY

If I had the assurance that both the Judiciary and Rules Committees could report back to us by next Wednesday or Thursday I would not hesitate about asking that it go to committee. Moreover, if the Senate were to agree that both committees be specifically directed to report to us by next Tuesday or next Wednesday, then again I say, I would have no hesitation about allowing the resolution to go to the committee.

However, too often it is hard to get committees together because of lack of quorum and are other parliamentary problems. And so, I appeal to my colleagues at this time to grant the unanimous request that I am now making.

I ask unanimous consent that the Senate Resolution 129 be made the pending order of business next Tuesday, April 24, and be voted upon that afternoon following whatever debate the Senate shall deem appropriate.

#### ADDRESS DELIVERED BY SENATOR WILEY BY TRANSCRIPTION OVER STATION WLS, CHICAGO, ILL., ON APRIL 14, 1951—WAKE UP AMERICA AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME

The American people are tremendously aroused over the crisis in foreign policy—over the firing of Gen. Douglas MacArthur—over our future course in relation to Russian communism.

But I should like to speak to you today, my friends, about a crisis on the home front—the crisis brought about by organized crime.

#### HOME FRONT BEING TERMITED

I say to you that the whole strength of our home front is being undermined by criminal termites gnawing at the foundations of our economy.

It is absolutely fantastic that American boys should be dying in Korea on behalf of international law and order while at the same time we, their relatives, friends, and loved ones, should fall to protect law and order here on our home front. You have all read and heard of crime and corruption, scandals, and confessions throughout this land. I say that there is every indication that the recent scandals in basketball, for example, could be duplicated manifold by other and newer shocking revelations. Why? Because the habit of making a fast buck regardless of moral scruples has become so widespread throughout our country. Our whole younger generation has unfortunately been impacted by a widely held cynicism. It consists largely in a rush for success and for wealth, regardless of consequences to self and to society, a rush for thrills, for pick-ups, for wild jags.

#### CRIME TODAY OPERATES WITH SILK GLOVES

Come back with me, my friends, to another April morning 27 years ago. It is April 1, 1924. An armed invasion of the city of Cicero, Ill., has occurred. The Capone gang has terrorized the entire town



from dawn until dusk in a successful effort to capture a municipal election. Machine guns have been set up at polling places; citizens, policemen, and even a few gangsters have been slugged, shot, and killed. The candidate of the Capone gang has won.

That bloody day in Cicero has come down in history as one of the most shocking examples of what happens when the organized mobsters take over.

Today, my friends, it is very unlikely that you will see criminals brandishing machine guns out on the streets. Occasionally some citizen engaged in legitimate or, most often, illegitimate activity, ends up in a bloody heap, riddled to pieces by bullets in an automobile or on the street or in some home.

However, organized crime today operates more with silk gloves than with 38-caliber slugs. It uses threats of violence galore; but so powerful is its hold that only comparatively rarely must it resort to open violence.

Now, practically everyone listening to my voice today has become aroused over the horrible conditions which have been brought to light by our Senate Committee investigating interstate crime. As a member of that committee, I have been thrilled to receive a tremendous amount of mail from my own State of Wisconsin, from Illinois, and from all over the Union pleading with the Congress to carry on the crusade of this committee.

#### CRIME COMMITTEE HAS WHOLE NEW AREAS TO COVER

So far as I am concerned, I need no urging on that score, because I am firmly convinced that if this committee is extended it can repay to the citizens a thousand-fold every dollar that is spent in the investigation. It can help bring to light other vicious conditions, depicting the numbers racket, organized narcotics, extortion, and all other forms of vice.

It can come up with sound bills on the basis of which we may help cut down the amount of crime in our country.

But, my friends, I want to spell out in this broadcast, through the courtesy of this station, some other facts about the continuing war against crime. Let's go right down the list.

1. My first point is that the Senate committee's record is still incomplete. By that I mean that, although it has done a great job, it has not followed through on all the substantial "leads" which have been furnished to it. There are considerable numbers of witnesses whom it subpoenaed or whom it brought to bay by virtue of warrants whom it has never questioned.

In addition, there are several cities like Baltimore, Pittsburgh, and Washington which the committee should still investigate. There are innumerable loose ends to be tied up in the city of Chicago and down-State Illinois. So this committee must carry on its fight. Partisan politics or disputes or personalities must not be allowed to kill it.

#### GRASS ROOTS HAS GREATEST RESPONSIBILITY

2. Now, second, my friends, I have referred to the fact that you, the American public, have become aroused to the danger of crime. All across this Nation we have seen healthy indications of the formation of new organizations, of new legal actions against crime. Grand juries have been set in force; income-tax evasions are being brought to light; voluntary citizens crime commissions are being set up. This evidence that citizen's awareness that his responsibility is the basic one.

Practically all of the crime being committed in our country today could be prosecuted under State and local laws. Uncle Sam, meaning the Federal Government, can

help State and local officials. But I don't want to see the buck passed to Washington. The real answer to crime is at the grass roots of America and not in Washington, D. C.

#### HOODS ARE WAITING TILL HEAT BLOWS OVER

3. Now, my friends, my third major point is that we should not be overimpressed by the temporary flurry of anticriminal action. I have every reason to believe that the gangsters of America are still feeling pretty smug. They have seen previous instances when the heat has become pretty intense. They have seen the public wax indignant for a while. They have seen the newspaper headlines blaze and the radio stations roar, only to have the flurry die down in a few months, after which the gangsters have come out of the "woodwork" again. Hoodlums are past masters at lying low until the heat blows over.

Now, what you and I have got to prove, my friends, is that their smugness and self-confidence are wrong. You and I have got to prove that we are embarked on a permanent crusade against these vicious thugs.

#### DON'T BE FOOLED BY SURFACE IMPRESSIONS

Don't become overconfident, my friends, because a grand jury has been formed. We have seen many such grand juries peter out with very little to show for their effort. Don't become overconfident just because an indictment is handed down. The big thing is when convictions occur and are upheld by the higher courts.

#### DON'T-CARE ATTITUDE IS DANGEROUS

4. Now, a fourth point, my friends. If you were to ask me what is the principal handicap to law enforcement throughout our country, I would say that it is the don't-care attitude on the part of many of our citizens. Just consider the fact, my friends, that in spite of the recent exposé of terrible crime conditions in Chicago, in spite of numerous newspaper and magazine articles on vice in that great city, less than 60 percent of the eligible voters bothered to even go to the polls recently. That was an all-time low in such an election. I think that is terribly unfortunate, my friends. I say that irrespective of whether the other 40 percent or so would have voted Republican or Democrat. What I am interested in is not partisan voting but a greater interest in voting.

#### HERDLIKE VOTING IS NO GOOD

And don't think, my friends, that if 100 percent of the people went to the polls, that would necessarily be an accomplishment. We want our people to be interested in their Government. We want them to exercise their precious franchise, but we don't want them to go like a herd of sheep to the ballot boxes.

We want them to think about candidates; we want them to figure out whether the officials for whom they are voting are like Caesar's wife, namely, above suspicion.

If we can replace the don't-care attitude of our citizens with an alert, vigilant attitude, we will have accomplished a great deal in the crusade against crime.

Remember, friends, eternal vigilance is still the best safeguard for liberty.

5. A fifth point, my friends, is the psychology of the average citizen when he reads the stories of crime. What happens when Mr. and Mrs. Public read that some 16-year-old youngsters have been arrested on charges of armed robbery while the youngsters were out on a marijuana jag? Well, Mr. and Mrs. Public read a story like that and they say to themselves, "Oh, well, that's just some kids in that bad section who have gone wild." Mr. and Mrs. Public don't recognize that their own children are potentially involved in this story of narcotics being consumed by youngsters.

You see, folks, unfortunately, there is too much a psychology of "that only happens to the next fellow." "That couldn't happen to my family, to my child, to my store, to my business." There's too much of that idea.

To the contrary of that idea, you and I should recognize the fact that the nature of crime is such that it sooner or later can poison the whole community.

#### SUMMARY

Well, folks, time is running out. So let me sum up, my friends. I have made several points, and they are these. First of all, the work of the Senate Crime Committee is not completed. It must be carried on. I hope that you will urge your Senators to vote for an extension of the Committee's life.

Second, I hope that you will join in citizens' movements for grass roots combating of crime.

Third, I hope that you will appreciate the fact that the present temporary flurry is hardly a lasting cure-all of crime conditions.

Look at a history of crime in the United States and you will see that the criminal mind is an ingenious mind. If you force it out of one community, it will pop up in another community. If you force it out of one racket, it will arise in another racket. If you imprison its leading character, someone will replace him.

And so, we need full and permanent cooperation by every constructive force in society—by the home, by the church and the school, by honest law-enforcement officials with guts and determination to do their job.

The answer to crime is not in the next fellow. "George" cannot do it. You and I must do it. The answer to crime is in your heart and mine, in your action and mine, in your community and mine. Thank you.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I was informed by the Parliamentarian that my resolution is now on the table and is subject to being called up at any time, on motion. I wish to inquire whether I correctly understand the situation in that respect.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MONROE in the chair). The Parliamentarian informs the Chair that it would not be in order to call up the resolution until there has been an adjournment of the Senate. In other words, the word "day," as referred to in the rules in connection with such matters, means a legislative day, not a calendar day.

Mr. WILEY. Of course the resolution would be subject to being called up by unanimous consent at any time, would it not?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.

Mr. WILEY. Then, if objection were made, it would be subject to a motion that it be considered by the Senate, would it not?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's resolution could be called up only by unanimous consent; if objection were made, it could not be called up on that particular legislative day. An adjournment of the Senate would be required before the resolution could be called up by means of a motion.

Mr. WILEY. I thank the Chair. Now the situation is very clear.

I wish to thank my distinguished friend the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] for yielding to me for this purpose.

Mr. MORSE. The Senator from Wisconsin is very welcome.

**THE BONUS-MARCH INCIDENT OF 1932 AS RELATED TO GENERAL MACARTHUR**

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield to me?

Mr. MORSE. Yes, if it is agreed that I may do so without losing my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I thank the Senator from Oregon for yielding to me under those conditions.

Mr. President, yesterday I made a brief statement intended to correct the impression left by the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. KERR] that in the Washington bonus-march incident of 1932, General MacArthur mistakenly fought a battle against innocent veterans of World War I, who had come to petition their Government for relief. From his response it is clear that the Senator from Oklahoma is reluctant to believe that any Communists were connected with the bonus march.

I therefore wish to repeat that the thousands of honest veterans who took part in the Washington disorders of July 1932, were unwittingly under the leadership of nonveteran Communists, and that General MacArthur's action to restore order through the use of Army troops was carried out without firing a shot, in strict accordance with the orders of President Hoover and Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley.

In order further to document this statement, I wish to cite an authoritative letter on the subject, which was called to my attention yesterday after I had made my remarks. The letter was written by General Hurley himself. It appeared in McCall's magazine for November 1949.

General Hurley's letter was written in reply to an account of the bonus-march incident in Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt's book, *This I Remember*, as serialized in McCall's magazine. I call the attention of the Senate to a brief acknowledgment of General Hurley's letter which Mrs. Roosevelt wrote, with characteristic candor, to the editors of McCall's, and which was printed immediately following General Hurley's letter. Mrs. Roosevelt, apparently after having been shown the letter, responded as follows:

I simply stated my impressions of that day, derived from the press which I happened to read. I know others had similar impressions, but I am glad to have an authentic account published and I only wonder why it was not done much sooner.

Mr. President, I therefore ask unanimous consent that General Hurley's letter, which appears in McCall's magazine for November 1949 be printed at this point in the body of the RECORD, as a part of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, let me say to the distinguished Senator from New Jersey that the files of the House Committee on Un-

American Activities contain testimony to the effect that there was Communist leadership of the bonus march on Washington.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I thank the Senator.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from New Jersey?

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I am sure the Senator from New Jersey will not object to having appear in the RECORD, immediately following his statement, a list of the casualties which occurred on that particular day. Would the Senator object to having that done?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. No, provided this comment appears: that the casualties were due to the action of the local police, and that the United States troops under General MacArthur were not involved in those casualties, were not responsible for them, did not cause them, and did not fire a shot. I wish to make it clear that General MacArthur acted in compliance with the orders of his superiors, the President of the United States and the Secretary of War, who called out the troops; and that the troops did not fire a shot.

Mr. McMAHON. The Senator from New Jersey would not object, would he, to having printed in the RECORD the casualties which were listed the next day in the New York Times? I have just looked up that list, and I believe it should appear in the RECORD at this point.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. If the Senator from Connecticut wishes to imply that the casualties were due to the action of General MacArthur or the action of the troops serving under General MacArthur, I would say that would be misleading. On the other hand, I have no objection to having the list to which the Senator refers printed in the RECORD, if the RECORD will show that those casualties were due to action of the local police, and not to the action of the United States troops under General MacArthur. I want that to be perfectly clear in the RECORD. Under those conditions, I cannot object to anything the Senator wishes to put in the RECORD.

Mr. McMAHON. That is perfectly agreeable, but I merely want this list of casualties to be printed, because the casualties occurred on that day. The Senator has given us an explanation of how they occurred, but they happened to those whose names are given. I have the list here before me, and I submit it for the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous-consent request of the Senator from New Jersey?

Mr. SCHOEPEL. Reserving the right to object, I should like to ask the distinguished Senator from New Jersey whether he will permit me to ask a question of the distinguished Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON].

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. The Senator from Oregon has the floor, but I assume he would not object. Certainly I do not object.

Mr. MORSE. On the conditions heretofore stated, I am very glad to yield.

Mr. SCHOEPEL. I should like to ask the distinguished Senator from Connecticut whether he would have any objection to showing the list of casualties which occurred among veterans when a number of them were transferred to Key West, Fla., after President Roosevelt took office.

Mr. McMAHON. No; not at all.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH]?

Mr. CASE. Reserving the right to object, I should like to ask the distinguished Senator from New Jersey whether it is his understanding that the troops under General MacArthur were called in to prevent a continuation of rioting, and whether it is not a fact that it was the ability of General MacArthur and of his troops to handle the matter which prevented further bloodshed or casualties, and which put an end to the riots.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. That was very definitely the President's purpose in asking General MacArthur to come into the picture, and, as I said, not a shot was fired by any of the United States troops. The casualties were due to the inability of the local police to handle the situation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from New Jersey that there be printed in the RECORD a letter from Gen. Patrick J. Hurley published in McCall's magazine?

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**PATRICK J. HURLEY DISCLOSES THE FACTS ABOUT THE BONUS MARCH**

"I am glad to have an authentic account published and I only wonder why it was not done much sooner."—Eleanor Roosevelt  
TO THE EDITOR, MCCALL'S.

DEAR SIR: On page 109 of the July issue of McCall's there appears the following passage in Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt's autobiography, *This I Remember*. The words within brackets are supplied by the undersigned.

"The first [bonus] march, which had taken place in Mr. Hoover's administration, was still painfully fresh in everybody's mind [in 1933 when the second march occurred]. I shall never forget my feeling of horror [in 1932] when I realized that the Army had actually been ordered to fire on the veterans. This one incident shows what fear can make people do. Mr. Hoover was a Quaker; and General MacArthur, his chief of staff, must have known how many veterans would resent the order and never forget it; he must have known, too, the effect it would have on public opinion. Yet they dared do nothing else in the face of a situation which frightened them."

It is with a deep sense of regret that I undertake to correct Mrs. Roosevelt. My personal relations with her have always been most cordial. Moreover, during World War II it was my privilege to serve her husband, the late and lamented President Roosevelt, in various capacities as a military officer or as his personal representative or minister or ambassador, in 21 different nations. Also I must recall that Mrs. Roosevelt's distinguished son, General Elliott Roosevelt, gave me a square deal in his book, *As He Saw It*. Nevertheless, I cannot ignore Mrs. Roosevelt's erroneous statements, because they do a grave injustice to former President Hoover and General MacArthur.

The first bonus march did take place in Mr. Hoover's administration. At that time

the world was in an economic panic. The United States was in the throes of a Presidential campaign, and the events of the bonus march became campaign issues. The Democratic National Committee, as well as the Soviet Comintern and some of the veterans, declined to accept as true the facts pertaining to the marchers' riot in Washington. The Nation was deluged with false statements. It is, therefore, not altogether surprising that Mrs. Roosevelt remembers the propaganda rather than the facts.

Much of the propaganda at the time went far beyond Mrs. Roosevelt's statement that "the Army had actually been ordered to fire on the veterans." The soldiers were represented as having shot down the veterans in cold blood. Mrs. Roosevelt does not make such broad, flagrant charges, but she has permitted herself to be drawn into a grossly incorrect statement. To clarify her remark let me ask the following questions:

1. Who ordered the soldiers to fire on the veterans?

2. If such an order was given why was it that not one shot was fired by any soldier during the riot?

3. Since no shots were fired by the soldiers, does Mrs. Roosevelt mean to convey the idea that the soldiers would not obey what she calls the actual orders to fire on the veterans?

The truth is, no order was given by anyone to the soldiers to fire on the veterans. The riot was stopped by the Army personnel without firing a shot. Not one person was seriously injured after the arrival of the Army troops.

If I were to stop here I would merely be denying Mrs. Roosevelt's statements. It is, therefore, fitting for me to restate a few of the basic facts with supporting documentary evidence.

In 1932 a great many veterans and veterans' organizations demanded that Congress enact a law authorizing the payment of a bonus to the soldiers amounting to \$2,300,000,000. The administration opposed the bill, and the Congress refused to enact it.

A group of veterans from the west coast then set out to march on Washington to petition the Congress to enact the bill. Before they reached Washington their leadership had been, to a great extent, taken over by nonveterans. These nonveterans, for the most part, were either criminals or Communist agitators, who, taking advantage of the unsettled conditions of the country, sought to promote violence and bloodshed as a step toward communism. These facts, at the time, were denied with convincing vigor by all who opposed the administration.

When the marchers first arrived there were about 12,000 of them. Despite their presence and their demands Congress refused to enact the bonus bill. But, on the request of President Hoover, Congress did vote an appropriation to pay costs for any veteran desiring to return home. More than 5,000 of the real veterans accepted the offer. Some left without claiming transportation. On the morning of the riot less than 6,000 marchers remained in the city.

I have before me a report of the Department of Justice, signed by Hon. Nugent Dodds, the Assistant Attorney General. Mr. Dodds states that the FBI had fingerprints of only 4,334 of the bonus marchers, but 1,069 of them—or nearly 25 percent of the fingerprints recorded—were those of men who had criminal or police records. The crimes included murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery, burglary, blackmail, assault, extortion, disorderly conduct and, of course, such minor categories as traffic violations and drunkenness. This report is an official document and may be inspected by anyone. It was repeatedly cited by members of the Government in 1932.

There was, and is, ample evidence that the Communists had gained control of the bonus marchers before the day of the riot. For in-

stance, of the three largest camps in which the marchers lived one was called "Camp Marx" and one "Communist Camp." Instead of petitioning, the marchers attempted to command, coerce, and intimidate both the officials and the public. In his official report of the riot, based on G-2 information (Army Intelligence), General MacArthur, Chief of Staff, declared that the original leaders of the bonus army lost their authority over the marchers, "and the subversive element gradually gained instead." This fact was no secret at the time.

General MacArthur's report, the Army Intelligence, the FBI, the Justice Department, the interpretation of events given by the newspapers and the subsequent judgment of the Un-American Activities Committee have all been confirmed by the disclosures since made by Benjamin Gitlow, a repentant Communist official, in his book, *The Whole of Their Lives*. Gitlow has said in describing the bonus march:

"The CI (Communist International) representative in a Washington hotel room turned purple with rage. The plan to bring about in Washington a massacre of the hunger marchers as a result of provoked violent clashes with the authorities did not materialize. \* \* \* The enraged CI representative called the Communist leaders together. He lashed out against them, charged them with being cowards and with deceiving the Comintern. The leaders, terror-stricken, admitted their mistakes and shortcomings. The Communist Party leaders, having no further business in Washington, checked out of the fashionable hotels and left by Pullman train for home."

The riot itself—the climax of the march—occurred on July 28, 1932. On that morning Hon. L. H. Reichelderfer, President of the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia, informed the President that the Treasury Department attempted to clear a certain area south of Pennsylvania Avenue for the purpose of beginning new Government buildings. This work was intended to absorb a great number of the unemployed in the Washington area. The work of clearing the area was opposed by the bonus marchers. The city government then called upon the Metropolitan Police to remove the objectors so that construction could begin. This was the immediate cause of the riot.

Bonus marchers hastened to the area from outlying camps and greatly outnumbered the police force. In the first fray the police were repulsed. Having been reinforced, the police made a second unsuccessful attempt to clear the area. Several policemen were seriously injured; one bonus marcher, a veteran, was killed, and another was wounded and died later. In all, 57 persons were seriously injured. All this took place while the civil government was attempting to restore law and order. The President did not call the troops on the first request of the civil government.

Reichelderfer then wrote a letter to the President, asserting that it would "be impossible for the Police Department to maintain law and order except by the free use of firearms. \* \* \* The presence of Federal troops in some number will obviate the seriousness of the situation, and it will result in far less violence and bloodshed."

It was at this point, while the riot was still raging, that the President directed me, as Secretary of War, to take over. He admonished me to prevent bloodshed. He said definitely that his purpose in calling the Army was to prevent bloodshed, to restore law and order, and to protect the people from the violence of the mob.

As Secretary of War I issued an order in full, as follows:

2:55 P. M., JULY 28, 1932.

To: Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff, United States Army.

The President has just now informed me that the civil government of the District of

Columbia has reported to him that it is unable to maintain law and order in the District.

You will have United States troops proceed immediately to the scene of disorder. Cooperate fully with the District of Columbia Police force which is now in charge. Surround the affected area and clear it without delay.

Turn over all prisoners to the civil authorities.

In your orders insist that any women and children who may be in the affected area be accorded every consideration and kindness. Use all humanity consistent with the due execution of the order.

PATRICK J. HURLEY,  
Secretary of War.

Probably for friendship's sake, or perhaps because she did not know the facts, Mrs. Roosevelt did not mention me as the author of the order. The order was released at the time and published in the newspapers word for word as quoted above. Mrs. Roosevelt is not justified by any form of imagination in construing the foregoing as an order to fire on the veterans. Yet no other written order was issued by anyone during the riot. The President's directive to me was oral. General MacArthur gave detailed oral instructions to Brig. Gen. Perry Miles, who was in command of the troops, how to handle the situation without firing on the rioters. Miles, in turn, orally passed on the same detailed instructions to his subordinates. In the face of showers of brickbats and clubs, not one officer, not one enlisted man of the Army, fired a single shot. No one gave any order at any time, either oral or written, to fire on the veterans or marchers.

The Army did show force. The force was intended to show the radical leaders that a Government by all the people was still functioning and could not be overcome by an organized minority. But force was never used. The soldiers were always halted in time to give the marchers an opportunity to retire. The Army used no weapons other than a few tear-gas bombs. After having thrown a volley of brickbats at the troops at the first camp, the marchers broke and ran.

I have omitted comment on Mrs. Roosevelt's mention of President Hoover's religion. I do this notwithstanding the fact that I could show that men of that faith have served our people with distinction even on the bloodiest battlefields of the Republic.

I have also omitted any question concerning Mrs. Roosevelt's estimate that the situation frightened Douglas MacArthur and Herbert Hoover. In my experience I have never known any two persons who were less affected by fear in formulating their course of action than these two men.

I come now to the second bonus march referred to by Mrs. Roosevelt. That bonus march was unlike the first in that the marchers were composed entirely of veterans who wished to prevail upon the Roosevelt administration to enact the bonus law for the appropriation of \$2,300,000,000. President Roosevelt, like President Hoover, opposed the appropriation. The second bonus march occurred after it was known that the new administration would recognize Soviet Russia, which the Hoover administration had declined to do. That accounts for the fact that there were no Communist nonveterans in the second bonus march.

When the second bonus march arrived in Washington President Roosevelt used public funds to ship the bonus marchers to Florida. This was intended to take them far from their homes, to support them at Government expense, and to prevent agitation by them in a troubled period. It happened, however, that after they arrived in Florida they were caught in a tremendous storm. Hundreds of them were drowned or otherwise killed. I do not know the exact number killed, but the

press of the period often mentioned approximately 300. I have offered no criticism of President Roosevelt's handling of the second bonus march. I have assumed that the President and his advisers acted in what they sincerely believed to be the best interests of the people.

In closing, permit me to remark that the Armed Forces of our country approach the suppression of riots among their fellow citizens as a most disagreeable duty. Usually when the Armed Forces perform such a duty without firing a shot they are given some credit. This was not the case with the men who restored law and order in the bonus riots.

Every soldier engaged in the service of suppressing the bonus riot in Washington, from General MacArthur to the newest private in the ranks, conducted himself with skill, patience, and courage. I can think of no better statement with which to conclude than a quotation from General MacArthur's report to me, as Secretary of War, after the riot, which reads as follows:

"The mission given them had been performed loyally and efficiently and in accordance with your personal injunction to 'use all humanity consistent with the due execution of this order.' They had neither suffered nor inflicted a serious casualty. They had not fired a shot, and had actually employed no more dangerous weapons than harmless tear-gas bombs. Even these were not used in heavy concentrations nor for periods of more than a few minutes each. Any contention that injury to individuals was caused by them is entirely without foundation."

To my own personal knowledge every word of that report by General MacArthur is true. The soldiers who performed this duty would, I am sure, be grateful to Mrs. Roosevelt if she would in some way express appreciation of a service so successfully and so patiently performed under the most difficult and disagreeable circumstances by the Armed Forces of her country.

Respectfully,

PATRICK J. HURLEY.

"I simply stated my impressions of that day, derived from the press which I happened to read. I know others had similar impressions, but I am glad to have an authentic account published and I only wonder why it was not done much sooner."—Eleanor Roosevelt.

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER.** Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Connecticut that there be printed in the RECORD a list of the casualties suffered at the time of the so-called bonus march?

There being no objection, the list of casualties was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**DEAD AND INJURED IN BONUS RIOTING**

WASHINGTON, July 28.—The casualty list in bonus rioting here today:

Shot to death: Hashka, William, 37 years old, 2316 West Twenty-third Place, Chicago.

Seriously injured: Carlson, Eric, Oakland, Calif., veteran, shot in the abdomen; Hall, John, Negro, Mocksville, N. C., veteran, gunshot wounds; Scott, George, policeman, skull fractured by brick.

Less seriously injured: Bankert, William, policeman, struck by bricks and bottles; Beard, Emmett, Washington, head wounds; Belfield, Richard, policeman, tear gas; Bradley, Allen, policeman, tear gas; Carhart, Lt. R. B. Fort Washington, hand burned; Chief Mountain Heart, veteran, head wounds; Christian, Detective William, 33, gas; Clark, Philip K., policeman, head wounds from bottles; Conley, Francis, Pennsylvania, veteran, gassed; Davis, William K., veteran, badly cut right eye; Elyord, Pvt. Harold C., of Troop F, Third Cavalry, severe cut on the head from brick; Fihelly, Detective Sergeant Arthur, cut

head; tear gas; Floyd, Robert N., policeman, head wounds from bricks; Green, Otto, Nashville, Tenn., saber cut on head and ear; Hardy, Ernest, Negro, 25, Washington, cuts and burns; Harrell, Wylie, 37, Reading, Pa., gas; Harmon, William, veteran, gas; Hartung, Samuel H., policeman, head wounds; Hellman, Sgt. John T., Fort Washington, hand burned; Hite, John O., policeman, cut with hatchet; Hoffman, Francis, Washington Times photographer, overcome by heat; Klotz, Dewey, Kansas City, veteran, gas and cut ear; Lay, Policeman Herman, 29, cuts; Liberty, Owen, 35, Negro, 220 Four and a Half Street SW., gas; McCoy, Bernard, Chicago, veteran, wounds from police clubs; Manning, William, Los Angeles, veteran, tear gas; Martina, Pvt. Albert, Fort Myer, hit by brick and knocked from horse; Mondy, William C., North Carolina, veteran, tear gas; Morris, Emmett, veteran, gassed; Morrow, George, Negro, 234 Second Street, gas; Morton, John O., San Angelo, Tex., head burned; Newton, Mrs. Elizabeth, wife of Dallas (Tex.) veteran, gas and run over by horse; Olson, John, Sacramento, Calif., veteran, head wounds; Price, Henry, policeman, body wounds from bricks; Pritchett, John W., policeman, gassed; Quick, Corp. Kermit, Fort Myer Cavalry, tear gas and brick injury to head; Sandberg, Robert, 42, New York, cuts, burns, and gas; Shinault, Policeman George, foot injury; Smith, Earl, Las Vegas, Nev., gassed; Walters, Harry, 14, Washington, saber cut; Winters, John E., policeman, head injury; Wyndom, John, Cleveland, veteran, head wounds; Williams, John, veteran, gassed; Znamenacek, Miles, policeman, struck on head by brick and badly mauled.

**DISPERSAL OF GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS—UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT**

**Mr. MCFARLAND.** Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield?

**Mr. MORSE.** I yield to the majority leader, with the understanding that I shall not lose the floor.

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER.** Without objection, it is so ordered.

**Mr. MCFARLAND.** I thank the distinguished Senator.

**Mr. President,** I ask unanimous consent that, beginning at 12 o'clock Monday, debate on the pending measure be limited to 1 hour, to be divided equally between proponents and opponents, the time of the proponents to be controlled by the senior Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND], and the time of the opponents by the distinguished minority leader or anyone he may designate; that the debate on any amendment or motion be limited to 40 minutes, to be divided in the same manner, except that the time would be controlled by the proponent of the amendment or motion, and the distinguished Senator from Florida, unless he favors the amendment or motion, in which event the time would be controlled by the distinguished minority leader; and that all amendments must be germane.

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER.** Is there objection to the request of the majority leader?

**Mr. WHERRY.** Reserving the right to object—and I shall not object—is the pending measure in such form so far as committee amendments are concerned that no question could be raised about amendments in the second degree?

**Mr. MCFARLAND.** It is.

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER.** There are numerous committee amendments lying on the desk.

**Mr. WHERRY.** Yes, but they can still be amended in the second degree, can they not?

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER.** Amendments can be offered after the committee amendments are disposed of, or amendments can be offered from the floor as amendments to the committee amendments.

**Mr. WHERRY.** I wanted to have it understood that amendments can be offered in the second degree. So there is no question about the usual procedure being followed in amending the bill, is there?

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER.** Each of the committee amendments is an amendment in the first degree, and would be subject to amendment in the second degree.

**Mr. WHERRY.** That is correct. Mr. President, I was about to offer a suggestion to the majority leader, regarding committee amendments. I do not see the Senator from Florida on the floor at the moment, though he has been here all afternoon, and has worked industriously. I am wondering whether the time limit should not be 1 hour on each amendment, or at least on committee amendments, with 30 minutes to a side. I make the suggestion, not because I am particularly anxious about it, but because I think perhaps it would be advisable.

**Mr. MCFARLAND.** There are several committee amendments. I do not believe I shall object to what he suggests, if I understood. Does the Senator suggest that the time be limited to 30 minutes on each committee amendment, 15 minutes on a side?

**Mr. WHERRY.** I think I shall withdraw the request, if the Senator does not mind, and leave it as suggested by the majority leader, namely, 40 minutes on each amendment, 20 minutes to a side. I think that is a better understanding.

**Mr. MCFARLAND.** Very well.

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER.** Is there objection to the request of the majority leader? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The unanimous-consent agreement, as reduced to writing, is as follows:

*Ordered,* That beginning at the hour of 12 o'clock noon on the calendar day of Monday, April 23, 1951, debate upon any amendment or motion (including appeals) that may be pending or that may be proposed to the bill (S. 218) to authorize a program to provide for the construction of Federal buildings outside of but in the vicinity of, and accessible to the District of Columbia, and for other purposes, shall be limited to not exceeding 40 minutes, to be equally divided and controlled, respectively, by the mover of any such amendment or motion and Mr. HOLLAND: *Provided, however,* That in the event any such amendment or motion is favored by Mr. HOLLAND, the time in opposition thereto shall be controlled by Mr. WHERRY: *Provided further,* That no amendment or motion that is not germane to the subject matter of the said bill shall be received.

*Ordered further,* That after the disposition of all amendments or motions that may be proposed, debate on the bill itself shall be limited to not exceeding 1 hour, to be equally divided between those favoring and those opposed thereto and controlled, respectively,

by Mr. HOLLAND and Mr. WHERRY or by anyone the latter may designate.

**LABOR DISPUTES DURING THE DEFENSE MOBILIZATION PROGRAM**

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I desire to make a few brief comments on a matter which occurred yesterday, which I think is of great significance in connection with the defense mobilization program. Although the Nation seems to be somewhat agog in these days over the issue of MacArthur's dismissal, it is rather pleasing to know that the various agencies of government which have the responsibility of proceeding with the development of an effective mobilization program for the defense of the Nation have been working arduously in seeking to accomplish that end, while the rest of the country is concerning itself primarily with the MacArthur issue. I refer to the action which was taken yesterday by the Mobilization Policy Advisory Board in adopting recommendations for the handling of labor disputes during the mobilization period, recommendations in the form of a resolution which I shall shortly read, which was adopted by a vote of 12 to 4.

Mr. President, I think it is very fortunate for the defense mobilization program that yesterday the Mobilization Policy Advisory Board succeeded in breaking the deadlock which has held up the work of the Board for some time past because of the inability on the part of its members to reach an agreement in regard to the procedure which should be followed during the emergency for the handling of labor disputes in defense plants. The press today carries the story that an agreement was reached by a vote of 12 to 4, with the representatives of labor, of agriculture, and of the public members agreeing, and the representatives of industry dissenting, in respect to a procedure which they recommended to the President should be followed in the period of emergency in defense plants in which disputes arise between labor and management.

I have before me a news release which seems to be a very fair summary of the press stories that appeared in newspapers generally. It is a report from a news letter entitled "Daily Labor Report," and reads as follows:

The Mobilization Policy Advisory Board, industry members dissenting, votes 12 to 4 to recommend that President Truman reconstitute the Wage Stabilization Board as a tripartite agency with limited authority over labor disputes. The recommendations are almost identical to the proposal submitted to industry members of the Board last week by its labor members—which almost was accepted at that time, and was voted against April 17 in response to the objections of employers and their organizations.

If, as he is expected to do quickly, President Truman follows these recommendations, the new WSB will consist of 18 members—6 public, 6 labor, and 6 industry. The Board will recommend solutions for disputes submitted by the parties or certified by the President (when in his opinion they substantially threaten the progress of national defense), and will hand down binding decisions in cases where the parties agree in advance to be bound by such decisions.

Management spokesmen wonder how the recommendations can be put into effect under the Defense Production Act. This requires a labor-management conference to set up a disputes-handling agency, and the conference is supposed to agree on the terms. This wonder got immediate voice from William H. Ruffin, president of the National Association of Manufacturers. If no answer is forthcoming earlier, it may be that the proposed Board's jurisdiction would be challenged with certification of a dispute involving nonwage issues.

Mr. President, I think it is fitting, before I make further comment on the action of the Mobilization Policy Advisory Board, to read into the RECORD at this point the exact terms of the recommendations which were adopted yesterday by a majority of the Board, by a vote of 12 to 4. This is the official text of the recommendations which the Board has sent to the President of the United States:

1. The Wage Stabilization Board shall be reconstituted as an 18-man tripartite Board with six representing the public, six representing management, and six representing labor.

2. The reconstituted Wage Stabilization Board shall be empowered to assume jurisdiction of any labor dispute which is not resolved by collective bargaining or by the prior full use of conciliation and mediation facilities and which threatens an interruption of work affecting the national defense where:

(i) The parties to any such dispute jointly agree to submit such dispute to the Board, or

(ii) The President is of the opinion that the dispute is of a character which substantially threatens the progress of national defense and certifies such dispute to the Board.

3. In any such case certified to the Board by the President or in any such case where the parties jointly agree to submit the case to the Board for their recommendations, the Board shall investigate and inquire into the issues in dispute and promptly report to the President thereon with their recommendations to the parties as to fair and equitable terms of settlement.

4. In any such case where the parties jointly agree to be bound by the decision of the Board, the Board shall render a decision on the issues in dispute which decision shall be binding on the parties.

Mr. President, I desire now to make a few brief comments upon the significance of these recommendations, by way of interpretation, because I sincerely hope the President of the United States will without delay accept the recommendations of his Mobilization Policy Board.

I believe I am correctly informed when I tell the Senate that this is another matter which was thoroughly discussed by the Mobilization Policy Advisory Board, consisting of representatives of agriculture, of industry, of labor, and of the public, and that it was agreed to by the representatives of agriculture, labor, and the public that the same procedure must be put into operation for the handling of the disputes which arise in so-called defense plants. It is a procedure which will permit of a very quick investigation of the facts and report of the facts, and will supply the parties with a tribunal to which they can voluntarily submit their case for adjudication, in the form of what amounts, in fact, to voluntary arbitration.

Mr. President, if we are going to have the unity on the home front which is so essential, if we are to have a successful prosecution of the defense program, which is so vital to the security of the Nation, then I say without reservation that some such procedure as was agreed upon by the majority of the Mobilization Advisory Policy Board yesterday should be put into effect without further delay.

I happen to be one who has been critical of the fact that already there has been too great a delay on the part of the administration in establishing a procedure for the handling of labor disputes during this emergency. I think the Senate will permit me to say that in regard to this matter I speak with some experience, because during World War II I served as a public member of the War Labor Board, and a great many of the same problems which confronted the country in the field of labor-management relations in December 1941 exist today, without adequate procedure for a quick handling of the disputes—and I emphasize the word "quick."

It was in January 1942 that the War Labor Board was created by a Presidential Executive order, and we need to face the fact that now, as in December 1941 and January 1942, labor finds itself in a position where it is not free.

Incidentally, I am one who believes it should not consider itself free to make use of its economic weapon of a strike. I think it would be unconscionable for labor to call a strike in a defense plant. As I have said to labor on many occasions, and sometimes in formal written decisions when I have been in position to pass judgment through adjudication of the merits of a labor dispute, in a time of great national emergency, such as is this defense period, in time of war—and I happen to be one who believes that we are in a war at the present time, to a certain degree—labor cannot justify the use of the strike weapon. In my opinion, it cannot now justify its use in any defense plant.

Mr. President, the American people must recognize that fairness and industrial peace make it exceedingly important that there be constituted a procedure for the quick adjudication of disputes arising in defense plants, if labor is to be expected to abide by what I consider to be its moral and ethical obligation not to resort to a strike. I am very much disappointed by the attitude of industry, although I am accustomed to such attitude on the part of the industry, because I noted many times in the early days of the War Labor Board that industry was reluctant to give up certain procedural advantages which accrued to it in the handling of labor disputes as a result of an emergency situation, which placed automatically upon labor the moral obligation not to resort to economic force.

So I say that although I am not surprised at the position which the industry members took yesterday, I am greatly disappointed with their position. I thought they had learned something from World War II. I thought the representatives of American industry

had come to recognize that fair play on the part of both sides to a labor dispute in a time of emergency and fair play in relation to the public were a part of their patriotic obligation. I am at a loss to understand why representatives of industry on the board cannot see that common fair play calls for agreement on a procedure which would permit of a quick adjudication of a labor dispute arising within a defense plant.

I consider the procedure agreed upon yesterday to be fair. There are many things about it which recommend themselves to me. It permits of a maximum retention of voluntariness in the settlement of labor disputes in defense plants during an emergency period, if both industry and labor will measure up to what appears to me to be the clear public responsibility of agreeing to a very simple principle, namely, that neither labor nor industry can justify during an emergency period taking refuge in legal technicalities or in economic action to stall a quick settlement of a labor dispute arising in a defense plant.

Mr. President, let me point out what I consider to be some of the significant features of the procedure provided for in the recommendations.

First is the provision that the so-called dispute board shall be tripartite in nature and shall consist of 18 members, 6 representing industry, 6 representing labor, and 6 representing the public. I do not intend today, although I may at a later time, to enter upon a lengthy discussion of the strengths and weaknesses—for there are some weaknesses—of the tripartite system. Advantages to all parties concerned, including the public, are to be found in a tripartite system. I would hastily mention only one of the weaknesses of the system. It became apparent a few times during World War II, when there seemed to develop collusion between industrial members and labor members with respect to some principle which the public members wished to invoke in behalf of the public as a fair and proper basis for the settlement of a dispute. We settled it by working out a gentleman's understanding among ourselves to the effect that each member of the Board would cast his vote on the basis of the merits of a dispute, in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence, in his capacity as a quasi-judicial officer on the Board, not in his capacity as one who had somewhat of a partisan economic background, which he might be considered to represent on the Board. Therefore, by and large I think the advantages of a tripartite system far outweigh some of the weaknesses and disadvantages which I admit it may contain, but which our experience in World War II on the War Labor Board clearly demonstrated, in my opinion, did not seriously interfere with the doing of substantial justice and equity in the cases which came before us.

In the second place, it is to be noted that the recommendation provides that "the Wage Stabilization Board shall be empowered to assume jurisdiction of any labor dispute which is not resolved by collective bargaining or by the prior full

use of conciliation and mediation facilities, and which threatens an interruption of work affecting the national defense." As a lawyer, it is my opinion that that is very important language in the resolution. It sets forth the framework or the terms of reference within which the jurisdiction of the Board is to rest. It makes very clear the expression of intent on the part of the parties. The Wage Stabilization Board shall be empowered to assume jurisdiction in any labor dispute involving, of course, a national defense plant, when there has been a breakdown in collective bargaining, conciliation, and mediation. In other words, the language of the recommendation, as I interpret it—and I do not believe a court would interpret it any other way—makes clear that the first responsibility of the parties is to exhaust collective bargaining, conciliation, and mediation before there can be any certification of a dispute to the Board. That is of great importance, Mr. President, because there is one thing that needs to be watched out for in instituting such a procedure as this, and that is that one or both of the parties to the dispute do not make a practice of substituting a proceeding before the Board for free collective bargaining, conciliation, and mediation. In other words, the members of the board made clear yesterday their intent, and I look upon their recommendation as a pledge, and I believe that if the recommendation is approved by the President of the United States, he has the right to look upon this language as setting forth a pledge on the part of the parties to a dispute that they will first exhaust collective bargaining, conciliation, and mediation before a case is referred to the Board for adjudication.

Furthermore, this paragraph in the recommendations makes it clear that the parties recognize the importance of carrying out their responsibility by attempting, through voluntary negotiations on their part, to settle disputes without a subsequent decision by the Government, and that only after voluntarism has failed, do they intend under this recommendation to seek adjudication by the Wage Stabilization Board.

Next, I point out that the language makes it clear that a case will not be referred to the Board unless the parties to the dispute "jointly agree to submit such dispute to the Board." In other words, save and except for the provisions which follow, what this language in the recommendations says to the President of the United States is, "We do not agree that a dispute should be submitted to the Board for determination, or that either party should ask to have a dispute submitted to the Board for determination, unless both parties voluntarily agree to submit the dispute to the Board for determination."

What does that mean as a matter of law? In my opinion, all that provision of the recommendations means is that the parties agree that there should be set up, through the Wage Stabilization Board, a system of voluntary arbitration for the settlement of disputes which arise in national defense plants. Not only do I believe that that principle is

salutary, but I believe it should recommend itself to the American public. Senators would be surprised how important the matter of procedure and machinery for the settlement of labor disputes really is. They would be surprised to know how long it sometimes takes to get the parties to reach any agreement or understanding as to the procedure which is to be followed, including voluntary arbitration, for the settlement of the dispute.

But under this recommendation, Mr. President, with respect to disputes arising in defense plants, we have a pledge that the parties will give consideration to the procedure of voluntary arbitration; and when they jointly agree to voluntary arbitration through the Wage Stabilization Board, or through arbitrators to be appointed by the Wage Stabilization Board—and I am of the opinion that such procedure will develop—a dispute can be submitted to the Wage Stabilization Board voluntarily for final disposition.

I wish to commend that language in the recommendations and again draw upon the experience of the War Labor Board. It would be difficult even to guess the number of cases which were referred to voluntary arbitration during World War II, under the sponsorship and direction of the War Labor Board. However, there were a great many such cases. For the most part, during the war the public heard about the few cases in which difficulty developed in their settlement. But it did not hear very much about the scores upon scores of cases which were settled peacefully and voluntarily through the peaceful procedures of conciliation, mediation, and, in many instances, voluntary arbitration.

So it is my interpretation that the particular section of the recommendations to which I am now addressing myself, namely, "that the parties to any such dispute jointly agree to submit such dispute to the Board," is really a provision for the voluntary arbitration of the dispute, upon the joint agreement of the parties.

It is to be noted that it does not involve compulsory jurisdiction. It does not involve a situation in which one of the parties can say to the Board, "We ask for the Board's services as a voluntary arbitrator of the dispute," and then have the Board order the other party to participate in the arbitration. I hope that we will not have to come to that in this emergency. We had to come to it in World War II. There were cases in which either labor or the employers in a case refused to participate in voluntary arbitration. We then had to order, as a decision of the Board, compulsory arbitration of the dispute in the interest of the successful prosecution of the war.

Sometimes one of the parties wanted such an order for its own reasons; and the reasons varied. Sometimes the union representative wanted to be in a position where he could go back to his union and say, in effect, "I did the best I could to keep this case out of arbitration, but the Board has ordered us into arbitration, and I think we had better comply with the order." I shall say

something in a moment about what happened when they did not comply with the order.

Sometimes an employer would very frankly say to those of us on the public side of the Board, "The war is going to be over some time. I have always opposed arbitration in the operation of my plant, and I am thinking ahead about the labor relations I am going to have after the war. I do not want to find myself in a position where the union negotiators can say, 'But, Mr. X, in 1943, you agreed to arbitrate a case that was before the War Labor Board.'" So the employer would say to us, "Of course, if you gentlemen order it, there is nothing I can do so far as my patriotic obligations are concerned but to comply. I do not like it. I will protest a bit, but I will comply."

I mention that because the notion seems to be abroad in some quarters that in some of the decisions which the War Labor Board handed down imposing compulsory arbitration either upon a union or upon an employer, it did so over the adamant opposition of the party who, on the record, was objecting to arbitration. That often was not the case. It sometimes was the case. I recall the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad case, in which the president of the railroad refused to arbitrate under any circumstances whatsoever. The decision of the Board was unanimous. In fact, I well recall that one of the strongest opinions written in that decision was by that great industrial statesman Roger Lapham, then representing the American-Hawaiian Steamship Co. as its president, but serving on the Board as a representative of industry during the war. He wrote an exceedingly strong opinion in the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad case, leaving no room for doubt that the industry members of the board, in behalf of the successful prosecution of the war effort, considered it to be the duty of the president of that railroad to arbitrate the dispute in accordance with the unanimous decision of the Board. When he refused, the case, of course, had to go to the White House for enforcement, and I well remember that it was one of our early enforcement cases which resulted finally in the seizure of the railroad and its operation by the Government for, as I recall, the duration of the war.

Mr. President, I say I hope we can avoid the establishment of a procedure that will finally result in the Government having to say to any union or to any employer, "In the interest of the defense effort, you must arbitrate the case." I am glad to see that the recommendation which was adopted yesterday by the Mobilization Advisory Board, and which has gone to the President for his action, does not include within it a provision for compulsory arbitration save and except in respect to the next clause which I shall discuss in a moment. But so far as the parties are concerned, their pledge, as I interpret the recommendation, is that unless both parties agree to a final determination of the dispute by the Wage Stabilization Board, the Wage Stabilization Board, on its own initiative, is not empowered to take jurisdiction.

Let me dwell for a moment, Mr. President, on that jurisdictional point because the recommendation, as I interpret it, requires that we keep in mind two definite, distinct, and separate jurisdictions encompassed within its language. The portion of the resolution which I have just discussed contains the language which deals with the agreement between the parties as to the jurisdiction of the Board over disputes which arise and which the parties jointly and voluntarily submit to the Board for adjudication. As to the question of jurisdiction the Board has no authority to initiate a mandatory jurisdiction over the dispute. Its powers to adjudicate the dispute depend upon the voluntary and joint action of the disputants based upon their submitting the case to the Board for jurisdiction. In other words, it is a very simple provision whereby the parties agree that the Board shall act as a voluntary arbitration tribunal when the parties jointly submit the matter to the Board for arbitration.

There is another jurisdictional provision in the recommendations, agreed upon yesterday by the vote of 12 to 4, which is of great significance. I assume it is this jurisdictional provision which has caused the employer members, the industry members of the Board, to make the reservations which they apparently have made to the recommendation by their refusal to vote for it yesterday. I refer to the provision that the case will go to the Board when the President is of the opinion that the dispute is of a character which substantially threatens the progress of national defense, and certifies such dispute to the Board.

As I said earlier in my remarks, apparently Mr. Ruffin, president of the National Association of Manufacturers, is of the opinion that before such a provision can be imposed upon industry, the Defense Production Act, section 5 thereof, requires a labor-management conference to constitute a disputes-handling agency, and the conference is supposed to agree on the terms. The article I read states that apparently it is going to be the position of the industry members that they may challenge the jurisdiction of the Board if the President approves this recommendation in the first dispute case not involving wages that is certified by the President to the Board.

That raises the question, Mr. President, of the power of the President of the United States to certify to the Board a labor dispute involving a national-defense plant, when such a dispute interferes with the defense program. I would say to my friends in industry that, as a matter of law, I think the President by way of an Executive order has the authority and power in time of national emergency to certify to the Wage Stabilization Board for adjudication a dispute which threatens the security of the Nation.

I do not intend this afternoon to enter upon a prolonged technical discussion of the many decisions on the war powers of the President, but this particular legal field of jurisdictional power has been pretty thoroughly plowed and har-

rowed over the years. We had an identical problem in World War II, because the War Labor Board itself was created by Executive order, not by legislative act. It functioned for a long time under Executive order. It required the parties in some instances to accept what amounted to compulsory arbitration by way of Executive order, because once the Board handed down a decision that the parties should submit their dispute to arbitration, and one party refused so to do, and the President then issued an enforcement order, it was in the form of an Executive order. So I would say that in my opinion the President has the power by Executive order to certify a dispute to the Board if he makes the finding the recommendation calls upon him to make, namely, that the dispute is of a character which substantially threatens the progress of national defense and certifies such dispute to the Board.

Mr. President, woe unto our country if the President did not exercise such power. In this period of great emergency we simply cannot permit either labor or industry to take the position that a dispute which threatens the defense effort shall not be quickly decided by a fair procedure under which judgment can be rendered on the basis of the evidence, in accordance with the merits, which the parties submit to the Board.

I know the power is a very broad one. I once said, in a decision, that it is an awful power, in the true sense of the dictionary meaning of the word "awful." Yet it is a power which I say must be exercised and should be exercised by any President of the United States, be he Democrat or Republican, if the facts in a given case meet the terms and conditions of this particular language of the recommendation which was adopted yesterday.

Let me say to my friends in American industry that I hope they will not use the present condition of disunity within the public of America as a basis or an opportunity to resort to legal technicalities now, in defiance of or in challenge to the right of the President to certify a case to the Board if the President—as I hope he will—approves and adopts, by way of official proclamation, the recommendations which were agreed to yesterday.

However, if industry desires to do that, we shall have to cross that bridge when we reach it and shall have to take appropriate action.

Let me also say to industry that the recommendations in no way prevent the calling of a labor-management conference, and I hope one will be called. But I am interested now in what we are going to do with labor disputes presently pending, which are beginning to have serious repercussions on the national economy and on the defense program. To meet that emergency, I sincerely hope the President will affix his signature of approval to the recommendations, and will call upon both labor and industry to perform what I believe to be their clear, patriotic obligation in fulfilling the terms and conditions of the recommendations.

Mr. President, it would be a mistake for anyone to get the notion that this particular provision of the recommendations—namely, that the case shall be submitted to the Board by the President on certification, when "the President is of the opinion that the dispute is of a character which substantially threatens the progress of the national defense," and certifies such dispute to the Board—will result in the certification to the Board of a great many disputes.

One would think that during World War II a great many disputes would have been submitted to the Board by way of enforcement orders on the part of the President, after the Board had rendered a decision on the merits. Yet, very few, comparatively, were submitted. Many hundreds of disputes were settled during the war. Mind you, Mr. President, the work of the Board became very acceptable to both industry and labor, although, of course, I do not mean that there were not many persons in both industry and labor who had many reservations about the Board's work. But the generally fair basis on which the Board operated became so acceptable during World War II that it became necessary to constitute, as I recall, approximately 12 regional boards, which in turn handled a great many cases; in fact, several hundred cases, during the period. In all those hundreds of cases there were very few so-called enforcement cases, very few cases in which the President had to resort to the strong arm, so to speak, and had to use his powers as Commander in Chief to require enforcement or subject the recalcitrant parties to whatever forces of Government were necessary to be imposed in order to compel compliance. So I say that I am not at all moved or disturbed by the early protests one is hearing from some segments of industry to the effect that this section of the recommendations will give the President too much power.

How long this emergency will last, I do not know; but no doubt it will last longer than most of us like to believe it will. No matter who may be in the White House during this period of emergency, be he a Democrat or a Republican, I want him to exercise the power called for in this section of the recommendations, with such checks as we shall be perfectly free as a legislative body to impose, as I have argued in recent weeks on the floor of the Senate, in order to see to it that the defense program goes ahead without the delay and the interference which characterize a labor dispute which is long delayed.

I repeat that we need a procedure for the quick settlement of labor disputes.

I also repeat that I would that a national labor-management conference would be called. I would have placed on such a conference some representation in addition to the representation of management and labor. I would add to it the type of representation on the Mobilization Policy Advisory Board, which includes agricultural representatives, who yesterday voted for the procedure I have been discussing. I would also add some representatives of consumer groups, as well as representatives of so-

called over-all public groups. We need that kind of a procedure now. I have a hunch and an expectation that if we put this program into operation, characterized, as it is, by a maximum amount of voluntarism, a final stamp of approval will be placed on it by an overwhelming majority vote in any general labor-management-agriculture-consumer conference that may be called.

The next paragraph of the recommendations is that—

In any such case certified to the Board by the President or in any such case where the parties jointly agree to submit the case to the Board for their recommendations, the Board shall investigate and inquire into the issues in dispute and promptly report to the President thereon with their recommendations to the parties as to fair and equitable terms of settlement.

Mr. President, that provision constitutes much less compulsion than was exercised by the War Labor Board during World War II, for, in the last analysis, during World War II the War Labor Board became a compulsory arbitration board. There can be no question about that. Every time a case was taken to the President for enforcement, that was compulsion, and the request then made was that the decision of the Board be enforced by the Government.

Mr. President, I dare say some leaders of industry who have already commented upon the action of yesterday have not noted carefully enough the point that in those instances in which a case is certified to the Board by the President because the President believes it to be of sufficient importance in view of its effect upon the defense effort, the Board does not proceed to sit as a compulsory arbitration tribunal. I believe the meaning in law of the language employed is that the Board shall function as a fact-finding board, but a fact-finding board, with the obligation to make recommendations for a fair settlement of the dispute.

To whom does the Board make its recommendations? It makes them to the President. If that does not afford protection in the situation presented by assuring the maximum amount of voluntarism, then I do not know what language could be used which would bring about that result.

We have been pretty much in agreement in the recent past that the President has the authority to appoint fact-finding boards in disputes which involve national emergencies, even when we have not been engaged in the defense effort. For example, I recall in the New York Times of July 13, 1949, a story dealing with the President's appointment of a Board to make recommendations for the settlement of the steel strike. It will be recalled that in that case many persons challenged the authority of the President when he appointed a fact-finding board, saying, "There is no statute on which he can base it; he does not have that executive power." Some of us argued to the contrary, because we held to the point of view that in such a national emergency the President of the United States had the power to proceed to act, with the reserved right of the Congress to take its

own action in the premises by providing a legislative mandate in accordance with which the President must act, once the legislative mandate went on the books. Some of us who took that position had some very able associates who shared that point of view with us, but with certain reservations, because the New York Times story of July 13, 1949, stated what the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] had to say about the appointment of the fact-finding board in the steel case. I read from the article:

"The President has a perfect right," said Senator TAFT, "to appoint a fact-finding board if he wants to, but I think it is doubtful as to whether it is wise to do so at the present time. I think maybe the President ought to appeal to both sides to make a further attempt to settle things."

Mr. President, in the recommendations which were adopted yesterday by the Mobilization Policy Advisory Board, it seems to me that adequate provision was made for exhausting all the voluntary peaceful procedures of collective bargaining, conciliation, mediation, and voluntary arbitration, for when those peaceful procedures fail, the President shall then certify the case to the Board, if in his opinion it is a case which warrants being certified because of his interference with the defense effort; and, once certified, the Board shall then hear the parties, make findings of fact as to the causes of the dispute and the evidence existing in relation to it, and then make recommendations to the President of a fair and equitable basis of settlement. That is what the recommendations of the Board provide. I think that is exceedingly fair and exceedingly proper, and it will be a matter of great regret to me if leaders of industry generally, upon reflection, quarrel with that kind of procedure.

The last recommendation is:

In any such case where the parties jointly agree to be bound by the decision of the Board, the Board shall render a decision on the issues in dispute, which decision shall be binding on the parties.

In other words, even in cases where the President has certified a case to the Board because, in his opinion, the dispute threatens the defense effort, the parties can at that stage of the dispute voluntarily agree that the Board, in hearing a certified case, shall render a decision in the dispute, which will be binding upon the disputants.

That simply sets forth a well-established legal pattern of arbitration, and I assume that it is put in the recommendations so that if such an agreement is reached by the parties, their agreement will then be subject to reference to the courts, if either party refuses to abide by his agreement to accept as final and binding the decision of the Board.

It is true that the recommendations do not provide what the President shall do if either party or both should refuse to agree to the Board's findings of fact and recommendations, after a case has been certified and the Board has made its finding of fact and its recommendations to the President for a fair and equitable settlement of the case. Some-



times there is a case in which both parties do not want to accept the recommendations. I assume that if there were such a refusal we should then be confronted by a situation in which the President would have to resort to what I consider to be his basic Presidential powers, so far as war powers are concerned in time of emergency, first to try to persuade the parties to accept the recommendations of the Board, or to accept such modifications of the recommendations of the Board as the President himself might think fair and proper; and, persuasion failing, then resort could be had to any one of a variety of procedures which would be open, including, for example, recommendations to the Congress of specific legislation for handling the case. So I think that the recommendations which were adopted yesterday by the Mobilization Policy Advisory Board were very reasonable, very fair in the procedure indicated, and very desirable, because it is very important, in my view, that we bring to an end the bitter unrest which has developed within certain industries because of a failure up to this time to bring about quick adjudications of the disputes which have arisen in industries.

If we have learned any lesson from World War II in the handling of labor disputes, we certainly learned that a quick decision is the important thing. During that war we heard parties litigant say, "Whatever you do, please give us a quick decision; let us get this behind us."

Here is a procedure which will permit of a quick decision. I do not want to see our Nation go into a world war with the possibility that greater disunity will be created because of the development of an unnecessary conflict between labor on one side and management on the other, resulting in engendering bitter feeling between not only labor and management, but between the public and labor.

Let us be realistic. Labor is always at a great disadvantage during an emergency, so far as protecting its economic rights may be concerned, because it is not and should not be free to strike, and during an emergency period the Government has a perfect right to ask labor to forego the right to strike. As I have previously said on the floor of the Senate and elsewhere, labor has no absolute right to strike; it has only a relative right. It has a right which must be exercised in relation to the public interest; and in an emergency period the public interest is so far superior to any relative right on the part of labor to exercise economic force that I have been one who over the years has held, in decisions, that labor has no absolute right to strike when the use of the strike weapon jeopardizes the public welfare.

The public, and the Government representing the public as a whole, also have a responsibility—the basic responsibility of being fair in the procedure established for settling labor disputes during an emergency. If we are going to call upon labor, as we have the right to do, to forego economic action in the

settlement of disputes, then, in all fairness, we have the duty to establish a method for the settling of disputes during the war period quickly and immediately, by such a procedure as the representatives of agriculture, of labor, and of the public agreed to yesterday by a vote of 12 to 4, with industry members dissenting.

One word in conclusion, Mr. President, in regard to an argument which is being used by some members of industry in opposition to the recommendations adopted. It is said that in many respects they set aside the Taft-Hartley Act for the duration of the emergency. That is an old, bewhiskered argument. How many times we heard a similar argument during World War II from both sides of the economic table, sometimes from labor, when labor thought that the long procedures of the Wagner Act would be favorable to them, and sometimes from employers who, although not enthusiastic about the Wagner Act, were eager to get a delay in the handling of their case, which the Wagner Act would give them, and who argued that the jurisdiction of the Board took away the rights of the parties under the Wagner Act.

They were not sustained in that position by any tribunal in the country. During the emergency the position was taken that the Government had the right to provide a fair procedure for handling disputes which involved the war effort. I do not think the members of industry will be sustained in their argument in connection with the Taft-Hartley Act, because their rights under the Taft-Hartley Act will be preserved. The courts will be open to them, as they found them to be during World War II. The courts were open to them, so far as any rights they had under the Wagner Act were concerned.

Regarding the resort to the long legal procedures of the Taft-Hartley Act. I submit the Government has the right and the duty to provide for some such procedure as is provided in the recommendations for an immediate and a quick settlement of a labor dispute arising in a national defense plant, when such dispute is interfering with the defense effort.

What is the alternative? We will not help the defense effort, we will not serve national unity well, if we take the position that labor, on the one hand, must not be allowed to strike, but that employers, on the other hand, can take advantage of labor by resorting to all the legal technicalities and delays of the Taft-Hartley Act, requiring not only months, but, in some instances, 2 or 3 years, for final adjudication before a settlement in the case can be reached.

No, Mr. President, I would not take away from the parties their right to exhaust their legal remedies under the Taft-Hartley Act, but I would say to American industry and to American labor, "You have a patriotic duty to agree to a fair procedure for the settlement of disputes arising in national defense plants during this emergency period, without resort to the strike or to the lock-out, or to any other form of economic action, and without seek-

ing to hide behind a barricade of legal technicalities which permit a delay in the adjudication of your dispute."

So, Mr. President, I close with an appeal to the President to approve the recommendations at the earliest possible date and with an appeal to American industry and labor to live up to what I think is their clear patriotic obligation, to carry out the fair provisions of the recommendations for the settlement of labor disputes in national defense plants during the emergency period.

#### A FRAUDULENT LETTER—ARTICLE FROM THE NEW YORK JOURNAL-AMERICAN

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD an article entitled "A Fraudulent Letter," which appeared on page 1 of the New York Journal-American of April 8, 1951.

On March 14, 1951, Hon. THOMAS A. JENKINS, a Member of the House of Representatives from Ohio, inserted in the Appendix of the RECORD, under the heading "Roosevelt traded American interest to please Stalin," a story from the New York Journal-American of March 11, 1951, which appeared in the daily RECORD of March 16, 1951, at page A1543.

The article from the April 8 issue of the New York Journal-American has to do with a letter represented to have been sent by Franklin D. Roosevelt to Jacob Zabronsky, president of the National Council of Young Israel. Under the headline "A fraudulent letter," the Journal-American states that it has made an investigation and has found the letter to be a fabrication and a fraud. I think it is a good thing to print this explanatory article in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### A FRAUDULENT LETTER

On March 11 and the two following days, this newspaper published the so-called Figaro letters.

The matter published by us comprises a letter represented to have been sent by Franklin D. Roosevelt to Jacob Zabronsky, president of the National Council of Young Israel, and correspondence between the American Ambassador to Madrid, Mr. Carlton F. J. Hayes, and the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs.

They are contained in the memoirs of a high Spanish official, presently acting as Spanish Ambassador to Chile. These memoirs were published in 1949, and in February, 1951, they appeared in *Le Figaro*, conservative and responsible Paris newspaper.

In explanation, not as an excuse, we wish to state that this newspaper did not question the authenticity of the letters, since authenticity had not been denied for a year and a half after their first appearance, and after two publications.

A thorough investigation indicates that the Hayes correspondence is authentic and that the Roosevelt letter is a fraud, and this newspaper denounces it as such.

We regret its publication and caution all against believing it or using it or excerpts from it for any purpose whatsoever. It appears to have been constructed for German wartime propaganda purposes.

It goes without saying that this newspaper did not intend to cast the suspicion of Communist sympathies at the National Council of Young Israel or its officials.

That such an inference could be drawn, we sincerely regret. That such an inference has been drawn, we deeply deplore, and we are glad for the opportunity to state publicly that we know the National Council of Young Israel to be a religious organization of the highest character, the very purpose of whose existence would make communism hateful to it.

Mr. McMAHON. I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point a statement on the same subject, released by the Department of State on March 12, 1951.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**AUTHENTICITY OF LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 20, 1943, PURPORTEDLY WRITTEN BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF YOUNG ISRAEL**

The only reference to that document in the files of the Department prior to the recent reports from Embassy Paris was that contained in despatch No. 694, May 26, 1950, from Embassy Madrid. The subject of that despatch was *Espana tenia razón, 1939-45* (Madrid, 1949, 1950), a justification of Spain's conduct during the past war, by José María Doussinague, former political director of the Spanish Foreign Ministry and presently Spanish Ambassador to Chile. The pertinent statement referred to a letter allegedly written by President Roosevelt to a Zionist Zabrinsky.

The alleged letter is not cut out of whole cloth but ingeniously fashioned from fact, half truth, rumor, and inaccuracy. The illusion of authenticity is created but fades under scrutiny. This is especially true of the final paragraph.

A. The facts bearing upon an award of the council to President Roosevelt and the celebration of its thirty-first anniversary are as follows:

1. In a letter of November 22, 1938, Jacob O. Zabrinsky, president of the National Council of Young Israel, informed President Roosevelt that constituent branches of the council had unanimously voted to present him with its second annual award and a copy of Israel's greatest treasure, the scroll of the Torah.<sup>1</sup> He requested the President to designate the time and place most convenient for him to accept the award.

2. President Roosevelt's acceptance of the award was communicated to Zabrinsky by Col. Marvin H. McIntyre, secretary to the President. McIntyre's letter was dated December 12, 1938. Arrangements for the formal presentation were to be made at a later date.

3. On December 14, 1938, Zabrinsky again wrote to the President. Gratefully acknowledging the President's willingness to accept the award, he sought a statement from Mr. Roosevelt, a statement to be included in a publication which would be issued at the dinner on January 29, 1939, commemorating the twenty-seventh anniversary of the National Council of Young Israel.

<sup>1</sup> Photostatic copies of correspondence between the White House and Zabrinsky were made available by Herman Kahn, director of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y. There are 53 pieces in the series, the first dated February 10, 1938, and the last November 8, 1944, none for 1943. These are all of a more or less ceremonial or routine nature. The report from the Roosevelt Library stated that the material there failed to reveal any such letter as that of February 20 or any indication of such a letter ever having been written.

4. Subsequently, an appropriate message from the President, dated December 20, 1938, was sent to Zabrinsky. Despite the changes that might occur in the process of several translations, there is a very striking similarity between the first three sentences of the December 20, 1938, document and the final paragraph of the alleged February 20, 1943, letter. (For a comparison, see C.)

5. Jacob O. Zabrinsky as president of the Council of Young Israel presented the second annual award and the scroll of the Torah to President Roosevelt at the White House, March 14, 1939.

6. The thirty-first anniversary dinner of the council was held on March 28, 1943, Hotel Waldorf Astoria, New York. The presiding officer was President J. David Delman, not Zabrinsky. On that occasion, Zabrinsky dedicated a service flag in honor of young Israelites in the Armed Forces and recited a prayer "for President Roosevelt, for all constituted officers of the United States, and for servicemen."<sup>2</sup>

7. Writing to President Roosevelt on November 1, 1944, Zabrinsky expressed his "heartfelt wishes for a double victory—the first at the polls on November 7, and the second on the battlefields of the world in the very near future." He recalled their meeting at the White House on March 14, 1939, and indicated that he had not seen the President since that date.

B. Other portions of the alleged letter suffer likewise under examination:

1. Visit of Timoshenko to the United States. A check of qualified sources in State and Defense Departments, and CIA failed to uncover any evidence that Marshal Timoshenko ever visited the United States before, during or after the war. In February 1943, however, rumors of a pending visit by Timoshenko to the United States had appeared in press and radio reports from North Africa, London, and New York. In his press conference of February 16, 1943, President Roosevelt simply laughed off the question. Tass News Agency denied all reports.<sup>3</sup>

It is known that, in January 1943 Marshal Timoshenko was in active command of Soviet forces in the north between Staraya Russia and Leningrad. He was credited with victories at Demyansk and in the Lake Ilmen region from February to June 1943.

2. Councils of Europe and Asia. It is a matter of published record that, in the spring and fall of 1943, President Roosevelt was emphatically opposed to the United States being a member of an independent regional group such as a council of Europe. He indicated this position to British Foreign Secretary Eden in a meeting at Washington, March 27, 1943; and again to Josef Stalin at the Tehran Conference, November 1943.<sup>4</sup>

All the United Nations, in the President's opinion, should be members of a world organization, under which there might be re-

<sup>2</sup> The Young Israel Viewpoint (April 1943), pp. 8-9; New York Times, March 29, 1943, p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> New York Times, February 14, 1943, p. 36; *ibid.*, February 15, p. 6; *ibid.*, February 22, p. 9; The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. XII (The Tide Turns), p. 95.

<sup>4</sup> Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins; an intimate history, pp. 717, 786. Prime Minister Churchill did discuss with President Inonu of Turkey at Adana, January 30, 1943, the idea of a postwar organization such as Councils of Europe and of Asia. He publicized the scheme in a speech of March 21, 1943. (Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 711 f. Onwards to Victory; war speeches of the Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, C. H., M. P., 1943, p. 36 f. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 700.)

gional councils also exercising only advisory powers. The real decisions would be made by the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China. This "four policemen" idea ties in with the world tetrarchy phrase of the alleged letter. In the latter, however, there is no mention of China. At the Tehran Conference, Stalin was reported to be doubtful as to the power of China when the war ended, and to feel that the small nations of Europe would take an unfavorable view of the "four policemen" concept, especially with China as one of them.<sup>5</sup>

3. Absorption of Baltic States by the Soviet Union: As late as March 14, 1943, when he discussed postwar geographical problems with Eden, President Roosevelt was averse to yielding unreservedly to any future Soviet demand for absorption of the Baltic States into the U. S. S. R. He felt that the United States would require another plebiscite as the 1939 was probably a fake. He agreed that pending a decision, close economic and military relations between those states and the Soviet Union were essential.<sup>6</sup>

4. Role of France in the postwar era: No evidence has been found as to what the President thought, in the spring of 1943, should be the role of France in the postwar period and world organization.

C. Similarity between certain portions of December 20, 1938, message from President Roosevelt to Zabrinsky and of alleged February 20, 1943, document.

1. December 20, 1938:

"I am deeply touched by the action of the National Council of Young Israel in presenting to me the second annual award of that organization. And I appreciate from the bottom of my heart the generous terms of your letter conveying to me your decision to present me with a copy of Israel's greatest treasure, the scroll of the Torah.

"Will you, therefore, please convey my thanks to the national council on the happy occasion of the banquet marking its twenty-seventh anniversary."

2. February 20, 1943:

"I noted with the greatest pleasure, as I said to you at the time, the generous terms of the document advising me of your decision, and the desire which you expressed of presenting to me, on behalf of the national council, a copy of that treasure which is the finest of Israel, the roll of the Torah. This letter is your proof of my acceptance; to the loyalty I respond with the greatest of confidence. Be good enough, I beg you, to convey my gratitude to the distinguished body over which you preside, recalling the happy occasion of the banquet on your thirty-first anniversary."

**AN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY BASED UPON ULTIMATE SECURITY AND WELFARE OF THIS NATION**

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, this Nation is in dire need of an American foreign policy, a policy based solely and completely upon the ultimate security and general welfare of the United States of America, with a full realization that sovereign nations do not have permanent friendships, but have only permanent interests.

Acts of vengeance and recrimination, vilification of individuals, or the bitterness of attack upon personalities will not save our country in this crisis. Nor will it safeguard the integrity and stature of America to make such a national issue a partisan quarrel between the Republican and Democratic Parties.

<sup>5</sup> Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 786.  
<sup>6</sup> Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 709, 715.

TIME AND VICTORY WILL DETERMINE WHO IS RIGHT

Victory alone will determine who was right in the strategy of the Korean War—Gen. Douglas MacArthur or Dean Acheson. What we say and do here will not undo the errors of policy and commission which will now run their course, even as the errors of Tehran and Yalta, are facing us now.

The dismissal from service of our greatest general, who has given 52 years of his long life to distinguished public service, must be discussed in an atmosphere as free from personalities and as far above party politics as is possible.

LOOK AT THE RECORD

Therefore, I implore the gentlemen of both parties to look at the record which discloses that what we were told was a mere police action under the United Nations has extended itself into war, in which already 10,000 Americans have been killed in a reported total of nearly 70,000 casualties.

I fear war by whatever name it is called. Stalin calls war, peace. That may be Russian humor; it need not be adopted by the United States, for our people have never regarded war with favor. It is surely nothing to joke about. War is war; peace is peace. The use of one term for another can only be propagandistic hairsplitting designed to confuse the people.

WHO ARE OUR FRIENDS?

Where are our friends? Where are our allies?

Is Great Britain our friend? Can we count upon Great Britain—when, as is now the case, she continues to sell machinery, rubber, tin, fuels, and munitions to those who kill our sons, and even British soldiers in Korea?

Can we trust Great Britain when, while she is associated with us in the Korean war, she encourages Soviet China to oppose our purposes in spirit?

Can we trust France and Italy which seem to have adopted an attitude of effective neutrality between the United States and Soviet Russia?

Can we trust the United Nations which denounces the very war in which, for the first time, its flag flies over soldiers fighting in the name of the United Nations?

Can we trust India which, while seeking our aid, acts as agent for Soviet China—and places embargoes on strategic metals which are essential to us?

ISOLATIONISM—RESULT OF FAULTY POLICIES

This question of an isolationism produced by faulty policies cannot be ignored if we are to pursue the national interest. It is necessary that we analyze our position. What has happened during the past 5 years that Canada, our most constant friend and closest neighbor, suddenly turns upon us with an announcement so strongly worded, in press dispatches, as to be a caution?

Mr. President, the present increasingly resentful attitude of many foreign nations should be a warning to the administration and to the American people that the senseless hybrid domestic and foreign policies and programs of the State Department are stripping this

Nation of its economic stability and of the respect of its neighbors.

SEPARATE ISSUES FROM MEN

These and other issues are inherent in the MacArthur controversy. If we separate the issues from the men, the issues stand like gigantic and frightening obscene figures, dwarfing the human engaged in dispute. The men may disappear; the issues remain to haunt us.

WHERE THE BLAME LIES IS CLEAR

The President now seems to recognize the seriousness of a step which he took lightly. For he is now blaming all the errors of the past 20 years on the Republican Party which he now describes as the war-mongering party.

This reversal of fact does not trouble him, although his very statements denounce his knowledge of history.

Again, let us look at the record:

First. The Republicans were not in power when the United States, a neutral, aided Great Britain, a belligerent, by the exchange of destroyers for bases, and by lend-lease, thus setting a precedent which Soviet Russia is employing against us in Korea. The rule that neutrals may engage in warlike acts without assuming belligerent responsibility was set by the United States, but those who implemented that act were not Republicans.

Second. The Republican Party did not direct World War II nor attend the international conferences.

Third. Members of the Republican Party were neither in the White House nor in the State Department at the time of the Tehran, Yalta, San Francisco, Paris, London, Potsdam, or Moscow conferences where the basis of our present misfortunes was laid.

Fourth. The Republican Party did not give Manchuria to Russia at Yalta after issuing the factually false three-power declaration.

Fifth. The Republican Party did not suppress the Wedemeyer report on China and Korea.

Sixth. The Republican Party did not order General MacArthur into Korea and then tie his hands behind his back, blindfold him, give him a targetless war, and then try to make him responsible for the stalemated war that caused 10,000 American lives and a total of nearly 70,000 casualties to date.

Seventh. The Republican Party did not adopt the policy of inflation through deficit financing—on the theory that a nation can only be prosperous by spending more than she can collect.

Eighth. The Republican Party did not adopt the policy of "free trade"—the program of dividing our markets with the nations of the world, of destroying our workmen and investors through sending their jobs to foreign soil.

Ninth. The Republican Party did not tie the domestic and foreign policies together, which the Constitution of the United States pointedly separates.

Tenth. The Republican Party did not adopt the policy of sending "foot soldiers" to Europe and Asia—their real fundamental problem is over-population—when the decision in the next war will probably be won through air power and submarine fleets.

Eleventh. The Republican Party did not surrender our foreign policy to the dictates of the British Colonial Empire system.

Twelfth. The Republican Party did not dismiss General MacArthur.

Thirteenth. The Republican Party did not recognize Soviet Russia in 1933.

Fourteenth. The Republican Party did not make the State Department subservient first to Soviet Russia during World War II—and then to Great Britain, becoming a satellite to protect the British colonial empire in the Far East, the Mediterranean area and on the African continent.

THE EFFECT OF THE FALL OF CHINA

We are witnessing the fall of China—while it is still in our power to prevent it.

If China falls under the complete control of Communist Russia it will mean Russian domination of Asia, and 100 years from now modern history will be dated from that world-shaking event.

Our people do not now realize the profound, far-reaching effect such an event will have on the world concentration of power, with the regrouping of nations and the complete change in the future economy and welfare of this country, and the effect upon our own lives.

When and if Asia falls under the domination of Russia, then Europe will fall as soon as Russia, then backed by the power of Asia, chooses to move.

We must have an American foreign policy if our American way of life is to survive.

NATIONS HAVE PERMANENT INTERESTS—NOT PERMANENT FRIENDSHIPS

It is a truism of history that successful nations cannot have permanent friendships; they have permanent interests.

This truism must be fully understood to realize the significance of George Washington's statement when he said that we should avoid permanent alliances with foreign powers.

History is strewn with the wreckage of so-called permanent treaties readily broken when the interests of either nation moved away from the terms of the treaty.

THE ULTIMATE SECURITY OF AMERICA

We should have an American policy, flexible as need be, based solely upon the ultimate security and welfare of this Nation.

Our great mistake has been to say that we are going to hold the world status quo, that wherever a fire starts we will put it out. A laudable ambition not only impracticable, but impossible of attainment.

SEVENTEEN MILLION SQUARE MILES—OVER A BILLION PEOPLE

With 17,000,000 square miles and over a billion people in Asia, we could not hold it. We could not occupy it, even if God handed it to us on a silver platter.

There are 7,000,000 square miles of China, with over 400,000,000 people. No one can occupy China. No one in his right mind is going to entertain the thought of trying.

ADMINISTRATION BUILT UP COMMUNIST CHINA

The program of building up Communist China in opposition to Nationalist

China started at Yalta when an ailing President advised by Alger Hiss, now serving a term in the penitentiary, turned over the harbors and transportation system in Manchuria to Soviet Russia. This meant giving Russia the control over the breadbasket of China, and it was done without China's consent, which we later forced her to give.

In 1946, General Marshall, now Secretary of National Defense, was sent to China to force Chiang Kai-shek to cooperate with the Communists. The general said he had discovered that they were "agrarian Communists." The State Department, through General Marshall, also forced Chiang Kai-shek to leave the pass unguarded into Manchuria above the Great Wall of China. The Communists went into China, armed themselves with the materials left there by the defeated Japanese and moved into Nationalist China.

This was, perhaps, the turning point of the war between the Nationalists and the Communists in China.

Since that time the Secretary of State has never rested, but has continually urged decisions and rulings in favor of Communist China, and announced openly as he did before the joint meeting of the two Houses of Congress, that the United States would not veto the admission of Communist China to the United Nations.

The way is now open for Red China's admission to that organization, and her recognition by the United States.

Jerry Greene, on April 6, 1951, said in the second of three articles for the New York Daily News on the United States' strength in the air compared with Russia's:

Latest intelligence reports indicate that Russia today has 25,000 operational aircraft in her armed services and of these 15,000 are in front-line units.

United States reports disclose that we have 3,200 combat planes in the Air Force and something less than that total in the Navy.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks the dispatch from the New York Daily News of Friday, April 6, 1951, entitled "Russians Have 25,000 Operational War Planes."

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### RUSSIANS HAVE 25,000 OPERATIONAL WAR PLANES

(By Jerry Greene)

(This is the second of three articles on the United States strength in the air compared with Russia's.)

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 5.—Latest intelligence reports indicate that Russia today has 25,000 operational aircraft in her armed services and of these 15,000 are in front-line units.

If these figures are correct, and few around Washington will dispute them, this means that the Soviet has just about twice the air power in being that this country has at the moment.

United States reports disclose that we have 3,200 combat planes in the Air Force and something less than that total in the Navy. The Navy's latest tabulation listed 6,200 planes assigned to the fleet, but this included

combat, support, and shore establishment aircraft.

#### RUSSIAN PRODUCTION HIGH

Russia's productive capacity now is estimated at 40,000 to 50,000 planes per year, and the experts figure this can be jumped by another 10,000 without much trouble.

While the United States was sitting back and being proud of owning the atom bomb, with some extremists figuring this weapon gave this country supremacy in any future conflict, the Russians, building a bomb of their own, rushed the development of jet aircraft.

One intelligence report here has this to say: "At least 10 types of jet aircraft are currently in production in Russia, of which 2 are bombers and 3 are fighters specifically designed for close-support work. In all probability the other five jets are also capable of providing ground support as well as being used as defensive fighters."

#### COMPARE WELL WITH OURS

"Nearly all these jets will perform in the 550-650 mile-per-hour class and in general compare favorably with those in American operational units."

This report had this comment as a snapper: "Compared to American air power, it is apparent that the Soviet Union is outproducing us in numbers of aircraft and has available a substantially greater striking force which we will be unable to equal for many months to come."

Another report said that the Russians have about 19,000 planes in military service, of which 9,000 are postwar fighters and more than half of these are jets. The rest of the planes, this report indicates, are bombers, and of these 600 are the TU-4 type—the Soviet copy of the B-29, which is still the backbone of our A-bomb retaliation force.

It's little known, but of major importance come another war—Russia's satellites have 3,000 planes, manned by 42,000 men.

#### PENTAGON PESSIMISTIC

Our planes, with our pilots, have given an excellent account of themselves in Korea when matched against some of Russia's production-line models, presumably piloted by Chinese. But the Korean results don't encourage the Pentagon airmen, who know what the Soviet is capable of throwing into action. We haven't got enough, they say, and we can't get it fast enough.

That's why the air generals keep saying publicly that if Russia strikes, some of her planes will get through to United States targets and will hurt.

#### AMERICA FIRST

Mr. MALONE, The junior Senator from Nevada is for the United States of America first, last, and all of the time. It is becoming more popular to be for our homeland—we have been through a great sickness—we are convalescing—the future is bright.

The junior Senator from Nevada is for America like Churchill is for England—and he is for England like Churchill is for America.

Every move that the junior Senator from Nevada has made, every vote he has cast since the people of his State of Nevada sent him to the Senate, and every vote that he is likely to cast will be calculated to reflect the ultimate security and the general welfare of this Nation.

He believes in the truism that a major nation cannot have permanent friendships, but they have permanent interests—and that is the basis for his belief that the Monroe Doctrine method of dealing with foreign nations is superior to the permanent rigid treaty or pact

method of protective combinations of nations.

Properly prepared, with air power and submarine fleets, together with trained servicemen, this Nation can control the air over any area important to our ultimate security—and can blockade any nation seeking to move into that area.

George Washington said in his often misunderstood statement that we should avoid permanent alliances with foreign powers—he pointedly did not say that we should not have temporary alliances and allies for a definite purpose.

His statement is in line with the Monroe Doctrine, which is a policy which gives us control over our own destiny. It is in line with England's 100-year-old policy that she had no permanent friendships or enmities, but only permanent interests.

This principle is in line with common horse sense. I pointedly disagree with England's method of signing rigid economic and military pacts with both Russia and the United States—with the evident purpose of adhering to the nation, if and when there is a final show-down, which is better calculated to protect her interests.

#### CHOICE OF TWO POLICIES

The country is at the crossroads in Asia and must make a choice of two policies:

First. Accept the Acheson-British foreign policy of admitting Communist China to the United Nations—giving Formosa to the Communists—and losing all of Asia to Russian domination.

Second. Prevent with every means at our command the admission of Communist China to the UN, and her recognition by the United States; hold Formosa for Nationalist China; win the war against the Chinese Communists in Korea through the destruction of the supply lines, transportation systems and war industries in Manchuria and eastern China with air power, and by blockading the China coast against shipments of arms and strategic minerals and other war-making materials; and forthwith liberate Chiang Kai-shek and General Sun-Li-Jen to return to the mainland and resume the protection of their homeland.

#### THE COMMUNIST MISTAKE—COULD DELAY RUSSIAN INVASION

The Chinese Communists have attacked our Army in Korea—they have deliberately given us just cause to destroy their present and potential war-making capacity, and thereby delay by several years, if not permanently the domination of China by Russia. The Chinese Communists have made it easier for Russia to consolidate her gains in that potentially great fighting nation—and, through her, to dominate practically all of Asia.

#### BARRON'S WEEKLY ON THE FAR EAST

With further reference to the MacArthur-Truman controversy, Barron's National Business and Financial Weekly had this to say on April 9:

In the Far East, Mr. Truman will have in one way or another to come to grips with MacArthur's contention that it makes less than no sense to sacrifice American lives in

Korea if the forces of Chiang Kai-shek are held in tightest leash.

In Europe it likewise makes no sense to send divisions abroad if the best that Ambassador Jessup can do is talk disarmament with the Russians in Paris, a disarmament which at the moment could only enhance Russian power.

The minimum goal surely is to negotiate a peace treaty with Austria consonant with this country's interest. The maximum goal, to be achieved not only over a long period of years, but by every sort of pressure, is to get the Russian Army out of Central Europe. Until this is done there will and there can be no lasting peace.

#### BLOCKADE RED CHINA—WIN IN ASIA

We cannot keep wasting American men and resources in Asia without a decision. We cannot afford to be permanently caught in a Korean limited war—and at the same time if we abandon Korea now, regardless of the mistake of sending foot soldiers there in the first place, we lose Asia—and this we must not risk, because to lose to Red China is to lose practically all of Asia to the Red Communists.

#### TO INVADE WITH "FOOT SOLDIERS"— HEIGHT OF FOLLY

To invade Communist China with foot soldiers would be the height of folly, just as it was folly to invade Korea with foot soldiers.

We can blockade the China coast with our fleet, now being used in the silly procedure of bottling up the only ally we have in that area, Chiang Kai-shek and his efficient generals including General Sun-Li-Jen on Formosa, while allowing, if not actually promoting, trade as usual in the strategic and critical tin, rubber and steel supplies, through Singapore and Hong Kong, with Communist China and Russia.

#### TRADE AS USUAL—ERLE COCKE, JR., NATIONAL COMMANDER

Erle Cocke, Jr., national commander of the American Legion said on April 16 that "the British are sending 11 shipments of strategic materials to Communist China every week. We are placing too high a price on this Hong Kong economy."

He advocated all-out measures against China. He said:

We should bomb Red airports in Manchuria, blockade China, use Chiang Kai-shek's troops and rearm Japan.

#### BRITAIN—FORMOSA TO RED CHINA

In a United Press dispatch dated April 11, based on information from authoritative sources, it was reported that Britain had proposed giving Formosa to Red China, and suggested that the Red regime have a voice in writing the Japanese peace treaty. The dispatch further stated that this development brought to a head the long difference of opinion between this country and Great Britain on the question of which government was entitled to represent China on the international scene.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, at this point, as a part of my remarks the United Press dispatch from Washington, dated April 11, headed "Give Formosa to Red China, Britain urges."

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MORSE in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

The dispatch is as follows:

#### GIVE FORMOSA TO RED CHINA, BRITAIN URGES

WASHINGTON, April 11.—Britain has proposed giving Formosa to Communist China and has suggested the Red regime have a voice in writing a Japanese peace treaty, authoritative sources said today.

These sources said the British view was sent to the United States in an aide memoir about 10 days ago.

The development brought to a head the long differences between this country and the British on the question of which government will represent China on an international scale.

#### UNITED STATES OPPOSING REDS

The United States has rejected any recognition or entrance into the United Nations of the Communist regime. However, it has acted to neutralize the authority of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists and confine them to their refuge on Formosa. Great Britain has taken the position the Reds are in fact the rulers of China and it is useless to blink at that fact.

President Truman has proposed the fate of Formosa be put over for settlement by the UN after security is restored in the Far East. Giving Formosa to the Communists would in effect wipe out Chiang's regime.

In London, the British Foreign Office announced Britain's position on allowing the Chinese Communists to take part in current negotiations on a Japanese peace treaty had been made known in consultations now under way in Washington.

#### BRITISH ANNOUNCEMENT

The British official announcement said:

"In the communiqué issued in December after the conversations between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States, it was stated that Great Britain and the United States had agreed to differ on the subject of which government was entitled to represent China.

"His Majesty's Government and the United States Government are agreed that all the states which played a major part in the defeat of Japan should participate in the drafting of the Japanese peace treaty. As a consequence, His Majesty's Government have recorded their view that the Central People's Government [Chinese Communists] should be given an opportunity to take part in the current negotiations."

#### COLONIAL EMPIRE SLAVERY SYSTEM IS DEAD

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, the colonial empire slavery system is dead, yet we are even now supporting this outmoded principle in the Far East, the Malayan States, and Indochina, the Mediterranean area, including Egypt—the African colonies and the whole Moslem world. We are thus making enemies where we desperately need friends whose interests are common with our own.

#### OUR ATOMIC BOMB SECRETS

We gave, and are still giving to the British all of our atomic bomb secrets. Yet Britain has recognized Communist China, wants the United Nations to admit Communist China, and wants to give Formosa to Communist China.

Great Britain has an independent military and economic pact with Russia. She is trading as usual with both Red China and Russia and the iron curtain countries, sending them materials they

need to consolidate their gains and to fight world war III with us.

Mr. President, it will be remembered that on this floor 2 years ago, again a year ago, and only last month for the third time the junior Senator from Nevada placed in the RECORD a list of 88 trade treaties, and then 96 trade treaties which the 16 Marshall-plan countries have in good standing with Russia and the iron-curtain countries. Those nations are sending Russia and the iron-curtain countries all kinds of materials they need to make a third world war on us and to consolidate their gains.

The junior Senator from Nevada also included in the RECORD, the first time on March 30, 1949, the full text, and again on later occasions excerpts from these military and economic pacts which both France and England have separately with Russia; these pacts are in good standing and read startlingly like the Atlantic Pact. It is hard to see how those two countries could lose in the final showdown because they could take their choice whether they would go with Russia or the United States of America.

Why give such vital information as atomic knowledge to Britain? If to Britain, then why not France, or Belgium, or China? Why not give it to Sweden or to Switzerland?

Entrusting such secrets to untrustworthy allies is, in effect, putting our fate, the very lives of our people, in the hands of the British.

Now the Communists are blackmailing the British on account of their colonial possessions in the Far East, and the British are blackmailing, or rather tricking, us into going along in the recognition of the Communist regime of China to save these possessions. We recognize still Nationalist China and the British recognize Communist China—and our Secretary of State actually told a joint meeting of the Congress that we will not use the veto to prevent the admission of Communist China to the UN.

Every man connected with the reckless disclosure of our atomic secrets to the British should be tried for treason.

#### COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZERS CONTROL THE UN ARMY

The following members made up the Korean "cease fire" committee of the United Nations: India, Sir Benegal N. Rau; Iran, Nasrollah Entezam; Canada, Lester B. Pearson.

Mr. Pearson, Mr. President, was the one who just lately let loose the statement in a press dispatch that from here on there would be a difference in the relations between Canada and the United States of America. He did not predict an open break. But he went much further than anyone ever suspected these nations would go in parting company with each other.

The nations represented on the cease fire committee had either already recognized Communist China, or were openly sympathetic with her. This was the committee of the United Nations to which President Truman had transferred much of the responsibility for the policy in the Korean War. The UN policy held

the United Nations forces on the thirty-eighth parallel approximately 10 days on their first trip across, giving the fleeing North Koreans time to regroup their forces and call on Communist China for reinforcements.

Finally our forces were allowed to proceed to the Manchurian border, and there they were held again, while the UN would let neither foot soldiers nor the air force cross the border to destroy the supply lines and the south Manchurian industries from which supplies were being shipped to the enemy, or to break up any aggregation of industry or forces in China itself.

With a guaranty that they would not be molested north of the Korean border, the Communists increased their production and supply lines and reorganized their forces for an attack on the United Nations' army.

Since the United Nations' army was ordered not to attack the Communists in Manchuria, but to stop them at the line of scrimmage on the border like in a football game, the UN finally worked out a kind of war that even MacArthur could not win, and our forces were driven back across the thirty-eighth parallel.

#### TO FIGHT, BUT NOT TOO HARD

Now they are on the way again with the same set of orders—to fight, but not too hard—to move, but not too fast—and, on no account, to disturb the supply lines and industries from which the material is being shipped to murder and mutilate the men of the United Nations' army, including our American boys.

It is, of course, a policy entirely controlled by the British and French, so that they may deal with the Communists in retaining their interests in Indochina, Singapore, and the Malayan States—their colonial possessions; also, that trade through these possessions with Communist China and Russia might proceed as usual and without delay.

We have agreed to hold our Navy near Formosa, and in no way to interfere with trade on the China coast.

#### WE HAVE BEEN POURING OUT OUR SUBSTANCE

Mr. President, the deliberate and endless assistance direct to the Socialist governments in Europe in the form of lend-lease, UNRRA, the gift-loan to England, the Marshall plan or ECA, point 4, loans from the World Bank and the Export and Import Bank, topped by the division of our markets through the free-trade program of the State Department under the 1934 Trade Agreements Act, the so-called Reciprocal Trade Act, has constituted a continuous drain on the taxpayers of this Nation.

Mr. President, the sending of troops and arms and war material to Europe is really an extension of ECA in a different form.

The sending of a large number of men to Europe, will augment the tourist-traffic income by the payment of their salaries and expenses. The drain on the American taxpayers continues.

#### THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENTS TO GREAT BRITAIN

During the conference from December 4 to 9, 1950, Clement Attlee, Prime Min-

ister of Great Britain, was assured by President Truman that there would be no major invasion of North Korea without Great Britain's prior approval.

In that connection, I quote from the April 10, 1951, issue of the Whaley-Eaton Service Foreign Letter No. 1669. In reporting a statement said to be included in a report to Parliament by the British Foreign Secretary, this service said:

President Truman gave Attlee, in Washington (January 1951) absolute assurances that there would be (a) no major invasion of North Korea, (b) no bombing of Manchuria, and (c) no change in the Formosan policy without previous consultation with London, Ottawa, and Paris. We are not concerned, therefore, with statements by MacArthur. He cannot change the accepted policy.

Mr. President, the Whaley-Eaton Service is a very famous and very reliable English news service.

#### ENGLAND'S 100-YEAR-OLD FOREIGN POLICY

England—the land of great statesmen and, up to now, the land of an indomitable race—enunciated her real down-to-earth national policy nearly 100 years ago, through one of its great Prime Ministers, Lord Palmerston.

Lord Palmerston voiced England's policy when he said in June 1849,

We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.

He did not make that policy of England, Mr. President, but he expressed its most important principle.

#### THESE ARE ENGLAND'S PRIME INTERESTS

If we could first understand what a small foreign nation's policy must of necessity be if it is to survive over the years, it would help us to better understand why it may be necessary for England to do the things which her present leaders have apparently decided to be her current best interests. These are—

First. Force the United States to recognize the Communist regime in China.

Second. Transfer Formosa to the Chinese Communists.

Third. Trade as usual with Red China—just the same as they had always traded in that area.

Fourth. Trade as usual with Russia, supposedly our common enemy, forcing the United States to bid against her for the tin, rubber, hemp, and so forth, which we so desperately need for our own security and for furnishing arms to Europe, including England—an ironical situation.

Fifth. Trade as usual with the iron-curtain countries.

Sixth. Maintain an independent military and economic treaty or pact with Russia—a pact reading startlingly like the Atlantic Pact which they have with us.

Seventh. Ignore the inconsistency of sending a token force of their own English soldiers to fight with our American troops against an enemy while at the same time supplying arms and war matériel to that same enemy over their trade routes.

Eighth. Object strenuously to any blockade of the Chinese coast by our fleet or air power which might in any way interfere with their trade as usual.

Ninth. Ignore the incongruity of England's holding Singapore and the Malayan States in colonial slavery while we—her supposed ally—are fighting to free South Korea from domination by North Korea, which, in turn, might be dominated by another nation.

Tenth. Ignore the inconsistency of her nationalizing her own steel, coal, and transportation industries while getting ready to send her troops into Iran to prevent the nationalization of petroleum there—with grave danger of thereby dragging the United States of America into world war III.

During World War II, when President Roosevelt told Prime Minister Churchill that Great Britain should relinquish her possessions in Hong Kong, Churchill, speaking at the Lord Mayor's luncheon in London, on November 10, 1942, said:

I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.

Mr. President, that statement lays it on the line as to just what is going to happen when the trouble really starts in Asia.

#### THE MONROE DOCTRINE

When these facts are fully understood by the American people, then, and only then, will our legislative bodies recognize the correctness of a Monroe Doctrine which did not include specific signed pacts of any kind or nature, but, instead, set forth a flexible foreign policy, laid down by this Nation in the interests of our ultimate security and welfare.

The Monroe Doctrine for the Western Hemisphere, enunciated by President Monroe 128 years ago, met with the instantaneous approval of the South American and Central American countries. We took little, if any, chance in signing an inter-American pact based upon this doctrine, because of the obvious permanent interests due to our contiguous areas.

#### PERMANENT PACTS—EMBARRASSING AND DANGEROUS

On the other hand, signing so-called permanent pacts with foreign noncontiguous nations—as, for example, the Atlantic Pact—could, and probably will, prove to be not only embarrassing but extremely dangerous.

The Atlantic Pact includes the colonial-empire nations of England, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, and while the areas to be protected are supposedly defined, our moral commitment will involve us, regardless of our own ultimate safety and welfare, when these nations get themselves involved in protecting their interests anywhere—in the Malayan States, Indochina, Africa, the Middle East, or in the Mediterranean area.

#### PROGRESS

We are making progress in our own country. More and more of our citizens are quickening their interest in public affairs because they suddenly have begun to realize the dangerous inroads that the economic one-worlders, the hothouse economists, the World Federationists, the Socialists, and the slap-happy Frankfurters are making on our Government and our American way of life.

## THE DIRECTED TRIO

All these political misfits are held together and directed by the Truman-Acheson-Marshall trio, men who are themselves caught in a sinister, ruthless undertow thoroughly and completely controlled by the British Empire.

## OUR BRITISH-CONTROLLED HYBRID POLICY

Apropos of our British-controlled, hybrid domestic and foreign policy, I now quote from the Book of Genesis, chapter, 27, the twenty-second verse:

And Jacob went near unto Isaac, his father; and he felt him, and said, the voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau.

Mr. President, I quote now from an address which I made on the floor of the Senate on March 21, 1951:

The voice of this foreign policy we are using is the State Department's voice, but the hands are those of Europe, principally those of England, controlling our hybrid domestic and foreign policy.

This combination is wrecking our national economy and is putting us into an international position which is untenable and indefensible.

## ONE ECONOMIC WORLD—COLONIAL SLAVERY SYSTEM

The one economic world objective and the protection of the British-France-Belgium-Netherlands colonial-empire slavery system throughout the world are being firmly established as a permanent policy of this Nation through inflation, free trade, taxes. Our present international policy is calculated to protect these empire systems.

## PRESIDENT AGGRAVATES OUR MISFORTUNE

Mr. President, the President of the United States only aggravates our misfortune when he makes today's problem a partisan issue. His psychology works furiously, but what he fails to recognize—and respect—is that he is President of the United States of America, and is not a stump speaker in a local partisan fight.

Mr. President, we face disaster. With courage, let us face it as Americans, protecting the reputation of no man, safeguarding the political position of no man, forcing no partisan issues, but serving, as we have been chosen to serve the United States of America, our beloved homeland, which with clear minds and with the help of God can be preserved for all time.

## SIR ALFORD MAC KINDER—THE "HEARTLAND"

Sir Alford MacKinder said, in one of his able works early in this century, that any country that controls the "heartland" of Asia controls the world. He described the heartland of Asia as China, Mongolia, western Russia, and eastern Siberia.

It is generally understood that Russia has decided to make her play for the control of Asia through the control of China—and through the control of Asia to control Europe and the world.

Asia is the key to the control of Europe; when Asia falls to the Soviets then Europe will fall whenever Russia chooses to move. Consequently, Communist control of China must be stopped if Russian domination of Asia and later of Europe is to be prevented.

The question is one of procedure.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

First. We should name those areas the integrity of which is important to our ultimate security, and we say to any aggressor nation: "This far and no farther. If you step over the line, we will loose on you from the air—upon your industrial centers, your sources of supply, your supply lines, your war-making machines—everything at our command." We would destroy any nation's war-making capacity which sought to move into any areas whose integrity was considered important to our ultimate safety. Thus we cover with a Monroe Doctrine all territory we wish to deny to the enemy. The necessary foot soldiers would be set up by the area being defended.

Second. We should select the necessary bases for strategic areas and there erect our air power and submarine bases, principally in the Western Hemisphere for long-range bombing operations.

Third. We then concentrate American resources and ingenuity on the creation of unchallengeable air and sea power. If we maintain this position, we can win any war with Russia or any group of nations.

Fourth. We forthwith stop assistance of every nature to the Communist nations and to nations in any way assisting Russia, her captive nations, and communistic China in the consolidation of Soviet gains and in the preparation for world war III.

Fifth. Officially inform both France and England that they must immediately terminate the economic and military pacts which they maintain separately with Soviet Russia.

Sixth. Give no more money, as loans and gifts to any government as such. If necessary such loans might be made to private business in strategic areas without weakening our own economy, in the same manner and on the same terms as the RFC loans funds to private business in this country in times of stress.

Seventh. Further assistance to European nations would be predicated upon an economic union or a United States of Europe, and a free exchange of their currencies and goods.

Eighth. Oppose the admission of Communist China by the United Nations with every means at our command.

Ninth. Forthwith stop supporting colonial slavery in any form, anywhere.

Tenth. Protect and strengthen our own national economy in the interest of world security through the adoption of the flexible import-fee principle as a floor under wages and investments in place of the 1934 Trade Agreements Act. Congress should reclaim its constitutional responsibility and authority to regulate foreign commerce which it has transferred to the executive branch of the Government.

Eleventh. Clean up our own Government, throw out the Communists, Communist associates, adherents to foreign ideologies, persons of abnormal moral weakness, and other dangerous security risks.

Twelfth. Start an immediate investigation through the Armed Services Committees of both Houses of Congress, to

determine why we are not prepared to fight a war after the expenditure of nearly \$60,000,000,000 since 1945.

Thirteenth. Preserve and protect our atomic bomb, guided missile, and other offensive and defense weapon's secrets for our own protection and bargaining power.

Fourteenth. Send no "foot soldiers" as such into either Europe or Asia—but develop and utilize to the fullest extent our air power, including long-range bombers, to be based principally on the Western Hemisphere and strategically defensible areas—and naval power, including submarine fleets, to protect our shores and to effectively blockade any nation that seeks to invade any area important to our ultimate security and welfare.

Fifteenth. Bring the "foot soldiers" out of Korea at the first favorable opportunity—and utilize an all-out air offensive not only against the North Korean and the Communist China armies, but against the supply lines and the war-manufacturing and industrial plants in southern Manchuria and eastern China.

Communist China has attacked us, therefore her war-making capacity should be destroyed to save American lives—and to delay indefinitely her usefulness to Russia in the control of Asia.

These recommendations were made substantially in this form, in an address to the Senate on December 14, 1950, and on February 5 and again on March 21, 1951.

## DIFFERENCE IN STRATEGY DEFENDING THIS NATION

There is not now and never has been any doubt about this Nation defending any country or area whose integrity is important to the ultimate safety and welfare of the United States of America.

There is a grave difference in strategy and the methods to be utilized in such defense, and that, as far as the junior Senator from Nevada is concerned, is the basis for the great debate.

## VESTED INTEREST IN THEIR OWN MISTAKES

A vested interest in their own mistakes is the only explanation that can be offered for the stubborn and senseless attachment of the administration to its continued betrayal of Nationalist China to the Red hordes of Russia. This betrayal began with the discovery of the agrarian Communists in China early in 1946 by General Marshall, his stopping the supply of American ammunition to American guns already in the hands of the Nationalists, and his insistence that Chiang Kai-shek withdraw his blockade of the pass above the Great Wall of China allowing the Communists to enter Manchuria and arm themselves with the abandoned Japanese guns and ammunition and return to fight the Nationalist troops.

It is the only explanation that can be offered for the continued policy in China best described through the ONA, a Government news service, on July 17, 1949, by Owen Lattimore when he said:

The problem was how to allow them [National Chinese Government] to fall without making it look like the United States had pushed them.

He further said in the same dispatch:

The thing to do therefore is to let South Korea fall—but not to let it look as though we pushed it. Hence the recommendation of a parting grant of \$150,000,000.

**FOOT SOLDIERS TO FIGHT—BUT NOT TOO HARD**

It is the only explanation for a policy of sending "foot soldiers" into Korea to fight, but not too hard—to be stopped at the Manchurian border and not be allowed to destroy supply lines and war industries—but to wait until the Communists struck each time and try to stop them on the line of scrimmage like a football game.

That reasoning must be at the bottom of the stubborn refusal to remove the "foot soldiers" after nearly 70,000 casualties and to do the job with air power and through blockading the China coast—and lastly topped by the ignominious dismissal of a great soldier who, for the security of his country and to eliminate the senseless slaughter of American boys in a war that is not a war, dared to question the wisdom of the master.

**MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE—ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED**

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Maurer, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills:

S. 60. An act for the relief of Cilko Elizabeth Ingrova;

S. 82. An act to provide reimbursement of expenses incurred in connection with the burial of those who served in the military forces of the Commonwealth of the Philippines while such forces were in the Armed Forces of the United States pursuant to the military order of the President of the United States, dated July 26, 1941; and

S. 379. An act to authorize relief of authorized certifying officers of terminated war agencies in liquidation by the Department of Labor.

**EXECUTIVE SESSION**

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of executive business.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business.

**EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED**

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McCARTHY in the chair) laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations and withdrawing the nomination of Paul A. Hughes, to be postmaster at Granville, N. Y., which nominating messages were referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

(For nominations this day received, see the end of Senate proceedings.)

**EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF COMMITTEES**

The following favorable reports of nominations were submitted:

By Mr. ELLENDER, from the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry:

Robert L. Farrington, of Oklahoma, to be Cooperative Bank Commissioner of the Farm Credit Administration.

By Mr. HENDRICKSON, from the Committee on the Judiciary:

Grover C. Richman, Jr., of New Jersey, to be United States attorney for the district

of New Jersey, vice Alfred E. Modarelli, elevated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further reports, the clerk will proceed to state the nominations on the Executive Calendar.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I ask that the first nomination on the Executive Calendar go over.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination will go over.

**UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INFORMATION**

The Chief Clerk read the nomination of Ben Hibbs, of Pennsylvania, to be a member of the United States Advisory Commission on Information.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

**DIPLOMATIC AND FOREIGN SERVICE**

The Chief Clerk proceeded to read sundry nominations in the Diplomatic and Foreign Service.

Mr. McFARLAND. I ask that the nominations in the Diplomatic and Foreign Service be confirmed en bloc.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nominations in the Diplomatic and Foreign Service are confirmed en bloc.

**DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**

The Chief Clerk read the nomination of Argyle R. Mackey, of Virginia, to be Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

**UNITED STATES ATTORNEY**

The Chief Clerk read the nomination of Chauncey F. Tramutolo, of California, to be United States attorney for the northern district of California.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

**UNITED STATES MARSHALS**

The Chief Clerk read the nomination of James M. Roche, of Connecticut, to be United States marshal for the district of Connecticut.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

The Chief Clerk read the nomination of John Wesley Thompson Falkner IV, of Mississippi, to be United States marshal for the northern district of Mississippi.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

The Chief Clerk read the nomination of Robert E. Boen, of Oklahoma, to be United States marshal for the eastern district of Oklahoma.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

**POSTMASTERS**

The Chief Clerk proceeded to read sundry nominations of postmasters.

Mr. McFARLAND. I ask that the nominations of postmasters be confirmed en bloc.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nominations are confirmed en bloc.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I ask that the President be notified of all nominations confirmed today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the President will be immediately notified of the confirmations of nominations made today.

**RECESS**

Mr. McFARLAND. I move that the Senate stand in recess until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 6 o'clock and 51 minutes p. m.) the Senate took a recess until tomorrow, Thursday, April 19, 1951, at 12 o'clock meridian.

**NOMINATIONS**

Executive nominations received by the Senate April 18 (legislative day of April 17), 1951:

**IN THE AIR FORCE**

The following-named cadets, United States Military Academy, for appointment in the United States Air Force, in the grade of second lieutenant, effective June 1, 1951, upon their graduation, under the provisions of section 506, Public Law 381, Eightieth Congress (Officer Personnel Act of 1947). Date of rank to be determined by the Secretary of the Air Force.

Edwin Eugene Aldrin, Jr.  
William Anderson Allen  
Loren Albin Anderson  
Robert Douglas Anderson  
Walter Julian Bacon II  
Willett John Baird, Jr.  
John Garland Ballard, Jr.  
Daniel Spaulding Barnes  
William Thomas Barnett  
Arnim Lavelle Brantley  
Lou Enlow Bretzke  
John Freeman Brown, Jr.  
Lewis Christian Buffington, Jr.  
Jose Andres Chacon  
Donn Fergus Chandler  
Clyde Cocke, Jr.  
Mathews McCleave Collins  
Julius Ronald Conti, Jr.  
Peyton Ellsworth Cook  
Ralph Cooper  
Patrick Joseph Corrigan  
John Harrold Craigie  
John Walter Croan  
Joseph Paul Crocco  
John William Cunningham  
William Hugh Cuthbertson  
Gordon Elmer Danforth  
John Charles Mousseau des Isles  
Samuel Thomas Dickens  
Gerald Edgar Dickson, Jr.  
Richard Gerry Dingman  
Wayne Manford Dozier  
Billy Joe Ellis  
Lawrence Lee Eppley, Jr.  
Frank Raymond Fischl, Jr.  
Frank Reese Forrest  
Charles Lynn Galloway  
Bruno Antonio Giordano  
John Leslie Glossbrenner  
John Bennett Gordon, Jr.  
Adam Allan Gorski, Jr.  
Richard Paul Guidroz  
Samuel Murton Guild, Jr.  
Richard Alan Haggren  
Frederick Jordan Hampton  
Daniel Mark Harmon  
Harold Edward Headlee  
Robert Michael Hechinger  
Gerald Keith Hendricks  
Frederic Allison Henney, Jr.  
Kenneth Frank Hite  
Franklin Herbert Hodgkins  
David Webster Huff  
Allan Parker Hunt, Jr.  
John Colcock Hutson



Robert Louis Jacobs  
Saul Antman Jacobs  
Harley Earl Jeans  
Loyd Merrill Johnson  
Verle LaFayette Johnston  
Peter Rowland Kuhn  
Barney McCoy Landry, Jr.  
Larry James Larsen  
Robert Lerner  
David Edward Leyshon  
Ledyard Long, Jr.  
Harold Gene Marsh  
Peter Matthews  
Anthony Wayne Maynard, Jr.  
Robert Franklin McDonald  
Donald Albert McGann  
Thomas Henry McMullen  
Paul Richard Miller  
Dain William Milliman, Jr.  
William Gregory Moretti, Jr.  
Robert Frank Niemann  
Alfred Dobson Norton  
Robert Earle Olson  
John Robert Osborn  
Howard Louis Peckham, Jr.  
Frank George Penney  
Leland Carl Pinkel  
Leo Fred Post, Jr.  
John Cooper Powell  
Jack Lewis Price  
Edward Rudolph Prince, Jr.  
William Michael Quinn  
Irving Butler Reed  
Gerald Selah Reeve  
Fred Guillermo Reichard  
William Lloyd Richardson, Jr.  
John Ritchie  
David Eithell Rogers  
Donald Henry Roloff  
Ernest Guy Rose  
William Joseph Ryan  
John Alexander Samotis  
David Myron Schlatter, Jr.  
Seth Ward Scruggs  
Philip Sheridan  
George Shibata  
John Wesley Shine  
Harold Dean Shultz  
Frank Elliott Sisson II  
Carleton Keith Sprague  
John Paul Starrett  
George Alden Sundlie  
Everette Taylor  
Stanley Milward Umstead, Jr.  
Hoyt Sanford Vandenberg, Jr.  
William J. Veurink  
Frank Elliott Walker, Jr.  
Stephen Watsey  
Absalom Theodore Webber, Jr.  
Howard Olen Wiles, Jr.  
Thomas Humphrey Williams  
Charles Russell Witmer, Jr.  
James Russell Young, Jr.  
Donald David Zurawski

The following-named midshipmen, United States Naval Academy, for appointment in the United States Air Force, in the grade of second lieutenant, effective June 1, 1951, upon their graduation, under the provisions of section 506, Public Law 381, Eightieth Congress (Officer Personnel Act of 1947). Date of rank to be determined by the Secretary of the Air Force.

John Edwin Allen  
Harvey Thomas Bailey  
Weldon Ralph Baird  
Dickey Lee Baltz  
William Oakley Banks  
Thomas Augustus Bartenfeld, Jr.  
Henry Leigh Baulch  
Ralph Russell Baurichter  
William John Bell  
Victor Cokayne Benjovsky  
John Orrin Berga  
John Theodore Berrier  
Everett Dale Biddle, Jr.  
Clement Dixon Billingslea  
Paul Russell Birch

Jackson Huffman Bowden  
Horace Lane Brame  
Robert B. Bregman  
Joseph Phillip Brenkle  
Donald Atwood Brewer  
Gerald Allen Brown  
Jack Darwin Brown  
James Richard Brown  
Sidney Pat Burke  
Theo Kit Carson  
Patrick Joseph Cashman, Jr.  
Wallace Gilbert Christner  
Vincent Pancrazio Ciamprone  
Edward Paul Clark  
Donald Conklin Cole  
Donald King Cole  
Thomas Patrick Conlin  
John Watson Cooper  
Joseph Patrick Corrigan, III  
William Patrick Craven  
Alvan Macauley Crews  
Gerald Thomas Cullen  
Joseph Edward Dalley  
Walter Millard Drake, Jr.  
Charles Bauer Duke, Jr.  
Donald Duane Dusch  
Ernest Edward Ebrite  
Halvor Martin Ekeren  
Antonio Manuel Fernandez, Jr.  
David Frederick Ferree  
Edward Dunne Flynn  
William Hammersley Frasca  
Joseph Thomas Garofalo, Jr.  
Marvin Colgan Gaske  
Robert Edwin Genter  
Herman Mills Giesen  
Ralph James Gilbert  
Leo Glenn, Jr.  
Frederick Francis Gorschboth  
Robert Patterson Gould  
James Harris Grady  
Fred Brown Graham  
Donald Robert Griesmer  
Edward Shuldron Guthrie, Jr.  
David William Hall  
Frank Charles Halstead  
John Francis Hanaway  
Robert Chester Harding  
Harry George Hartman  
LeRoy Kenneth Heidbreder  
John David Hemenway  
Richard Chester Higgins, Jr.  
Max Lloyd Hill, Jr.  
Joseph Patrick Hillock, Jr.  
Raymond Heittula Howard  
James Charles Hunt, Jr.  
Francis Robert Hunter, Jr.  
Calvin William Hurd  
James Benson Irwin  
Thomas LeRoy Jackson  
Carl Charles Jaffurs  
David Russell James  
Albert William Johnson  
Boyd Walker Johnson  
Robert Burns Kalisch  
Donald Jerome Kay  
Jack Ish Kendrick  
Kermit Alexander Kirby  
Cecil Edward Langmack  
Jerome LaPides  
Robert Vernon Larson  
James Arthur Latham  
William Henry Lawton, Jr.  
John Hirst Lederle  
Mark Elliot Lemelman  
Raymond Harry Lessig  
William Duexsaint LeSturgeon  
Robert Brierley Loughhead, Jr.  
Edward Miller Lyden  
Paul Leslie Maier  
Louis Gene Marlow  
John Floyd Martin  
Paul Brice Martin  
Keith Wayne Matson  
John Francis McCaffrey  
James Edward McCormick  
Charles Evans McDonough  
James Eugene McGarrah  
John Ferries McGrew

Robert Henderson McIntosh  
Charles Joe Meadow  
John Nicholas Mehelas  
Robert Louis Meinhold  
Freddie Dan Meredith  
Bernard Stanley Morgan, Jr.  
Tipton Pryor Mott-Smith  
Joseph John Mularz  
David Michael Mullaney  
James Barber Murphy  
Daniel Crawford Murray  
Robert Walker Muth  
Stanford Nall  
David Fenton Neely  
William Boyd Nelson  
Donald Alfred Nicksay  
John Walter Niven  
Charles Wolfgang Nyquist  
Charles Clark O'Brien  
Basil Anthony Ortolivo  
Phillip Miller Pahl  
Robert Dixon Painter  
William Joseph Pardee  
James Wheeler Parmelee  
Erwin Crockett Peake  
James Dargan Perky  
Benjamin Francis Price  
Kenneth Elmer Pruden  
Rudolph Walter Pyszk  
Lawrence Radkowsky  
Jack Lloyd Ramey  
Raun Jay Rasmussen  
Richard Harold Rasmussen  
Robert John Rehwaltd  
Raymond Walter Reig  
Donald Anthony Richitt  
Raymond Arthur Robbins  
Louis Aubrey Roberts, Jr.  
Robert Martin Roberts  
William Gordon Rollins  
Theodore Chapman Rook  
Robert Walker Roy  
Anthony Durk Rynties  
Kenneth James Schlagheck  
John Preston Schuler  
Leonard Warren Seagren  
Louis Walker Sessions  
Thomas Llewellyn Sheets  
Thomas Webster Sherman, Jr.  
Stewart Mitchell Singer  
John George Skidmore  
Paul Amos Smith, Jr.  
William Morris Smith, Jr.  
Frank Alan Stelzer  
Perry Lee Stephens  
William Griffith Stephenson, III  
Walter Clarence Stevens, Jr.  
David Twogood Stockman  
William Rex Thomas, Jr.  
Anthony Stearns Thorne  
Frederick James Trost  
Willard Martin Truesdell  
Edward Wingfield Verner  
Charles Matthew Waespy  
Richard Ambrose Walsh, III  
Clifford Lloyd Ward  
William Alexander Weaver  
Oscar Werner Weber  
Donald Elliott Westbrook  
James Eugene White  
Carr Choate Whitener  
William Alonzo Williams, Jr.  
William Boyd Wilson

#### CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate April 18 (legislative day of April 17), 1951:

#### UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INFORMATION

Ben Hibbs, of Pennsylvania, to be a member, United States Advisory Commission on Information, term expiring January 27, 1954, and until his successor has been appointed and qualified.

#### DIPLOMATIC AND FOREIGN SERVICE

George R. Merrell, of Missouri, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

of the United States of America to Afghanistan.

Paul C. Daniels, of New York, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Ecuador.  
J. Rives Childs, of Virginia, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Ethiopia.

*To be consuls general of the United States of America*

Archie W. Childs  
Ralph A. Boernstein

*To be consuls of the United States of America*

Hendrik van Oss Elmer Newton  
Joseph A. Armenta William A. Withus  
Seymour I. Nadler

*To be secretaries in the diplomatic service of the United States of America*

Charles K. Moffly  
Alfonso Rodriguez

*To be Foreign Service officer of class 6, a vice consul of career, and a secretary in the diplomatic service of the United States of America*

Francis J. Meehan

#### DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Argyle R. Mackey, of Virginia, to be Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization.

#### UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

Chauncey F. Tramutolo to be United States attorney for the northern district of California.

#### UNITED STATES MARSHALS

James M. Roche to be United States marshal for the district of Connecticut.

John Wesley Thompson Falkner IV, to be United States marshal for the northern district of Mississippi. (Now serving under an appointment which expired April 10, 1951.)

Robert E. Boen to be United States marshal for the eastern district of Oklahoma.

#### POSTMASTERS

##### ALABAMA

Edwin H. McNutt, Hanceville.

##### GEORGIA

Edward H. Osborne, Avondale Estates.  
William F. Gay, Gay.  
William A. Enloe, Jr., LaFayette.

##### IDAHO

Joseph Vern Dunn, Montpelier.

##### ILLINOIS

Gerald C. Hardiek, Dieterich.  
Francis M. Masterson, Fairbury.  
Oliver W. Ator, Jr., Griggsville.  
Nelle M. Antle, Hanna City.  
Pearl L. Reilley, Hartford.  
William G. Cabbage, Joy.  
Carroll K. Heitzman, Litchfield.  
Joy A. Mitchell, Noble.  
Charles C. Paull, Roseville.  
Jerry H. Elliston, Waltonville.

##### INDIANA

Richard L. Teeters, Martinsville.  
Grat Millard, Montpelier.  
Ralph H. Adams, Newport.  
Gershon A. Adams, North Salem.

##### KENTUCKY

Mildred J. Golden, Bethany.

##### LOUISIANA

Jack W. Lemons, Abita Springs.  
Ruth Maloof, Braithwaite.  
Frederick J. Dugas, Paincourtville.  
John I. Roberts, Venice.

##### MARYLAND

John O. Steel, Mount Airy.  
Elwood F. Armacost, Upperco.

##### MINNESOTA

Albert E. Anderson, Montevideo.

##### MONTANA

William J. Brown, Dixon.

#### NEBRASKA

Grace G. Webb, Arcadia.  
Laurence A. Carlson, Arnold.  
James M. Casey, Johnson.  
Leonard L. Gratopp, Shickley.

#### OHIO

Harry F. McLaughlin, Carrollton.  
Warren D. Huffmyer, Cortland.  
John Bennett Burford, Farmdale.  
Charles R. Kline, Medway.  
Howard R. Thompson, Piketon.  
Donald P. Auxter, Seville.

#### OKLAHOMA

Lorraine S. Fogarty, Guthrie.  
Homer Schneider, Hitchcock.  
Francis B. Bordenkircher, Jennings.

#### OREGON

Harry E. Way, Aumsville.  
Velma F. Evers, Elmira.  
Chester L. Langslet, Klamath Falls.

#### PENNSYLVANIA

Paul C. Althouse, Parkesburg.  
Joseph F. Sullivan, West Chester.  
Henry F. Sickler, Jr., Westtown.  
John Mark Good, Williamsport.

#### WASHINGTON

James S. Aynsley, Clallam Bay.

#### WEST VIRGINIA

Bob Henderson, Sistersville.

#### WITHDRAWAL

Executive nomination withdrawn from the Senate April 18 (legislative day of April 17), 1951:

#### POSTMASTER

Paul A. Hughes, Granville, N. Y.

## HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 1951

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.  
The Chaplain, Rev. Bernard Braskamp, D. D., offered the following prayer:

O Thou eternal God, the creator and source of life and light, we thank Thee for all the beautiful and marvelous revelations and changes which we are witnessing in the world of nature during this glorious spring season.

We pray that these changes may be inner as well as outer experiences, inspiring us to have our lives rooted and grounded in Thy divine life in order that we may grow in moral and spiritual stature, in beauty and strength of character, and in obedience to Thy divine laws.

May the mysteries and splendors of nature, upon which we are looking with wonder and amazement, challenge and stir us with a rebirth of spiritual desires and a renewed spirit of fidelity and devotion to life's loftiest aspirations and noblest principles.

Hear us in the name of our blessed Lord whom poets and prophets have called the Lily of the Valley, the Rose of Sharon, the Bright and Morning Star. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

#### MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate, by Mr. Carrell, one of its clerks, announced that

the Senate had returned pursuant to House Resolution 195, the bill H. R. 3587, an act making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1951, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed a bill of the following title in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. 271. An act to authorize the transfer to the Vermont Agricultural College of certain lands in Addison County, Vt., for agricultural purposes.

The message also announced that the Senate disagrees to the amendment of the House to the bill (S. 1) entitled "An act to provide for the common defense and security of the United States and to permit the more effective utilization of manpower resources of the United States by authorizing universal military training and service, and for other purposes"; requests a conference with the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and appoints Mr. RUSSELL, Mr. BYRD, Mr. JOHNSON of Texas, Mr. BRIDGES, and Mr. SALTONSTALL to be the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The message also announced that the Vice President has appointed Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina and Mr. LANGER members of the joint select committee on the part of the Senate, as provided for in the act of August 5, 1939, entitled "An act to provide for the disposition of certain records of the United States Government," for the disposition of executive papers referred to in the report of the Archivist of the United States numbered 51-18.

#### ANNOUNCEMENT

The SPEAKER. The Chair desires to make a statement. After consultation with the majority and the minority leaders of the House and remembering the terrific jam we had upon this floor on previous occasions, with the consent and approval of the floor leaders, the Chair announces that on tomorrow during the ceremony the door immediately opposite the Speaker will be open and the doors on the Speaker's left and right and none other. No one will be allowed upon the floor of the House who does not have the privilege of the floor of the House.

No one will be allowed in the gallery who does not have a ticket.

#### SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to address the House for 3 minutes today, following any special orders heretofore entered.

Mr. MEADER asked and was given permission to vacate the special order granted him for tomorrow, and to address the House for 40 minutes on Monday next, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered.

#### W. STUART SYMINGTON

Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?